

MODERN RUSSIA

BY

GREGOR ALEXINSKY

EX-DEPUTY OF THE DUMA

TRANSLATED BY
BERNARD MIALL

LONDON : T. FISHER UNWIN
NEW YORK : CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

TO
MY MOTHER AND FATHER
THE AUTHOR

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	PAGE 7
--------------	-----------

BOOK I

GENERAL SKETCH OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA

CHAPTER	
I. THE COUNTRY	13
II. THE RACES OF RUSSIA	18
III. THE STATE AND ITS EVOLUTION	34
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL MIND	69

BOOK II

THE MODERN PERIOD

I. THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF RUSSIA	97
II. THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE	103
III. THE DEVELOPMENT AND FORMS OF RUSSIAN CAPITAL	114
IV. RURAL ECONOMY AND THE ARMENIAN QUESTION	138
V. THE FAMILY AND THE POSITION OF WOMEN	155
VI. THE INTELLECTUAL CLASSES - Nihilism	161

BOOK III

THE ABSOLUTE POWER, ITS ORGANIZATION AND RESOURCES

I. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL POWER	173
II. THE RUSSIAN BUREAUCRACY	178

CHAPTER	PAGE
III. THE POLICE—THE LAW	185
IV. LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT: THE ZEMSTVO	196
V. THE FINANCES OF THE STATE	205
VI. FOREIGN POLITICS AND THE ARMY	213

BOOK IV

THE POLITICAL CONFLICT

I. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND THE REVOLUTIONARY CAUSE	231
II. THE ELEMENTS OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY—THEIR RÔLE IN THE REVOLUTION AND THEIR POLITICAL IDEOLOGY	230
III. AFTER THE REVOLUTION	275

BOOK V

THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION

I. THE NATIONAL CONFLICT AND THE UNITY OF THE STATE	297
II. THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION	307

BOOK VI

RUSSIAN LITERATURE AND POETRY

I. GENERAL CHARACTER OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE	321
II. THE EVOLUTION OF LITERATURE IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES	335
CONCLUSION	35
INDEX	35

INTRODUCTION TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

ONE of the most notable characteristics of the life of contemporary society is its international quality.

The fundamental function of human activity—the production of materials to satisfy the needs of the masses—has assumed an international form. Capital, the organizing force of production and exchange, passes rapidly from one country to another, uniting them by indestructible material ties. International organizations of capitalists are coming into being, which are held in check by labour organizations of an equally international type. Every invention, every improvement in the technique of production, every scientific discovery, is at once transmitted to every portion of the globe. Besides the exchange of products we observe a mutual interchange of ideas, and the two form a common foundation, a foundation both material and spiritual, for the future development of human culture. The separate members of the great family of the peoples and States of the modern world are like the various portions of a single gigantic organism, or the links of a single chain. When one of these links is moved all the others promptly feel the movement. Every event that occurs in any country of the modern world is to-day an international event.

The “good old days” are gone, when humanity lived in groups; when the individual might live all his life in his native town or village without knowing what was happening at a few miles’ distance. The modern man is a citizen of the world.

INTRODUCTION

The telegraph cables which enmesh the globe force him to keep an eye upon all the countries of the world. It is obvious that to the modern man a closer knowledge of the life of other peoples appears not only desirable, but necessary. The older nations—the French, Germans, and English—which have attained the highest degree of civilization, are in this respect in a favourable situation. Their way of life and their material and spiritual activities serve as examples to other nations, and are the object of attentive study. But a knowledge of the younger and more backward nations is far less widespread. This ignorance is most perceptible in the case of those nations which are divided from Western Europe not only by geographical distance, but also by linguistic remoteness. All will remember how Europe was surprised by the apparition of Japan in the guise of a first-class Power, equipped with the technical methods of the Occident. No one has yet forgotten the astonishment evoked by her army, so powerful and so highly trained, her Press, and her subtle and capable diplomacy.

Russia is a thought less strange to the European public, but the general knowledge of Russia leaves much to be desired.

If we take even an educated European—provided he be not a specialist, an investigator into Russian life—we shall find that his information respecting Russia is almost inevitably confined to extremely limited impressions, acquired by chance.

As a French critic declared, when the French edition of this volume was published, this ignorance is deplorable, and might well be dangerous.

The English public is, I must admit, perhaps the best informed in Europe upon Russian affairs. But its knowledge of the life of our country is yet highly imperfect. The English newspapers and reviews offer their readers information respecting Russia, but as separate drops of water do not make an ocean, so the various facts and articles provided by the Press cannot give a general or a well-grounded view of the life of the great people, or the agglomeration of peoples, which inhabits the vast plain of Eastern Europe. I trust this book of mine may serve as a guide to all

those who wish to know Russia better, and who are often perplexed by the amazing complexity of her life.

I have no wish to speak as a prophet unveiling the future or revealing the enigmas of Destiny. Nor do I speak as a political agitator; my aim is quite otherwise. I hope to speak the calm language of facts and figures and exact data. This book, in my intention, should be a small encyclopædia of Russian life in all its manifestations; an unpretending photograph, which seeks to reproduce, as faithfully as possible, the contours and the colours of reality. But the reader will readily understand that such a word-picture presents its difficulties. I should have preferred to reveal to him a little corner of the actual life of my country; but to present in a single volume all that I should like to say of Russia, all that might interest the foreign public, is beyond my means.

I shall be always brief in my explanations: *non multa, sed multum*! To say many things in a few words: that is the difficult problem before me. The reader must judge how far I have solved it.

G. A.

(The English edition differs in certain points from the French; the economic and political portion of the book has been enlarged, and three new chapters are included: one dealing with the Police and the Law, one with Self-government, and one with Foreign Politics and the Army.)

BOOK I

**GENERAL SKETCH OF THE HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIA**

CHAPTER I

THE COUNTRY

The Russian Plain—Its geological structure.

THE great Russian plain, by its geographical aspect, is emphatically distinguished from Western Europe. It occupies a vast expanse of 2,000,000 square miles: a surface equivalent to ten times the area of France. The possibility of making one enormous State of this expanse has been greatly facilitated by the remarkable unity of its surface. While Western Europe is a land of mountains, plateaux, plains and valleys, Eastern Europe forms one single undulating plain, the interior of which is traversed by only two elevated tracts of any importance. One, in the centre of Russia, commences in the Government of Novgorod and ends at a distance of 3,000 miles from the Don; the other runs southward from Nijni-Novgorod. Along these two watersheds are disposed the principal river systems of Russia, the basins of the Dnieper, the Volga, the Don, etc.

Since antiquity the river systems of the Russian plain have attracted the attention of historians and geographers. In the fifth century before Christ, Herodotus described the southern portion of Russia (Scythia): "In this country there is nothing extraordinary excepting the rivers that water it; they are many and of great size."

Indeed, the basin of the Volga alone occupies a surface of 1,216,400 square versts—about 800,000 square miles.

Russia is distinguished not only by the unity of her great plain,

but also by the small extent of her shores. While in Western Europe the coast-line is highly indented, running far into the mainland, so that 30 square miles of continent correspond to 1 mile of coast-line, the proportion for Russia is 41 to 1.

These peculiarities of the Russian plain caused the geographers of ancient Greece to include therein a considerable portion of Asia, regarding the Don (the Tanais) as the frontier between Europe and Asia, instead of the Urals, as to-day. The similarity between the geographical and geological conditions of Russia and those of Asia is especially obvious in the south of Russia. The celebrated Russian historian, V. Klutchevsky, thus describes the southern steppes :

"In their geological structure these steppes are precisely similar to those of the interior of Asia ; geographically they are merely the immediate continuation of the latter. They meet below the wide gateway formed by the gap between the Caspian and the Ural mountains. . . . The steppes are a fragment of Asia buried in the midst of the European Continent, and are closely connected with Asia both by their history and their climatic conditions. From the remotest times the steppes have been the principal route of the terrible nomad hordes, numberless as the sands of the Asiatic deserts, who came from the depths of Asia."

The ancient Greeks regarded Russia as the continuation of Asia.

"Asia herself, the old nomadic Asia, century after century with her tents and herds invading the south of Russia, would not, in this portion of Europe, have experienced the sense of having entered another continent. But immediately the Carpathians were crossed, once Hungary was attained, the Asiatic hordes, finding it impossible to continue their Oriental way of life, very shortly became sedentary. In the wide prairies of Southern Russia, between the Volga and the Dniester and on either bank of the Don, they were far from experiencing the same compulsion, and for centuries they lived there as on the steppes of Central Asia."

And the climate of the steppes of Southern Russia was nearer to that of the Asiatic plains than to that of Western Europe, which "knew nothing of the exhausting summer droughts nor the terrible snowstorms of the Russian plain : phenomena imported from Asia."

"How much of Asia there is in European Russia !" cries Klutchevsky. "Historically it is not Asia, but again, geographically it is hardly Europe. It is a country of transition, midway between the two worlds."

The uniformity of the soil is reflected in the climate. When we consider the vast extent of Russia it would seem that notable differences of climate in its various portions must be inevitable. But the absence of lofty inland ranges and the southerly trend of the principal watersheds qualify these differences, so that in travelling from one portion of Russia to another they are barely perceptible. Of all the seas surrounding Russia the Arctic Ocean alone has a sensible influence on the climate of the extreme north. The Baltic and the Black Sea are too insignificant to affect the climate of so vast a plain. The climate of Russia is therefore continental, and the difference between the mean winter and mean summer temperatures amounts to 40° Fahr., and in some parts to 63° ; a difference which increases slowly and evenly from south to north, the increment being equivalent to about 9.7° Fahr. for each degree of latitude.

More marked is the change of temperature from west to east. This is readily understood : from the north-west blow the temperate and fruitful winds of Western Europe, while from the south-east issue the winds of Asia, cold and destructive.

A study of the geological past of Eastern Europe informs us that the superior stratum of the Russian plain was formed by the deposits of melting glaciers. All over Northern and Central Russia the Glacial Age has left regular layers of sand, loam, and clay, while the southern portion of the Russian plain is covered with similar strata, but of different origin. They are left by the ocean, which, after invading all Southern Russia, withdrew to the present basins of the Caspian Sea and the North Sea.

The sea did not retire suddenly, but at intervals. The composition of the soil and the character of the flora enable us to determine the two latest phases of the history of the ancient Southern Sea. We may suppose that during the first of these phases the northern shore of this sea ran along the 50th parallel of latitude, and then withdrew some 4°. Thus the northern coast became a chain of hills. The space thus surrendered, comprised between the 55th and 51st degrees of latitude, is to-day covered with a thick bed of vegetable mould, while the country below the 51st parallel, which was not relinquished by the waters until a later date, is covered with an alkaline soil, forming a vast grassy plain which changes to an almost naked desert by the salt lakes near the Caspian Sea.

The other portion of the Russian plain may be called the wooded zone. Even in 1881 this zone occupied almost 39 per cent. of the area of European Russia. In the north and the centre of the country the great glacier left an enormous quantity of fresh water, split up into marshes and lakes, forming the region of the great lakes (the Governments of Novgorod, St. Petersburg, and Pskov). Nearly 8,000,000 acres are occupied by marshes. In Polesia (the Governments of Grodno, Minsk, and Volhynia) the marshes cover nearly 5,400,000 acres.

In 1873 drainage works were instituted, but in twenty-five years only one-fourth part of this region was drained.

A very important peculiarity of the Russian plain is the quantity of ravines and moving sands contained therein. The soil being of a relatively recent origin, its upper layer is highly unstable and friable. When the snows melt or the rains fall the waters easily erode the surface, forming ravines which render the cultivation of the soil a difficult matter. Both the northern glacier and the southern sea left a covering of sand, especially in the south of Russia. The winds whirl it about, blowing it over the roads, the lakes, the rivers, and the fields. More than 5,400,000 acres of European Russia are covered by these destructive moving sands, and this area is annually *increased* by 1 per cent. The conflict with this incalculable enemy was commenced only in 1898,

and only some 16,000 acres have been consolidated each year. If this work is not pushed on more rapidly the sands may "gradually cover the vegetable soil and make Russia's the fate of Turkestan."

Such are the geographical peculiarities of the Russian plain, which are narrowly allied to its geological past.

CHAPTER II

THE RACES OF RUSSIA

- I. First colonization of the country—The results of geological and geographical conditions—The Asiatic tribes of the South—Greek colonization—The Scandinavians—The Finns. II. The advent of the Slavs—Their distribution over the Russian plain—The conflict with the nomads. III. Relations between Finns and Slavs—Reciprocal influence of these two races on manners, language, and religion. IV. Modern races and their subdivisions.

I

How was the Russian nation formed, and what was its origin? Russian scientists and scholars have long discussed the question, and a false sense of patriotism has induced certain of them to declare, obstinately and in the face of all the facts, that the Russians were the autochthonous inhabitants of Eastern Europe. They sought to reconcile the anthropological Russian prototype and the fossil human remains of the glacial and a later epoch. But all these attempts remained fruitless; patriotism was powerless to prove that the Russian Slavs were the aborigines of Eastern Europe; on the contrary, it has been firmly established that the Slavs were the latest invaders of Russia.

The primitive trend of the colonization of the Russian plain was determined by the geological and geographical past of the country. Geological changes opened to the Asiatics a wide gateway into Eastern Europe, between the southern extremity of the Urals and the Caspian Sea. For centuries upon centuries this passage saw the descent upon Europe of vast Asiatic hordes.

These invasions did not constitute colonization in the true sense of the word. Few of the visitors tarried for long on the southern steppes; the majority continued on their way to Western Europe. Of the people who did remain the scholars of antiquity took special note of the Scythians. The Greek geographers and historians were able to study their life, for the Scythians were in close communication with Hellenic culture. The propagandists of this culture in Russia were the Greek colonies strung out along the shores of the Black Sea, in Tauris (the Crimean Peninsula), and in certain other localities, some centuries before the Christian era. By means of these colonies the Scythians were brought into contact with the Greeks, whence that mixture of Greek and Hellenic races to be found upon the shores of the Black Sea. In the Greek cities palaces were built by the Scythian kings; and the Scythian aristocracy was educated in the Greek schools.

Even to-day works of the Greek masters remain in the silent *kurgans* of Southern Russia; the sole relics of the civilized life of the kingdom of Scythia.

After the Scythians the Sarmatians invaded the Russian steppes; they also belonged to the Aryan group, and appeared in the first century after Christ. The Sarmatians left behind them a living remnant of their race, whose descendants, forming the little tribe of the Ossetes, live to this day on the northern slopes of the Caucasus. Then the Aryan flood gave place to a wave surging from the very heart of Asia, and the Turkish tribes appeared on the scene. According to the chronicles of the Chinese, the western frontier of China, from the commencement of the third century of our era, witnessed numerous social catastrophes and political transformations, which continued until the thirteenth century. Each of these upheavals resulted in the overflow into Europe of Turkish tribes, which followed one another across the southern steppes of Russia. In the fourth century of our era the Huns came thither; in the sixth, the Bulgars and the Avars. The Khasars reigned there from the seventh century to the tenth; the Petchenegs between the tenth and eleventh; and the Polovetzes from the eleventh to the twelfth century.

After the Turks appeared the Mongols, whose representatives—the Tartars—formed on the banks of the Volga an independent State, remaining in Russia for five hundred years—from the thirteenth century to the eighteenth. The Tartars were the last of the Asiatic occupants of Russia, but they remained longest of all, the preceding tribes rapidly replacing one another.

Formerly one flood of Asiatic peoples had hardly poured into the Russian steppes than another arrived, sweeping all before it and drawing all after it. The new-comers had not sufficient time to fix themselves permanently in the relatively narrow zone of the steppes which winds along the Black Sea and the Caspian. As for directing their colonizing movement towards the north, that was not to be thought of, for there commenced the forest belt, whose natural conditions were totally unsuited to the needs and the economic customs of the nomads.

Thus Asiatic culture could not take root in Russia, and the character of the shifting flood of invaders was principally destructive. Very different was the character of the Greek colonization, whose centres dotted the northern coast of the Black Sea. According to Herodotus, the Hellenic oases, even in the fifth century before Christ, played a considerable part in the life of the surrounding populations. The Greek colonizers, pushing forward from the trading cities, penetrated the country northward, settled in the forest belt, and spread the Hellenic influence among the inhabitants. This tie between the Greeks and the populations of the Russian plain, interrupted awhile by the Asiatic influx, was quickly renewed, and the seventh century of our era once more saw Greek traders and colonists in the south of Russia. But these Greeks, the sons of Cæsarian Byzantium, no longer of the republics of Hellas, were missionaries of a culture already different.

The road into Europe followed by Greek culture was the Dnieper, a river utilized both by Hellas and Byzantium, whose importance was noted by Herodotus. The ancient Greeks received by this route the yellow amber of the Baltic shores. The earliest Russian chronicles speak of the Dnieper as the route

leading "from the Scandinavians to the Greeks"—*jz variags v greki*. This expression shows that not only did the Greeks employ this route, but that another colonizing current met them from the country of the Variags (Varingians), the name by which the chronicler knew the inhabitants of the Baltic coasts and the Scandinavian peninsula—Swedes, Norwegians, and Goths. Moreover, in the early centuries of our era the hardy Scandinavian sailors, merchants at once and pirates, succeeded in pushing southward and eastward from the Baltic to the Black Sea, by means of the waterways which formed an almost continuous connection. The river-basins of the western Russian plain were well adapted to half-warlike, half-commercial expeditions; from the Baltic Sea the Norsemen sailed up the Neva, across Lake Ladoga, up the Volkhov, across Lake Ilmen, and up the Lovat; then, by way of lesser streams, they reached the Dnieper, and the Dnieper led to the Black Sea. Where the waterway was broken they made *volokom* or portage (from *volotshit*, to drag), hauling their light, long vessels from river to river.

In the fourth century the celebrated leader of the Goths, Germanaricus, at the end of a series of invasions, established a great kingdom in the Russian plain, which according to the historians was "the first historic kingdom founded by Europeans within the limits of modern Russia." Into the composition of this kingdom entered certain Finnish tribes—the Esthonians, the Merias, and the Mordvans.

The Finns, long before the Slavs entered the Russian plain, peopled a considerable portion of the forest zone. All Middle Russia was occupied by Finnish colonies (the Governments of Moscow, Vladimir, and Kostroma). The Finns, thanks to the network of rivers and lakes, had spread in all directions, covering with their villages an enormous area, from the middle course of the Volga to the shores of the Gulf of Finland, and from the upper course of the Dnieper and the affluents of the left bank to the basin of the Dvina to the north. The Finns were the first inhabitants of the forest zone of Eastern Europe mentioned by history. They were also its earliest colonists in the true sense of

the word : they blazed the first trails through the dense woods, and the Slavs merely followed in their footsteps.

II

As for the Russian Slavs, historians have given much time and labour to determine where they dwelt before appearing on the banks of the numberless rivers of Eastern Europe.

Some asserted that they came from the steppes of South Russia, connecting them with the Roxolans or Rossolans who lived there at that period, and even connoting a linguistic resemblance between the names "Russians" and "Rossolans," for *Ross* was formerly often employed in place of *Russ*. Others made them inhabitants of the southern shores of the Baltic. To-day we know that the Slavs who colonized Russia descended from the Carpathian Mountains, where they were still living in the fifth century after Christ, and that they only commenced their march eastward in the sixth century. This march appears to be a decisive point in the history of Russia.

Let us remark that the word "Rous" was not always the name of our people. A Latin writer of the fifth century—Jordanus—called them the Veneti, and the Byzantine authors of the fifth century speak of the Σκλάβοι or Slavs. It was only after their arrival in the plain of Eastern Europe that they received the name of "Russ," a name borrowed from a Scandinavian tribe established in Russia since the eighth century.

The colonizing movement of the Russian Slavs commenced only when the other populations were distributed about the Russian plain ; it continued during several centuries, and according to some writers the movement of the popular masses has not completely subsided even to-day.

The primitive Slav colonists profited by the natural conveniences of the plain of Eastern Europe—its level and equal surface and its great river systems.

Between the ninth and tenth centuries the ancient inhabitants

of the Carpathians, having colonized the basin of the Dnieper, pushed forward to the north, north-east, and north-west. At first they colonized the belt adjoining the road "from the Variags to the Greeks" of which mention has been made. At the two extremities of this belt rose Kiev and Novgorod, towns which subsequently served as the foundation of the Slav colonization.

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries we find settlers from the Carpathians in the centre of Russia, in the parts now occupied by the Governments of Vladimir, Moscow, Kostroma, and Yaroslavl.

In the fourteenth century the Slavs had reached the basin of the northern Dvina, and in the sixteenth century were installed on the shores of the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean; while in the seventeenth they had crossed the Urals and were moving eastward across Siberia. How favourable were the natural conditions of colonization and how energetic the colonists themselves we may judge by this remarkable fact: in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the wave of Russian emigration passed from the Urals to the north-western extremities of Siberia in the space of seventy years.

The cause of this migration must be sought in the economic life of the Slavs. The fundamental characteristic of their life resided in the fact that their numbers were so great as to demand a continual change of residence. The resources of one locality being exhausted, the Slavs left it to go farther afield. Their agriculture made similar demands. As for commerce, and their trade was considerable, it required no sinking of capital; moreover, it was half trade and half brigandage. The Finnish tribes established to the north of the Volga, being peaceable folk, readily submitted to the Slavs, who flowed towards the centre and the north of the plain in two currents: one, compact and principally agricultural, setting out from the banks of Dnieper, and the other, commercial and rapacious, from Novgorod.

Much later the steppes of South Russia were colonized. The country was unfamiliar and unsympathetic; the Slavs were used to the forest and the customs of forest life: coming to the

steppes they had to transform their way of life. So long as the forest zone had an empty corner, there the Slavs settled.

In their march southward, moreover, the Slav tribes encountered serious obstacles: the Asiatic nomads, the Petchenegs (ninth-eleventh centuries), the Polovetzes (eleventh-thirteenth centuries), and the Tartars (thirteenth-eighteenth centuries), who for a thousand years held Southern Russia in a state of siege. Incessantly these Asiatics attacked the Slavs, killed and pillaged, ruined their villages, and carried off their women. The period of Russian history known as the period of Kiev (ninth-thirteenth centuries) is full of struggles between Slavs and Asiatics, and the wars of the Russian princes against the nomads form one of the saddest pages of the past of Russia. This colossal conflict, terminated by the fall of the "Russia of Kiev," and the removal of the national centre to Moscow, is recorded in Russian poetry, and inspired one of the greatest of Russian painters, Vassnetsov. Of two of his most famous canvases, one, "The Knights" (*Bogatyri*), represents three Slav warriors, on horseback, mounting guard and gazing across the steppes; the other represents a group of Slav warriors lying slain on the field of battle, the birds of prey hovering above their heads.

After the Kiev period the struggle was continued by Muscovite Russia. Of the enemies of Russia the Tartars were those that remained longest and were the most dangerous. They invaded Russia in 1237, and for two hundred years were masters of the Russian princes and people. In 1480, under Ivan III, Grand Duke of Moscow, the Tartar yoke was at last thrown off.

The attacks of the Tartars were far more terrible than those of the Polovetzes. With the latter the struggle was on equal terms; and often, when the princes of Kiev quarrelled among themselves, they called in the Polovetz princes to aid them in warring upon their countrymen. The military technique of the Polovetzes was not superior to that of the Russians. The Tartars, on the contrary, had attained the highest degree of military skill, and "were to the thirteenth century what the

Prussians were to the eighteenth" (Pokrovsky, *Russian History*). They were strong in attack, and captured the best fortified of the Russian towns; the assault of a town being followed by complete destruction and the slaughter of the inhabitants. The surrounding populations they loaded with imposts.

What moral or social influence had the nomads on the Slavs? The Petchenegs and the Polovetzes had scarcely any, as their stay in Russia was short; moreover, their relations with the Russians were like those of one tribe of Russians with another; they imported no new element into the manners of the Slavs. Defeated by the Tartars, the Polovetzes took refuge in the south, where they doubtless mingled with the Slavs; for in the sixteenth century the Russian population of a portion of the district of Kiev were known as Polovetzes.

The influence of the Tartars was greater. They did not confine their operations to isolated attacks: they sought to make the territory inhabited by the Russians their *uluss*, their domain. Chance-won tribute being insufficient, they subjected the Russians to a regular system of taxation, and established a financial organization. This organization survived the Tartar rule, was retained by the Muscovite Tsars and princes, and became part of the financial system of the Muscovite kingdom. We may say that the first organizers of Russian unity were not the High Princes of Moscow, but the Tartar Khans, who assembled the towns and principalities of Russia as a State, and assisted the high principality of Moscow to place itself at the head of all the Russian principalities. The richest of the Russian princes bought of the Khan the *yarlyk*, the right to call themselves "High Princes." These High Princes of Moscow were the intermediaries between the Russians and the Tartars, being entrusted with the levying of taxes, which were paid over to the "Golden Horde" (the name of the Tartar Empire of South Russia between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries). By appropriating a portion of this wealth they became rich and powerful.

The influence of the Tartars on the manners and the spiritual life of the people was negligible, for they held apart from the

inner life of the conquered populations. The economic and social structures of the two nations were dissimilar, and kept them estranged. The influence of the Tartars on the manners of the Russian princes and aristocrats was more marked, for the latter were constantly in contact with the Khans, having many political and financial affairs to discuss with them. It is undoubtedly the case that an element of Asiatic despotism and brutality penetrated the manners and the psychology of the upper strata of Russian society at this period, and that it was subsequently reflected by the people ruled thereby.

III

Very different were the relations of the Russian Slavs with their neighbours of Finnish origin, who occupied the centre and part of the north of the plain of Eastern Europe long before the Slavs appeared in these countries. These relations were established in a highly peaceable fashion, thanks to the Finns, whom Tacitus had long before described as a "poor tribe unacquainted with houses or arms," and whom Jordanus regarded as the most docile of all the peoples of Northern Europe. This peaceable encounter of the two peoples was also due in part to the character of the Russian colonization, the pioneer element of which was composed of agriculturists, who advanced from the south-west and gradually spread over the country. There was no conquest of the Finns, but a colonization of their country, which was not followed by the expulsion or the enslavement of the earlier settlers. Quarrels there might have been, but history relates no conquest, no defensive rebellion.

These assertions are sustained by linguistic data, and especially by the geographical nomenclature of the region; villages and rivers bearing Finnish or Russian names are mingled indiscriminately, in place of being confined to separate zones. We may, therefore, conclude that the Russian settlers did not advance in a compact mass, but in irregular streams, establishing them-

selves gradually in the wide spaces dividing the Finnish villages, which lay scattered amid the woods and the marshes. In one of the chief centres of Russian colonization, Rostov, not far from the Volga, and near Yaroslavl, part of the town was long known as the Finnish quarter, and there, during the latter half of the eleventh century, dwelt the Finns in perfect accord with the Russians. Such cohabitation could not have existed had the two peoples been in any degree hostile.

This admixture with the Finns had a considerable influence on the Russian Slavs, at first of a social nature only. The Finnish tribes, aborigines of the upper reaches of the Volga, were entirely rural, and were socially akin to the Russian agriculturists. As the two populations were at peace, so were their gods; and as the Slav current flowed over the Finnish soil the two peoples were fused into one ethnographical and social mass, and their beliefs and mythologies were similarly compacted. No insuperable frontier ever divided the two religions, which were but different aspects of the same fetishism. The fusion of the two beliefs resulted in the most curious of double religions. The simpler gods of the Finns took a lower place than those of the Russians, just as the economy of the Finns gave place to the more complex economy of the Russians. The contact of this double religion with Christianity was more violent, but again assimilation ensued, and a triple religion was born, of which we shall speak in another chapter.

We have already seen that traces of Finnish influence are to be found in the geographical nomenclature of Central Russia and the region of the Volga. In these parts we encounter numerous rivers whose names end in the syllable *va*. This *va* is a corruption of the Finnish *oua* = water. The names of certain towns also bear the Finnish imprint; even Moscow (in Russian Moskva). Many articles of domestic use have also Finnish names.

A more considerable phenomenon is the phonetic modification of the Russian language; the introduction of hard consonants and inharmonious groups of consonants and vowels. The proof

that these transformations were introduced by the Finns is that they are more and more pronounced as we advance from the South-East of Russia toward the North-West.

IV

What is the Russian nation from the racial point of view? And firstly, what do we mean by race? Usually by the word "race" we denote a mass of particular anthropological peculiarities, the ethnological indices proper to a given people. If we endeavour to solve the question by the aid of anthropology we are forced to abandon the inquiry, so scanty and uncertain are the data. During their long sojourn on the globe the isolated portions of the human race have formed so complex a mixture that it is extremely difficult, indeed almost impossible, to elucidate the origin of these different groups from the racial point of view. To refer this or that people positively to this or that "pure" race is, as has been said, as impossible as to determine the race of a stray dog. Moreover, we must not forget that the Slavs on the whole have appeared on the historical stage far later than the other nations of Europe, and that the history of the Russian branch of the Slav people is shorter than that of other peoples. Those who desire something more exact than the empty classification of the Slav as a "tall fair man with blue eyes" must admit that the precise anthropological qualification of the Slav at the present day is impossible. We can define the special characteristics of the Russian nation only in a limited degree, for the data are limited to the external differences between the physical types of various groups of Russian Slavs dwelling in European Russia. These may be subdivided into three leading classes: the Great Russian (*Viélikoruss*), the Little Russian or Ukrainian (*Maloruss*), and the White Russian (*Biéloruss*) types. Those who have retained the most primitive and pronounced Slav type are the Little Russians or inhabitants of the Ukraine. However, some investigators maintain that their "purity" is not so

pure, thanks to the Asiatic tribes who formerly strayed across the steppes of South Russia. The White Russians also have departed from the Slav type, having mixed with Lithuanian stock. As for the Great Russians, they are least pure of all the Slavs, for their long cohabitation with the Finns has affected not only their social life, their religion, and their language, but has effected considerable changes in their anthropological features. "The Great Russian physiognomy does not reveal the general characteristics of the Slavs. The cheek-bones are highly salient, the hair almost always brown. The Great Russian nose is very peculiar; resting on a wide base, it alone certifies Finnish influence."

This current division of the Russian people is confirmed by linguistic data: the Little Russians speak a dialect which is almost the old Slav language.

Much more marked has been the influence of racial characteristics of secondary formation; that is, those characteristics inseparable from the environment of the nation. But in this case it would be imprudent to attribute too much significance to the natural environment, for humanity is gradually liberating itself therefrom, substituting an artificial environment, technical, economic, and social, which stands between man and nature.

M. Paul Lafargue, in his interesting work on *Le déterminisme économique de Karl Marx*, points out that just as the environment, acting upon vegetables and animals and men, able to resist by means of organic adaptation, is sufficient to differentiate even such as have a common origin, and to create the various races of humanity, so the artificial environment which civilized man erects has a similar action; and that similar artificial environments will eventually cause a racial approximation in peoples of different racial origin. The artificial environment may therefore be regarded as tending to unify the human species.

From one point of view, then, the origin of races is a question of secondary importance; the social and economic environment is the crucial factor. The United States of America are a striking case in point; the intensity of economic life is there so great that the masses of immigrants which flow thither yearly are

fused in the crucible of capitalism and transformed into a new alloy, which is the American race. Even the "negro question," complicated by a profound divergence of physical type, is according to some observers based more upon economic than upon racial factors; the white man is the representative of capitalism and the black of a less developed economy.¹

The Russian national question, as we shall presently demonstrate, is due not to a conflict between different races, but to a conflict between opposing economic types, and the current economic development of the country, overruling the systems of production peculiar to different regions, is leading to new combinations and new relations, by force of which the national conflict is becoming a social conflict. But here we have a phenomenon of the capitalist period of Russian history: a modern development. Formerly, before the growth of the artificial environment had rendered man as independent of the natural environment as he is to-day, the technique of production and economic activities provoked local peculiarities and groupings of a tribal nature. These peculiarities were in many cases profoundly rooted, for the sections of the nation were profoundly isolated, thanks to the lack of means of communication; so that the ethnological features remaining from the past are as yet by no means effaced.

In describing these features we must avoid the snare of the subjective. For example, in speaking of the influence of nature on the mentality of our ancestors, we must not attribute to these latter the impressions which we ourselves receive from the mournful plains, the mighty rivers, and the gloomy forests of our country. Our ancestors possessed a different mentality, and probably saw things at quite a different angle. The following passage from the pen of Klutchevsky, describing the Great Russian, must therefore be accepted with a certain reserve:

"The Great Russia of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, a country of marshes, presented, at every step, danger and fatigue and unforeseen difficulties which necessitated a great

¹ Firmin Roz, *L'Energie américaine*, p. 310.

presence of mind, a continual struggle against the elements. This accustomed the Great Russian to scrutinize nature ; to keep his eyes always open ; to go forward with caution, sounding the track before him, and never to cross a stream without ascertaining the ford ; and this developed a great adaptability in the face of petty difficulties and a notable patience in the face of checks and privation. In all Europe there is no people less spoilt and exacting, less accustomed to rely upon nature and the future, than the Great Russians.

"The nature of the country continually confronted the colonist with fresh economic enigmas, and forced him carefully to study all the conditions of a district before halting there and devoting himself to agriculture. Hence the astonishing power of observation revealed by the popular proverbs of Great Russia.

"The proverbs of the Great Russian are capricious, as is the nature of the country which they reflect. Nature often mocks at the most prudent calculations of the Great Russian, and upsets his most modest experiments. Accustomed to this treachery, the Great Russian, full of foresight, forms desperate and unreasonable decisions, meeting the capriciousness of nature by the capriciousness of his audacity. This inclination to tempt Destiny is the *avos* (perhaps) of the Great Russian."

M. Klutchevsky goes on to explain that a fine day being a rarity, and the summer short, the Great Russian must make the most of a favourable working-day, so that his powers of rapid and assiduous labour are remarkable ; but he has no capacity for moderate and regular work. Used to the life of villages isolated by lack of roads, he is unused to working in union with others : he labours best alone with none to watch him. He is reserved, prudent, timid, always on the watch : not at ease in company : uncertainty stimulates him : success diminishes his efforts.

The numerical preponderance of the Great Russians over the other Slav peoples, Russian or otherwise, is considerable.

In 1897, the year of the last census, the total number of Russian Slavs dwelling in the Russian Empire amounted to 83,933,500, or two-thirds of the whole population, and in some

departments the proportion was 95 per cent. to 99 per cent. Of these 55,667,500 were Great Russians (66·3 per cent. of the Russian population of Russia), 22,380,000 Little Russians (26·6 per cent.), and 5,885,000 White Russians (7 per cent.). Next come the Polish Slavs, 7,931,000; the Bulgars, 172,000; the Slovaks and Czechs, 50,000; the Serbs, Khorvats and Sloventsy, 1,000. Then come the representatives of an Indo-European group: the Letts, 1,435,000; the Livonians, 1,210,000; and the Jmuds, 448,000. Then comes the Germanic branch, comprising 1,790,000 Germans, together with Swedes, Norwegians, English, Danes, and Dutch. But these are mostly passing visitors. The Roman family is represented by the Moldavians and Roumanians, 1,121,500; the 16,500 French and 4,500 Italians are chance elements. Of Iranians there are 850,000 Tadjiks (in the Russian possessions of Central Asia); the Ossetes, 171,000; the Persians, 31,000; and a few other peoples. In the Armenian group are 1,173 Armenians. Then come the Greeks, 186,000, and a few other Indo-European peoples: Tzigani, to the number of 44,000, Albanians, and even Hindoos. The Semitic race is represented principally by the Jews, 5,640,000; it also includes the Syro-Chaldeans of the Caucasus and the Arabs of Central Asia. The Uralo-Altaian race is represented (excluding Finland) by two great groups: 3,500,000 Finns and 13,601,000 Turko-Tartars. Each of these races is minutely subdivided. The Finns number four chief subdivisions: (1) the Baltic Finns, akin to the Finlanders, 1,393,000 (the most cultivated being Esthonians); (2) the Finns of the Volga, 1,399,000 (Mordvans, Tcherimiss); (3) the Finns of the Urals and the River Kama, 6,797,600 (Zyrians, Permiaks, Votiaks); (4) and the Ugro-Finns, 28,000 (Ostiaks, Voguls). The Turko-Tartaric group contains the Khirgiz, 4,884,000, and the Tartars, 3,737,500; the Paschkirs, 131,600; the Tchuvash, 843,500, and a mass of populations on the Volga, in Turkestan, and Siberia. In the Caucasus are two groups entirely isolated from the other races: the first, of Kartvelia and Iveria, comprises the Georgians, 824,000; the Imeritinions, 273,000;

the Mingrelians, 239,500; and the Svanetiens, 15,000. The second group, known as "the Mountaineers," comprises the Tchetchentzes, 226,000, the Lezghins, 600,000, and the Circassians, or Tcherkess. And all these peoples are subdivided into tribes.

A similar diversity reigns in the Hyperborean group, consisting of semi-extinct Asiatic tribes: Ostiaks, Yukagirs, Tchuktchis, Esquimaux, Aleuts, Kamtchadals. If we add the 57,000 Chinese, the 26,000 Koreans, and other Eastern peoples, the number of dialects and languages spoken on Russian territory amounts to 150, not including those of Finland, where dwell 2,362,000 Finlanders and 349,500 Swedes, as well as Russians, Germans, etc.

The religions practised in the immense Empire of Russia are many: the principal are the Orthodox, 69 per cent.; Old Believers, 8 per cent.; Protestants, 2·8 per cent.; Jews, 4·2 per cent.; Mahometans, 11 per cent.; the Buddhist religion also is practised, and many lesser faiths.

We shall now consider the various forces that have formed this gigantic anthill of such varied languages, religions, and peoples.

CHAPTER III

THE STATE AND ITS EVOLUTION

- I. Economic and political forces. II. Birth of the State in Russia. III. Difference between the development of Russia and that of Western Europe—What is the feudal period of Russian history?—*Boyars* and princes—The Church—The people. IV. The Muscovite principality and its struggle against the other Russian princes. V. Origin of absolute power—Aggrandizement of the Russian State, its internal development, and its transformation into an empire. VI. Territorial development of Russia down to the latter half of the nineteenth century—Evolution of the forms of the State based upon the new forms of economy.

I

IN Chapter VIII of the 18th Book of his famous work, *De l'Esprit des Lois*, Montesquieu writes:

"The laws are very closely related to the fashion in which the various peoples procure their subsistence. A more extensive code of laws is needful for a people addicted to commerce and the sea than for a people content to cultivate the soil; and the latter requires a code more extensive than a people which lives by its flocks and herds. This latter again requires a wider code than a people which lives by the chase."

Here Montesquieu remarks the connection between the juridical forms assumed by the life of the organized collectivity and the economic problems which beset man in his struggle with natural conditions. Montesquieu examines law and the laws not as the product of the free operation of the minds of

monarchs and legislators, but as the indispensable result of a certain level of economic development. This purely realistic point of view is highly creditable to the author, for it is one of the most precious acquisitions of the historic science of our times.

Historic theory, while accepting this point of view, has enlarged and more firmly established the formula of this conception. Montesquieu, in his *Esprit des Lois*, speaks only of a connection between political and economic phenomena; he does not wholly grasp the highly complex relation uniting economic forces and political forms. He approaches the estimation of this relation more particularly, so to speak, from the *quantitative* point of view; the *qualitative* aspect of the matter he ignores. But it is not enough to say that juridical and political forms are "more extensive" or "wider" in one society than in another. We must ascertain the *qualitative* dissimilarities of these forms, referring these latter to the corresponding dissimilarities to be observed in the methods of economic activity.

What is the fundamental impulse of this activity which determines its historical development? Apart from the natural environment in which man labours and has his being, it is the technique of his labours and the mode of production. Transformations of these factors will vary the methods of division of technical and social labour. The collaboration of individuals leads to new social groupings and the co-ordination of new social forces. Ancient economy, based upon the exploitation of slave labour, brought to the surface of social life a group of citizens freed from the necessity of labour and material need. It was this social group that furnished the human material of the "free city commune" of the ancient world, a political form representing not a democracy, but a large oligarchy. If we examine the Middle Ages we find that the political forms of that period also are based upon a definite social and economic foundation. We see that the basis of the feudal system was the great landowner and the labour of serfs. The workshop of the city artisan and the enterprise of the merchant were the social and

economic units which found expression in the free city commune of the Middle Ages. Approaching our own age, we see the development of the same process: that is, a fundamental transformation in the method and the technique of production, the decay of the old private workshop, the death of the old commercial undertaking which had only a limited market in view, the advent of manufacture and the factory, and finally, the universal character of exchange, which creates the most complicated financial and commercial relations. But as a technical reconstruction of the means of production provokes a change in the grouping of society, we may note that the new social material has found a new political expression in Parliamentary legislation and other forms of the modern *bourgeois* State.

So to comprehend the political history of any country we must examine its economy. Russia is no exception to the rule, and to obtain a clear conception of the development and transformation of the political forms of the Russian State we must study the connection between these forms and the economic forces which they reflect.

II

The most primitive unit of the social life of the Russian Slavs of the historic epoch was the family; but not the small family consisting of husband, wife, and children which we know to-day. The family of the Slavs of the ninth and tenth centuries consisted of thirty to forty members of the same blood practising a collective economy. The origin of this primitive social organization is easily understood; it was born of the conditions of economic activity. The primitive culture of the soil demanded the effort of a considerable number of persons. For the transformation of a dense tract of forest into a cultivable clearing the labour of what we know as a family would not have sufficed. It was the "large family group" that accomplished it. The group was a unit common among many peoples other than the Russians. Among the Southern Slavs—Serbs and Croats—an

analogous social form obtained. (The *Zadruga* or *Vielika Kutchá* corresponded exactly to the ancient Russian family, known in the south-west as the *dvorishtché* and in the north as the *pítchishtché*.)

The social organization of the ancient Russian was of a communal character. However, it in no way resembled the modern *mir*. The communism of the *mir* is confined to the collective property, purely nominal, of the soil, and to a common financial and economic responsibility towards the power of the State. The communism of the ancient family group was profoundly economic; it was a communism of production and consumption. The members of the group not only owned the soil destined for agriculture; they tilled it in company. Apart from agriculture, they carried on, collectively, a whole series of other callings; they had meadows, fisheries, and apiaries in common. Working collectively, they lived all together in an enormous *isbah* of timber, examples of which may be met with in the north of Russia, in the provinces of Archangel (Arkhangelsk) and Olonetz.

Although in most cases the communal group consisted of kinsfolk, the fundamental basis of the union was not kinship but an economic tie.

"We should be greatly mistaken," says a contemporary Russian writer, "were we to attribute too prominent a place to kinship. . . . Kinship was customary but not indispensable; a similar economy was also organized by people who were entirely unrelated to one another and associated by conventions (*skladstvo*). These people also created *pítchishtché*s, but only for a term, say for ten years. During these ten years all was common among the members: property, movable and otherwise, gear, bestial, revenue, and expenditure. This association was known as 'a family'" (Pokrovsky, *Russian History*, vol. I.).

The term fixed by the convention having expired, the "family" could dissolve. The common goods were then shared equally among its members. We find such examples among the Serbs and Croats, and in these cases the economic tie predominates over the tie of blood.

This ancient family was not merely an economic organization. It was also a miniature State, which defended itself, its property, and the product of its labours against the neighbouring families.

"The truth was not among them," said a Slav chronicler in speaking of the ancient Russians. "Their tribes, never agreed among themselves, were continually in conflict." Even under the Prince of Kiev, Yaroslav the Wise, in the first half of the eleventh century, the "right of vengeance" was officially extant: that is, warfare between the different families was authorized. The legal existence of "private warfare" indicates the reciprocal relations of these families, which resembled the relations between isolated political bodies. The absolute necessity of defence naturally demanded a certain amount of organization and a considerable degree of discipline. Thus the father became the military organizer, receiving the title "Sovereign Little Father," and full power over all members of the family. Presently the function of priest was added to that of military chief. The father defended his subordinates against the powers of heaven and hell. It is in the old Russian family that we find the germ of autocratic power. This germ quickly developed in two directions. Firstly, the size of the family increased; and this increase, complicating the economic problems of military and religious life, gave greater importance to the functions of the father. Becoming unwieldy, the family broke up into groups, which in their turn became independent units. A whole series of villages was built, all tending toward the same centre, in which dwelt the elder generation entrusted with the care of the altar. The old term *ognishtché* (altar), from the word *ogon* (fire), gave its name to the primitive patriarchal aristocracy or *ognishtchanité*. This aristocracy, living by the sacrifices offered by the younger members of the tribe, had soon no need to carry on their own economy; thus arose the differentiation of the economic and the religious functions: the fusion of these with the military command having been the most ancient type of political power. The artificial enlargement of the old social organization contributed to the extension of this political power: when one family was forcibly subjected to

another the "sovereign father" of the victorious family became also the father of the vanquished family, so that his power was still further increased and commenced to lose its patriarchal character.

The second important phase of the development of the life of the Russian Slavs was the replacement of the old patriarchal aristocracy by another and foreign form. Under the auspices of the Scandinavian princes and their *boyars* this entered Russia when the country was undergoing changes in its economic and especially in its commercial life. At this period commerce was not content with remaining a mere peaceable exchange of products. The words "merchant" and "robber" were synonymous. The booty was guarded in the towns, and in the towns the merchants kept out of the way of "competitors." The word *gorod*, city, in Russian means a place surrounded by walls; and *tovary* in the old Russian tongue means at once merchandise and—an armed camp! The population of the towns was composed of the most varied elements. In ancient Kiev and Novgorod were Slavs, Jews, Greeks, and Scandinavians. This population, organized in a military sense, was divided into "hundreds" and "thousands." It is comprehensible that these towns or commercial centres thus organized had an enormous political influence over the surrounding districts, and that these were subject to them. Here was another phase of the development of political power.

Then appeared the new aristocracy: a Scandinavian aristocracy. The names of the first Russian princes—Rurik, Igor, Princess Olga—were not Russian but Scandinavian (*Rörek*, *Ingvar*, *Helgi*). According to the legend, the first Scandinavian princes were called in by the Russians themselves, who, weary of internal discord, proposed to them: "Our country is wide and fertile, but order is lacking. Come and govern us." In reality the matter was simple enough. The Russian population, fearing the attacks of the Scandinavians, doubtless entered into negotiations with the *kunnings* of these latter, and arranged to pay them a *dan* in exchange for protection against other Scandi-

navians. Eventually the councillors and warriors of the "kunnings" became the first Russian *kniazs* or princes, forming a new aristocracy, which seized upon the goods of the *ognishtchanié*. This aristocracy took the name of *boyarstvo*. Gradually it was completed by native elements; and individuals of economic and military prominence entered into its composition.

Thus proceeded the social differentiation of ancient Russia, and thus the political forms adopted by the life of Russian society were modified and developed.

III

The change we have described—the advent of a military and commercial aristocracy together with the rise of commerce—proceeded rapidly during the tenth and eleventh centuries. This period of Russian history is often referred to as the "period of Kiev," for the city of Kiev, situated on the principal highway, "from the Variags to the Greeks," was then one of the most important commercial and intellectual centres. But while at this period it was regarded as the first of Russian cities, it was by no means an organizing centre of the political life of all the Russian Slavs, nor did it represent national interests. Many other cities, with their surroundings, constituted independent political centres. All these cities, headed by their princes, incessantly warred among themselves, and the high principality of Kiev was only distinguished from others by its formidable military power and its wholesale brigandage. Even those princes of Kiev whom the chroniclers speak of as "reformers" and creators of order, such as Yaroslav the Wise (first half of the eleventh century) and Vladimir Monomakh (first half of the twelfth century) were far from pacific. In his will, Vladimir Monomakh boasted of having organized eighty-three military expeditions, not counting affairs of lesser importance. These hostile relations between different provinces, cities, and princes were immediately consequent upon the commercial methods of

the times. The commerce of this period, as we have stated, being founded on brigandage or piracy, not only failed to unify the population in a single economic organism, but broke it up into hostile groups. Commerce, moreover, thanks to its voracious character, was ruinous in its effect on the population, and retarded the development of the productive forces of the country. The Russian merchants proceeded to Constantinople or "Tsargrad" (the Tsar of all cities) to find an outlet for their merchandise, which consisted of slaves, furs, beeswax, etc. These goods were stolen or received from the people as *dan*. In settling the amount of this *dan* the Russian princes never considered the needs or the economic means of their subjects, often by this fact provoking revolts and insurrections. The lamentable results of the exploitation of the population by the commercial and military aristocracy and its princes were not long in appearing. Even in the middle of the twelfth century the contradiction was striking between the culture and the brilliant appearance of the commercial capitals and the increasing poverty of the rural population. The town was the parasite of the country.

Presently the city, having drained the village of its life-blood, began to break up, to die. The fall of the principality of Kiev was hastened by external misfortunes. Thus the bombardment of Constantinople, in 1204, by French and Italian warships went some way to destroy the commercial importance of Kiev, for it ceased to be a centre of transit between West and East. Even before the ruin of Constantinople the commercial communications between Kiev and the Black Sea were greatly hampered by the attacks of the nomads who for long years terrorized the south of Russia.

Kiev was not finally destroyed by the Tartars until 1240; but the taking of Kiev was only the external symptom of the breaking up of the "period of Kiev." The internal process of decadence was long before complete. Fleeing from the exploitation of princes and *boyars*, and the attacks of the nomads, the rural population of the Russia of Kiev had commenced, as early as the twelfth century, to migrate in masses to the banks of the Oka and the

Volga, where they quickly developed new forms of political and economic life. This translation of the centre of economic and political gravity from Kiev to the city of Vladimir in the first place and later to Moscow marked the commencement of the "Muscovite" period of Russian history. This period is one of the most important, for it saw the rise of a vast political unity in place of the old isolated provinces: the Muscovite principality, and the development of the fundamental elements of the political structure of the Russian State. These elements assumed the form of an absolute monarchy; however, this was the product of a slow process of evolution, for we do not perceive it until the sixteenth century. The earlier portion of the Muscovite period saw quite another political system.

What was this system? This was long a problem, a subject of debate among Russian historians, the majority affirming that the Middle Ages of Russia could not even be compared with the feudal Middle Ages of Europe. Eager to prove that nothing in Russian history resembled the history of other nations, they denied the existence of feudalism in Russia. "They even sought to impose upon more than a generation of readers a celebrated conception which became classic: the contrast between rocky Europe, divided by seas, every corner of which gave refuge to some 'feudal brigand' who obstinately opposed all attempts at centralization, and Russia, with her level surface, innocent alike of castles, seas, and mountains, and destined by Nature to form only one great State."

This conception of the patriotic historian, based upon the contrast between Russia and Europe, favours impressionism rather than scientific analysis, and "results less from the observation of social life than from observation of the landscape as the latter appears when we look out of a carriage window" (Pokrovsky, *Russian History*, vol. I.).

When an attentive examination was made of the historic material available, it became obvious that the "contrast" between the Russian Middle Ages and the Middle Ages of Europe was only relative.

A young scholar recently deceased—M. Pavlov-Silvansky—was the first to prove that the first part of the “Muscovite period” was the age of Russian feudalism, presenting a close analogy with the feudal system of Western Europe, for all the characteristic features of the latter may be traced in the Russian life of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries.

The first of these characteristic features, as we have seen, is the supremacy of the great landowner, whose rise in Russia was antecedent to the thirteenth century. In the first part of the “Moscow period” this fundamental basis of feudalism was completely consolidated. Even in the most ancient reactions of “the Russian Truth” (thirteenth century) we find traces of the centralization of large domains in the hands of the *boyars*. The Russian *boyar* was before all a great landowner, comparable to the great feudal lord of Western Europe. But the birth and development of Russian landed property was different from the same process in the West, for although in the West the development was slow, and was due merely to an economic differentiation of the free rural commune, in Russia its rise was immediate upon the ruins of the “great family” or *pitichishtché*, of which we have already spoken. Whatever the local circumstances, however, the results of the process were the same: the feudalization of landed property, that is, its concentration between the hands of that aristocracy which had succeeded in subjecting, politically and economically, all its weaker neighbours. The relations between masters and their subjects constituted the *boyartchina*, corresponding to the French *seigneurie*, the English manor, and the German *Grundherrschaft*.

“The Russian *boyartchina*,” says the writer already cited, “is like the *seigneurie* in the essential features of its economic structure. The large estates of the Middle Ages comprised, as in the West of Europe, two unequal portions. One, the larger, was cultivated by the peasants, who paid a due to the *seigneur*. The other was under the direct supervision of the latter, and was only a small part of the whole estate. . . . The administrative centre of the whole, or *Votchina*, was the manorial house, or *dvor*,

like the German *Hof*, the *Curtis* of Western Europe. *Votchina*, *Hof*, and *Curtis* all granted land or *Curtis-Villicana* to the peasants. The Russian term *dvor boyarsky* is the exact translation of the Latin *curtis dominicalis* and the German *Fronhof*. The land belonging to the seigneurial house and administered directly by the *seigneur* was called the Salic land (*terra salica*, *salland*) in the West, and in Russia *zemlia boyarskaya*—the land of the *boyar*. (Pavlov-Silvansky, *The Feudalism of Ancient Russia*, St. Petersburg, 1907.)

To this extraordinary terminological analogy the facts correspond. The economic side of Russian life, in the thirteenth-fifteenth centuries, was very like the economic system of the feudal period of Western Europe, for in each case the corresponding period was marked by the supremacy of agriculture over all other forms of production. Moreover, agricultural production did not exceed the narrow limits of natural economy. And the *natural economy*, composed of isolated economic units, could not furnish social material for the construction of a centralized State, and therefore resulted in the fractional division of the political power.

“Power was broken, at the feudal period, into a thousand fragments, as a goblet of glass is shattered by a fall. And these fragments were very unequally divided among the large and small seigneurial domains.” As the origin of feudalism, according to Guizot, was caused by the “fusion of sovereignty and property in land,” and as under the reign of natural economy and primitive culture the dimensions of landed properties determined the economic and political powers of their possessors, the unequal distribution of the soil naturally produced a complicated system of political units whose representatives formed a hierarchy. This hierarchy of sovereigns and vassals may be found in the Russia of the thirteenth-fifteenth centuries, as well as in the France of the Middle Ages, and the *kniazya* and *kniajata* (princes and princelets) correspond exactly to the barons, counts, dukes, etc., of France. And as they were, like their French colleagues, sovereigns in their own domains, they executed justice, coined money, levied

taxes, and, in short, enjoyed the privileges of immunity. Many of the princes and *boyars* "might, like the *seigneurs* of the feudal period at its height, have set up a gibbet in some corner of their domain, as an attribute of the high justice."

Each prince or *boyar*, sovereign on his own domain, was the vassal, that is, the military servitor, of a larger landowner. Beside military service (*servitum*) each French vassal had to assist his suzerain in council (*consilium*) and contribute to the formation of a court. The same arrangement existed in Russia in the form of the *Boyarskaya Duma* (*boyars'* council). Even the symbols of these relations were the same in France and in Russia. Thus the French *hommage* corresponded exactly to the Russian *tchelobitié* (from *tchelom*, *bit*, meaning to strike the ground with the forehead). As homage was followed by the oath, so the *Tchelobitié* was followed by the *tzelovanié kresta*, the kissing of the Cross.

To complete this comparison, we may cite the fact that in Western Europe, when the vassal entered his suzerain's service, and gave his promise of fidelity (vow, *aveu*) he remained a *free* man who could always retract his vow: that is, take service under another suzerain. The Russian words *prikaze* and *otkaze* literally signify "vow" or "avowal" and "retractation" or "disavowal." Thus in 1392, in the principality of Nijni-Novgorod, the *boyars* resolved to abandon their prince Boris Constantinovitch, and to enter the service of his enemy, the prince of Moscow. One of these *boyars*, Vassili Roumanietz, declared openly to Prince Boris, in the name of his fellows: "Lord Prince, count on us no longer, for we are no longer thine nor with thee, but against thee!" By this brief disavowal the *boyars* of the province of Nijni-Novgorod broke off all relations with their suzerain.

In the juridic and economic position of the Russian Church of this period we find all the typical characteristics of the feudal system. The representatives of the higher clergy and the convents were great landowners, each of whom occupied a certain position on the long scale of the feudal hierarchy. The archbishop and metropolitans, like the lay princes, had their vassals and *arrière-vassaux*, and these latter "took service with the arch-

bishop as with a prince: that is, vowed service in field and in court, receiving in return a grant of land." Thus, for example, the Archbishop of Tver possessed some dozens of vassals, and the Metropolitan of Moscow commanded quite a regiment of *boyars* and "sons of *boyars*," inferior vassals corresponding to the *arrière-vassaux* of the French.

Each lord, whether spiritual or temporal, had his own financial system, like that of a little State; granting land to his peasants for a certain term, receiving various services in exchange. Most of the peasants of this period (fourteenth and fifteenth centuries) were already landless, and laboured on the estates of princes, *boyars*, convents, and archbishops. Only in the North were a few "black lands" left here and there: that is, lands belonging to peasants. But although they were landless the peasants of this period were not yet serfs; serfdom did not appear until towards the sixteenth century. The peasants were the *free* servants of their masters, and, like the vassals, could make disavowal of service. Their loss of land and the concentration of landed property in the hands of the spiritual and temporal aristocracy resulted in their *economic* dependence on the latter, but they retained their *personal* freedom. But we must admit that their condition, in a sense peculiar to Russia, facilitated the destruction of their personal liberty by the *seigneurs*. We have seen that the *mir* or *obshchina* (the rural commune) of feudal Russia was far less developed than that of Western Europe, so that the Russian *boyar* found it easy to seize the peasant's lands and bring him into legal subjection.

The feudal relations here described were those that usually prevailed in the Muscovite Russia of the fifteenth century. Only the domains of the "free cities" of Novgorod and Pskov were distinguished from other feudal units by their social and political character. As for the rest of the north-eastern Russian plain, it was scattered with the "state-domains" of *seigneurs* of various degrees and ranks. The most important of these domains were the principalities of Tver, Riazan, Suzdal, Nijni-Novgorod, Yaroslavl, etc. All were subdivided into the smaller domains of

the lesser princes, who in turn had the *boyars* for vassals. Then, of this motley mass of feudal lords and vassals, the strongest of all became gradually predominant: the High Prince of Moscow, who succeeded, according to the patriotic historian, in "assembling all the land of Russia into a single unit," and who, to speak more prosaically, conquered all the other princes and founded the Russian monarchy.

IV

The principality of Moscow was one of the oldest principalities of the north-east of Russia. When the chronicles first mentioned the existence of Moscow (1147) it was only a little fortress-village belonging to the Princes of Vladimir. Only in the beginning of the fourteenth century did Moscow become a separate principality, under its first prince, Daniel Alexandrovitch, who inherited Moscow from his father, the illustrious Alexander Nevsky. Under Daniel and his successor Yury the principality of Moscow rapidly expanded, absorbing the cities of Kolomna, Mojaïsk, and Pereiaslavl-Zalessky, and it became the Grand or High Principality under the second successor of Daniel, Ivan Kalita (1328). From that time onward Moscow continued to strike at her feudal neighbours, gradually absorbing the divided soil of Russia, and centralizing the political power.

At this period the Tartar Khan was the sovereign of all Russia. He it was whom the Russians named Tsar, and the title of High Prince with the privileges thereto appertaining was transmitted to one or other of the Russian princes according to his will. The Tartars meddled little in the inner life of the Russian people: they were chiefly concerned in obtaining the highest possible financial benefit. Ivan Kalita, like his successors, found a way to satisfy the Tartar greed. The nickname *kalita* means purse or bag, and tells us what was the quality of the "first to knit the soil of Russia together." The Russian princes, entrusted by the Tartars with the levying of the *dan*, used to send ambassadors to the "Golden Horde," or resorted thither themselves with rich

presents, in order to gain the friendship of the Khan and his army—a friendship which enabled them to subjugate their rivals, the other Russian princes.

But to conquer in the political struggle Moscow had first to triumph as an economic organism. This latter victory was made easier by the geographical position of Moscow, on the important commercial highway connecting the commercial region of Smolensk with that of the Volga, which crossed another highway leading from wealthy Novgorod to Nijni-Novgorod. When, after the seizure of Constantinople by the French and Italians and the reinforcement of the nomads about the mouths of the Dnieper, the famous route "from the Variags to the Greeks" had to be abandoned, another trade route was chosen—the Don—and one of the principal points of this new highway was Moscow.

Later, in the tenth century, the principality of Moscow entered into commercial relations with the ports of the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean, and by such means quickly induced a lively current of trade between England and Russia. Presently Moscow became the clearing-house and centre of all the trade routes of Russia; but even by the end of the fourteenth century the city numbered some tens of thousands of inhabitants, and in that respect was not inferior to the greatest cities of Europe.

In the centre of the country, and therefore little disturbed by the attacks of foreign neighbours, the principality profited economically by its geographical position, and gave asylum to a compact mass of agriculturists whose produce soon exceeded that of the region of Kiev. Moreover, the colonizing policy of the Muscovite princes contributed to the development of the agricultural yield of the State; they employed certain of their resources in ransoming Russian prisoners of war from the Tartars, and peopling their domains therewith.

The economic strength of the Muscovite principality and its friendship with the Khan resulted in an influx of *boyars*. Many vassals of the Princes of Tver, Nijni-Novgorod, and others abandoned their suzerains and entered the service of the Prince of

Moscow. Lesser princes followed their example, transforming themselves from independent *seigneurs* into Muscovite servitors, while others were subjected by force.

Thanks to these facts Moscow was already, in the first half of the fifteenth century, the most powerful of the feudal States of Russia, or, to speak more exactly, the most powerful of her feudal associations, for the principalities of that period, as we have seen, were not States in the modern sense of the word, but unions of feudal domains of varying dimensions. In the middle of the fifteenth century only two great principalities were still independent of that of Moscow—those of Tver and Riazan: but these too were soon absorbed.

The success of the Princes of Moscow was partly due to the Church, for the interests of the most important of the feudal ecclesiastics, the metropolitans of Vladimir, coincided with the interests of the grand-duchy of Moscow. The metropolitan was always in rivalry with the Archbishop of Tver, just as the Prince of Moscow was always contending against the Prince of Tver. The principality of Tver, situated in a corner of the principality of Moscow, hampered commercial exchange between Moscow and Novgorod. The archbishopric of Tver, cutting into the religious domains of the metropolitan, gave asylum to all sorts of "heretical" ideas, and above all to the movement of ecclesiastical reform directed against simony, that is, against the sale of religious appointments, which was so highly profitable to the metropolitan.

It is interesting to note the manner in which the metropolitan supported the Prince of Moscow. One of the metropolitans, St. Peter, had quarrelled with the Prince of Tver (then High Prince), left the capital some time before his death and "went to Moscow to die. The relics of St. Peter presently began to effect miracles. The capital of the rival of the Prince of Tver became sacred." Another means of assistance was the excommunication and anathema to which the metropolitan treated such cities and principalities as were unwilling to submit to the Muscovite princes.

At the end of the fifteenth century the struggle between the Prince of Moscow and the other princes, a sanguinary conflict marked by more than one crime, ended in the victory of Moscow and the unification of the greater portion of North-Eastern Russia. But this was not as yet the victory of the absolute monarchy. Certainly the quantitative changes in the life of the Muscovite principality and the expansion of the latter were accompanied by qualitative changes. But the principle of the State remained the same, and the Prince of Moscow remained not so much the sovereign and political chief as the owner of a vast domain. The admixture, typical of feudalism, of private and public law, still obtained in the Grand Duchy of Moscow. After his triumph over the other principalities the High Prince continued to own his city of Moscow as he owned, say, his table service. Both were his private property, which he dealt with not as a monarch but as a good landowner. Like other feudal lords, he conducted his affairs with the aid of his free servitors or vassals, who formed the "*boyars'* Duma." At the head of this Duma was the most important of all these vassals, a spiritual vassal, the metropolitan. The vassals safeguarded their rights with the utmost jealousy. When one of the High Princes of Moscow began to neglect the advice of the Duma and to settle affairs in his "bed-chamber," in company with a few favourites, he provoked the keenest discontent among his feudaries. One of the latter, being entrusted with the verbal expression of this discontent, had his tongue cut out. Similarly, the *boyars* defended their right of "*divavowal*," and in the celebrated conflict between Ivan the Terrible and his insubordinate vassal, Prince Kourbsky, the departure of the latter to serve the Grand-Duke of Lithuania was one of the most dramatic episodes.

Two incidents played an important part in the ideological and technical prelude to the absolute power. The first of these was the shattering of the Tartar yoke. The Prince of Moscow was the representative of the Russian people with the Khan, not only because the Khan granted him a charter or *yarluk* which conferred the title of Grand-Duke of Moscow, but also because he was

charged with the collection of the *dan*. At the end of the fourteenth century Prince Vasili Dimitrovitch paid the Khan 34 per cent. of all the *dan* collected in Russia. At the end of the fifteenth century the grandson of that prince possessed such a territory that he was able to pay the Khan 72 per cent. of the total *dan*: that is, the principality of Moscow represented three-fourths of Russia. When in 1480 the High Prince of Moscow, Ivan III, profiting by the internal decadence of the Golden Horde, refused to recognize the Khan as sovereign of Russia, he received not only the title of national liberator, but great material advantage, for the *dan* paid by the Russian people went to swell the treasury of the Muscovite principality. Moreover, the Government of the latter inherited from the Tartars an excellent financial organization, for the Tartar functionaries were the first to commence the census of the Russian people, to divide them into financial groups, and to establish a regular levy of taxes.

The second of these incidents was also connected with the name of Ivan III, and was marked by relations between Moscow and Byzantium. During the period of Kiev the Byzantines had introduced a religious ideology into Russia: orthodoxy, to wit; and during the period of Moscow they introduced a new political ideology. The external sign of the Byzantine influence was the marriage of Ivan III to the niece of the Emperor of Byzantium—Sophia Palæologus. This marriage, excellent from a diplomatic point of view, enabled Ivan III to adopt the arms of the empire for his own. The two-headed eagle has ever since been the blazon of the Russian State. Later, in the treasury of the Grand-Duke of Moscow, a crown and other articles were "discovered," which constituted the so-called regalia of the Byzantine Emperors, which were ceded, so it was said, by the latter to the Prince of Moscow in token of the transference of their power. But this is mere legend. The legend further states that the first of these Russian princes, Rurik, was descended from the Tsar of Rome, Cæsar Augustus, and that Moscow was the third Rome (the second being Byzantium), on which had devolved the function of eternal guardian of the "true faith."

The union of Florence (1439) and the taking of Constantinople by the Turks furnished material for this legend. In 1471 the metropolitan of Moscow, Philip, wrote in one of his charters : " Learn, O my children, that the city of Constantinople and the Church of God were indestructible, for, like the sun, there shone the true faith. But losing hold of the truth, the Patriarch of Constantinople joined himself to the Latins (Catholics), swearing fealty to the Pope, for the sake of gold. Then died prematurely the Patriarch, and Tsargrad (the *Tsar of Cities*) fell into the hands of the impure Turks."

Thus was laid the ideological basis which enabled the Muscovite princes to become " heirs " of the absolute power of the Byzantine Emperors and sole defenders of the Orthodox faith. But this ideology demanded, for its realization, a social environment favourable to its development. The conditions necessary to the birth of absolutism began to develop in Russia in the sixteenth century.

V

The sixteenth century was, for Russia, the period of the economic revolution. Rural production remained, during the whole of this period, the most important branch of production, but its forces underwent profound modifications : from natural economy arose monetary economy, founded on the circulation of merchandise, and the exchange of products for currency. These changes were closely connected with the progressive expansion of the internal and external trade of Russia. Although Novgorod began to be one of the most important commercial centres, yet others arose, in the North, such as Kholmogory and Archangel, which a great commercial highway running through Yaroslavl and Vologda connected with Moscow. A whole series of facts testifies that the rapid development of Russia's internal trade destroyed the basis of natural economy.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century the character of internal exchange underwent a change ; it became intenser and

more extensive. The official documents of this period speak of numerous centres of trade, of fairs, of a close network of highways, and of constant relations between the various portions of the country. Thus, according to the statistics of a number of Englishmen who visited Russia at this period, the region of Yaroslavl alone sent 700 to 800 wagons of wine daily for sale to Moscow. Compare this fact with the isolated life of the small economic groups of a former age, which laboured exclusively to produce enough for their own consumption, and you will understand how the character of the economic life of Russia was transformed in the sixteenth century.

The celebrated German economist, Karl Bücher, states that we may distinguish three stages in the economic development of Western Europe : (1) the phase of natural economy, without exchange ; (2) that of urban economy, the latter furnishing a limited market and consisting of the city and its surroundings ; (3) that of national and finally universal economy. In Russia the second phase, if it was not entirely absent, at least existed only in a germinal form, so that the national phase followed almost immediately upon the domestic phase.

"The uniformity of the surface of the country, the abundance of rivers, and above all the duration of the snows, which permitted of relatively convenient methods of communication, diminished local difficulties and the economic isolation of the various regions. According to the English, merchandise was sent enormous distances, in winter, as from Archangel to Moscow, in a fortnight. *Thus the monetary economy of Russia, born in the second half of the sixteenth century, differed from others in this peculiarity : it was not urban, but national, or at least each of its markets embraced a considerable radius.* This is proved by numerous observations. . . . According to the testimony of Jenkinson, the Russians sent to Astrakhan wool, sheepskins, grain, and salt pork ; the region of Riazan sent large quantities of grain to Moscow ; Smolensk sent live-stock to the centre of Russia and received hemp from Viazma, while Yaroslavl provided Moscow with corn, and the latter city resold it to customers living at a

distance of 500 leagues" (V. Rojkov, *Origin of Absolute Power in Russia*, Moscow, 1906).

The data in our possession as to the activity of the middlemen of those days and on the prices of corn in various parts of Russia prove that each local market furnished enormous areas. *This economic union of the country certainly played an important part in its political union and in the creation of the Russian State.*

But the economic phenomena herein described had a still more notable influence on the political development of the country. The development of exchange led to an increase in the amount of currency. The proof of this statement is the progressive decrease of the value of money. This latter fact may be observed in the Russia of the sixteenth century. "While at the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth the value of the ruble was equivalent to nearly 94 of our modern rubles, towards the years 1530-40 its value fell to 75 rubles, and early in the second half of the sixteenth century to 25. So rapid a fall in the price of money marks the sudden passage from natural to monetary economy" (Rojkov, *op. cit.*).

The taxes, paid at first in kind by the peasant in the form of rent, very soon had to be paid in money. Even at the end of the sixteenth century the peasants working on the lands of the convents of the Holy Trinity and St. Sergius paid money to their *seigneurs*, and then the State taxes also were levied in currency.

The new method of production, that is, production for a large market, was regulated by means of money, and this led to a change in the internal organization of the rural economy. Landowners whose system of economy had hitherto been a narrow one, who had preferred to let land to the peasants in order to obtain imposts in kind, now saw a vast market opening for the outlet of grain, and commenced, little by little, to diminish the area of the lands let to the peasants and to cultivate their own land. In some cases the land exploited by and for the master amounted to 30, 40, or 50 per cent. of the whole estate. It soon befell that the principal organizers of the new economy were no longer the great landowners, the *boyars*, but the small proprietors, the

dvorianids, for the former, accustomed to luxury, troubled themselves very little about the administration of their property, and were addicted to useless expenditure. Moreover, it was in general more difficult for a great estate to adapt a new economy and new forms of production than for a small estate to do so. For this reason the passage from one economic form to another affected the *boyars* principally, and caused the downfall of their economic power. The economic enfeeblement of this class was utilized by the Grand-Duke of Moscow, who was able to confirm the absolute autocracy and thereby oppose the oligarchy of the *boyars*. Highly characteristic was the most intense phase of the Terror, the policy which Ivan the Terrible adopted in order to crush the *boyars* of the higher aristocracy, just ten years after the economic fall of that class in the centre of Russia. The sapping of the economic strength of the *boyars* explains the curious fact that they did not rebel against the persecutions of Ivan, and even the most energetic of them, Prince Andrei Kourbaky, contented himself with passively protesting against the Tsar and by leaving his dominions. In order to struggle against the *boyars* Ivan established a special system known as *spritchnina*. It is unjust to suppose that the *spritchnina* and the pitiless system of the Terror were manifestations of personal hatred, of a Sadic caprice. It is highly probable that the character of the Tsar gave his policy a more gloomy and sanguinary tone, but the gist of that policy was the struggle of the developing autocracy against the aristocratic oligarchy. The *spritchnina* (exceptional law) was preluded by two manifestoes published by Ivan. One was a friendly appeal to the whole people, with the exception of the *boyars*; the other, steeped in hatred, was addressed to the *boyars* themselves. The *spritchnina* consisted in this, that the Government had the right by law to confiscate the estates of the nobles in the regions where the application of the system was announced. This policy was directed against the *boyars* in particular, and aimed at the destruction of the flower of the feudal aristocracy by seizing their property and the privileges thereto appertaining. Another

manifestation of this policy was the institution of a body of what we may call military police, whose ranks furnished Ivan with his instruments. The lands confiscated were distributed to members of the *opritchnina*. This body of police was composed of small landed proprietors or *dvorians*, who at this period, as we have seen, rose to the surface of national life by the action of the forces of economic evolution. Every district proclaimed subject to the *opritchnina* was outside the scope of the *boyars'* Douma, and that meant more than half Russia.

Thus the *opritchnina* may be regarded as the first attempt of the heads of the Russian State to govern without the aid of the *boyars* and to create a new governmental system in place of the old feudal administration. The diminished political importance of the *boyars* appears even more significant if we examine the *Soudiébnik* (code) whose drafting in 1558 marked the apogee of the *boyars'* political power. One of the articles of this code stated that all new laws were "to be proposed by the Tsar and adopted by the united *boyars*."

The *dvorians* supported Ivan in his struggle against the *boyars*. The feudal privileges of the latter hampered the economic development of which the *dvorians* were the propagators. At this time the fundamental thesis of the *boyars* was the demand that the Tsar—Ivan adopted the title in 1547—should govern with them and respect their rights of birth and inheritance. The ideologues of the *dvorians* expounded the opposite theory: that rights were conferred not by birth but by the will of the Tsar and personal merit, and that the power of the Tsar was unlimited, as it came from God. Needless to say, this theory of the divine origin of the power of the Tsars was greatly to Ivan's taste, and he was able to maintain it by effectual arguments—the gibbet and the axe.

The policy of Ivan the Terrible was continued by Fedor and above all by Boris Godunov, who endeavoured to ruin the aristocracy of the *boyars* by leaning on the *dvorians*. After Boris began what is known as "the period of troubles," which was a period of revolutionary crisis and internal warfare, which

lasted through most of the first ten years of the seventeenth century. It was only in 1613 that the end of the "period of troubles" came, when the first representative of the present dynasty, Mikhail Fedorovitch Romanov, ascended the throne.

During this period of disorder, as always happens in a period of revolution, social contradictions were very marked. The *boyars* made an attempt to defend their privileges. The instrument of this attempt was the notorious Dimitri the Pretender. Profiting by the fact that the heir of Ivan the Terrible, Dimitri, had been killed by order of Boris Godunov, the *boyars* spread the rumour that the real Dimitri was still alive, and, having selected a young adventurer, they put him forward as pretender to the throne. But when Dimitri became Tsar (he ruled for a few months) he also, relying on the *dворянство*, attempted to practise an autocratic policy without regard to the counsel of the *boyars*. The *boyars* then took an oath together, slew the Pretender, and proclaimed as Tsar a man of their own class, Prince Vasili Choumsky, who promised to share the power with them. Unsuccessful in obtaining the support either of the *dворянство* or the popular masses, Shoumsky was unable to retain the supreme power. Then commenced a series of insurrections, and the people broke up into different groups, each with its own leader and its own demands. Finally victory remained with the *dворянство*, who, acting in concert with the clergy and the traders in the towns, managed to restore the country to order, protecting it against its external enemies, and in 1613 the power of the Tsar was re-established by the election of Mikhail Romanov.

The very fact of election to some extent limited the power of the first Tsar of the new dynasty, the more so as the *boyars* were able to obtain, during the election, by means of a compromise with the *dворянство*, a few concessions to their own advantage. The "period of troubles" left behind it a whole series of problems affecting the internal life of the country. To resolve these problems the State had recourse to the counsel and the support of the public. For this reason the institution known as the *zemskii sobor* attained a considerable development under the

Tsar Mikhaïl. The *zemskii sobory* were not parliaments, but consultative assemblies, representing the various districts and the various classes of society. The place of honour was occupied by the delegates of the middle classes, above all those of the *dvorianstvo*. The *zemskii sobory* played a great part in the establishment of order and the public powers. A result of their activity was the code *Ulozhenië* (1649) in which are expounded the new civil and political ideals adopted after the downfall of the old natural economy and the feudal system. When the *zemskii sobory* completed their work the successor of Mikhaïl Romanoff, the Tsar Alexeï, suppressed them, and in their place created a council of experts to which were called the most experienced persons of each class, especially that of the *dvorianiis*. In 1662 the great merchants attempted to re-establish the *zemskii sobory*, but the *dvorianiis* did not second them, so the Government refused their request. From that moment we may regard Russian absolutism as firmly established.

The reign of Peter the Great, which saw Russia transformed from a *tsarstvo* (kingdom) into an empire, and which inaugurated the period of St. Petersburg, did not actually bring any new principle into Russian absolutism. Peter the Great laboured to develop absolutism in two ways: firstly, he suppressed the functions of the patriarch of Moscow, and, having entrusted the administration of the Church to the Synod, a Synod entirely submissive to the Government, he freed the latter from all rivalry on the part of the Church. He then introduced a military reform: he created a permanent army to replace the old feudal militia of the nobles, and thus gave absolutism a powerful means of dominating the people. Peter was very well aware of the influence of the army in establishing the power of the absolute monarchy, and he introduced a declaration of absolutism in his military statutes (1716): "His Majesty is sovereign and autocrat. He is accountable to no one in the world."

The confirmation of the absolute power contributed to the territorial extension and the external successes of Russia. Under Ivan the Terrible were conquered the Tartar kingdoms of Kaza

and Astrakhan, which remained after the destruction of the Golden Horde. Thanks to this conquest the basin of the Volga and the region to the east thereof were opened up for Russian colonists. Then came the conquest of Siberia, thanks to the famous expedition of the Cossack brigand Yermak Timophaevitch. Then commenced the march of the Russians toward the Far East. In the middle of the seventeenth century, under the Tsar Alexis, the Ukraine, or Little Russia, was united to the State, having hitherto belonged to Poland. (It was not the whole of the Ukraine that was absorbed, but only the banks of the Dnieper.) Under Peter the Great Russia seized the Baltic shore, warring against Sweden and Livonia. The foundation of St. Petersburg, and its transformation into the capital city, showed what value Peter set upon his conquest. According to the great Russian poet, Pushkine, St. Petersburg was for Russia "a window overlooking Western Europe." At the end of Peter's reign the Russian State had increased from a small princely domain to an enormous political structure occupying an area of 2,755,000 square miles and containing thirteen millions of inhabitants.

Naturally the geographic expansion of the power of the heads of the Russian State led to its political expansion. The autocratic Emperor, head of the Church and the army, soon appeared to himself, as to others, a terrestrial god.

VI

After Peter the Great the territorial expansion of Russia rapidly progressed. Under Catherine II the State seized the Crimea and a belt of land contained between the Bug and the Dniester. Then, by the conventions of 1772-3-5 Russia, Prussia, and Austria effected three partitions of Poland, which enriched Russia by White Russia, Volhynia, Podolia, Courland, and Livonia. Under Alexander I ten Polish provinces were definitely acquired, with Warsaw and Lodz, provinces which to-day form the wealthiest commercial region of the whole

Russian Empire. Under Alexander I also Bessarabia and Finland were absorbed. Under Nicolas I Russia advanced her frontiers along the eastern border of the Black Sea, penetrated Central Asia as far as the mouth of the Syr-Daria, and in the Far East approached the west bank of the Amur. Under Alexander II the Caucasus was conquered, the region of the Amur and the Ussuri, Turkestan with Tashkend, the regions about the Zariavstchan, a portion of Khiva, the region of Ferghan, and the Trans-Caspian country, with Akhal-Tekhé. The area of the Russian Empire, which at the end of the reign of Peter the Great was 2,755,000 square miles, touched 3,055,000 under Catherine, 3,395,000 under Alexander I, 3,755,000 under Nicolas I, and 3,890,000 at the end of the reign of Alexander II. At the end of the nineteenth century the Russian Empire, not counting expanses of water, composed one-twenty-second of the whole area of the terrestrial globe, or one-sixth of the land surface; its area was more than two and a half times that of Europe, its width from north to south 2,480 miles, and from east to west 4,960 miles.

The military strength of the empire naturally increased with its area. The Russian army, which numbered 200,000 men under Peter the Great, was doubled by the end of the reign of Catherine II, had doubled again at the time of the war with Napoleon (1812), and at the time of the Crimean campaign numbered 1,600,000 men, while to-day its war strength is 2,500,000 men.

This enormous expansion of Russian territory has had a great influence on the social and economic life of the population. Continually providing fresh means of subsistence, it delivered a large proportion of the population from the necessity of adopting intensive forms of production. Although the population of Russia has rapidly increased, being now more than ten times as great as in the days of Peter the Great (nearly 150,000,000), an enormous amount of unutilized land has provided an asylum for superfluous labourers. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Russia counted 51·2 men per square mile, while in France the proportion was 184, in Germany 263, in Ireland 337,

and in Belgium 512. Even six hundred years earlier, in the fourteenth century, France numbered 102 inhabitants to the square mile, while in Russia a like density of population is of rare occurrence even in our own days.

Here a question presents itself: How could a country so poor and backward as Russia was during two and a half centuries become a vast invincible empire and assume universal importance? To reply to this question we must expound certain peculiarities of the internal organization of the country, anterior to the emancipation of the peasantry.

We know that the autocracy triumphed by leaning on the lesser nobility or *dvorianstvo*, who naturally did not assist the Princes and Tsars of Moscow for love of the thing, but with a view to their own interests, economic and social: production for an unlimited market and the rise of a monetary economy necessitated plentiful labour, and the economic revolution of the sixteenth century recoiled upon the peasants, increasing their debt and still further depriving them of land. Pressed by material need, the peasants began to flock to the landed proprietors in order to be transformed from the free men they were into serfs. The *seigneur* engaged to provide them with land and material assistance in exchange for the *bartchina* (such, during the period of serfdom, was the term for the obligatory labour of the peasant on the master's land). Often, owing to his debt, the peasant became a slave for the rest of his life. The peasants did not willingly place themselves in economic and juridical dependence on the nobles, and energetically defended their "right of disavowal." This, since the revolution in production, was highly inconvenient to the *seigneur*, for it threatened to deprive him of his labourers. The *dvorianstvo* therefore began to appeal to the Government for the suppression, by legislation, of the right of disavowal, and for the institution of general serfdom. Except for Boris Godunov all the Muscovite Tsars issued edicts to this end. In the first place they permitted the right of "disavowal" on one day of the year—St. George's Day—and later the right was withdrawn altogether.

The institution of serfdom was facilitated by the circumstance that the economic movement of the sixteenth century was followed by a depression which ruined a whole mass of peasants and forced them to choose serfdom rather than death by starvation. From this point of view we may say that serfdom was, not only for the landed proprietors but also for the peasants, the inevitable issue of unfavourable economic conditions, and, whatever the moralists may say, a step in advance in the economic development of Russia. It must be noted that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the commencement of the eighteenth the exploitation of the serfs was relatively not very extensive. At this period the market for the outlet of grain was still limited; the proprietor reserved for his own use half the estate, and only required three days' labour a week of the peasant. The three other days were the peasant's own.

At the end of the eighteenth century the situation of the peasants became still more painful, as the grain produced by Russia began to flow outward into the international market. The development of the export trade in Russian corn is shown by the following figures :

In 1758, grain was exported to the value of £12,000.				
1778,	"	"	"	£106,400.
1802,	"	"	"	£870,000.
1897,	"	"	"	£7,530,000.

Towards 1830 Russia exported a fifth part of her whole harvest. This development of the export trade filled the heads of the landed proprietors with dreams of a golden future. The desire to produce as much as possible, to gain the greatest possible profit, impelled the landowner still further to exploit the peasants. The private fields of the master were enlarged and the days of the *bartchina* (the term of labour per week which the proprietor demanded of the labourer) were increased. This extreme exploitation of the peasants filled them with indignation, and under the reign of Nicolas I, 556 rural revolts were officially recorded.

Slavery was especially harsh in Russia, and was distinguished

by the ferocity of the landed proprietors. The Russian serfs were not attached to the soil, to the economic organism, as were the serfs of Western Europe, but to the person of the master. The private and therefore despotic character of Russian serfdom may be thus explained : In Europe, thanks to the limited dimensions of the local markets, each market had to be provided with an assured quantity of labour, whence the binding of the peasant to a particular locality. In Russia, on the contrary, the markets even in the sixteenth century served enormous areas, so that the land-owners had to be granted the right to transport their labourers from one district to another, according to the demands of the market, and to attach the peasants to their own persons.

The institution of slavery was highly advantageous to the Government. The *dvoriani*s, serving as intermediaries between the central power and the rural population, organized the economic activity and the rural life of their peasants with a view to their own material interests and the financial and military requirements of the State. The noble had to see that his serfs accomplished their military service, and was responsible for the taxes levied upon them. Moreover, he had to act as the peasants' judge, and to settle their quarrels and disputes. In a word, to quote the expression of Nicolas I, "absolutism had 150,000 unpaid prefects of police," and according to the well-known Slavophile, Kochelev, "the Russian *dvorianstvo* was the dough from which the Government kneaded its functionaries."

The large number of functionaries thus provided by the lesser nobility simplified the problem of administering so populous a country and diminished the expenses of the State. In the middle of the eighteenth century, for example, the expenses of the Russian Government were only 19,000,000 roubles, divided as follows : 8,500,000 for the army, 2,000,000 for administration and justice, 50,000 for public instruction, and the rest for the upkeep of the Court or the payment of high officials. For a very long time the central administration was anything but complicated. It was evolved from the private economy of the Muscovite Princes. The titles of the highest dignitaries of the State—cup-

bearer, master of the horse, etc.—show clearly that the first administrators of the Russian State were chiefly the private servants of the Princes of Moscow. When administrative affairs became more complex there were institutions called *Prikazes*, at the head of which were *boyars* who had received from the Tsar the *prikaze* (order) to occupy this or the other branch of the administration. Into the Provinces were sent the *voevody*, charged with the higher administrative and judicial duties. Under Peter the Great, who liked to employ foreign terms, the *prikazes* were replaced by “colleges,” and under Alexander I the “colleges” gave way to ministries. But these changes were only technical; the principle of government remained the same; the autocratic Emperor held all powers concentrated in his own hands, and himself appointed all the higher agents of the administration, who were responsible only to him. It is easy to realize that in so vast a country as Russia, where the mass of administrative affairs was proportionately vast, the Tsars exercised the absolute power more in phrase than in fact: the power actually fell into the hands of the class from which the Tsar chose his civil and military administrators. In the seventeenth century State service was compulsory for every landed proprietor, and the lesser nobles were really the serfs of the Government, as the peasants were the serfs of the nobles. Peter the Great was extremely strict in exacting the accomplishment of the functions of the State by his nobles. He also required of the younger nobles a term in some foreign college; a condition by no means welcomed by these young men.

It was only under Catherine II that the compulsory service of the nobles was abolished; but at this period the nobles themselves realized the advantages of concentrating the administrative functions in their own hands, and were attracted by service under the State as a source of income and of power. At this period the *dvorianstvo* profited by its political influence in order to increase its dominion over the peasants. In 1747 it obtained the right to sell serfs. This living merchandise was extremely dear in the markets, so that the *dvorianstvo* profited greatly by its

privilege, pitilessly separating husband and wife, mother and children. In 1760 the nobles were allowed to send their serfs to Siberia as a punishment, and in 1767 *a ukase of the Tsar forbade the peasants to make complaints against their masters*, thereby delivering them completely to the mercies of the latter.

Thus a vast State fabric was formed, living on the labour of the serfs and governed by an autocratic central power assisted by the nobles.

The Tsar proudly assumed the title of "first noble of the Empire"; while the nobility resolved at all costs to safeguard their privileges. Moreover, this nobility did not demand any constitutional guarantee, for it possessed a better security: it occupied all the high civil and military posts. The fate of the Tsars Peter III and Paul I, husband and son of Catherine II, both killed by noble officers of the Imperial Guard, shows clearly the kind of "influence" exerted by the *dvorianstvo* to express their discontent where this was provoked by a representative of the autocratic power.

But it must not be supposed that the absolute monarchy, while supported by the nobles, was maintained merely by brute force; the birth of the monarchical and aristocratic State, and its external successes, were possible only because this monarchical State had at one time been a progressive phenomenon of the historic life of the Russian people. The monarchy and the lesser nobility joined efforts to destroy the feudalism of the oligarchy or *boyars* which so hampered the economical and political unity of the country, and the lesser nobility devoted itself to the military organization of Russia and the defence of the country against its external enemies. Moreover, this same nobility played a considerable part in the organization of the principal factor of national economy—namely, agriculture. We must remember this if we are to judge of the relative importance of the functions of the Russian monarchy and the Russian nobles. While doing justice to the historic activity of these two principal elements in the life of the Russian State, we must not forget that this activity was determined by material class interests, and we must impartially

judge the present situation of the autocracy and the nobility, and understand why these two forces have become so retrograde and so negative.

The problems of external politics and of internal administration, and above all the necessity of possessing an army and a fleet, forced the Government, even in the days of Peter the Great, to aid the development of Russian industry. Without that aid Russian industry must have developed; the economic relations of Russia with other States, the increase of the needs of Russian society, would have led to its development. But the intervention of the autocracy hastened this development and eventually gave it a wider expansion. It is a characteristic fact that under Peter the Great the merchants, not the nobles, were the first to organize the nascent industries. The development of commercial exchange in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries amassed the capital indispensable for the construction of factories and workshops. But one indispensable element was lacking: labour. Then, in 1728, a law authorized the merchants to buy peasants, but only by whole villages, and on condition that each village was absolutely attached, not to the person of the merchant, but to the factory itself. In this way Russian industry was founded on serfdom. But it soon became obvious that the labour of serfs in the factories and workshops would be far from productive, for industry demands far more technical knowledge and culture than husbandry. In the second half of the eighteenth century the Government was obliged to conduct an inquiry into the evil state of Russian industry. But the nobles, realizing what a source of income industry might become, began to demand that the Government should limit the activity of the merchants. In 1762 a law forbade the merchants to buy serfs in order to make them work in workshop or factory. Thanks to this law and the small numbers of free workmen, the nobles promptly possessed themselves of all the leading industries of the country. Thus in 1809 of 108 cloth factories which existed in Russia only 12 belonged to men of the commercial classes. But while the serfs were bad workers the nobles were deplorable

organizers. Accustomed to live by the fruit of gratuitous labour, they had neither the energy nor the initiative required by a successful manufacturer. However, profiting by their relations with the Government, they obtained State contracts, and monopolized the production of articles necessary for the equipment of the fleet, the army, etc. Having no fear of competition, there was no force which could stimulate them to improve the technique of production.

For this reason the industry of the country, which had so rapidly developed, now gradually decayed. The export of the foundries, for example, was four and a half times greater at the end of the eighteenth century than in the middle of the nineteenth; and in the same period the number of clothworks making for export fell to one-third of its former figure; for the labour of Russian serfs could not compete with the work of the free artisans of Europe.

However, the branches of industry which produced for the home market (for example, the weaving of cloth and cotton goods) fared better than the export trade. Their products quickly replaced the village-made article. But here again industry suffered by the action of the Government, for the ever-increasing financial demands of the latter decreased the purchasing power of the population. In the second half of the nineteenth century it became evident that serfdom was checking the development of the national economy, and that before it could pass to higher forms of economic activity the Russian people must enjoy different social and political conditions of life. But as always happens in such a case, the ruling class, with the monarchy at its head, was not willing to relinquish the privileges which appertained exclusively to the old order of things. In vain did certain influential officials of the day, like the celebrated Speransky in the reign of Alexander I, seek to persuade the Government to liberal reforms; in vain did a group of prudent and educated nobles attempt, on the 14th of December, 1825, to effect a change of *régime* (an attempt known as the revolt of the "Decembrists"). The greater portion of the nobility was reactionary.

Some of the "Decembrists" were executed, the rest deported to Siberia, and not until a quarter of a century had passed, a time of development and conflict, not until the downfall of Russia during the Crimean War, did the autocracy consent to grant the people a few concessions.

CHAPTER IV

THE EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL MIND

- I. Influence of geographical and economic conditions upon the psychology of the people. II. Influence of religion and the function of the Orthodox Church. III. Influence of serfdom and the autocracy.

I

In the chapter dealing with racial factors we saw that the social and economic environment plays the most important part in the formation of the mental peculiarities and the classes and groupings of a people. But as the natural conditions of human life determine the character of human activity, so also natural conditions are reflected in human mentality. Thus one of the most salient peculiarities of the life of the Russian people has been, as we know, the enormous area of the territory which it inhabits, a country devoid of the natural obstacles which might have covered the great plain of Europe with little Russias. The result of this geographical peculiarity has been manifested in the character of the labour accomplished by the population. For a long time the people felt no need to alter the form of its economic activity, or to improve the technical methods of production. This economic conservatism naturally provoked a social and mental conservatism, which was, until very recently, a typical feature of the great majority of the population. From the sixteenth century to the middle of the nineteenth the Russian peasantry, who formed an enormous proportion of the nation, lived under monotonous economic conditions, a prey to the

prejudices and traditions of centuries. The collective experience amassed by their ancestors came down to the younger generations without appreciable change.

This circumstance—that for centuries the economic basis of the State was the rural economy—has had a great influence on the political life of Russia. Agriculture, absorbing the peasant entirely, cut him off from the rest of the world and confined his interests to his native village. For this reason the Russian peasants have been a more or less passive element of society, leaving others to busy themselves with politics. It is a phenomenon common to all countries in which the economic basis of the State is agriculture, and the social basis the peasantry, that a feudal aristocracy or an Oriental absolutism asserts itself as predominant. Russia was no exception to the rule.

Another result of the geographical conditions of Russia has been the continual danger of nomadic invasion. At the very beginning of Russian history the people and the State had to struggle persistently against the Asiatic peril. The previous history of Russia and the incessant expansion of Russian territory stimulated the military activity of the State, demanded of the people an extreme exertion of its military strength, and by checking the intellectual activity of the masses, maintained it at the lowest level.

Moreover, having entered upon the historic stage at a later date than the Latin and the Germanic peoples, the Russian Slavs were deprived of the civilizing influence which the Roman Empire exerted over the peoples of Western Europe. When the Slavs began to colonize the great plain of Eastern Europe they encountered no learned and cultivated Romans, but poor and ignorant Finnish tribes whose political life was more than rudimentary.

II

Another leading influence was the linguistic and religious isolation of the Russian people. Russia has lost much by this

isolation, not only in comparison with the Latin peoples, but also in comparison with the Germans, for whom Latin was long the language of science and religion. The Poles—the only section of the Russian Slavs who were subjected to the influence of the Church of Rome—have by their general culture been much closer to Western Europe, and have suffered less than other Slavs from their linguistic isolation.

Not only did the Russian people receive no knowledge of the Latin tongue and of Roman culture from the Orthodox Church, but that Church did not even seek to encourage or extend its maternal language. The apostles of Christianity in Russia, having found no ready-made alphabet, created one themselves, and then composed a special language in which the religious services were celebrated. This language—"the Slav of the Church"—has little resemblance to the dialects of the Russian Slavs of the ninth and tenth centuries: that is, of the period during which Christianity was spreading about the country. The social and economic conditions of the life of the ancient Russian Slavs was extremely unfavourable to the spread of Christian ideology. Living among forests and marshes and on the banks of rivers, busied with the chase and primitive husbandry, the Russian Slav of the period had no time to free himself from the influences of nature. He did not envisage himself in opposition to nature, and according to a recent investigator, he could not well distinguish "where man left off and where nature began;" he animated every fragment and every phenomenon of nature. Animism was the leading feature of the ideology of the Russian Slavs. The popular Russian tales are to this day full of animated birds, beasts, trees, etc.

The economic weakness of the Slav peasant, his impotence in the hands of wild nature, inspired him with a fear of his surroundings. The animals whose language he could not understand seemed to him more dangerous than human enemies. Just as he formed treaties of peace with neighbouring tribes, so he entered into relations with certain species of animals. The totem, the animal which protected the man in moments of difficulty and

danger, received offerings in exchange and became an object of worship. A relic of totemism and the cult of animals among the ancient Slavs may still be found in the district of Minsk, in the form of a myth relating to two dogs. These dogs having on several occasions saved the prince their master from the greatest danger, the latter, after their death, ordered the evocation of their memory on certain days of the year. The tales of the "Tsar of the Brass" and the "Golden Fish" both reveal the imprint of animal-worship.

The individualization and personification of animals and the sacred phenomena of nature transformed the totem into a fetich ; that is, it led to the replacement of the worship of different groups of animals or natural phenomena by the worship of this or that particular object. As the ancient Slav found himself more at home in the midst of nature he learned to distinguish certain isolated objects to which he continued to attribute a soul. Very often the Russian Slav realized his supremacy over these objects and profited by it. In a Russian legend an old man took pity on a tree which implored him to spare it. But the old man's wife forced the tree to work for her and to satisfy her slightest caprices. These caprices ended badly : the old woman and her husband were changed into bears by the miraculous tree, because they had sought to become gods. The adoration of nature and of material objects led to the appearance of the cult of nature, that is, of a certain means of action towards the subject adored. The ancient Russian Slav, like all savages, made offerings and addressed prayers and requests to his god. As the technical experience of economy was transmitted from generation to generation, so with the cult, whose guardians were the oldest and wisest members of the family. The *Viedun* and the *Koldun*, who knew the secrets of nature, were the first representatives of the religious functions of primitive Slav society.

The succeeding stage of development of religious ideology was the appearance of more general conceptions of the forces of nature, the original anthropomorphism which peopled the woods and waters and the air with various beings resembling man. In the

woods the Russian Slav saw the *Lechy*, fierce and crooked, comparable to a gnarled and twisted tree. In the waters lived the *Vodianoi*, the divinity of the waters; in the house lurked the *Domovoi*, the little round-shouldered old man who must always be carried with one on removal, in a few hot embers taken from the old hearth. To the Dnieper, which played so important a part in the economic life of the Slav colonizers of Russia, was attributed a special divinity known by the name of *Dnieper-Slavutitch*, powerful and majestic as the waves of the great river itself. The thunder, the wind, death, sleep, happiness and misfortune, all the elements, all the phenomena of nature were deified, and even to this day the Russian peasant-woman sings to her child a lullaby which was formerly addressed to the god of slumber, Ugomon.

"Spi, ditiia, moid, usni,
Ugomon tebia vozmi!"

(Sleep, my child, fall thou asleep; may Ugomon take thee in his arms!)

In each man also dwelt a god—his soul. The ancient Slav represented this soul under an ultra-material aspect: it was a bee, a butterfly, a little mouse or bird, living in the throat, just above the collar-bones, where lies the "salt-cellar." Before sleep or death the soul quits its dwelling. After death the soul without asylum becomes dangerous to the living. If the eyes of the corpse are not closed it is a sign that the soul seeks a victim, and even in our days a practice is extant in Russia of placing pieces of copper on the eyelids of the dead, in order to close their eyes for ever. During the funeral the soul of the dead may attack either a sleeping person or a little child. For this reason, in the villages of White Russia even to this day, all the sleepers are waked when a corpse is borne past a house, and knives are placed in the cradles of infants in order to frighten the souls of the dead. Sometimes the homeless soul visits the living: the inhabitant of White Russia will still tell you how a dead woman will come in the night to give suck to her child, or how a dead usurer has stolen the cloak of a peasant who had not repaid his debt. If a youth

or maiden dies the body is dressed in wedding garments, so that the soul can marry after death. Food and drink are set out on the tombs of the dead, and on the day before the day of commemoration great stones are placed at the cross-roads, so that the dead may sit thereon and rest. In White Russia, where many old beliefs are preserved, a curious festival is celebrated twice a year, in spring and in autumn. On this occasion the peasant's family cleans and adorns the *isbah*. A great feast is prepared, and in the evening, having lit a candle, the father says: "Blessed kinsfolk, we call you; blessed kinsfolk, come to us: here is all that makes a house rich; blessed kinsfolk, hear our prayer, fly towards us!" During the meal each member of the family sets part of his portion aside for his ancestors, and at the end of the feast the father says: "Blessed kinsfolk, you have come hither, you have eaten and drunken, now fly away home!" (V. N. Nikolsky, *Primitive Religious Beliefs and the Appearance of Christianity in Russia*).

Primitive agriculture gave birth to cults peculiarly closely allied to the agricultural economy. But these cults were far less developed than other analogous cults among the ancient Greeks and Egyptians. The imagination of the Russian Slav had not the leisure nor the ability to develop these agricultural cults until Christianity invaded the country. Even the two chief divinities of the old Slav mythology, *Dajdbog* (Sun) and *Mat-Syra-Zemla* (Mother-Moist-Earth), present wholly animistic features. The Earth is represented as groaning under the weight she bears; and the Sun as a material being. The Spring was represented in a very curious fashion. The Slav savage, "unable to resist his love of animating all things, sought to discover what living creature brought the Spring. This was not difficult. Was not the Spring in one of those migratory birds which come when Winter is ready to disappear, and fill the woods with their cries?" Hence legends respecting the lark and the woodcock, which bring "from across the seas" nine locks, liberate the Spring, and put the Winter under lock and key. Once the Spring had appeared, sacrifices were offered to it. Even to-day the peasants of the

province of Penza (near the Volga), when the snows of winter begin to thaw, place morsels of bread or cake on the spots that are the first to be delivered of their snowy covering. The birch-tree, the favourite tree of the Russians, also played the part of a vernal fetich, to which offerings were borne, and on festival days its shadow fell upon games and dances. At the season of sowing, bread and eggs were placed on the furrows left by the plough. The divinity of grain also demanded offerings.

At the beginning of the harvest two festivals were celebrated, one of which was in honour of the divinity of the harvest, known as *Kupala*. The Russian Slavs believed that bracken blossomed on the night of *Kupala*, and that he who should pluck it that night would be rich and happy. The other festival, dedicated to *Yarila*, contained a sexual element. It was doubtless sacred to the god of fecundity.

Above these and analogous rural cults, in the midst of the military and commercial city of the period of Kiev, was another cult whose ideology marked a step in advance of the religion of the agriculturists.

"In the city, or during an expedition, men were not content with occasional fetiches. Totems became gradually unfamiliar to the merchant-bandit. The cities required permanent protectors, and the expeditions continual assistance. On the other hand, the Slav bandit and the merchant constantly came into contact with the Normans and Byzantines, whose mythology was certainly far more systematically developed than theirs. Thanks to these conditions their religious beliefs, in this half-military, half-commercial environment, presently developed in two directions. In the towns permanent idols appeared, not entirely deprived of their fetichistic character, but possessing invulnerable power and the sanctity of gods. Then came allusions to a theological system, the desire to determine the relations existing between various gods. Here the influence of Byzantine beliefs was undoubtedly at work" (V. Nikolsky, *op. cit.*).

Among the population of the towns the idols of *Perun* and of *Veless* or *Voloss* enjoyed the greatest consideration. *Perun* was the

god of thunder and lightning and of war, and the protector of the guard of the Prince of Kiev. *Voloss* was the god of flocks and herds. Besides these, *Svarog*, god of fire and father of *Dajdbog* (the Sun), and *Stribog*, the god and father of the winds, were greatly venerated. The representation of these divinities was full of the most ingenuous fetichism. For example, when the Prince of Kiev, Vladimir the Holy, introduced Christianity in his city in the year 998, he ordered that the idol of Perun should be thrown down and cast into the Dnieper. Moreover, so that the ancient god should not meditate a return to the city, the idol was pushed away from the banks until it was swept away down the river.

The warlike and commercial element of ancient Russia was equally ingenuous in its conception of the soul. The corpse of every prince and knight was burned with the arms, the horse, and sometimes even the wife and slaves of the deceased, so that the dead man could live in Paradise as he had lived on earth. The conception of Paradise reflected the change produced by the rise of the military-commercial element: vulgar persons could not enter Paradise, it being reserved for princes and *boyars*. To reach it the dead must cross a sea and then climb to a great height, no one knew whither. To facilitate this ascent a ladder was buried with the body, and sometimes the clippings cut from the fingers of the deceased during his life. It was the custom with the Russians to keep nail-clippings, as with their help it was easier to climb into Paradise.¹ Once there the aristocratic soul would lead a most agreeable life, always at table, always making merry.

The religious ideology of this warlike and commercial aristocracy reposed upon a low degree of development, and both it and the agricultural cults were presently replaced by Christianity.

The reader will understand that at the outset the change can have been no more than formal, for Christianity was the product

¹ The practice of hoarding nail- and hair-clippings is very general, but the motive usually given is that one may be bewitched if they fall into the hands of the ill-disposed.—Tr.

of a social environment and a culture very different from those of Russian society during the period of Kiev. The elements of Christian ideology which constituted its greatest attraction to the slaves and the proletariat of the Roman Empire were quite unfamiliar to the mind of the Russian Slav of the tenth and eleventh centuries. The doctrine of Christ suffering to redeem humanity could find no echo in the mind of the Slav. It was the same with the dogmatic and theosophical side of Christianity. The inhabitant of the banks of the Dnieper could adapt himself only to its external phase, its system, sacraments, and religious ceremonies. The Greek popes and monks replaced the pagan priests: ikons and the relics of saints took the place of the ancient fetiches, and the Christian ceremonies succeeded the ancient sacrifices. But all these external transformations were not accompanied by any internal transformation of religion. The Russian Slav, even after baptism, remained a pagan. More, the Christianity introduced among the Russian Slavs quickly became a semi-pagan cult. For this the Byzantine priests entrusted with the introduction of Christianity into Russia were partly responsible. Unable to uproot the pagan ideas from the Russian mind, they sought simply to adapt Christianity to the popular beliefs. "They recognized the existence of the innumerable Slav gods by abasing them to the level of demons, and recognized the sanctity of pagan rites and traditional dates by building temples on the homes of the ancient idols and establishing festivals on the days chosen by the pagans." A similar "pædagogic process" led merely to the complete confusion of the religious conceptions of the people. The old gods did not disappear; they contented themselves with taking Christian names. The functions of Perun were transferred to St. Elias, "who drives in a chariot across heaven," and those of the divinity of flocks and herds, Voloss, to St. George. As for the goddess of Spring, she becomes the Holy Virgin, "arriving on a plough at the time of the Annunciation." All the old beliefs, though dating from centuries and centuries back, are still extant to-day. In certain parts of Russia tobacco and spirits are placed in the coffin, that the dead man may be able in Paradise to offer

them to his friends. And the faith of the peasantry in ikons and miracles is marked by the same gross and ingenuous fetichism that we find in the pagan beliefs of their ancestors.

But although Byzantine Christianity did not greatly influence the psychology of the Russian Slav, although it was content to change merely the name of a religion, it has, on the contrary, played a prominent part in the organization of the country. Christianity in the hands of the ruling classes was a means of influencing the masses. The mere fact that the chief figures in the society of Kiev were the first disciples of Christianity proves as much. The prince and his guard were baptized first of all ; then they assembled the people to receive baptism on the banks of the Dnieper. The people were far from willing to change their idol Perun for the idol Christ, and the inhabitants of Novgorod, for example, retained a lasting memory of a certain baptism "by steel and fire."

It is not difficult to divine the reason of the sympathy which the warlike aristocracy felt for Byzantine Christianity. The religious relations between Byzantium and Russia were precluded and promoted by the political and commercial relations between the two countries. These relations confirmed the Byzantine influence in Russia, and gave the Russians certain privileges, for Constantinople was at this time the chief market for the outlet of Russian goods. The introduction of Byzantine Christianity in place of the Roman type had a lasting effect upon the country of the Russian Slavs : it made it less difficult for the lay power to dominate the ecclesiastical power. The Roman Church, as we know, depended not at all upon the Empire, while at Byzantium the head of the Church was really an official of the Emperor. So it was in Russia. Even during the period of Russian feudalism the Church was unable to win its independence, for the independence enjoyed at this time by the spiritual as by the temporal feudaries was not the independence of the Church, but of its various representatives. Peter the Great easily concluded the work commenced by his ancestors. He suppressed the Patriarch and replaced him by an administrative council termed the

"Directing Holy Synod," at the head of which was placed a lay official, the chief procurator, *ober-prokuror*. This dependence on the Church upon the civil authorities still further strengthened the hands of the autocracy, which added the "spiritual sword" to its already crowded arsenal. In moments of reaction the autocracy employed this weapon to oppose the development of free thought amidst the intellectual strata of society. Although Russia has not known a militant clericalism like that of Rome, she has, on the other hand, been subjected to an official clericalism, a sort of ecclesiastical police, which has pressed very heavily upon the spiritual life of the country. Orthodoxy was one of the basic elements of the autocratic system, and one of the principal checks upon social and scientific progress. The following fact may afford some idea of the extraordinary forms assumed by the yoke of this clerical police: in the first half of the last century the professors of anatomy at the Russian universities were forced, when explaining to students the structure of the human body, "to call their attention to the benefits of God, who created this body in all its astonishing complexity." An innumerable quantity of such facts might be cited; but the civic functions of the Russian Church have by no means been limited to supervising the philosophical and scientific thought of the country. The superior and the local clergy were charged by the Government with the supervision of the social activity and the private life of every inhabitant. All the Orthodox functionaries were obliged to attend confession at fixed intervals. A certificate of confession was demanded yearly of all school-children. A civil marriage does not exist in Russia; the contract is valid only when consecrated by the Church and recorded in its registers. Similarly divorce can be granted only by the ecclesiastical authorities. If to this we add that the popes are the registrars of births and deaths, we see that the Russian Church is still entrusted with functions that in Western Europe have long ago devolved upon the secular authorities.

The hypertrophy of the administrative and magistral functions of the clergy led to the atrophy of their spiritual functions.

In the sphere of culture the influence of Russian orthodoxy was infinitely less than that of Catholicism. The Russian "white clergy," with very rare exceptions, have always been and are still extremely uneducated. Even in the first half of the eighteenth century it was sufficient for the intending shepherd of souls to be able to read, to write after a fashion, and to recite a couple of psalms by heart. At the beginning of the nineteenth century an examination was imposed on the candidates. Seminaries were opened in all the provinces. However, the moral and intellectual level of the Russian clergy still left much to be desired. Even to-day the education provided by these seminaries is highly scholastic, and intended not to awaken and enlarge the philosophic faculty of the pupils, but to extinguish it.

The low level of culture prevalent among the clergy is further explained by the fact that the law and ancient customs have transformed the clergy into a closed caste. Hitherto the religious vocation has been transmitted from father to son by inheritance. There are, therefore, among the clergy certain ruling dynasties, each of which has ruled some parish for a hundred or two hundred years. Moreover, usage demands that "the son shall never occupy a grade superior to that of his father." "The son of the pope can only present himself as candidate for the position of pope; the son of a vicar can only aspire to be a vicar. Castes are thus formed within the clergy, and it is very difficult for men of talent to break through them" (Professor Znamensky, *History of the Russian Church*). We must add that the religious caste has long been in a position very greatly inferior to that of the nobility, and that down to the end of the eighteenth century the priest, just as the serf, might *according to the law* be subjected to corporal punishment; and the lower clergy were so until 1863. The nobility had long regarded the priests as a contemptible class. The rural pope was often an object of ridicule to the noble landowners of the district. All these facts went far to diminish the moral prestige of the clergy. Moreover, the latter were less concerned with their moral prestige than with their material interests, and this fact was emphasized in the early years of

the eighteenth century by St. Dimitri Rostovsky, who attained one of the highest grades of the Russian hierarchy. St. Dimitri stated that the Russian priests entered into orders *nie radi Iisusa a radi hlieba kusa* : "not for Jesus Christ, but for a goodly portion of bread."

The upkeep of the clergy weighs heavily on the budget of the Russian peasant, and the journals are always recording the unworthy fashion in which the divine mercy is trafficked in, and how ruthless are the clergy in extorting money. Often a Russian priest refuses to bury a corpse if the relatives of the deceased refuse to pay him the sum demanded. Then the body will lie days without burial until the relatives have got together the amount required. The police are often forced to intervene in such a case and to order immediate burial for fear of contagion. Money plays so great a part in the relations between the "shepherds and their flock" that a proverb has become popular among the peasantry : "Be born, get baptized and married, and die, and pay the pope for everything."

The material relations between the Church and the people are complicated by the fact that the Church holds some of the greatest estates in Russia, and the number of these is continually increasing. In 1877 the "white" and "black" clergy together—that is, the Church and the monasteries—owned more than 2,000,000 *desiatins* of land, and in 1905 more than 2,500,000. It must be remembered that the ecclesiastical lands are in the most fertile regions of Russia, in the centre and the south, precisely where the dearth of land is most sharply felt by the peasantry. Possessing considerable landed property, the Russian Church has failed to employ its influence in the direction of improving agriculture. The Russian popes and monks are in this respect very different from those Catholic priests, the "Brothers of the Christian Colleges," of whom M. Le Hon, in his *Psychology of Education*, states that "the only real agricultural education in France is in their hands. They have farms on which pupils receive a practical education and obtain all the prizes offered for competition." The Russian clergy are con-

tent to exploit their landed property in a parasitical manner, for they lease their lands to the peasantry, charging a very high rent, which still further irritates the peasants against them. Similarly, in the sphere of public instruction the Russian clergy have accomplished nothing like the results obtained by the "Brothers of the Christian Colleges" above mentioned. According to M. Le Bon once more: "These Brothers are now very seriously competing with the University in the matter of superior secondary education." Even for primary instruction the Russian priest has done very little. Although under the rule of Alexander III and Nicolas II the Government, struggling to extinguish liberal and revolutionary ideas, maintained a "confessional school" in opposition to the lay schools, so that the Holy Synod covered all Russia with "parish confessional schools," the results of this activity were negative. The instruction given in these schools was and is so bad that the peasants prefer to send their children to the lay schools provided by the State and the municipalities. Moreover, some of these "confessional schools" exist only on paper.

To sum up: we may say that historical conditions in Russia have prevented the formation of a soil favourable to clericalism like that to be observed in France. The political and intellectual power of the Russian Church has been infinitely inferior to that of the Roman Church, which continues to make its influence felt even in those countries which are on the way to a purely capitalistic development.

III

I proceed now to this question: What was the effect of serfdom upon the mentality of the people?

Three centuries of such a system must have left their mark. Abolished by law only in 1861, the system still makes itself felt both in the manners and in the mentality of the Russian people. Moreover, in the latter period of its existence—about the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century—

serfdom assumed particularly brutal forms, for at that period the rich landowners had realized the possibility of selling their products for money in the open market, and thus of augmenting their revenues. But in order to achieve this end they by no means sought to improve the technique of production. They mercilessly forced their serfs to labour, employing the same methods as slave-owners might employ towards negroes. Here, for example, are some facts, certified by historic documents and legal records :

In 1852 an inquiry was held in respect of a landowner of Kherson, K——, who had driven a young man to suicide. The inquiry elicited the fact that K—— very often had the peasants put in chains, and so chained drove them like cattle to work. One peasant-woman fled. "She was caught after an attempt at suicide. She was chained to a post in the kitchen and kept there for five years, being liberated only when her services were required." "Another peasant was chained by the neck for four years. *He died thus chained.*"

The serfs were shockingly fed. This was the diet on the estate of Mme S—— of the province of Kharkov. In the first place, food was cooked only once a week. "First meal, *bortch* (the national soup of Little Russia), but without salt. Second meal, rotten pumpkin or elderberries. For the whole day, a scrap of bread. On Sunday, meat full of maggots."

You may judge what was the effect on the physical, intellectual, and moral nature of the serf of exhausting labour accomplished under such conditions.

The serf was always subject to corporal punishment.

"On one estate," affirms a contemporary, "forty to fifty women were beaten every day, and those with child were not spared."

Between 1840 and 1850 Prince G—— "had as many as a thousand lashes given to offending peasants, and then applied cantharides to the wounded parts. Sometimes he conceived the whim to punish them amidst a solemn ceremony. For example, he one day assembled all the young girl serfs, and had one of them whipped in the presence of the others. The 'operation'

lasted an hour, during which the prince played at billiards. The result of the punishment was that extreme unction had to be administered."

The landowner K—— "whipped his coachman, who had overturned his carriage, till he drew his last breath." Another killed certain peasants in the same manner. A certain T—— "ordered peasants who were suspected of theft to be hanged by the fingers from the rafters of the coach-house."

In 1846 the affair of Mme Stotzky was made public. "The inquiry revealed that Mme Stotzky, without any motive, used to punish her peasants with her own hands. She had fitted in a chamber two ring-bolts of iron, one of which was fixed to the ceiling: by means of these she had the serfs strung up in an erect position. She used to bite her serfs, stifle them, pour boiling water down their necks, forced them to eat their own excrement, and would put a bridle on the women on the pretext that they drank milk while milking the cows. One girl, a farm-hand, died after having for months received fifty to two hundred blows of a staff daily."

Another landed proprietress, the wife of the marshal of the nobility, Mme de Svirsky, committed such horrors that one can hardly believe in their possibility (the trial was in 1853). "She used to force her serfs to eat their excrement or rotten eggs. She used to strike them with an *arapnik*, or make them sit naked upon ice. She forced a little girl to swallow brick and pounded glass; the child died. Another child she forced to eat a plait of hair. A wolf-bitch was kept in her court-yard, and she often set it upon the peasants. One woman was nearly killed by it; another received thirty wounds."

The hard labour and the horrible treatment to which the peasants were accustomed very often reduced them to a state of absolute insensibility. They *became accustomed* to these tortures. The well-known Russian publicist, Samarin, relates that a more than usually humane estate manager having forbidden the use of torture, the result of the experiment was that the serfs refused to go to work. "Threats, persuasion, nothing availed; only fresh

corporal punishment forced them to resume work." It was only in the course of time that the peasants became accustomed to obey without the fear of blows.

Some landowners reduced their serfs to such a state of brutalization that when the manifesto ordering the abolition of serfdom was published (19th February, 1861) the serfs were not in a condition to understand that they were free. A certain Kh——, of the province of Koursk, who owned a small estate, "having seized all the peasants' land, forced the serfs to labour for his own profit without granting them sufficient food to live on, or sufficient time to repose. Keeping no feast-days, leaving the master's estate only once a year, in order to attend church once a year, and forbidden to receive visits, the peasants of Kharkevitch, after twenty-five or thirty years of such treatment, lost all faculty of reason, and were reduced almost to idiocy." When a commissary visited Kh—— to read the manifesto of liberation, "the peasants listened attentively but understood nothing."

Serfdom was especially hard on the women. The masters exploited not only their labour but also their bodies.

In 1857 the Russian Senate dealt with the affair of the landed proprietor Stratsinsky. The latter was accused "of abducting the wives of his peasants and of the violation of numerous young girls, often children thirteen or fourteen years of age, followed by death." The inquiry confirmed these facts. Nevertheless the Senate did not find Stratsinsky guilty, but merely left him "under suspicion."

Another proprietor, Vitvitzky, of the province of Saratov, "enjoying great respect among the nobility of the district, abducted an incalculable number of peasants' wives, seduced more than two hundred young girls, and caused inconvenient husbands, brothers, or friends to be enrolled in the army." Another instituted a compulsory "night service" for all the young girls on his estate; the recalcitrant were flogged and put to labour, a collar of iron spikes round the neck. Some possessed veritable harems. One Jadovsky was not content

with violating young girls (Proceedings, 1855), but also insisted on the *jus primæ noctis* (to me the first night), allowing no peasants to marry save on the condition that the "first night belonged to the *barin* (*seigneur*).” Certain proprietors contrived even better : they demanded of the public women of Moscow or St. Petersburg a portion of their earnings. One lady, an owner of vast estates, went even further. She used to import into the capital young peasant girls, whom she educated and then placed in a licensed house which she herself managed.

Thus the person and the dignity of the serf were continually trampled under foot by the master. The peasant was treated incomparably worse than a dog. But then the price of a good hound was much higher than that of a peasant. Sometimes a landowner would exchange a family or even a small village of serfs for a fine *borzoi*. And just as animals are bred to obtain the desired strain, so the peasants were coupled by the master. The peasant was forbidden to think of love : he must marry according to the master's order, according to the material interests of the latter. What matter if the bride did not please, or if the bridegroom were repulsive to the young bride ?

Every phenomenon presents two sides. Russian serfdom was no exception to the rule. Although a cause of the mental and moral degradation of the masses, at the same time it liberated the privileged class of society from material care and labour, and contributed to the formation of an intellectual *élite*, which especially distinguished itself in polite literature. The Russian novel of the nineteenth century, with such masters as Gontcharov, Turgenev, and Tolstoy, was largely the fruit of "aristo-serf" culture.

Being the culture only of an insignificant minority, it was too slight and superficial a stratum to cover the life of a people. It was the beautiful frontage of a hideous building, with rotten foundations and tottering to its fall. This contradiction between the surface and the deeper life of the country was the cause of the estrangement between the *élite* and the people ; an estrangement which is responsible for the tragic note to be heard in the work

of so many Russian writers, and which is revealed in other ways : for instance, in language and methods of expressing thought. The Russian language, in prose and verse, even in the works of the most truly national of Russian writers, is far from being the language of the people, and it is still very difficult for the people to understand works written in "literary Russian." During the period of serfdom, when there were no schools in the country, when all the peasants were illiterate, when all the physical and spiritual forces of the country were the prisoners of serfdom, this separation of the "thought" and the "word" of the strict "truth of life" was still more tragic and profound. The situation was analogous to that which existed in the Roman Empire during the "golden age," when the refined culture of the aristocracy flourished on the social foundation of slavery.

This contradiction, this estrangement, very shortly became a danger to the privileged class, for all the peasants were not inured to their situation. Many of them despaired of finding any issue, and gave the signal of sedition.

The Government of Catherine II found it a difficult task to get the better of the notorious Yemelyan Pugatchev, who succeeded in mustering a whole army of peasants and fugitive serfs, taking several towns and fortresses by storm, and breaking the heads of many popes and nobles. The Government had to send serious military expeditions against him. The "Pugatchevshtchina" terminated with the victory of the Government and the execution of Pugatchev. But afterwards, and until the abolition of serfdom, there were incessantly peasant revolts in all parts of Russia. Under the reign of Nicolas I alone 556 "agitations" were recorded, or an average of nineteen annually. Their number increased year by year :—

Between 1826 and 1829 there were 41 peasants' risings.							
"	1830	"	1834	"	"	46	"
"	1835	"	1839	"	"	59	"
"	1840	"	1844	"	"	101	"
"	1845	"	1849	"	"	172	"
"	1850	"	1854	"	"	137	"

Sometimes these revolts attained enormous proportions. In 1846, for example, the revolt affected 18 provinces; in 1847, 22; in 1848, 27. In the majority of cases the cause of the riot was to be found in the persecutions of the serfs and their desire to free themselves from serfdom. The collective state of mind of the masses was so nervous that insurrection, like a psychical epidemic, spread among the people with extraordinary rapidity. Samarin, whom we have already cited, characterized the popular state of mind at this period in the following words: "In the present condition of the serfs the speech of a drunken deserter from the army, an imperfectly comprehended order, the appearance of an unusual malady, or the visit of the Tsar to Moscow (as in 1843), in short, any event that evokes the general attention, may produce excitement and arouse the thought, always present, of liberty. Then this excitement may turn to a riot, and the riot to a general insurrection. All this is possible at any moment, and a conscientious police force could not guarantee a single day of tranquillity."

The peasants did not protest against serfdom only by revolting. There were also cases of personal vengeance, murders of masters, and cases of burning their houses. Between 1835 and 1843, 416 serfs, of whom 118 were women, were transported to Siberia for the murder of their proprietors. The germs of crime and hatred had been ably sown by centuries of serfdom. The hatred of the peasants soon embraced both proprietors and State officials. This is not astonishing, for serfdom was closely bound up with the political system. Serfdom, the basis of the life of the State, tinged all social relations and the whole political fabric. The upper and middle bureaucracy, furnished by the nobility, was of the very blood and bone of serfdom. As for the petty officials, they lived less by their salaries than by the gifts of their superiors and the "profits" demanded of the population. The Russian habit of extortion is notorious throughout the world, and is the direct offshoot of slavery. A despotic will and a contempt of individual rights and social interests develop rankly in the gross and brutal atmosphere of serfdom. The terms "proprietor,"

"official," became synonymous, for the peasant, with evil and suffering. In Little Russia every great property was called "human blood." In White Russia a song is to this day extant which dates from the time of serfdom, in which the peasant implores of God "the favour that he may no longer have to fear the *Pan* (*seigneur*) nor the *Voit* (chief of the commune), and may be able to rest for a little in his house in peace."

I imagine that there is not in the world a country whose population is more distrustful of the directing element than Russia. This suspiciousness of the Russian peasant extends even to persons who are sincerely resolved to devote their labour and their energies to the people. The reader will have heard of the insurrections provoked by the appearance of cholera. During the epidemic of 1902 peasants destroyed hospitals and barracks prepared for those stricken with the disease, beat and killed the doctors and nurses, whom they accused of "sowing the cholera to make the people suffer." Such facts are to be explained not only by the ignorance of the people, but also by the profound distrust and suspicion inspired in the peasantry by the representatives of authority, among whom they count the doctor. The doctor is dressed otherwise than the *mujik*; he "speaks like a lord"; and moreover he performs mysterious experiments. What more could be needed? The matter is plain: the physician is the agent of the "masters" and the "authorities," and wishes to poison the people by means of cholera. So, to-day, reason the inhabitants of a Russian village. And from such logical reasoning as this it is only one short step to rioting and to *pogroms* of hospitals and medicines.

There is no country in the world, I repeat, where the *gospoda* (*seigneurs*) and the *tchinouniki* (officials of State) are regarded by the popular masses with so distorted a vision as in Russia. Here we must make a remark which at first sight may appear strange: the prejudice and malevolence of the people have never—or not until quite lately—extended to the head of the Government, the Tsar. Even of recent years the name of the Tsar was surrounded, as it were, with a magical halo, beyond which the

indignation of the people could not pass. Not only did the people disbelieve that the Tsar was in agreement with the nobles and the officials : not only did they refuse to hold him responsible for the actions of those about him, but they continually contrasted him with the detested *gospoda* and *tchinovniki*. The Tsar is not responsible for the sufferings of the people, for the truth is hidden from him—such is the refrain of the peasants when they speak of the Tsar ; a refrain which is enlarged and embroidered in the popular proverbs and songs and verses. In a song of White Russia two peasants, Danilo and Stepan, hold converse relating the melancholy situation of the serfs, and dream of deliverance. Says one to the other : “ The rumour goes that the Tsar wants to free the people, but the lords know how to lie. They make up lies about the peasants, and the Tsar believes them : and we shall have to bear the yoke of these liars.”

The same idea is expressed in this characteristic proverb : *Jalouet Tsar, da nie jalouet psar* (The Tsar means well, but his servant means ill).

Hence the conclusion that the Tsar himself must be reached ; he must be told the whole truth ; the sufferings of his people must be explained to him. And the peasants, hiding the matter from their masters and the local authorities, used to select *khodoks* (foot-messengers, from *khodit*, to walk) and send them to “Piter” (the popular term for St. Petersburg), that they might approach the Tsar and seek “protection and the truth.” With a few *kopecks* in his pocket, the *mujik* would set out from his native village on a journey of hundreds or thousands of miles. Rarely did he reach the capital. In most cases he was arrested on the way and sent to prison or Siberia. If he succeeded in reaching St. Petersburg he got no farther than the Palace guard, and was confronted by impregnable bars. It is not surprising that the following proverb is familiar to every peasant : *Do Boga vysoko, do tsaria daleko* (It is a great height to God, a long way to the Tsar).

Historical facts prove that the monarchical tradition took root a long time ago in the mentality of the people. In the seventeenth

century, when the aristocracy of the *boyars* wished to remove Boris Godunov from the throne, they summoned the people to revolt in the name of the "legal Tsar," Dimitri. In the same way Pugatchev, to obtain the sympathy of the people, took the name of the Tsar Piotr Fedorovitch, husband of Catherine II, who, as we know, was killed by the favourites of his wife in order that the latter might ascend the throne. The fundamental motive of the popular movement of the "Period of Unrest" of the *Pugatchevshchina* was certainly to be found in deep-seated social causes, but at present I can only speak of the form assumed by this movement. An insurrection against the Tsar in the name of the Tsar! Truly an original rebellion! But the succeeding period reveals facts no less interesting. When the abolition of serfdom was proclaimed by manifesto in 1861, a great many peasants were ill content with the conditions of their liberation, on account of the small quantity of land allotted to them by the manifesto. In some districts the peasants even refused to accept the manifesto, declaring that "it was not the truth," but a forgery composed by the landlords. The Government had to convince the peasants, by shooting them down or deporting them, of the authentic nature of the document. Then arose the legend that a day would come when the Tsar would grant his people "the true abolition of serfdom" as expounded in the "Golden Charter," which the nobles had stolen.

To judge the force and vitality of these monarchical illusions one must consider that the revolutionary propaganda has often encountered these very illusions as an almost insuperable obstacle. In the years 1870-80, at the time of the "descent among the people," when the intellectual youth of Russia began to leave their homes in order to devote themselves to the revolutionary cause, and later, just before the explosion of the revolution of 1905, the agitators who spread the propaganda in the country-side often heard this declaration on the part of the *muzik*: "Speaker, speak of what you like, but leave our Little Father alone!" Beside the peasants, many artisans, having recently

quitted the rural districts, have retained this mentality, and at the end of 1904 and the beginning of 1905 the majority of the were under the domination of the same monarchical illusion. Hence the possibility of such incidents as those of "Bloody Sunday" (January, 1905). On that day hundreds of thousands of working-men, with their wives and children, bearing *ikons* and portraits of the Tsar, with Father Gapon at their head, marched in front of the Winter Palace to implore the protection of the Tsar against the power of capital. Gapon, the *agén provocateur* of the Government, wanted to play the part of a Bonapartist demagogue; that is, he sought to exploit the monarchical illusions of the workers. If he failed it was not because these illusions were feeble, but because the Tsar and his advisers, terrified by the "love and confidence shown by the people," received the peaceful crowd with a murderous volley of bullets.

The Bonapartist demagoguery of the Government has certainly played a prominent part in the preservation of monarchical illusions among the Russian peasants, and especially among those of Poland and the Western Ukraine: for there absolutism, in order to shatter the opposition of the nobles, made certain concessions to the people. But the phenomena of monarchical ideology cannot be explained exclusively by Governmental demagoguery; we must look for other causes. One of these causes may be found in the ideas which have survived from the age of feudalism. During the feudal period the Tsar was the supreme sovereign, the highest of judges over the heads of the *boyars*. The peasants grew to regard the Tsar as the superior of the *boyars* and their supreme defence against the feudatories. The other cause may be found in the peculiarities of the peasant mentality. The peasant of earlier days, isolated as he was, neither saw nor comprehended the complex connections existing between political, social, and economic phenomena. This being so, he felt an irresistible need to personify the Tsar as monarch in the social domain, just as he personified God in order to explain the life and order of nature. To the peasant the Tsar appeared

EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL MIND 93

as a centre about which his political experience was concentrated and systematized. The idea of the Tsar, like the idea of God, served him as a compass, which saved him from losing himself in the gigantic ocean of the facts and phenomena of life.

And as the peasant's idea of God is extremely primitive and ingenuous, so are his monarchical concepts. If you ask a peasant what a Tsar is, he will reply in the words of Victor Hugo: "A king is a man on horseback." And before his eyes will pass a vision of monuments, of pictures representing the Russian Tsars, on horseback, in gorgeous apparel.

This political fetichism is analogous to religious fetichism, and both have identical hopes and prospects.

BOOK II
THE MODERN PERIOD

CHAPTER I

GENERAL SKETCH OF THE ECONOMIC POSITION OF RUSSIA AS COMPARED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

- I. Foreign trade. II.—Russia's part in the world of international competition—Russian capital and its peculiarities—The importance of foreign capital.

I

SOME one has said that an inch of statistics is sometimes worth more than a mile of abstract demonstration. This saying is very true when it refers to the estimation of the economic resources of a country; in this case the bushels of grain exported, the mileage of railways, and the tonnage of steel manufactured in a year tell us more, in their dry but exact language, than a whole poem inspired by the labour and the human energies of this or that nation.

This being so, I hope the reader will not be offended if I commence my exposition by statistical figures. Let us first of all consider the development of the external trade of Russia in the course of the nineteenth century.

In the first quarter of the century (1800–24) the total imports and exports attained an annual average of £11,700,000; between 1825 and 1849 the average was £22,200,000; between 1849 and 1874, £54,500,000; and between 1874 and 1899, £113,700,000. In other words, the commercial contribution of Russia to the world-market increased by 972 per cent., or ten times, in a century. And the isolation of Russia amid the

other Powers grew proportionately less, while the ties binding her to other nations were proportionately strengthened. At the end of the nineteenth century Russia occupied the sixth place among the participators in the world-market. Great Britain, whose commercial turnover is 20 per cent. of the whole, was first; Germany, with 11 per cent. of the total turnover, was second; the United States, with 10 per cent., was third. Then came France (8 per cent.), Holland (7 per cent.), Russia (6 per cent.), Austria (5 per cent.), and Belgium (5 per cent.).

At the beginning of the twentieth century the commercial significance of Russia is still increasing. During the first five years of the century her commercial turnover increased by one-third. In 1905 it amounted in value to £177,400,000, and in 1906 to £197,400,000, an increase of £20,000,000 in a single year.

The rapid increase of Russia's foreign trade is further verified by other data. Midway through the nineteenth century Russia possessed only 6,000 trading-vessels, representing 1,100,000 tons; and by the end of the century she was mistress of more than 11,000 vessels of 9,100,000 tons in all. Let us note that the exports by water do not by any means include the whole of the Russian exports. A large fraction of the export trade crosses the continental frontiers. This branch of the trade was developed more especially during the second half of the nineteenth century, when the Russian railways and those of other continental countries were expanding.

Between 1802 and 1804 the exports by sea formed 88 per cent. of the total. Towards the middle of the century the exports by land had risen from 12 per cent. to 17 per cent.; towards the end of the century to 27 per cent. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the imports by sea formed 78 per cent. of the total imports; while the imports by land constituted only 22 per cent. of the total. Towards the middle of the century the imports by land had reached 37 per cent.; by the end, 46 per cent.

An enormous quantity of grain, wood, coal, oil, petroleum, iron,

stuffs, etc., is yearly, monthly, daily shipped from Russia to Europe, and fabulous sums of money flow backward and forward from the human sea of Europe to that of Russia. European capital leaves England, Belgium, France, and Germany for the great Eastern plain. Between the years 1895-1900 alone Russian industry absorbed more than 500 millions of silver roubles of foreign money (£52,800,000). The total current of European money which flows into Russia is enough to turn one's head.

Take up any French journal and cast the eye down the columns devoted to the Stock Exchange. You will find there a large number of Russian words : *Briansk*, *Krivoi Rog*, *Donetz*, *Dubovaia Balka*, *Makaruka*, *Ekatereinevka*, *Tula*, *Marinopol*, and others. These words denote various cities, towns, and villages of Russia, which were, not so long ago, quiet and desert places, but which to-day are industrial centres connected with London, Paris, and Brussels. The mine opened by the Russian labourer somewhere in the southern steppes is turned into gold on the Paris Bourse. A dozen eggs laid in some village lost in the depths of Russia and collected by a humble peasant-woman are sent right across the continent of Europe, finally to reach the lamp of the sorter at the "Egg Exchange" of London, and thence to pass into the hands of the consumer.

The might of capital, the might of gold, has drawn Russia into the mad whirlpool of universal production and international exchange, and has thereby bound her to the older nations of Europe.

II

We have seen how important the position of Russia has been, from the quantitative point of view, in the international market. Let us now consider it from the qualitative point of view : what does Russia at present give the world, and what will she give it in the future, when her productive forces are fully developed ?

Different countries contribute in differing degrees to the

economic activity of humanity, fulfilling various functions. Some, as England and Germany, are especially active in the sphere of industry, providing their neighbours with metals, machinery, rails, ships, etc. Others, like Holland and France, play the part of international bankers; they are the home of the Stock Exchange, the Bourse, and the savings-bank. Others, like the United States and the Argentine, furnish corn to many countries and are the "granaries of the world." To this category Russia belongs. The exports of Russia exceed her imports. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the annual imports of Russia were £51,600,000 and the exports £62,000,000; and the principal article of export to-day is wheat. At the beginning of the nineteenth century "alimentary products" constituted only 19·4 per cent. of the Russian export trade. Between 1896 and 1898 the proportion was 58·2 per cent., and in 1903 it had swollen to 62·4 per cent. If we take the exact figures we find that in 1899 the value of the wheat exported was £34,000,000, and in 1903, £64,750,000. Russian wheat is therefore one of the most important factors of the alimentation of Europe, and certain countries of late years consume practically no wheat but that exported by Russia.

Hence we see the importance of the economic development of Russia and the significance of her agriculture in respect of international life.

The export trade in grain developed more particularly about the year 1861, after the abolition of serfdom; the exports of wheat alone, after that year, increased by 400 per cent. Between 1851 and 1860 the amount was 10,175,000 bushels; between 1861 and 1870 it rose to 36,600,000 bushels. Russia supplanted Germany and France in the cereal market, and was on the way to monopolize the provision of corn for Europe. But at this moment America appeared on the stage and American wheat began to compete with Russian grain (1871). The struggle resulted in lower prices and provoked an agrarian crisis, which, for more than twenty-five years, disturbed the rural economy of Europe. This crisis had painful results for Russia: it produced

a set-back in the industry of agriculture and a degradation of technical methods. As a result the most primitive forms of exploiting labour have been preserved in Russia, and a divorce has arisen between industry and agriculture, between the town and the country, between the "iron country" and the "straw country." And this fatal division is reflected in the social and political development of the country. Here is an example of the universal tie existing between the various phenomena of human life, however far removed from one another.

Russia, as we have already said, is one of the "granaries of the world." But it would be incorrect to represent her as an exclusively agricultural country. The nineteenth century, and especially the second half of that century, was for Russia, as for other countries, an industrial century. This is proved by the data of her foreign trade. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the largest Russian imports consisted of provisions (39 per cent.) and manufactured goods (35·2 per cent. of the total imports). As for raw material and partially manufactured products, they constituted 24 per cent. of the total imports. In the middle of the century these latter had risen to 44·3 per cent., and at the end of the century they amounted to more than half of all the goods imported. On the other hand, the importation of alimentary products and of manufactures fell appreciably towards the end of the century. The former then constituted 17·3 per cent. of the whole, and the latter 29·4 per cent. The increasing importation of raw materials and partly manufactured goods demonstrates the rise of a national industry absorbing these materials in order to create manufactured products.

The fact that industrialism is increasing in Russia is certified by the data relating to the number of factories and workshops. It is especially interesting to remark the grouping of industrial undertakings in respect of the dates of foundation. The *List of Factories and Workshops* published by the Ministry of Finance in 1900 facilitates the comparison. We are able to note that the application of capital to Russian industries is increasingly progressive. Thus, of the 14,500 factories and workshops of which

we have knowledge, an enormous number were established in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Before 1861, 2,177 enterprises were initiated; between 1861 and 1870, 1,285; between 1871 and 1880, 2,100; between 1881 and 1890, 3,030; between 1891 and 1900, 5,788. So 40 per cent. of the establishments mentioned in the list cited were founded during the latter portion of the nineteenth century. In spite of its youth, or perhaps for that very reason, the industrial capitalism of Russia gives evidence of stupendous energy and a great faculty of growth.

To illustrate the development of Russian industry I will cite an example taken from the sphere of the metallurgical industry, which, as we know, is the backbone of modern economy. In 1893, 68,800,000 poods or 1,050,000 tons of castings were founded in the Russian foundries; in 1902, 2,490,000 tons. The production of steel and iron in 1893 was 945,000 tons; and in 1902, 1,870,000 tons. In 1893 Russia occupied the sixth place in the matter of foundry-work; at the beginning of the present century she had already attained the fourth, outstripping both Austria and France, and even Belgium, in the production of steel and iron.

"While the production of cast metal increased, between 1890-1900, by 58 per cent. in France, 13 per cent. in Great Britain, 76 per cent. in the United States, and 61 per cent. in Germany, in Russia it increased by 220 per cent. The production of iron and steel during the same ten years increased by 41 per cent. in France, 50 per cent. in the United States, 91 per cent. in Germany, and 196 per cent. in Russia. *Thus the increase in production of Russia in this industrial sphere has sensibly exceeded that of the world, and has enormously exceeded that of each capitalist country considered separately*" (A. Finn-Yenotzavsky, *Industrial Capitalism in Russia during the last Ten Years of the Nineteenth Century*). Such is the statement of a Russian economist. The reader must not forget that the social and political conditions beside which Russian capitalism has had to develop have been far from favourable to the latter. If the juridical and p cal

formation of the life of the Russian people could be so reformed as to give the productive forces of the country entire liberty, we might count upon a still more rapid development of Russian capitalism. With its abundance of natural wealth, Russia would become a dangerous rival even of the most advanced nations. And in this struggle of giants—which assumes an increasingly acute character in the universal market—Russia would play a very important part. The old capitalism of Western Europe would be confronted by two formidable rivals—Russia and America. International history will in the near future be complicated by stupendous economic and political conflicts.

One of the peculiarities of Russian capitalism is the part which foreign capital has played in its development. Some branches of Russian industry—mining and metallurgy—exist very largely by means of foreign capital. This participation of European money in the economic life of Russia has had two results. In the first place, it has bound Russian capitalism closely to European capitalism. Everything that happens in Russia has an interest for the capitalist world of France, England, and Belgium which is not only theoretical, but material; for enormous quantities of gold are invested by these countries in the industrial undertakings of Russia. Still greater are the sums which enter Russia from abroad in the form of State loans. These loans, concluded not at home but abroad, have earned and do still earn a steady profit, not for the Russian middle classes, but for foreign capitalists. Finally, we find that the development of foreign capital in Russia is detrimental to the development of Russian capital. The cause of this phenomenon is the political weakness of the Russian middle classes. The autocracy, with the aid of European capital, has not only succeeded in making itself independent of the middle classes, but it refuses to allow the latter to acquire political power.

Freed from the difficulties which a strong capitalist opposition within the country would have presented, the autocracy has nevertheless profited by the technical advantages of Russian capitalism to reinforce its power. Thanks to modern technical

methods, it has fortified the mechanism of the State without modifying the despotic character of its authority, and has sometimes suggested the strange spectacle of a Tamerlane or an Attila equipped with the telephone and wireless telegraphy.

This peculiar fusion of the political forms of Asiatic despotism with the material procedures of a capitalist civilization is the result of the internal development of Russia, and the relations of the latter with other capitalist countries.

CHAPTER II

THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE FROM THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POINT OF VIEW

I. The process of differentiation. II. Professions and trades. III. The various classes of society and the distribution of the national revenue.

I

THE development of capitalism was accomplished in Russia—as in other countries—by the process of differentiation. This process was accomplished in many different ways. The whole territory of Russia has assumed a new aspect. The ancient uniformity of the country disappeared, as well as the old primitive scheme of economics. A territorial division of labour was effected between the different portions of the country. This division is bound up with the distribution of the natural wealth of Russia. Enormous layers of coal, which were found in the south of Russia, between the Dnieper and the Don, were the foundation of the coal-mining industry. All this region, formerly desolate, was transformed into a mining district. Another mining district was developed in Polish Dombrova. There metallurgy attained a great development. Two other and older metallurgical centres, the Moscow district and the Ural district (both of which regions were worked two centuries ago), were surpassed by the districts of Donetz and Dombrova. The petroleum wells beside the Caspian Sea and in the valleys of Terek and Kuban gave rise to the oil industry, which to-day employs an enormous amount of labour. The provinces of Moscow, Vladimir, Kos-

troma, and Yaroslavl have long been centres of the textile industry, which has found yet another home in the district of Lodz, in Poland. The province of Varsovia and the south-west, the districts of Kiev and Podolsk, and certain districts of Central Russia—such as the districts of Moscow and Tula—have become a “sugar kingdom,” being covered with plantations of beet and refineries. Besides these districts, which have their own special industries, there are other industrial centres in which production is both intense and varied, such as the district of St. Petersburg and its environs. There, side by side with enormous foundries are textile factories, ship-building yards, etc. These industrial regions and centres are the principal citadels by whose means capital conquers and rules the great Eastern plain and its millions of inhabitants. Moreover, capital has covered the plain itself with innumerable lesser fortresses. All over Russia, from the Prussian frontier to China and from the Black Sea to the White Sea, those industrial centres are coming into being by force of which the energies of capital penetrate every pore of the national life.

The economic differentiation of territory and the rise of industrial centres have had an enormous influence on the population of the country, for they provoked a movement of the masses. The factories attracted men and the railways favoured their transportation. The end of the rural economy, the impoverishment of the village, sent sons and daughters of peasants away from the paternal home toward the seductive whistle of the factory. The Russian population, formerly inert and almost immobile, astonishes the investigator to-day by its mobility. For example, if we consider those industrial provinces of Russia, St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Ekaterinoslav, and if we calculate what proportion of the labour in those provinces is constituted by the natives of the provinces themselves, we obtain a very instructive result. In the province of St. Petersburg 24·7 per cent.—that is, less than a quarter of the working population—is composed of the inhabitants of the province; the other three-quarters come from other parts, even from those remotest. In the provinces of

Moscow and Ekaterinoslavl the native workers constitute less than a half of the total of all the labourers (46·9 per cent. and 45·3 per cent.). Commenting on these data, an investigator asserts that "the mobility of the working population of Russia finds no analogy in any State of Western Europe, and can only be compared with the mobility of the labouring people of the United States."

II

The year 1897 was the date of a general census of the Empire. This was the first census to be statistically complete. Previous censuses had been special, and effected for fiscal objects. Unhappily this first attempt was a failure from the theoretical statistical point of view, partly because of the too bureaucratic nature of the organization of this important and complicated undertaking. The Government did not attempt to explain to the people the object of the census; and the people, illiterate and accustomed to regard every move of the Government with suspicion, were extremely hostile. It is true that in 1897 the peasants no longer believed that a census was "the seal of Antichrist," as their forbears had believed in the time of Peter the Great, when they fled from the Government "counters"; but none the less they regarded the proposal to "count" them with anything but goodwill. Long before the census commenced strange and sinister rumours were circulating as to its object. In the provinces of the North the people were persuaded that the aim of the census was to determine the number of people who owned no land, the number of men who might profitably be recruited. In other parts it was said that the census would be taken in order to know how many *kabaks* (Government drink-shops) ought to be established. The census had to do with *vodka*! Moreover, the peasants feared, and for that matter so did townsmen, that the census would be the signal for an increase of taxation. "In the province of Yaroslavl the rumour spread among the women that every sempstress or dressmaker, every woman working on her

own account at the making of body-linen, embroidery, or any other work of the kind, would be forced to pay a certain fiscal duty. Wherefore every woman employed in work of this nature replied to the question 'What calling do you follow?' by the answer, 'None!' . . . In the towns of the North the population was equally hostile to the census. The large merchants and the rich *bourgeois*, to the queries of the 'counters,' would only reply sulkily, 'No good will come of all this!' And when the same 'counters' begged them to read the warning printed on the census paper, they declared, 'That is nothing to do with us—we've got our business to see to!'

Under such conditions it was difficult to obtain very precise results; and, indeed, the figures published do not express the true economic state of the country, nor do they give the exact composition of the population. But bearing these reservations in mind, we may consult the result for a picture of nineteenth-century Russia. The census of 1897 gave the total population, in round figures, as 125,500,000. To-day, if we take into consideration the normal increase of the population, this figure must be increased to 150,000,000. These 150 millions of human heads, these 300 millions of human hands, present a vast reservoir of *potential* economic energy, but their *real* energy is not comparable to their potential energy: not all these heads and hands labour, and those who do work do not all work with the same intensity, nor in the same spheres.

Which portion of the Russian population works hardest?—or, as the economists would put it, how many Russians belong to the category of independent workers—that is, to the group of active workers who exercise some trade or calling? And how many belong to the dependent or passive category?

The official total of the census of 1897 (see next page) gives us the answer to this question. These figures refer to the whole Empire.

What strikes us first in this table is the small percentage of "independent" workers. These constitute only one-fourth of the population; that is, of four Russian people only one exercises

a calling; one must feed, by his capital or labour, four persons including himself. This percentage seems lower still when we compare it with the corresponding figures for other countries,¹

1897	Number of Persons.			Percentage.		
	Men.	Women.	Both Sexes.	Men.	Women.	Both Sexes.
Independent, exercising a trade or calling ...	29,140,328	6,260,087	35,400,405	43.1	9.0	26.4
Dependents (members of families) ...	38,530,820	50,201,706	88,732,526	56.9		73.6
Total	67,671,148	56,461,793	124,132,941	100		100

In Great Britain and Wales, for example, according to the census of 1891, there were 44.5 per cent. of independent workers, in Germany (1895), 44.2 per cent.; in France (1891), 49.5 per cent. Instead of the four mouths that each pair of hands must feed in Russia, in England and Germany each "independent" must feed only 2.3 persons, and in France 2 only. In other words, a sensibly smaller proportion of persons takes part in the economic activity of Russia than is the case in other countries. Consequently, although the forces of capital had by the end of the nineteenth century rooted themselves deeply in Russia, and although they had destroyed the ancient patriarchal character of Russian life, setting its enormous population in movement, they have not yet had time fully to exploit the productive energy of the people. Above all, and very naturally, female labour has been very little employed, so, while the men of Russia are divided fairly equally into active and passive (43.1 per cent. and 56.9 per cent.), of the women there are nine dependent women for each independent worker. However, in the industrial districts this

¹ Some investigators regard this figure—26.4 per cent.—as lower than the reality, and explain that at the moment of the census only the heads of families were placed on the list as "independent." But even if we count the active members of each family the figures are lower than those for other countries.

proportion decreases with the intensity of labour. For example, in the Government of Moscow, in 1897, for 100 "active" men there were 40 "active" women.

Here is a more detailed classification according to trades (according to the census of 1897).

Trade or Profession.	Men.	Women.	Total.	Percentage.
Military service ...	1,165,220	76,520	1,291,810	0.99
State and public services ...	523,325	426,036	949,361	0.75
Private and personal service ...	2,497,649	3,291,328	5,785,977	4.81
Drawing pensions or incomes from investment or land	1,026,858	1,280,781	2,307,669	1.84
Rural economy	45,902,201	47,799,363	93,701,564	75.57
Mines ...	321,963	232,784	554,747	0.44
Industry and manufactures (artisans)	6,302,693	5,428,122	11,730,815	9.34
Transport ...	1,108,657	842,353	1,951,010	1.55
Commerce ...	2,316,219	2,679,168	4,995,387	4.02
Other professions	347,721	460,366	808,087	0.64
	62,477,348	63,162,673	124,076,427	100

The greater portion of the population of Russia is composed of agriculturalists. Nevertheless, capitalist industry is the factor that determines the character and the tone of Russian life. The conflict between town and country, between the roaring industrial centre and the peaceful fields, is resolved in Russia in favour of the town. The village, despite its quantitative superiority, plays a subordinate part in the social life of the country.

What is the number of persons working in Russia to satisfy the intellectual needs of the population? If we consider, as belonging to this group, the representatives of public education, typography, the arts, etc., we at once perceive its numerical insignificance in the light of analogous data provided by other European nations.

Here is a comparison established by a Russian investigator (P. Masslov) between this group in Russia and in Germany :

Persons employed in—	Russia, 1897.	Germany, 1895.
Typography... ..	33,200	75,500
Bookbinding	26,000	61,000
Theatre, music, and other arts ...	38,000	74,000
Public instruction	168,000	232,000
Total*	265,200	442,500

As the population of Germany in 1895 was less than half that of Russia, the latter country should have not 265,200 such workers, but more than a million.

III

What is the average standard of living among the population of the Russian Empire? It is not easy to reply to this question, for hitherto the national revenue of Russia has not been statistically estimated. The Russian State lives largely by indirect taxation, the direct tax being little employed. It is therefore impossible to estimate the national income exactly. However, if we wish merely to establish the average standard of comfort in Russia, we can safely say that it is low. Certain investigators assert that at the end of the nineteenth century the average annual revenue of each inhabitant of Russia was only £5 to £6. This miserable figure appears even more wretched when we compare it with the figures for North America, England, and France. Even in a country so backward as Roumania the average is higher than this. It is the same with all that concerns

* Only one five-hundredth of the population.

the economic development of Russia. In the accumulation of national wealth she is far behind other countries, but the tendencies of development are the same in Russia as elsewhere. The concentration of capital and the differentiation of the various groups and classes according to revenue may be observed in Russia.

Not long ago the Ministry of Finance attempted to draw up a tabulated statement of the distribution of revenue among the various groups of the population. But this table included only those annual incomes which were over 1,000 roubles, that is, £104. Incomes less than this, which were of course the more numerous, were omitted. Here, according to the figures cited in an article published in 1907 by the *Tovarishtch* (Nos. 318 and 319), are a few details from this table: Among the rural landowners the Ministry of Finance counted 59,681 persons whose annual income was more than £104. Forty per cent. of these persons belonged to the first category—that is, they possessed between £104 and £208 annually. The sum of the revenues of the landowners of this first category constituted only 9.4 per cent. of the sum of the revenues of these 59,681 persons. On the other hand, the sum of the revenues of landowners of the higher category (having incomes between £2,080 and £5,200) constituted 17.3 per cent. of the sum of the revenues. Yet the proprietors of this last class formed only 3.5 per cent. of the 59,681 landowners. The members of the highest class of all, having each an income of more than £5,200, composed only a very small proportion of the whole number of rural proprietors (1.2 per cent.). But the total of their incomes amounted to 24 per cent. of the sum of the revenues. In other words, we observe here a concentration of capital.

We observe the same phenomena among the urban landlords. Of 57,684 persons having incomes above £104 almost half (46.6 per cent.) consist of small landlords of the first category. They receive only 14.2 per cent. of the sum of all the revenues dealt with. Landlords of the second category, who form only 3 per cent. of the whole, enjoy 26.8 per cent. of the sum of these revenues.

According to Professor Khodsky, author of the article published by the *Tovarishch* from which we have just quoted, "we may affirm with certainty that a great proportion, if not half of the landlords of the towns and the rural landowners, are in reality interfused. Many owners of real estate own country estates and *vice versa*." Here is another proof of the concentration of wealth. As for the distribution of revenues among the industrial and commercial capitalists, they disclose the same phenomenon in a less emphatic form: 44.5 per cent. of these capitalists are small proprietors of the first category. In their hands is only 8.6 per cent. of the totality of revenues, while a group of capitalists, insignificant in number (4.5 per cent. of the total number of industrial and commercial capitalists), but belonging to the higher category of proprietors, receive 56.3 per cent. of the totality of revenues.

I hope these facts and figures will fully demonstrate that Russia is far from being an exception, as regards the general economic and social characteristics of her structure, among the family of capitalist countries of the modern world. The "patriarchal customs of the Slavs"—if they ever existed—have to-day disappeared and left no traces. The economic differentiations and social conflicts are for Russia, as for other countries, the source of the most important events, the most urgent questions of popular life.

CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT AND FORMS OF RUSSIAN CAPITAL

- I. Russian industry compared with German and Belgian industry (according to the inquiry of 1902)—The conflict of large and small industries. II. The great capitalists; their syndicates or unions and their relations with the Government. III. The great industrial centres—The modern Russian city. IV. Evolution of the proletariat: its composition and the conditions of its life. V. The Trades-Union movement.

I

YOUNG countries have this advantage over their more aged sisters: they can profit by the experience of the latter, and thus they need not linger so long at the various stages of historic development. But this advantage implies certain disadvantages: it gives the social development of the younger countries a catastrophic character, and sometimes results in a tension of forces so great as to cause the ruin of the popular organism, as this tension naturally involves an inequality of development in the various portions of the latter. While certain sections of the social and economic life of the country undergo rapid evolution, reaching a higher level, other sections lag behind and even become retrograde. Thus a turning-back and a development are produced at one and the same time; we have hyperæmia in one part and anæmia in another. Some elements are hypertrophied; others are atrophied.

The economic and social development of Russia exhibited such characteristics at the end of the nineteenth century. Being based

upon the poverty of the State and the retrograde condition of the wretched and innumerable Russian villages, the oasis of economy and capitalist culture attained a considerable development. We may illustrate this by a few facts. According to a volume by M. Pogogev, published by the Academy of Sciences, in the year 1902 there were in Russia 302 large industrial enterprises each of which employed more than 1,000 workers; in all they employed 710,000. In Germany, according to the census of 1895, there were 296 such giant undertakings—*Riesenunternehmungen*—and they employed 563,000 workers. "Russia, therefore, takes the palm, both in the number of such businesses and in the number of hands employed. A comparison of Russia with Belgium gives us similar results. According to the census of 1896 Belgium possessed 184 large undertakings employing not less than 500 workers each, and employing 160,000 in all, while in Russia the enterprises of this category number 726 and occupy nearly 1,000,000 workers." Comparing these figures, says the author, we perceive the extraordinary development of the great capitalist industrial enterprises in Russia. "In Russia, thanks to the late development of industry, the large undertakings predominate."

I beg the reader not to forget that we are not dealing with the *quantitative* results of Russian industry, but with the form, the type, the rhythm of development. If we consider the general totals, those relating to Germany and Belgium are very much greater, but the *type* of Russian capitalism and the rhythm of its development are, so to speak, more *American*.^{*}

The exceptional importance of the great Russian factories and workshops is proved by the fact that these large capitalist enterprises have attracted the greater proportion of the salaried artisans of Russia. In 1879 the large undertakings (employing more than 1,000 hands each) had already absorbed more than two-

^{*} It is not so easy to establish a comparison between France and Russia. In France the concentration of capital is more evident in the sphere of finance, the domain of the Bourse. In Russia financial capitalism is as yet little developed. This explains the entry of foreign capital.

thirds of all the industrial workers of Russia (66·8 per cent.), and in 1902 more than three-quarters of the industrial proletariat (78·5 per cent.) were working for them. This concentration of production is by no means an accidental phenomenon. It is a permanent and fundamental tendency; we shall discover it when the productive forces of the country are most intense as well as during a crisis. At such moments the great enterprises are always more adaptable, more active than the small. We may verify this assertion by a study of the first ten years of the twentieth century, which marked a slackening in the development of Russian industry.

"How did this abatement affect the internal structure of the country?" asks the well-known economist Tughan-Baranovsky. To reply to this question we must refer to the figures dealing with the number of labourers working in the factories and workshops during the years 1901-8, and "subject to factory inspection."² The tabulated figures read as follows:

Factories and Workshops employing	Number of Workers		Increase or Decrease (per cent.)
	In 1901	In 1908	
Up to 100 workers	418,700	352,700	- 16
100 to 500	495,300	472,100	- 5
500 to 1,000	372,000	389,100	+ 5
More than 1,000	525,600	655,200	+ 25
Total	1,711,600	1,768,300	+ 3

"Thus," says Professor Tughan-Baranovsky, "the stagnation of industry produced a decrease of 16 per cent. in the workers

² By no means all the industrial undertakings in Russia are under the control of the "factory inspection." The following are exempt: (1) enterprises employing not more than six workers; (2) State factories or workshops; (3) railway workshops; (4) mining enterprises.

employed by small factories employing less than 100 hands; a less sensible decrease in the staffs of factories employing up to 800 workers: and, on the contrary, an increase of one-fourth in the staffs of the 'giant factories.'

"Thanks to the considerable diminution in the number of workers employed by the small factories and the still more sensible increase in the number of those employed by the large concerns both occurring during a period of industrial stagnation, an increased concentration of labour resulted. Far from diminishing the relative economic importance of the heavily capitalized enterprises, this industrial stagnation has augmented it to the detriment of the small industrial undertakings. These latter, not being in a condition to ride out the crisis, had to wind up their affairs. The great capitalists, having already led the way in our industrial life, assumed a greater importance than ever, profiting by the ruin of smaller competitors. Social contrasts thus became more marked than ever at a time when the country was generally impoverished. Capital inevitably proceeds to conquer fresh positions."

II

The beginning of the twentieth century was marked in Russia by fresh developments of the organizations created by the great capitalists. These organizations are of two kinds: on the one hand the Russian capitalists unite upon a purely economic basis, just as those of Western Europe; on the other, their organization assumed a semi-political and highly original character, for the Russian capitalists decided to exert a continual influence upon the Government with a view to their peculiar interests.

In the economic sphere the capitalist organization is divided according to the branches of industry. Syndicates and trusts are the principal types of economic union entered into by the Russian capitalist. The difference between a trust and a syndicate or union may be explained in a few words: a syndicate or union is an understanding entered into by manufacturers with a view to

"regularizing" the market. The syndicate does not involve the destruction of the technical and administrative autonomy of isolated enterprises. The trust, on the contrary, is a complete fusion of enterprises into a single technical and administrative unit. The trust is the more advanced stage of the concentration of capital and production. The "syndicalization" of industrial enterprises almost invariably precedes their amalgamation into a trust, but there are forms intermediary between these two.

Hitherto little has been heard of trusts in Russia. However, a few had been previously known; in 1890 a trust was formed of six pencil factories, and at the beginning of 1908 the manufacturers' trust of Lodz was established. Syndicates have been known for a much longer time. Thirty years ago some fire insurance companies drew up a secret convention which was, so to speak, the ancestor of a syndicate of insurance companies. In 1886 six factories in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Riga producing iron wire and nails formed a syndicate. In 1887 the sugar refineries followed suit, and the petroleum companies did the same in 1892. In 1895 a secret convention was signed by the owners of foundries and coal-mines.

But these attempts were only the few first swallows, which do not make a summer. The summer was delayed until the opening of the twentieth century. At this period appeared the first signs of the crisis of over-production which occurred in the years 1901-2, following the great industrial expansion which commenced in 1893. The crisis, the depression of the market, and the lessened outlet for products made the Russian capitalists realize certain disadvantages of free competition. This set them seriously thinking of regulating the sale of products by means of agreements or syndicates.

The following facts will show the progress effected by the employers' unions in Russia.

In 1901, at a congress of mine-owners, the foundation of certain unions was decided upon. In the same year twelve jute factories formed a syndicate in order to fix settled prices for their goods. This example was followed by several paper-mills.

In 1902 twelve foundries, etc., constituted a great syndicate, under the title "The First Public Company for the Sale of Russian Metallurgical Products."

In 1903 syndicates sprang up in Russia like mushrooms after rain. In the region of the Ural Mountains a syndicate of coal-mine-owners was formed. With these the mine-owners of the Dombrova district presently signed an agreement. In the Donetz district a "public company" was formed dealing with the "combustible minerals of Donetz." At Kharkov the manufacturers of machinery combined to standardize their prices. Twenty-eight manufactories of iron wire and nails founded a syndicate in Poland, and the lamp fabrics in Warsaw also combined. In 1903 many other syndicates were formed: of looking-glass manufactories, copper-founders, etc.

In 1904 the manufacturers of house-furniture formed a syndicate in Poland; in St. Petersburg the electrical manufacturers and others combined.

In the succeeding years the same process continued; rubber factories, asphalt companies, and cotton-spinners combined, while a syndicate of shipowners monopolized the transport on the Dniester, the Bug, and the Dnieper, and another shipowners' syndicate was formed on the Vistula.

The author who gives us these data arrives at the following conclusion: "The greatest intensity of syndicalist¹ activity is manifested in the coal and iron trades; that is, the syndicalization of Russia resembles, in these general features, that of Western Europe." But the process has not been confined to the "heavier" industries. "At the beginning of the twentieth century united capital had obtained such a hold upon Russia that even those undertakings whose conditions were entirely unfavourable to syndicalization could not escape it."

Many Russian syndicates promptly assumed a national character, and monopolized the production and the output of certain objects. Thus, for example, the thread-makers' syndicate monopolized the

¹ The word is not here used in the special political sense given to it by the French "syndicalists."

sale of reels of thread on the Russian market. Organized in 1903, the syndicate known as "The Nail" succeeded, in four years, in monopolizing 87 per cent. of the production of nails in Russia (3,050,000 cwt. out of 3,530,000 cwt.).

Founded in 1907, the syndicate known as "The Root" had monopolized, by the end of a year, the sale of the galvanized iron produced in all the factories of the Ural Mountains and some of those of Moscow. "The Prodmete" monopolized the production and sale of iron girders. Since the 1st of January, 1908, the public company "Copper" has controlled the entire production of copper in Russia. From its factories proceed every year 353,000 cwt. of copper. Founded in 1907, the coal syndicate of the Donetz basin promptly monopolized two-thirds of the coal obtained in that region. Between the years 1907 and 1908 two Siberian coal-mining syndicates shared the principal market between them and monopolized the supply of coal to the Siberian railroads. The most important of the trusts was formed by the fusion of two companies which monopolized 84 per cent. of the platinum obtained in the Ural Mountains. The monopolization of the markets by these syndicates has made itself felt in yet other branches of industry. In 1907 the syndicate of match factories resolved to sign an agreement with the international syndicate controlling preparations of potassium, in order that potassium might not be obtained by outsiders. The intention of this syndicate was to strike a mortal blow at independent producers. In the same year the congress of bottle-makers drew up a scheme with a view to monopolizing the market.

The union of great enterprises may have graver results in Russia than in any other country. Small and moderate capital is too weak in Russia to support a struggle with great masses of united capital. Hence the ruin of the small industrial undertaking and the concentration of production in the hands of industrial oligarchs may assume a very extreme form. We have already seen how rapidly this concentration has been effected, how swiftly the importance of these great enterprises has grown. Moreover, the syndicalization of the great industries has still

further increased the specific weight of the latter in comparison with the smaller industries. Hence the American character of the development of Russian capital, a character which I have already mentioned.

As for the consumers, they profit by this state of things *up to a certain point*. The concentration of production permits *in the first place* of an improved technique and a diminished sale-price. But when this concentration proceeds to the monopolization of the market by a few industrial oligarchs, the consumers are at their mercy, for prices are no longer the result of free competition. The ignorance of the consumers and their lack of organization make it very difficult for them to struggle against this evil.

We must add that the Russian laws whose intention it is to regulate commercial and industrial relations are extremely archaic. They were compiled before the development of modern forms of capitalist economy, and are far from anticipating such phenomena as syndicates and trusts. Moreover, it is difficult for the Russian Government to oppose the monopolization of the market by the larger capitalists on principle, for it has itself created a monopoly of nearly all the railways, and of one comestible which yields a large profit—namely, *vodka*. Again, the Government, with an eye to fiscal interests, has considerably increased the prices of the products which it has monopolized.

Once again, the Russian autocracy and bureaucracy are so far corrupted by the habit of extorting money and exploiting the population that it is not difficult for the great capitalists to purchase the ineffectual execution of governmental measures directed against their interests, or even the assistance of such measures. On the other hand, the employers' union can assist the Government in its struggle against the popular movement, in the van of which are the industrial workers. Thus in the years 1905 and 1906 a lock-out was employed in order to defeat the workers who had risen against the autocracy.

One of the most dangerous measures (for the worker) which has been adopted by the unions of employers is the use of the

"black-lists." These lists contain the names of those workers whose minds are "badly disposed," and are distributed to all owners and managers of factories and workshops. The worker who has been dismissed from a factory, and whose name has been inscribed on the black-list, cannot hope to obtain work from another employer. And as workers' trades-unions are rendered almost impossible by repressive police measures, they can neither defend nor materially support a dismissed worker.

The organization of accumulated capital is not confined to the syndicate. There is yet another form of employers' union which is semi-political. This is the "Council of the Congresses of Industry and Commerce." This organization, which was founded recently, unites a whole series of local organizations, such as Stock Exchange committees, clubs, and societies of manufacturers, etc. Nearly all the "large capital" of the country is represented by this organization, which publishes an organ of its own, *Industry and Commerce*. The article expounding the programme of this association tells us: "Capitalism, by its nature, does not recognize altruism and completely disowns sentimentalism." Characteristic words! It is no longer the voice of the patriarchal Muscovite merchant that we hear, but that of an American "business man."

The organization of capital has been of enormous *social* importance in Russia. Instead of the amorphous particles of old, instead of a "dust of humanity," we perceive the organization of a whole class. The social conflict is no longer the struggle of various small and isolated groups, but a struggle of classes, which are organized one against another. A series of perspectives opens before Russian society; but these are so far only in the region of prognostics, of what the Germans call *Zukunftsmusik*.

In the meantime organized capital seeks to employ its forces and its influence with the Government in order to derive immediate profits. Government subsidies, State contracts, protective customs tariffs, all these are at the service of the large capitalists; all these contribute to an incredible degree to raising the price of products. The metallurgical workshops of the

south of Russia, even in 1901, at the moment of the crisis, yielded 10 per cent. to 18 per cent. in dividends. The result is that many Russian products cost more in Russia than abroad. In 1900 the Russian consumer paid 6 rubles for refined sugar,¹ while the same sugar sold for 4.30 rubles in Hamburg and 2.48 rubles in London. This strange phenomenon is explained by an artificial increase in the price of sugar caused by the Government's understanding with the chief producers; and the case cited is far from being unique.

III

The development of capitalism and the concentration of production follow the increase and the concentration of the proletarian mass. The ever-increasing "proletarianization" of the population—that is, the transformation of a great mass of independent producers, rural *luzhiki* and urban artisans into a collectivity of wage-slaves living by the sale of their powers of production—is in Russia an indisputable fact.

According to a Russian statistician, M. Lositsky, by the beginning of the twentieth century the "proletarianization" of nearly a quarter of the population (22 per cent.) had been accomplished. The composition of the proletarian mass is extremely complex. We find representatives of the rural, industrial, and intellectual proletariat, and also of the *lumpen*—that is, of the unclassed elements of society. We shall have something to say of wage-earning workers, for the moment ignoring the other categories of the proletariat.

The inquiry of 1902, to which we have several times referred, proved that the number of wage-earning workers is very great in Russia. "It would be an error to conclude," says M. Pogogeve in summarizing the data returned by the inquiry, "that the wage-earning population of Russia is relatively unimportant from the quantitative point of view. Already we

¹ Six rubles—about 12s. 6d. —per pood, or 36 lb.; or 4½d. per lb.

have nearly seven millions of salaried workers of both sexes, domestics not included." On the contrary, "the relative comparison of the number of Russian wage-earners with those of Austria, Germany, and other States is far from showing any inferiority on our part." According to the calculations of M. Pogogev, Fedorov, Ilyin, and other authors dealing with these questions, the totality of salaried workers in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century was sensibly superior to that of France (census of 1891) or that of Germany (census of 1895). One of these authors even asserts that "the industrial development of Russia approximates, by its number of workers, to that of the United States." Exact data respecting the number of salaried workers do not exist in Russia. The census of 1897 gives 7,042,959, distributed over various branches and fields of industry.

Including members of the family, this figure is increased to some tens of millions of persons.

One curious fact may be noted. Many Russian men of science, politicians, and members of the Government have remarked neither the appearance nor the development of the salaried proletariat. We may say of Russian society what Turgenev said of an individual: "Until man lives he is not sensible of his own life: like a sound, it only becomes perceptible to him after a certain time has passed."

Only four years before the general census of 1897, the Russian Government noted in its official documents that "with us the contingent of industrial workers in the strict sense of the word, that is, of those who possess no land and do not return to the country to labour for a portion of the year is, at least at present, insignificant." In 1896 a publication of the Ministry of Finance had stated that in Russia industrial labour did not constitute a profession, nor a means of existence, but was only a complement of rural labour.

The facts, however, do not correspond with this assertion. According to the data of 1893, it is obvious that 70.8 per cent. of the workers in shops and factories are addicted exclusively to

industry, while 29·2 per cent. periodically return to their villages to cultivate the soil. In the case of workers permanently employed in the more highly developed branches of production, in the textile and metallurgical industries, this percentage is still higher (83·5 per cent. and 88 per cent.). Consequently, the fundamental condition necessary to the development of capitalism, the existence of specialized workers alienated from the rural economy, is present in Russia in a sufficiently advanced degree.

What is the general composition of the industrial proletariat? How is it divided according to sex and age? The replies to these questions will furnish us with material capable of demonstrating the strength of the capitalist tendencies of economic life in modern Russia. The development of capital is always accompanied by the transformation of the composition of the proletariat. The ever-increasing technical division of labour simplifies the forms of labour. Muscular strength and technical knowledge become more and more useless to the worker, who has only to learn a few automatic and uniform movements. Hence the necessity of a long apprenticeship is avoided. Another result of the development of mechanical labour is the possibility that the heaviest labour may be executed by the most deficient populations.

In considering the *Summary of the Reports of Inspectors of Labour* for the first years of the twentieth century we shall remark the rapid development of the exploitation of female and child labour, and the gradual replacement of the man's labour by that of his wife and children. Between the years 1901 and 1905 the number of female workers increased in Russia from 22·7 per cent. to 24·4 per cent., and the number of male workers decreased from 66·7 per cent. to 65·2 per cent. The inspectors' reports for 1903 record "the indisputable fact of the progressive replacement of the labour of the man by that of the woman and child." The report notes "the certain preference accorded by the manufacturers to women, as a more stable and tranquil element of labour, and above all one less highly paid." In the reports for 1906 the inspectors speak still more plainly: "The

relative increase in the number of women and the *absolute* decrease in the number of men are without doubt the result of the recent labour movement; the manufacturers, wherever it is in any way possible, are replacing men and even youths by women, whose attendance in the factories is far more certain and whose work is less highly paid. *At the present time women are obtaining even those posts that were the exclusive privilege of men.*

After the woman, the child: by the end of 1904 adolescents constituted 7·7 per cent. of the total of the industrial workers, and at the beginning of 1908 they had increased to 8·6 per cent.

The social and economic importance of this fact is enormous. In the first place, it entails the destruction of family life, for at present not only the father but often the mother and her children pass the whole day in the factory. How can the family circle survive this change? Another result is the fall of wages. The possibility of procuring cheap labour, the woman's, and the consideration that the man's wages, formerly destined to support a whole family, are to-day augmented by the money gained by other members of the family, have enabled the employers to pay *relatively* less to married men.

Moreover, the wages of a Russian working-man are seldom very high. It is difficult to compare them with English wages or even with French or German wages.* Thus, for example, the pay of a miner in the South of Russia was in 1904 sensibly less (by 12 per cent.) than that of a French miner between the years 1860 and 1870. Now the French miner earns almost one and a half times as much as his Russian comrade.

According to the data given by the inspectors' reports for 1904, the average annual earnings of each Russian worker amount to 213 rubles—£22 13s. 7d.; or less than £2 per month. This average varies according to the district: in the Government of St. Petersburg it is £34; in that of Moscow, £21 14s.; in that of Vladimir, £17 6s. 9d. In some regions the wages are

* According to the English Blue Book for 1908 the average earnings of a German worker are 83 per cent., and those of a French worker 73 per cent., of the earnings of an English worker.

incredibly low. In one Government of the kingdom of Poland (that of Lomja) the worker makes 69 rubles, or £6 16s. per annum, or 10s. 6d. per month. But what can we expect of the wages earned in private industries when those of the workers in the service of the municipality are as low as they are? The municipality of St. Petersburg admits in one of its reports that "the present rate of pay is often insufficient to satisfy even the most urgent necessities of the workers, such as the need of food, shelter, and clothing" (see *The Messenger of the Municipal Council of St. Petersburg*, 1905, No. 18). It recognizes the fact that a large number of the municipal labourers of St. Petersburg receive wages "so insignificant that they cannot assure the worker of a lodging for the night; he is forced to take refuge in some damp corner or in a night shelter. . . . Such wages, which stand in no relation to the work performed or to the cost of life in the capital, result in material conditions which destroy the worker's health and exert an evil influence upon his morality" (*ibid.*, p. 1339). Similar facts may be noted in respect of provincial cities.

The material relations existing between the employers and the employed of industrial Russia find no analogy in Western Europe. In many parts of Russia payment of wages is still made *in kind*. The worker receives provisions, either directly from the employer or from the store which is housed in the factory itself. In 1904, in the Government of Moscow, of 47,000,000 rubles (£5,000,000) earned by the workers, the latter touched only some 38,000,000 rubles, or £4,000,000. The other odd million was paid in kind. Of seventeen Governments lying round St. Petersburg and Moscow, there are only three in which the "Inspection of Factories" has failed to note cases of payment in goods. In the more "Europeanized" districts, as in the kingdom of Poland, this antiquated form of payment has almost disappeared.

Another fact worthy of attention is the great number of *finés* inflicted upon the workers by their employers. In 1901, in the workshops and factories of European Russia (Poland and the Caucasus included), no less than 2,300,000 fines were paid, or

194 fines for each hundred workers. Between the years 1901 and 1905 the annual average of the fines extorted from the workers in European Russia was more than half a million rubles, or £53,200. The sums realized by such fines serve to form a "fines capital," from which aid is granted to workers who have suffered some accident incidental to their work. The workers themselves have no say in the employment of this fund, which is nearly always very badly administered. State insurance of workers is as yet unknown to Russian legislation.

As for the duration of the working day, the law of 1897 fixed the maximum at $11\frac{1}{2}$ hours for adult workers. It is impossible not to regard this maximum as too high from a physiological standpoint (see the interesting article by Dr. René Laufer in the *Nouvelle Revue*, 1907, on the *Organisation physiologique du Travail*). In reality the employers of the great industrial centres generally require a much shorter day. Some exact 11 hours' work, others $10\frac{1}{2}$ or 10 hours, and some only 9 hours. But some, on the other hand, work their employees far longer than the law of 1897 allows. Here are some examples relating to municipal enterprises, examples of which I have already published in the *Annales de la Régie directe* (Geneva, 1910, No. 16).

The municipal garden labourers in St. Petersburg, according to the report of a municipal gardener, work on an average $12\frac{1}{2}$ hours a day, but in summer their daily work is increased to 17 hours. At Odessa the day of the municipal labourers is $15\frac{1}{2}$ hours. At Saratov the workers in the municipal slaughter-house, according to their own evidence, work from 4 a.m. to 8 p.m., and "even later." Moreover, they have no holidays. At Poltava the labourers in the municipal service work 18 hours a day! This is attested publicly and officially by a member of the municipality.

Since the material conditions of life and labour in Russia are such as we have seen, there is no room for the "rights of the man and the citizen" in the relations between the capitalists and their employees. In Russia we behold the complete dependence of the workers on their employers and the heads of industrial

businesses. How far the forms of this dependence may be called "patriarchal" may be judged from the following fact: in each annual account published by the "Inspection of Factories" are reported numbers of proceedings brought against employers on the grounds of ill-treatment, sometimes amounting even to blows. The report for 1907 cites 9,077 such cases. The employers have retained a habit of inflicting corporal punishment, which is a heritage from the ages of serfdom.

I will not here deal with other defects of the organization of the life of the Russian labour world. I will confine myself to remarking that the bad conditions of labour become hurtful in the end not only to the health and the mentality of the labourer, but to the capitalist himself. They sap the strength of Russian capitalism as compared with that of other countries where the labourer is better paid and therefore better nourished and healthier in mind and body.

"The industrial rivalry between different nations becomes in reality a struggle between the personal productive capacities of the workers," says Dr. Laufer, very truly. "All other conditions tend to become equalized. The rapidity and cheapness of transport abolish the advantages which one country might enjoy over another by reason of the proximity of raw materials or trade outlets. And as the material agencies of competition become equalized the supremacy will belong to that country which can extract the most from its human energies; that in which the working class is most vigorous, intelligent, and productive."

In these respects Russian industry still leaves very much to be desired.

IV

From the preceding chapters we may judge of the shock which the invasion of capital has administered to Russian life. Vast waves of humanity, set in motion thereby, have surged into the industrial centres. All these centres have not the same external aspect, nor a similar internal structure. We may dis-

tinguish four principal types: (1) cities in which there is a great concentration of workers, (2) the suburbs of important towns which have themselves become industrial centres, (3) large villages which contain works or factories (this type is especially widespread in the Governments of Moscow, Vladimir, and Kostroma), (4) the villages of *kustars*, inhabited by a number of small independent employers and workmen. These villages are mostly in the centre and in the Volga country.

This variety has, according to some, a considerable social importance. "The history of the labour problem in Russia has been evolving and becoming more complex for forty years. This development is closely allied to the predominance sometimes of the more advanced proletariat of the cities and capitals and sometimes of the less organized population which works in the rural factories," says a competent specialist.

We should note that the division of industrial types already mentioned is more than conventional, and that historically and geographically they have intermingled. Here, for instance, is a page from the description of the district of Shuya (Government of Vladimir) published in 1908 by the local *Zemstvo*:

"From the industrial point of view the district of Shuya occupies a very important position among the most highly industrialized localities of European Russia. The cities of Ivanovo-Voznessensk and Shuya and the villages of Teikovo and Kuhnya are known for their cotton-mills; no less than 100,000 persons are employed therein. Besides this colossal development of the larger industry there are many small factories which provide work for more than 10,000 hands. In any district of the Government of Vladimir we shall find all the different types of industry, from the artisan's workshop to the factories equipped with English machinery which send their products abroad. In the district of Shuya we find a strict graduation of industrial forms. The aspect of the city of Ivanovo-Voznessensk cannot, perhaps, be compared with that of the manufacturing towns of Poland or Western Europe. About this city the country is thinly sprinkled with villages like all Russian villages, with their roofs of thatch, their

sokhus, and their three-crop system. But although the outward aspect of these villages has not yet changed, the appearance of the factory chimneys among the *ishas* of the *mujiks* has produced an internal change in the life of the country."

"Nevertheless," we read further on, "industrial interests predominate over agricultural interests; the workers live by industry more than by agriculture. The profits of his trade form the foundation of the peasant's budget."

And here is explained the development of Ivanovo-Voznessensk and the industrial villages adjacent :

"The town of Ivanovo-Voznessensk has attained a genuine industrial development only during the last forty or fifty years. Only in 1891 were the *selo* of Ivanovo and the *possad* of Voznessensk united to form a 'city.' The suburbs of the town, the *slobodki*, which belonged to the last moment to the district of Shuya, and were under its jurisdiction, finally expanded, and were peopled by the flood of proletarians working in the factories, landless peasants, small merchants, and petty industrial employers. All these people settled in the suburbs of Ivanovo-Voznessensk, some as owners of "real estate" and others as factory hands. These latter settled in miserable lodgings, having left their families in their native villages. Thus arose the *slobodki*, noisy, motley, gaudily coloured quarters outside the protection of the administration of the cities, outside the archaic power of the rural *mir*. Only the police had access at every hour of the day and night to these muddy haunts. The *slobodki*, with their miserable dolls' houses and their narrow streets, remind one of a gipsy encampment, the ephemeral home of circus-folk, where all is changing and impermanent. There is a constant coming and going; like so many mushrooms the little yellow houses rise singly in the midst of fields covered with rubbish. Then they begin to appear in rows; finally they can no longer contain their inhabitants. Then fresh dolls' houses begin to rise beside the court-yards of the others; not a birch-tree, not a bush to be seen; nothing but dust and mud and rubbish in the streets, soot and smoke and the rumble of factories in the air." This external transformation is indissolubly bound up

with an internal change. The peaceful life of the peasant has made way for the fever of capitalism. "The extreme mobility of all relations, their purely speculative character, the perpetual chase for profit, and the sole motive of the life of the whole place, are felt at every step, in"

The most interesting phase of the evolution of these industrial centres, from the economic and social point of view, was undoubtedly the transformation of the "village of *lusters*" into a "village of factories." The villages of *lusters* (village artisans) began to spring up a long time ago, at the time when monetary economy made its appearance, together with the social division of labour. For centuries "*luster* industries"—village industries—supported millions of Russian families. But then capital came upon the scene and in a few years destroyed the old forms of petty industry that had endured for hundreds of years. This destruction was accomplished in two ways: capital entered into direct competition with the *lusters*, or it became the intermediary between these and the market. In the first case, having new technical methods and the force of organization at its disposal, it quickly vanquished the independent artisan and the small employer, and transformed them into wage-slaves. In the second case it left the *lusters* only the illusion of independence by opening what was called a "bureau of distribution." This bureau distributed raw material to the *lusters*, and bought from them the articles which they manufactured, in order to resell them to the consumer. The labour of the *lusters* thus became strictly what is known to Europe as a "home industry." This form of production is very widespread in Russia, especially as regards the textile industry. In 1907 the official statistics certified the existence of 405 such "bureaus of distribution."

One of the most characteristic peculiarities of the economic life of the Russian Empire is that the largest enterprises are often established away from the cities. This is true of more than 30 per cent. of the large factories and workshops, and nearly 70 per cent. of the labourers employed in "large industries." This tendency is explained by several factors. Firstly, by "the

desire of capitalists to obtain living tools that are cheap and not exacting." Secondly, by the fact that an industrial business can be established in the country with less formality and expense; the land is cheap in the country, water and wood are nearer at hand, and very often the raw material required is to be procured in the neighbourhood. However, these advantages are accompanied by certain disadvantages; a situation some distance from a town renders circulation more difficult and is a strain upon economic relations. "The predominance of industrial centres removed from towns," says M. Pogogev, "is in Russia more than elsewhere a cause of disequilibrium between national and international commercial competition. This predominance increases wages in some districts and lowers them in others. Moreover, it aggravates the insanitary conditions of labour." This predominance of non-urban industrial centres has had, according to the author cited, an enormous influence upon the social, economic, and hygienic life of the country. This assertion is often contradicted, there being a very general idea in Russia that the generality of factories are isolated from the mass of the peasants and can affect them very little. Actually, Russian capitalism goes from town to the country, and there builds its palatial factories beside the humble *isba* of the *mujik*.

But although the population of Russia has profited by capitalist culture, it has been deprived of urban culture, properly so called. It is difficult to establish a complete comparison, for in Russia the city is not what it is in Western Europe. In Russia it is before all an administrative, not an economic unit. Sometimes a Russian "village," with thousands upon thousands of inhabitants, is only a village because the bureaucracy has forgotten to raise it to the rank of a town. This restriction apart, we must nevertheless admit that urban life in Russia is far less highly developed than it is in Western Europe. According to the census of 1897 only 13 per cent. of the Russian population is urban. But the tendency of development is the same in Russia as elsewhere in Europe. It is proved by the fact that the urban population increases sensibly faster than that of the country.

"Between 1727 and 1897 the first multiplied itself 51 times; the second only 8 times." If we observe the cities separately, some of them show an extraordinary power of growth. Here are a few examples:

Cities.	Inhabitants.		Increase in Population
	1807	1897	
St. Petersburg ...	539,471	1,267,023	136%
Moscow ...	351,600	1,015,664	194%
Warsaw ...	180,657	618,208	253%
Riga ...	77,468	281,943	264%
Kiev ...	68,420	247,432	261%
Rostov ...	29,261	119,889	310%
Ekaterinoslavl ...	19,908	121,216	508%
Baku ...	13,992	112,253	
Lodz ...	32,347	315,200	872%
Vladikavkaz ...	3,358	43,813	1,205%
Blagoveshtchensk	2,050	32,600	1,491%
Ivanovo-Voznessensk	1,350	53,945	3,806%

The example of Ivanovo-Voznessensk is especially remarkable; in thirty years its population has multiplied nearly forty times!

This rapid growth of urban populations is explained by the attraction which the capitalist city has for the sons and daughters of the country. The Russian industrial towns are like the "tentacular cities" of Belgium sung by the poet Verhaeren; like those of England, Germany, and France. In Russia the attractive force of the industrial town is manifested in its tendency even more than in other States whose development has been more gradual. While the general composition of the whole population of Russia shows that only 13 per cent. is urban, the number of "independent" workers among the urban inhabitants had risen in 1897 to 25 per cent. In Germany, on the other hand, the census of 1895 shows an almost equal distribution of the population and of independent workers between town and country (49.97 per cent. of the independent workers

and 49.83 per cent. of the whole population was urban). In other words, the Russian city, still more than the German city, is greedy for flesh and blood, for human health and strength; for it absorbs more particularly the independent workers, that is, the productive forces of the nation. Daily the Russian city confirms its supremacy over the village; for the supremacy of modern culture over the ancient forms of life, the victory of the new mentality over the old forms of consciousness, becomes daily more evident.

V

Among the workers of Russia the trades-union movement—or, as it is called by the Russians, the *professional* movement—had its rise a long time ago; but until the workers commenced the political struggle of 1905 the syndicates or unions of the Russian proletariat were feeble and of insignificant dimensions. When the political and revolutionary movement was an accomplished fact, Tsarism attempted to oppose it by a purely economic movement, a "pacific" and "legal" movement placed under the protection of the police. The notorious chief of the Detective Bureau of Moscow, M. Zubatov, expended infinite pains in founding his "yellow," or rather "black," organizations, and in arranging for their direction by the agents of his bureau. But this attempt met with no success; while the Social Democratic organizations, in spite of prosecution, had at their disposal many devoted and militant members. These militants turned up at all the workers' meetings convoked by the agents of Zubatov, and there, often at the risk of their liberty, they opposed the Governmental propaganda with complete success. Thanks to this action of the Social Democrats, many of the members of the "black" unions were converted and absorbed by the Social Democratic party.

At last the Government realized that the money spent on the organization of "black" syndicates was being wasted, and resumed its former tactics of permanent repression. But the political

movement of the workers increased with the speed of an avalanche, and after a time it began to manifest itself by means of processions of hundreds of thousands of workers in St. Petersburg (in January, 1905) and the general strike of October, 1905.

The Government was forced to give way, and the workers obtained the right of establishing legal organizations. The Socialists, who were always in the van of the Russian proletariat, made use of this "period of liberties" (which unfortunately was not of long duration) by developing all the proletarian organizations—party organizations as well as trades unions. A large number of unions was created, unions of all trades and professions. Their committees and bureaux began to publish journals, pamphlets, and books, and to make inquiries into the present situation of the workers in all parts of Russia.

According to the official figures given by a Governmental journal (*Torgovo-Promyshlennaija Gazeta*—the "Gazette of Industry and Commerce"), on the 1st of January, 1907, there were in Russia 246,000 workers organized upon an economic basis, while on the 1st of January, 1905, their number was certainly limited to a few thousands.

But the more plainly the Russian workers manifested their desire to organize themselves, the more strongly did the fears of the *bourgeoisie* infect the Government and the great capitalists, who were soon agreed upon taking measures to suppress and disperse the labour organizations of the country. The Government arrested the leaders of the Socialist and syndicalist¹ movement, and deported them. The capitalists resorted to "lock-outs," and turned their more active employees adrift.

On the 1st of January, 1908, the trades union organizations of the Russian workers counted only 130,000 members in place of the 246,000 of the preceding year.² But prosecutions continued, and grew more numerous daily. At the beginning of April, 1908, the Social Democratic section of the third Duma

¹ "Syndicalist" movement here means the trades union movement; the special kind of syndicalism which has lately been evolved in France has no followers in Russia.

presented an interpellation on the subject of these prosecutions, but the Chamber refused to hear it. In this interpellation we find much information respecting the conflict between the Government and the unions.

Between the 1st of June, 1907, and the beginning of April, 1908, the police dissolved 81 workers' unions—3 in St. Petersburg, 12 in Odessa, 4 in Simferopol, 3 in Vitebsk, 3 in Minsk, 6 in Ekaterinoslavl, 8 in Nijni-Novgorod, 7 in Kazan, 1 in Kharkov, 1 in Kiev, 1 in Voroneje, 1 in Dvinsk, 1 in Borissov, and 25 in Moscow and the surrounding districts. We must add that this list is incomplete, and that every day has added to it.

The organs of the syndicalist press suffered the same fate. During the same brief period the Government suppressed 27 syndicalist journals in St. Petersburg, 4 in Moscow, 3 in Odessa, 2 in Kharkov, 2 in Warsaw, 1 in Ekaterinoslavl, and 1 in Revel, or in all 41; but still the police were not content, and prosecutions still continued.

At the present moment there are very few trades unions and syndicalist journals which have been spared by Tsarism. Those organizations which do still exist are exposed to the violence of Governmental despotism. The police conduct searches almost daily in the offices of such unions or journals; they arrest their leaders, presidents, and secretaries, and imprison them at will. They suppress their strike funds and confiscate them. The police department has ordered the local authorities to authorize the foundation of a syndicate only on the condition that it has no relations with the Socialist party. The Government also forbids the trades unions of Russia to proceed to mutual or national federation or unification.

Such are the conditions with which the working-class organizations of Russia have now to contend.

It is not surprising that many Russian Socialists believe that it would be better once more to abandon legal organization, and to give all their attention to secret and "subterranean" clubs and societies.

CHAPTER IV

RURAL ECONOMY AND THE AGRARIAN QUESTION

- I. Abolition of serfdom in Russia (1861). II. Mobilization of landed property and its present distribution (according to the data for 1905). III. Economic and social life of the Russian peasants. IV. The rural commune and its decay.

LET us now leave the noisy town, the industrial centres, the new world of Russian capitalism, where we find fragments of Europe and even of America, and take a glance at the Russian countryside, the true Russia of the bygone days, which lives, or rather is dying, side by side with the new and ever growing Russia.

To comprehend the life of the Russian countryside, and the agrarian question, the principal centre of that life, we must go back to the abolition of serfdom (19th February, 1861).

Three weeks before the publication of the "manifesto of the 19th of February," its signatory, Alexander II, declared during a session of the Council of Empire (25th January, 1861):

"Serfdom was instituted by absolute power. Only absolute power can destroy it; and to do so is my will."

The Liberals of this period were also claiming the honour of delivering the peasants, affirming that the *ideas of Liberalism* which had taken root in the midst of Russian society had led the latter to recognize the suppression of serfdom as indispensable.

This is an example which shows us how the historic reality is distorted in passing through the prism of human ideology. The

absolute monarch represented this reality as a manifestation of his supreme power and his free-will, and the Liberal ideologues regarded it as a manifestation of another absolutism, that of the ideas which were supposed to determine the course of humanity. But we know now that neither was right; serfdom, far from being the "product" of a "will" or an "idea," was the result of the necessities of the economic evolution of the period, and its fall was due to profound transformations of the material and economic basis of the life of the Russian people, on which the juridical and legislative forms of serfdom itself had been built.

The progress and the results of the reform of 1861 were assuredly determined by their co-ordination with the social forces of the moment. The Crimean War contributed to the realization of the reform by showing that it was impossible for a State reposing on serfdom to resist more civilized and freer nations. "The fear with which the Government and the nobles regarded the proclamation of liberty, once the enemy was in Russia, hastened the abolition of serfdom," said one of the authors of the reform. But when the danger had passed the bureaucracy and the nobles sought to frustrate the reform, to give it an illusory character. The peasants, too ignorant to oppose a systematic political activity, were only capable of instinctive revolts, revolts without influence on the course of the reform, which was promulgated without their assistance. The elaboration of the reform was effected entirely in the "Governmental committees" and the "drafting commissions," on which sat none but bureaucrats and nobles. The reform of 1861 was drafted with an eye to the interests of the nobility, not those of the peasantry.

The interest of the noble and landowner demanded that the liberated serfs should be forced to labour on the seigneurial estate. Formerly the law forced them to provide the master with the labour required; now some other means had to be sought of obtaining the same thing. A way was found. At the moment of "liberation" each peasant was deprived of a large part of the land which he had enjoyed previous to the 19th of February,

1861. Of the 7,873,200 acres of peasant lands 1,420,740 acres were "detached," or 18 per cent. In certain provinces the percentage of these "detachments" was much higher than this average: in the Government of Samara it was 44 per cent.; in that of Saratov, 41 per cent.; in those of Poltava and Ekaterinoslavl, 40 per cent.; in that of Kazan, 32 per cent.; in the Governments of Kharkov and Simbirsk it was 31 per cent.; in that of Penza, 28 per cent.; in that of Tauris, 27 per cent.; in those of Tchernigov and Veroneje, 25 per cent.; in that of Tambov, 24 per cent., etc.

This partial deprivation forced the peasant to *rent* fields belonging to some landowner, usually his former master. Too poor to pay the rent in *money*, he paid it in *kind*, in *bartchina*, that is to say, in *labour*, as during the age of *serfdom*. The system of *otrabotki* (*corvées*), which is still extant in the Russian countryside, is a direct reminiscence of *serfdom*. A book written by an official of the Ministry of Agriculture contains a description of the economic relations based upon the *otriezki* and the *otrabotki* (the volume was published by the State in 1892).

"In the south of the district of Yeletz (Government of Orel)," writes M. Korolenko, "the large estates are cultivated to a small extent by labourers engaged by the year, and to a very large extent by peasants who thereby pay their rent. The ex-serfs still cultivate the soil for their former masters, and their villages are still the *bartchiny* of this or that estate."

In another volume, published in 1898, and signed by a number of prominent economists, we read that the *bartchina* and the system based upon it belong partly to the economy of the period of *serfdom*, and that they are preponderant in Central Russia and the region of the Volga—namely, in seventeen Governments.

This being so, the liberation of the peasants was not followed by an actual breaking-up of feudal properties, of rural feudalism, and the course of agrarian evolution assumed a character quite unlike its course in Germany when the serfs of the latter country were liberated. (Readers who wish to compare the two

cases should read M. Henri Lichtenberger's *L'Allemagne moderne*, ch. iii., pp. 41-2.)

One of the peculiarities of the reform of 1861, which was anything but favourable to the economic progress of the country, was the system of "redemption" organized by the Government. The State assumed the duty of paying for the lands alienated in favour of the peasants, on condition that the latter returned the sum expended in several instalments or *vykoupní plateži*. According to the declarations of the Government, the peasant was to redeem only land; the rights of the *seigneur* over the serf and the right of *corvée* should have been liquidated without the payment of ransom. But in reality the peasant had to redeem both his person and his labour, although the process was a masked one. The valuation of the land was artificial. The lands in question were worth no more than £68,900,000; but £92,230,000 was demanded for them, or a sum £23,330,000 in excess of their market value. This £23,330,000 was not destined, as was pretended, to compensate the landowners: it served to redeem the labour and the person of the peasant. A contemporary economist (V. A. Lossitzky, *The Operation of Redemption*, St. Petersburg, 1906), having analysed the operation of redemption in detail, categorically declared: "The peasant population was forced to redeem not only the soil, but also its own personality; it had to pay the price of its 'souls'" (in Russia serfs were known as "souls"). This extra £23,330,000 weighed heavily on the budget of the "liberated" peasantry and hampered the organization of their economy.

And if the nobles gained by this process, so did the Treasury. The Government made the peasants bear the working expenses of the "redemption" scheme. Moreover, having arranged for the expiration of the repayments within fifty years, the State received from the *muji* a considerable sum in interest and fines for delayed dayments. By the 3rd of November, 1905, when the payments ceased, the peasants had paid more than £139,000,000 instead of the nominal £92,230,000. Thus an enormous financial burden was laid upon the shoulders of the peasant immediately after his liberation, destroying his economic independence.

His social independence was no less compromised. The manifesto of 1861 forbade landowners to treat their peasants as cattle, and permitted peasants to marry without the authorization of the *barine*, to acquire real or personal estate, to plead before the Courts, and to present petitions to the administrative institutions. (Previously all these things had been rigorously prohibited.) But the peasants, even after the edict of "liberation," were still partly dependent on the nobles and could not attain civic equality. The peasant commune was still subject to the "arbiter of peace" chosen by the nobility, and the marshal of the nobility had as much influence as ever with the local administration. Thus the feudal relations of peasant and landowner were not entirely dissolved, even at the moment of abolition. The reaction and the counter-reforms of Alexander III presently restored in part those bonds which the abolition of serfdom had loosened or destroyed.

II

During the fifty years which have elapsed since the liberation of the serfs, the Russian has sensibly evolved. If we observe the changes that have come about during this period, we are first of all struck by the extreme mobility of landed property, above all of that of the nobility.

Before the reform of 1861 the debt attached to the real estate of the nobility was very considerable—£34,000,000. The manifesto of 1861 which "liberated" the serfs also liberated the nobles from this debt, which was transferred to the peasants, who cancelled it by "redemptive payments" in addition to the £60,000,000 paid to the nobles for the land. In spite of this the nobles were unable to organize a new economic system, and each year marked an increasing loss of their wealth in land.

For ten years after the liberation of the peasants the nobles lost annually more than 1,620,000 acres of land, and during the last ten years of the nineteenth century this annual loss had increased to 2,160,000 acres. Between 1863 and 1892 the nobles sold land

to the value of more than £100,000,000. Yet the Russian Government employed every effort to maintain the estates of the nobles. With this object it organized the "Nobles' Land Bank" and granted the nobles numerous subsidies, etc.

This prolonged crisis, affecting the real estate of the nobles, was perceptibly related to American competition and the depression of the corn market provoked by that competition. But the decline of the territorial wealth of the nobility is to be explained more particularly by the economic incapacity of the latter. The system of "free enterprise" which replaced the old forms of economy was completely alien to the feudal mentality of the noble landlord. Then the noble *seigneur* commenced to "eat" the "redemption payments," and finally attacked the estate itself.* Only in the provinces of the West, where the rural economy had long assumed a capitalistic character, and where the feudal baron had succeeded in transforming himself into an agriculturalist, was the territorial wealth of the nobility entirely preserved; in other regions it was rapidly split up. The principal heirs of the noble were on the one hand the merchant and capitalist, and on the other the wealthy peasant, of the type the Germans know as the *Grossbauer*.

The rich peasants constituted and constitute only a very small minority of the rural population of Russia. The majority of Russian peasants live in miserable poverty. Their pauperism is becoming more and more acute, thanks to the rapid increase of the population. In 1861 the number of peasants was 30 millions, and in 1897 it was 85 millions, an increase of 70 per cent. But this increase of the peasant population was not balanced by an extension of its lands. For this reason the average

* Between the years 1867 and 1897 the nobles threw 76,940,000 acres upon the market, and between 1897 and 1907 another 19,000,000. At the end of 1903, 181,000 nobles' estates were mortgaged, comprising 136,350,000 acres of land. The amount of the mortgages was £235,000,000, of which only £221,000,000 was discharged. This indebtedness was especially observable in the regions of *Amur* forming the granary of Russia.

dimensions of the peasants' holdings, or *nadyels*, had considerably diminished since the year 1860.

In 1860 for each "soul" of masculine sex the average area of land was 4·83 *desiatins*, or 13 acres; in 1880 3·82 *desiatins*, or 10·3 acres; in 1900 only 3·05 *desiatins*, or 8·1 acres, a decrease of 37 per cent.

The "land-famine" of the Russian peasant appears in particularly glaring colours if we contrast it with the landed wealth of other classes. For this comparison we shall utilize the official figures for the year 1905, published by the Central Statistical Committee of the Ministry of the Interior. These figures apply to 50 provinces of European Russia (excluding Finland, Poland, and the Caucasus).

The territorial wealth of the State amounts to 373 million acres. Eighteen million acres constitute the *nadyels* of the Imperial Family. To the churches belong 5,130,000 acres; to the monasteries, 2,160,000; to the cities, 5,670,000; to various institutions, 11,070,000.

To private persons (excepting peasants) belong 234,590,000 acres, of which 42,660,000 are the property of companies and societies, while the remaining 191,930,000 are divided as follows among individual proprietors: 7,640,000 are held in small properties of less than 54 acres each; 8,910,000 in holdings of 54 to 135 acres; and 2,151,800 is in large estates of more than 135 acres each. This last category comprises 138,000 owners, of whom the majority are nobles. Each landowner of this category therefore possesses an average of $79,400,000 \div 138,000 = 575$ *desiatins*, or 1,552 acres.

In the possession of peasants are 483,950,000 acres, which are divided into 12,200,000 *dvors* (*dvor* meaning court); each of these *dvors* forms not only one family, but constitutes an economic unit consisting often of several related families. Each *dvor* should therefore own 30·5 acres, but in reality it often possesses a much smaller *nadyel*:¹ 2,800,000 *dvors* own on an average 5·4 acres;

¹ From *nadyelat*, to allot. The *nadyel* is the parcel of land granted to the *dvor* upon the abolition of serfdom.

3,300,000, 16·2 acres; 4,800,000, 35 acres; 1,100,000, 89 acres; 200,000, 197 acres. Thus the majority of the *dvors* possess less than the normal 30·5 acres. This majority includes 6,100,000 owners of "dwarf" holdings, which form a striking contrast to the estates of the large proprietors, each of whom possesses, on an average, 1,552 acres. It is not astonishing that the idea of increasing the peasants' holdings at the expense of the estates of the nobles should under one shape or another have impressed itself, throughout the greater portion of Russian society, upon the theorists and the politicians of the country.

The reader may ask: Why increase the peasants' holdings at the expense of the landowners instead of the State, which owns 373 million acres? The answer is that of these 373 million acres only 19,710,000 are suitable for agriculture: the rest consists of wooded areas, unsuited to cultivation, stretching most especially to the extreme north, in the Governments of Archangel, Olonetz, and Vologda.

The reader may again demand: What is the scheme of territorial aggrandizement demanded in favour of the peasant, and how far would it remedy his lack of land? We may say approximately that if the 214 million acres of the 133,000 large landowners were taken, leaving to each 135 acres, and the rest were distributed among the peasants, the property of the latter would be increased by 194 million acres. If we add the 19,710,000 acres of cultivable soil belonging to the State, the 21,330,000 acres of *uluzh*, and the 7,290,000 acres in possession of the churches and monasteries, we should obtain almost 243 million acres. The division of these 243 million acres among the peasants would enable us to increase the holdings of the poorest so as to obtain a minimum of 43·2 acres per *dvor*. Such a measure would at one blow extricate the peasant from his condition of poverty and ignorance, improve his economy, and increase his powers of production and consumption. It would create a solid internal market and afford a durable foundation for the development not only of rural economy, but also of industry.

We must remark that the transference to the peasants of the

lands of the large landowners would in no wise menace Russian agriculture. If the estates of these proprietors were now exploited by a rational economy of a capitalistic type, then the cutting-up of these estates would hamper the development of technical methods and lower the level of agriculture. But the present system adopted by the majority of proprietors is parasitic in form, and the property of the noble, having retained a semi-feudal character, appears in the light of an obstacle to the transition from the old forms of economic activity to others more highly perfected and more modern. The clearing up of the remains of feudalism would destroy the "famine rents," the system of *corvées* (*otrabotki*), and would give an impulse to the initiative and energy of the peasant.

III

In our days the economic and social life of the Russian village is more than melancholy. It is not life: it is the slow death of creatures incessantly hungry, whose starvation can only be compared with that of the more poverty-stricken masses of the East—of Persia, India, and China.

We obtain an idea of the low degree of intensiveness of Russian agriculture by comparing the Russian wheat crop with that of other countries. An acre sown with wheat yields on an average :

						Bushels.
In Great Britain	30·8
In Germany	19·3
In France	17·0
In Russia	7·7

Moreover, the harvest in Russia is subject to variations unknown in other European countries. Thanks to the faulty system of manuring the fields, the absence of artificial irrigation, and the primitive implements employed, the peasant's economy is completely dependent upon atmospheric conditions. Every unexpected natural phenomenon destroys the labour of an enormous number of workers, distributed over a vast area. We may say

that that portion of the human species which is formed by the Russian peasants is even to-day absolutely at the mercy of the forces of nature, and that far from being the master of these forces it is their pitiable slave.

This slavery costs the peasants dear; its price is paid in vast numbers of human lives. The mortality in Russia is twice as high as in Norway and Sweden, nearly twice as high as in the British Isles, and 50 per cent. higher than in France.

"The Fijian Archipelago alone," writes a Russian economist, "surpasses Russia in its mortality." Moreover, the death-rate in Russia, instead of diminishing, is continually increasing. At the end of the eighteenth century it was 20 per 1,000. At the end of the nineteenth century this figure had risen to 35, and in some parts to 50. The years of dearth or famine kill off almost incredible numbers. Between 1891 and 1892 a large number of entire villages were literally extinguished.

The death-rate is especially high among children. In 1890, in a canton of the Government of Pskov (where the cholera had not been severe), in one year, a year not remarkable for any natural disaster, of each thousand of newly-born children aged less than one year 829 (82·9 per cent.) died. More, we learn that "every group of four of these little corpses contained one which had been eaten by worms and insects *while still living*." (See *Appeal of the Union for the Organization of the Struggle against Infant Mortality in Russia*.)

This great mortality is indissolubly connected with the insufficiency of the peasants' holdings. This may be judged from these figures:

At the close of the nineteenth century, in the districts of Korotoyaksk, Zadonsk, and Nijnedievitzk, in the Government of Voroneje, the average mortality was as follows:

				Per 100
Among peasants without land	25·0
Among those owning up to 13·5 acres	31·0
" " " from 13·5 to 40·5 acres	29·8
" " " from 40·5 to 67·5 acres	26·6
" " " more than 67·5 acres	23·8

The author from whom we borrow these figures remarks: "The peasants without land break the harmony of the decreasing series of figures. This phenomenon is explained thus: these peasants have more leisure to devote to some calling whose profits lessen mortality."

The peasants are worse than ill nourished. Here is a description of the diet of the inhabitants of the Government of Kíeltzy:

"Potatoes are their customary food. Sometimes they add to this a little thin soup or gruel of black rye boiled in water, or a little cabbage. Meat is eaten only on the greater festivals. As for bread, it is an adjunct of the above victuals, but neither a daily nor a plentiful adjunct. In early spring, when the store of potatoes and of money is exhausted, the poorest of the peasants dig up the potatoes of the previous year. Almost rotten, having been left all winter in the earth, they are dried, crushed, and made into a tasteless 'bread' which hardens very rapidly." (See M. Bernatzky, *About the Agrarian Question*, St. Petersburg, 1906.)

Thus millions of the inhabitants of the Russian country-side are kept alive. Even in the wealthier regions the material conditions of the peasant's life are extremely bad. For example, here is a description of the sanitary condition of the villages of the Government of Yaroslavl, whose inhabitants are "far wealthier and more cultivated than their neighbours." First, let us consider the dimensions of the *isbas* of these peasants. A large *isba*, belonging to one of the wealthier peasants, measures 79 to 94 cubic *arshins* or 950 to 1,150 cubic feet: one of average size contains from 500 to 580 cubic feet, and a poor *isba* only 300 to 380 cubic feet. "The smaller *isbas* are distinguished especially by their narrowness." Ventilation is unknown: the air is made even more impure by the admission of a calf or a lamb or fowls. "In the *isba* twilight usually reigns. The floor is swept only on great ecclesiastical feast-days. There are no beds, no bed-linen. The family lie on benches, on the stove, or in a loft, covering themselves with their cloaks."

The food of the peasant in the Government of Yaroslavl has

grown worse than ever during the last few years. "While formerly he ate meat almost every Sunday, to-day he sees it on the table only a few times a year. . . . Even the more comfortably situated live chiefly on a *pokleбка* of potatoes (a kind of soup) or a cabbage soup without meat, known as *shtchi*."

Tea, which has become an article "of the first necessity," is nothing but "boiled water slightly coloured." In general "the food of the peasant constitutes an absolute minimum. Bad seasons, years of dearth, still further reduce this minimum, so that the peasant's body, deteriorated by starvation, is a most favourable soil for epidemics."

Permanent poverty always means physical degeneration. This is clear when we consider the statistics of the young men not admitted to military service. In fifty Governments of European Russia the following numbers were discharged annually on account of physical defects: between 1874 and 1883, 407,000, or 6.4 per cent.; between 1884 and 1893, 534,000, or 7.7 per cent.; between 1894 and 1901, 702,000, or 10.3 per cent.

To this, add the ravages of alcoholism. In 1904, according to the data of the Ministry of Finances, the State, which holds the monopoly of alcohol, sold more than 70 millions of *vedros* of this product of "prime necessity" (a *vedro* = 22 pints). In 1911 these 70 million *vedros* had increased to 192 millions. The spread of alcoholism among a people so miserably poor, in a social atmosphere so degraded, will reduce the population to a state of psychical degeneration. At the Congress of Russian Physicians (1910), Dr. Petrovsky, basing his observations upon published statistics, proved that neurasthenia is more prevalent among the masses of the people than in any other country.

Moreover, neurasthenics are far more numerous in the villages than in the towns. Thus, rural "tranquillity" and "peace" do not save the Russian peasant from physical and mental degeneration.

The condition of the village becomes worse every year. According to a member of the Council of Empire, M. Rotvand, "in 1909 work was lacking in the country districts for 7 millions

of workers of both sexes, who had to support 17 millions of members of their families."

IV

At one time, not yet remote, many publicists, economists, and politicians believed that the existence of the rural commune (the *mir*) was a peculiarity of Russian life, and that this commune was destined to give the economic and social development of Russia a different direction to that adopted by *bourgeois* Europe. The communistic spirit of the Russian *mujik* would, they thought, save Russia from the social conflicts of the capitalist system, from the "plague of the proletariat."

Not only the Russians were of this opinion. A Belgian, M. de Lavelaye, having studied the question, expressed the following opinion: "This rural communism prevents the inequality of conditions from becoming extreme and offers serious guarantees of social tranquillity. So long as the land is in the possession of the commune it cannot be seized by a few powerful families. On the other hand, the periodical allotment of the soil prevents the formation of a proletariat, since it assures every one of an inalienable portion of the common fund" (M. de Lavelaye, *De la propriété et de ses formes primitives*, cited from M. Kovalevsky's *Régime économique de la Russie*, Paris, 1898).

Opinions generally held are often false; and this opinion concerning the rural commune of Russia is certainly false.

It is true that the communal system is still in vogue in Russia. At the beginning of the twentieth century 80 per cent. of the peasants' land belonged to the communes. But the communal system is far from being an exceptional privilege peculiar to Russia, so that those ingenuous and romantic persons who contrast the "holy communism" of the Russian *mujik* with the "pagan individualism" of the European *bourgeois* are absurdly mistaken.

* Such an antithesis was first suggested by the works of the so-called Slavophiles (about 1850). The Slavophiles transformed the ideas of the German romantic philosophy into a patriotic Russian romanticism

The commune existed in Western Europe when that form of landed property corresponded with the level of economic development. I cannot linger here over so general an aspect of the economic theory as the problem of the correlation between the communal form of landowning and the system of agriculture. But, I repeat, the national, racial, psychic element plays no part in this question of communism. If you open M. Henri Lichtenberger's *Allemagne moderne* you will there find a description of the communal relations of the German country-side, a description which is perfectly appropriate to the Russian system. One has only to alter the dates and the terminology. As matters were formerly in Germany, so they are in Russia to-day: "The peasant village still constitutes a sort of collectivity. To each peasant or member of the collectivity is allotted a *nadyel* (in Germany *eine Hufe*), or right of participation in the general possessions of the village, cultivated lands, rivers and lakes, roads, pastures, and forests. In virtue of this principle every member of the association should find himself in possession of a holding sufficient in size to afford him employment and to yield the products necessary to the subsistence of himself and his family. The *nadyel* comprises: a farm with its dependencies, which is the private property of the peasant; a right of using the unshared portion of the communal domain; and lastly, a certain portion of cultivable land. But this cultivable land is never held by a single tenant; the total cultivable area is divided into a certain number of sections—say 30 to 40—of land whose quality is more or less equivalent, and in each of these sections each family receives a *polessa* (in Germany, *Morgen* or *Joch*). Under these conditions, notwithstanding such modifications as have been introduced, the

of a highly original kind. The leader of this school, Constantin Axakov, wrote: "In Europe the principle of personality is supreme; with us, the communal principle. Europe is a pagan, Russia a holy Christian. In the West reigns apparent liberty, a liberty like that of a wild animal in the desert. The true liberty is found among us, in the East."

These words were written during the period of serfdom, under the reactionary reign of Nicolas I.

village land is still divided into hundreds and sometimes thousands of parcels, and each peasant owns a large number of such parcels, scattered over the face of the village domain. This method of division (*tcherexpolossitza*, or in Germany, *Gemengelage*) necessarily leads to collective exploitation. As all these parcels are adjacent and there are no paths leading to them which would enable the owner to reach them without passing over his neighbours' fields, the whole area is cultivated according to a plan laid down by the elders of the village. By virtue of the *prinuditelny svooborot* (literally "obligatory rotation," German *Flurzwang*) each peasant is required to cultivate a given crop on a given parcel of land, and to proceed, from sowing to harvest, according to fixed dates. In a word, his rights as owner of the soil he cultivates are limited by a series of strict obligations, which prevent him from arranging the exploitation of his property as he likes, and force him on many points to obey the decisions of the collectivity."

I cite this whole page from M. Lichtenberger's volume, for despite the fact that his description refers to the German commune of 1800, it is perfectly applicable to the territorial ownership of land by the Russian peasants of to-day. We have only to alter the terms. That the rural *mir*, as a form of property, is far from being the product of the "national spirit" is confirmed by another interesting fact: these same Germans, whose ancestors, in Germany, dissolved the rural commune at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when they had arrived in Russia, in the Government of Saratov, installed in surroundings favourable to the development of the communal system, put the latter into practice in order to be in harmony with the economic conditions of the period.

Thus the attribution of a purely national character to the Russian rural commune is merely a legend, one of those "social myths" which affect not only the profane mind, but even science.

The representation of the Russian commune as a system that will save the population from proletarianization is equally false. According to the preceding chapters, we know that the progress

of proletarianization in Russia has been extremely rapid, despite the existence of the commune. Economic and social differentiation is as common among the peasants of the "holy *mir*" as amid the industrial population of the city. In vain did the Government, seeing in the commune a safeguard against "the Revolution" and a guarantee of "order," endeavour to hinder the process of proletarianization, by forbidding the "division of families" (law of 1886) and rendering departure from the commune difficult: in short, by giving the commune the character of a compulsory and not a voluntary union. Economic development obtained the upper hand, shattering the old juridical forms which attempted to confine it. Commercial exchange having led the peasant to produce cereals for the market, and being bound up with the capitalist system, destroyed the social myth of the "holy *mir*" and of rural fraternity and equality.

Here is an interesting fact: the same Government which, in the name of the old traditions, preserved the commune and isolated it from the rest of society, also impelled it towards its dissolution. Having need of money, the Government heavily taxed the peasants. To pay these taxes the *mir* had to supply wheat for the market, to enter the arena of competition and immerse themselves in the spirit of enterprise. The conception of the commune as a safeguard, a guarantee of "social peace" (see the words of M. de Lavelaye), was a vain and ingenuous dream. If there did seem to be a certain manifestation of "equality" in the commune, it was of no equality of high culture and well-being, but of the equality of poverty and ignorance. This because the system of communal property annihilated individual energy, wrapped the economic activity of the country in a network of tiresome regulations, and ended in extreme subdivision of the land. Thus the material situation of the peasants and their level of culture are most satisfactory in those parts of Russia where individual ownership was first introduced, for example, in the Baltic provinces.

I do not say the commune is to be blamed for the ignorance and the poverty of the Russian peasantry; these are the result

of the abolition of serfdom, of the *mujik's* lack of land, and the yoke imposed by the aristocracy and autocracy. But I do say that the communal system aggravated the crisis of rural economy and complicated the social and economic relations of the village.

CHAPTER V

THE FAMILY AND THE POSITION OF WOMEN

- I. Evolution of the family—Prostitution. II. The intellectual woman in Russia.

I

THE family, like all other phenomena of social life, is far from being immutable. It develops and changes its forms, and at different periods, among different peoples, we observe various types of family and of family ties and relations. The data of modern historic science permit us to assert that the evolution of the family is not due to chance, and that it is closely bound up with the evolution of economic life.

In the first part of this book an example of this relation was cited: the "great family" of the Russian Slav, formed under the immediate influence of the economic activity of the old-time agriculture. We know how slowly the forms of agricultural economy have changed with the Russian peasant. The forms of family relations evolved as slowly in the Russian village, and are as backward, as those of the modern agricultural economy. To this day the "great family" has not entirely disappeared in Russia. It is often encountered slightly transformed. The rural *dvors* composing the *mir* are not rarely veritable "great families," that is, assemblies of several related families, living under one roof, under the direction of a single *domokhoziain* (master of the house) and in economic unity. The *doma-*

khoziain, that is, the most aged man of the family, represents the *dvor* at the rural *skhod* (assembly of the *domokhoziains* of the villages), disposes of the goods of the family and the labour of its members, and the latter must submit to him. The foundation of this form of the family was certainly economic interest. The following fact proves as much : into the composition of a "great family" the married sons of the house-master entered first, but if there was a lack of workers the sons-in-law were also called in.

The Government, after the abolition of serfdom, took measures to preserve this type of rural family. In 1886 Alexander III issued an edict which forbade the division of land between the various members of a family. But no measure could prevent such division, and from 1861 onwards to our own days there have been more than two and a half million cases of division of families. This phenomenon shows plainly that the old family forms do not at all correspond with the new economic developments. When the *dvor* commenced to produce wheat not only for its own consumption but also for the market, the individualist middle-class tendencies suddenly penetrated the pseudo-communistic atmosphere of the *dvor* and resulted in the dissolution of the old family relations.

This dissolution was greatly augmented by the development of industry and the migration to the cities ; both factors drove to the towns and industrial centres millions of young people of both sexes. This isolation of "children" from the "fathers" does not as a rule take place suddenly. At first, after leaving for the cities, the young country-folk keep up relations with their parents. These relations are manifested more particularly in the "community of the purse" ; the member of the family who has left for the city sends part of his or her earnings to the "house," and will often return to the village to help in the field-work. These relations with the "house" grow less frequent ; the child founds a family in the city and finally breaks off all relations with the native village.

The old-fashioned rural party and the True-Russian Conser-

vative publicists complain bitterly of the disgust exhibited by the young people for the quiet rural life and their love of the "debauched" cities. But these lamentations often contain a proportion of hypocrisy which is sometimes unconscious, but more often premeditated. The village—as we have stated in preceding chapters—is far from being such a Paradise as to retain the young: especially as neither custom nor the law protects their labour. The position of the woman is especially painful.

The woman in the village is completely defenceless before her husband and elders of the family in general. Blows are the means employed by the Russian peasant to make his wife respect him. When the *mujik* thrashes his wife the neighbours say: "He is teaching her." This "he is teaching her" is in its way a technical term; it refers to a common incident of village life.

The power of the "house-master" is sometimes exhibited in a repugnant fashion where the women of the family are concerned. In the Russian country-side the *snokhatchestvo*, or concubinage of the house-master with his *snokha* or daughter-in-law, is still extant. This practice is often observed in village life. When the young husband leaves to perform his military service, or when he goes to the city to work there, his father uses his authority to satisfy his sexual needs by means of the *snokha*, who is left behind. Many deeds of violence, many dramas, are caused by this exercise of "paternal" authority.

To believe that on the whole "pure and patriarchal" manners reign in the Russian country-side is to be cruelly deceived; it is to wear rose-coloured glasses. The Russian peasants are too wretched and ignorant to be the guardians of a high morality. Moreover, the nobles, regarding the village as part of their own premises, are far from being models of virtue. The position of young peasant girls and women working on the great estates, in the refineries, or the beet-root or tobacco fields, is lamentable. The body of a peasant-woman is bought like a pound of meat, and prostitution is a general practice. The following fact will give

some idea of this prostitution: according to the report of the secretary of the Council of the Charity House of St. Petersburg, "every winter numbers of peasant-women come to St. Petersburg from the neighbouring provinces. All the winter they practise prostitution. In summer they return to their native district to help in the field-work." From the Government of Tula peasant-women bring to the city their innocent daughters, at sixteen years of age, and place them in licensed houses. These women excuse themselves thus: "I do not wish my daughter to be the wife of some quarrelsome drunkard. Better for her to live like this until she is eighteen. Then she can work in some factory." The young girl thus placed often sends her mother part of her earnings.

As a rule the peasant-women form the largest percentage of prostitutes. In St. Petersburg 65 per cent. of all the prostitutes are peasant-women. At the fair of Nijni-Novgorod, which the Russian merchants visit annually, not only to do business but to "amuse themselves," 74 per cent. of all the prostitutes are peasant-women. St. Petersburg numbers 50,000 women who live by prostitution, either permanent or occasional. At the Congress of the "Defence of Woman" (April, 1910) the frightful development of child prostitution was mentioned:

"Child prostitutes are now met in St. Petersburg at every step. The sale of their bodies by these children is effected openly, without the slightest concealment. In the streets where the prostitutes habitually assemble one may see whole groups of girls of ten or twelve years,¹ who accost men and exchange obscene phrases. There are 'hotels for new-comers' which make a speciality of child prostitution. . . . Intermediaries organize this traffic in the body of the child." (Cited from the journal *Kiruskayia Mysl*, 1910, No. 76).

The inquiries prosecuted by the first Russian Congress concerning the white slave trade have thrown light on the following question: Why has prostitution attained so great a development?

¹ In the report of the Council of the Charity House cases of prostitutes of eight and nine years are noted.

The first cause of this development is hunger and wretchedness. The ruin of the productive forces of the population—a result of the profound contradictions of the social life of the Russian people—has been extremely favourable to this monstrous growth of prostitution. The bad conditions of labour and insufficient salaries push the peasant-woman and the factory hand into this calling. In Russia domestic servants earn 3 to 8 rubles monthly—6s. 4½d to 17s.—and the wages of the factory girl are slightly higher. . . . Add to this the absolute lack of laws protecting the woman of the people and her extreme ignorance. According to the data for 1897, 90 per cent. of the women of Russia were completely illiterate. Even to-day this maxim is general in rural Russia: "Knowledge is no good to girls." The *mujik*, instead of sending his daughter to school, employs her as a servant or a herd.

The position of the woman is equally painful in the household of the merchant or ecclesiastic. The young girl is not allowed to marry for love. Material conditions are the basis of every marriage. Among the clergy it is usual, in some cases, to place the son-in-law of the former priest in charge of the parish. The seminarist, having completed his training, proceeds to look for a "fiancée with a parish." A marriage is often concluded between absolute strangers.

II

Modern society forces the woman to use more than her muscular strength. She is forced to employ her mental energies also. Hence the appearance on the stage of history of the intellectual woman, the woman doctor, the schoolmistress, etc. The rise of the intellectual woman in Russia must be referred to the "period of the great reforms." To realize these reforms, to improve public instruction and the hygienic conditions of the life of the people, a vast number of intellectual workers was required. In this manner woman was able to apply her faculties. Thus is explained the invasion of the high-schools by women, and the

attitude assumed by them in respect of social reform towards the year 1860. Moreover, the social and economic development of the nation contributed to the formation of an army of intellectual women. At first the nobility furnished the elements of this army: the fall of the economic system of the nobility and the breaking-up of families forced a large number of young girls to earn their living. To obtain their object they devoted themselves to the liberal professions. These young women of noble birth were joined by the daughters of officials, of popes, of small middle-class townsfolk. In many professions, and especially as teachers and physicians, the Russian women are inferior to men neither in numbers nor in quality. Lately Russian women have commenced to study agronomy, technical methods of production, etc.

But the intellectual Russian woman is not content to embrace a liberal career. She also takes an active part in the social struggle, in politics. In this respect she has far outstripped her European sisters. Perhaps only the great French Revolution, with its "women of the Halles," can afford a similar picture of the collective participation of women in the political conflict. But while the "women of the Halles" were only unconscious partisans of an instinctive movement, in Russia the revolutionary woman represents a conscious and organized activity.

Like the intellectual man, the intellectual woman in Russia has been influenced by Socialistic ideas. Terrorism, which—as we shall presently explain—so fully corresponds with the mentality of the intellectuals, has found many disciples among the revolutionary women of Russia. Many acts of terrorism in Russia have been performed by the "feeble" hand of a woman, and how many young girls have died for the Revolution!

We may affirm without any exaggeration that the Russian *intellectuelle* regards her social functions with far greater seriousness than her European sisters.

The social and political activity of the Russian woman would be still more effectual if it were not hampered by legislation. The

law forbids women to take part in elections, whether parliamentary or local. However, in the local administrations women can work as salaried employees—as physicians, school-teachers, etc. In the country the conditions of intellectual work are extremely painful, and especially so for a woman.

CHAPTER VI

THE INTELLECTUAL CLASSES—NIHILISM

- I. The origins of Nihilism. II. The intellectual youth of Russia.
III. The intellectual classes and Socialism—Terrorism.

THE Russian "intellectuals" form a social group so peculiar and so unlike anything to be observed in Western Europe that I must necessarily speak of their principal characteristics.

"A Russian Nihilist!" Who has not heard the phrase? Yet in spite of the widespread use of the term it does not, in most cases, evoke any clear or truthful image of the real "Nihilist." The majority of the public forms an idea of the Nihilist from sensational articles in the gutter Press, from plays and novels written by persons almost wholly ignorant of Russia, and from cinematograph films. For this section of the public the Nihilist is a young man in a blouse, with "blazing eyes," a bomb in his hand: the female Nihilist is a young girl with her hair cut short, full of cold resolution. The inhabitants of certain quarters of those European cities in which Russian students seek asylum have a less nebulous conception of the term. In the Latin Quarter of Paris the Nihilist is a familiar figure, but is only superficially understood.

Let us at the outset understand the word itself. Its origin is by no means recent. In Europe it was applied to the heretical doctrine of Peter of Lombardy. In the early part of the nine-

teenth century we find the word in the works of a Russian literary critic, but it was not then used in the sense which it assumed in the latter part of the century. The modern sense of the term was formulated by the representatives of "Nihilism" themselves; not by living representatives, but by literary figures; by two heroes of Turgenev's celebrated novel, *Fathers and Sons*.

"The 'Nihilist,'" say Turgenev's heroes, "is a man who bows to no authority, who accepts no principle on hearsay, however generally it may be esteemed."

"We act in the name of that which we consider useful. In our days what is most useful? Negation. We deny."

But Turgenev's heroes do not deny for the sake of denial. According to them negation is indispensable to "clearing the way," to "cleaning up." Their negation is the negation of all the old fetiches and prejudices which during the period of serfdom served as the foundation of the life and mentality of Russian society.

One of the principal supports of this society was a gross religious fetichism. Upon this the Nihilists at once showered their blows. The talented publicist Pissarev, who unhappily died young, and the writers Dobrolubov and Tchernychevsky were prominent in this struggle. To religious fetichism they opposed a new conception of the world and man, based upon a naturalistic positivism. They led Russian youth to the study of Karl Vogt, Büchner, Moleschott, Comte, Mill, etc.

"Only the natural and mathematical sciences have the right to be called sciences. . . . Only the natural sciences can develop the understanding," says Pissarev. Then, generalizing these ideas, he continues: "Words and illusions perish, but facts remain." The knowledge of facts, pure empiricism—this is what is most useful to the "conscientious critical personality." It is the analysis of phenomena, not philosophic speculation, that forms the intelligence.

Such were the fundamental theses of the Nihilism of the second half of the nineteenth century. The reader will see that there was no question of a "bare negation," but of the replacement

of the old fetiches and authorities by the scientific study of nature. These ideas reflected the social transformations which were then taking place. At this moment the feudal system was beginning to crumble; new middle-class elements were replacing the old aristocracy; the type of educated noble, an æsthete and philosopher, had to make way for the intellectual *bourgeois* who protested against the ancient doctrines. This phenomenon is analogous to that which was observed in France before the Revolution, when the new *bourgeois* ideas overthrew the *ancien régime* and delivered humanity from its age-long yoke. Russian Nihilism was the declaration of war of the middle-class individual against all that fettered individual liberty. It was also the ideological reflection of the new system of free competition, which victoriously entered into Russian life under the influence of capitalistic development.

"We consider nothing before the human being," says Tchernychevsky, and Pissarev, describing the theory of individualism as "egoism," writes: "Egoism—if properly understood—is an entire liberty of the person, the ruin of *obligatory* virtue and labour, and not an uprooting of all worthy tendencies and generous impulses."

The advent of Nihilism was closely related to the demands of the new economic forms. The original point of view of the Nihilists regarding life and the function of man is a proof of this. "Life is a workshop and man a worker who labours there," says one of Turgenev's heroes, Basarov; and his living prototype, Pissarev, adds: "A good chemist is twenty times more useful than a poet." This point of view was an instinctive protest against the indolent æsthetics in which the nobles of the period of serfdom were steeped, and which served as an agreeable screen against abuses, ignorance, and filth. The productive worker was the type to which the Nihilists called the attention of their contemporaries, and in so doing they betrayed the most urgent needs of the country. The Crimean War opened the eyes of the people to their backward state and their poverty, and the period of the "great reforms" called for abundant hard work, so that men had no leisure to

consider æsthetics. As for the negligence of dress, grooming, and manners which were observable in the Nihilists, and so greatly astonished the "cultured" man, it was only an outward manifestation, very often exaggerated, of this protest against "æstheticism" and æsthetic aristocracy.

II

This democracy of dress and aspect, which was one of the characteristic features of Russian Nihilism, may also be explained by the composition and origin of this intellectual youth which formed the principal nucleus of "Nihilism." Up to the middle of the nineteenth century the children of nobles were predominant among the intellectuals. The most prominent leaders of the revolutionary movement which broke out under Alexander I were young aristocrats, brilliant officers, most of whom died under the blows of Governmental reaction, after the attempted revolution of the 14th December, 1825.

During the second half of the nineteenth century the social composition of the intellectual youth of Russia underwent a change. The development of capitalism opposed to the noble element a new social class and led to the breakdown of castes. The families of priests, bureaucrats, small merchants, even of peasants, provided "intellectuals." Thousands of these young people flocked to the cities to attend the Universities or other secondary colleges.

This exodus of youth from the paternal hearth toward the temples of knowledge symbolized, so to speak, the awakening of Russia from her age-long sleep at the disastrous close of the Crimean War; the Russian boy and girl student symbolized the pursuit of science and liberty.

The report of the Commission of the University Professors who were directed to conduct an inquiry into the University disturbances of 1861 gave the following account of the peculiar situation of the Russian student:

"Russian society has inspired the student with such an idea of his dignity that the same phenomenon is not to be observed

in any other country. In those States in which education is extensive and popular, in which it has firmly taken root, those who study have their social rank already determined for them. In Russia the representatives of intellectual culture, the students, and in our days all Russians, feel profoundly the necessity of culture, regarding it alone as capable of remedying the social evils which oppress them. The habit of inactivity and the custom of relying upon others for the accomplishment of our duties, both implanted in our nature, make it inevitable that youth should constitute the active element, while the riper generations are commencing to enjoy life in tranquillity. It is for this reason that our young people are so conscious of their predestined part. The student, in Russia, is no longer a pupil, but a teacher of society. Society regards him with pride and respect. In the eyes of many the student is the incarnation of the future and the hope of Russia."

The famous teacher and surgeon, Nicolas Pirogov, stated that the University and the students were "the barometer of society." In this connection we may affirm that the incessant disturbances among the students in the second half of nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth were only the reflection of the unsatisfied need of the Russian people.

The Government sought to annihilate the democratic tendencies of the time among the University element. To achieve this end it took the following measures: it made entrance to the University difficult to free students; the fees were greatly increased, and young people desirous of frequenting the University were required to produce a "diploma of maturity," that is, the classic baccalaureate; even entrance to the gymnasias was rendered difficult, especially after the circular of the 18th June, 1887. This, known in the history of Russian education as the "circular on the subject of the cook's children," ordered the directors of secondary schools to accept only a limited number of pupils belonging to a democratic environment. "It is necessary," said the Ministry, "to rid the gymnasias and the progymnasias of the children of coachmen, cooks, washerwomen, and

little shopkeepers. These children, unless exceptionally gifted, must not depart from their station."

"Education only leads them to contempt of their parents, discontent with their lot, and resentment of the inevitable and natural inequality prevailing in respect of the division of property."

But all these measures were ineffectual. Waves of democracy gradually invaded the schools, and the youth of the upper social classes had to make way for the democratic youth. Thus, for example, between 1899 and 1900, among the students of the University of Moscow, the sons of functionaries constituted 32·5 per cent. of the total number of students. Between 1900 and 1909 this decreased to 23·7 per cent. In these ten years, among the students, the number of the sons of nobles fell from 17·4 to 13·8 per cent. On the other hand, the sons of peasants increased from 5·2 to 8·4 per cent., the sons of merchants from 14·7 to 16·9 per cent., and the sons of *meshchanin* (small city landlords) from 15·9 to 21·2 per cent. This phenomenon acquires still greater significance if we consider, not the relations between the different groups, but the increase of each group separately. Between 1899 and 1909 the number of children of nobles and functionaries among the students had increased by 50 per cent. ; that of the children of merchants by 150 per cent. ; that of the children of *meshchanin* by 200 per cent. ; that of the children of priests by 200 per cent. ; that of the children of peasants by 250 per cent. ; and the number of persons exercising liberal professions had increased by 350 per cent. !

III

With the composition of the youth of the Universities such as it is, we must not be surprised that a tendency toward the "Left" is everywhere apparent among the students, and that the majority of them are under the influence of various revolutionary organizations. However, to represent a revolutionary Russian student

as an anarchist is absolutely false. Anarchism, in the true sense of the word, has had very little vogue in Russia, and the basic principle of anarchism—antiparlamentarism—has not obtained and could not obtain the approval of a people that has so long struggled for the establishment of a parliamentary system. As for Socialism, it has certainly been a powerful influence with the intellectual youth of Russia. This fact may be explained in many ways.

In the first place, by their composition and their material circumstances, the greater number of young Russians frequenting the Universities belong to the intellectual proletariat. I imagine one could nowhere in the world find a poorer and hungrier body than the Russian students. Fifty shillings a month is above their average income. The inquiry into the conditions of the life of the students of Kiev (in the year 1872) established the fact that many students "try to do without the indispensable." In these latter times the number of such students has multiplied. It is not rare for poverty and hunger to drive some student to suicide. With such a condition of affairs it is not surprising that the students fall under the influence of the Socialist parties.

Another cause of the success of Socialist ideas among the Russian "intellectuals" has been expressed by the German author—Karl Kautsky—who connects this phenomenon with the part which foreign capital plays in the economic life of Russia.

"In a country of capitalist industries in which capital is furnished to industry more especially by foreigners, we remark in the first place the absence of a considerable quantity of workers who are not producers—domestics or intellectuals—depending on capital. The absolute number of non-productive workers may be very considerable, but the influence exercised by them upon capital will not be great. In such a country the non-productive workers and their services depend on other social classes—the landed proprietors, for instance. If they are intellectuals their existence will be the poorer, but will depend less on the capitalist mentality.

"Capital has a harmful influence on these workers solely in places where it consumes the profits.

"The French financier has boldly acquired Russian obligations, has placed his money in Russian industrial enterprises, holds shares issued by the State for the construction of Russian railways. However, this financier has his service, not of Russian domestics, but of French domestics; he passes his time with French actresses; is the Mæcenas of French musicians, painters, and poets; receives in his *salons* French artists, politicians, and scientists, and—if he is a believer or wishes to maintain religion among the masses—he supports French and not Russian monasteries. He buys not Russian but French journalists. The surplus earnings of industry confirm the influence of capitalism, not in Russia, but in France.

"And this phenomenon is one of the serious causes of the fact that in Russia the 'intellectuals,' as a general thing, lead a more than modest existence. For in no other State are the 'intellectuals' less dependent on capital than in Russia, or more violently opposed to it, and nowhere do they better understand the proletariat or are more closely attached thereto.

"In no country is the number of Socialist agitators and highly trained theorists so high as in Russia, the country of illiterates."

We can offer yet another explanation of the leanings of the Russian intellectuals toward Socialism: the "intellectuals" are themselves interested in the downfall of the present system, but being too weak to solve the problem, they seek other forces to aid them. As the democratic middle-class is one of the most insignificant classes in Russia, only the proletariat can prove a serious ally in the struggle against absolutism. To get nearer to this ally the "intellectuals" adopt the Socialist ideology.

We ought to make one reservation: by no means all the Russian "intellectuals" are Socialists. The disciples of Socialism form the most democratic sphere of the intellectual classes, and the highest sphere (professors, advocates, engineers, etc.) is in sympathy with the *bourgeois* Liberals and Radicals.

Combining with the proletariat and taking part in the Socialist

movement, the "intellectuals" bring to this movement a certain atmosphere of their own. This is visible more especially in revolutionary tactics and in the forms of Terrorism. The individual policy of terror, as a system of political action, has been in Russia a product of the ideology of the "intellectuals." The latter, who do not participate directly in production, being independent of the economic mechanism and unconscious of any bond between themselves and the social mass, are inclined to oppose their personality to Society, to consider the phenomena of social life less as results of the material forces of nature than as manifestations of personality. On this account it seems to the "intellectuals" possible to transform a social or political system by causing a personage, or series of personages, to disappear. In such a system they do not see the reflection of the grouping or the social classes, but a combination of individuals and persons. Hence "individual terror" as a method of political action. Another source of this policy may sometimes be found in the desire of self-sacrifice, a desire almost mystical.

As to the Russian workers, their sympathies are all for the organized action of the masses. This is very comprehensible, for the technical and economic environment which surrounds the worker engaged in great industrial undertakings reminds him at every moment that he is only a part of an enormous social whole.

BOOK III

**THE ABSOLUTE POWER, ITS ORGANIZA-
TION AND RESOURCES**

CHAPTER I

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL POWER

- I. The Imperial House—The autocracy. II. The Ministry and the Council of Empire.

I

THE reader knows how the absolute centralized monarchy was formed in Russia, what were its social roots and its historical development, and what forms it assumed when this development was complete. We must now consider more closely the political structure of the Russian State and the internal organization of its different parts.

The first and principal of these parts is naturally the power of the Tsar. The Tsar and his family constitute *Rossiyskii imperatorkii Dom*, the Imperial House of Russia. As the Tsars and Grand-Dukes are distinguished by a very considerable fecundity, the present strength of the House is fairly respectable: more than threescore members. The Imperial Family, considered collectively, is the largest and richest landowner in all Russia. The private wealth of each of its members is very great. In Siberia alone the Tsar possesses $42\frac{1}{2}$ million *desiatins*, or $11\frac{1}{2}$ million acres, of land. Many vast properties in the Caucasus, the Crimea, etc., belong to the Tsar and the Grand-Dukes. Without counting its private possessions, the Imperial Family enjoys what is known as the *udelys*, which consist both of land and capital. These *udelys* were established in 1797 by Paul I, "to assure for ever

the existence of the Imperial Family." These *udyls* include 7,900,000 *desiatins*, or 21,330,000 acres, of land, 1,500 mills, 850 commercial undertakings, 100 workshops, the finest vineyards in Russia, etc. (In 1896, for example, the administrators of the *udyls* sold wine to the value of £160,000, and the total revenue of the *udyls* in the same year amounted to £2,120,000.) In a hundred years (1797-1897) the *udyls* provided more than £60,000,000 for the support of members of the Royal Family. This sum does not include money from the "Imperial capital," which is stupendous. Merely for the liberation of the serfs belonging to the Imperial House, the latter received £50,000,000, which went to swell the aforesaid capital.

But this does not exhaust all the sources on which the house of the Romanov can draw. In addition to private properties and the Imperial capital, it enjoys certain State sums known as the "Subsidy of the State Treasury." In 1904 this subsidy amounted to £1,360,000, and in 1906 to £1,640,000.

Moreover, many members of the Imperial Family occupy very highly paid posts in the upper strata of the administrative services and in the army, and are far from showing their subordinates an example of disinterestedness. The reader may now judge how dearly the Russian monarchy costs the people.

But we must not consider only the material side of the case. From the juridical point of view the supreme centralized power of the Russian State is "unlimited autocracy." The original sense of the word "autocrat" is not that attributed to it during the "period of St. Petersburg." When a Muscovite Tsar adopted the title of "autocrat," he meant that he depended on *no foreign sovereign*. But when the monarchy was firmly settled in Russia the conception of the term was modified, and the absolute sovereignty of the Tsar over *the whole population of the country* became the chief element of that conception.

Thanks to the historical glimpse which we have taken of the development of the Russian State, we know that Russian absolutism has not been a real absolutism ; that the monarchy has

always been dependent on the nobility, and that its actions have merely expressed the interests of the latter. Presently we shall see that the whole bureaucratic machine of Russia is closely related to the nobility, and that in its composition the bureaucracy reflects the advantageous situation of the aristocratic landowners.

II

As for all that concerns the organization of the higher institutions of the State, for a long time now these institutions have been *apparently* similar to those of Europe. The chief agent of the autocracy, charged with executing the will of the latter, was during the whole of the nineteenth century the minister. The formation of the cabinet of ministers depends entirely on the Tsar, and all are responsible solely to the Tsar. To-day, in Russia, far from being members of the Government, the ministers are the *private* servants of the monarch; they are his private agents. The national representation granted in 1906 under the form of the *Gosudarstvennaya Duma*—the Imperial Duma—has not modified the position of the minister, for according to law the latter is in no wise dependent upon the national representation. The Duma often expressed its distrust and suspicion of a minister, but the latter did not resign.

The dependence of the ministers upon the Tsar has this result: the ministers do not form a self-contained unity.

The Prime Minister is always a man who enjoys the personal confidence of the Tsar; and he must act, not according to his opinion and that of his colleagues, but according to the "prevailing atmosphere" at Court. In Russia there are really two Governments: one official, consisting of the cabinet: the other non-official, consisting of the Court *camarilla*. This *camarilla* holds all the threads of foreign as well as home politics. There are many proofs that this *camarilla* is a fact; the foreign politics of Russia furnish a startling proof of its reality. The admissions of the Russian and foreign Press establish

the fact that the Russo-Japanese dispute was transformed into an armed struggle *in spite* of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the War Office, and that this development was entirely due to the Tsar and his suite, both acting with a view to their private material interests. In home politics also the courtiers force the Ministry to adopt that line of conduct which is most advantageous to themselves. The activity of this *camarilla* is based on the interests of the aristocracy, for it consists of the representatives of the aristocracy.

The functions of this backstairs Government are not very arduous. Enormous sums burden the Budget yearly, being intended "for employment known to His Majesty the Emperor." These funds are utilized as a principal resource for the organization of the forces of reaction. The admissions of the Press have betrayed the fact that every reactionary Governmental action, as, for example, the dissolution of the first and the second Duma, is always preceded by important assignments, the expenses of which are covered by this fund. The same funds purchase the journals of the "Right" and meet the expenses of the other weapons employed in the struggle against the Russian people.

In this manner the organization of the high executive power of Russia still bears the marks of feudal law, the traces of those periods when the interests of the State coincided with the private interests of the Sovereign and his Court.

The organization of the legislative power is no more satisfactory. Even as lately as 1906, at the moment when the first Duma was opened, the "Council of Empire" served as a laboratory of legislation. The members of this Council were not elected, but appointed by the Tsar. Moreover, the Tsar was able to veto their decisions. Russian history is full of instances in which the Tsar, by a stroke of the pen, annihilated the laws proposed by those he had appointed. Moreover, many reforms were effected before 1906 of which the "Council of Empire" had no cognizance. These reforms were promulgated by manifesto or *ukase*.

In 1906 the organization of the legislative power was somewhat modified. The Council of Empire was reformed. To the members appointed by the Tsar were added the representatives of the zemstvos and the municipalities, the merchant corporations, the nobles, the clergy, and the universities. This half bureaucratic, half parliamentary body was supposed to exercise the mission of "restraining" the other chamber, the Duma. Six years proved that the Council of Empire was not content with being "conservative" after the fashion of the English House of Lords, and that it had a purely reactionary plan of campaign. The Council of Empire rarely presents a prospective law, but it limits the performances of the Duma, and in its zeal is more reactionary than the Government itself.

As for the activity of the Duma, it is closely bound up with the events of the Revolution, to which we shall presently return. At the moment we will proceed to consider the remaining portions of the mechanism of the State.

CHAPTER II

THE RUSSIAN BUREAUCRACY

- I. The bureaucracy and landed property. II. The character of the Russian bureaucracy.

RUSSIA is the true home of bureaucracy. Compared with Western Europe, the development of her social and political life has been extremely slow, but the bureaucracy has progressed with incredible celerity. According to the well-known publicist Rubakin, "nowhere in the course of the nineteenth century was so rapid a growth of the bureaucracy observed as that which took place under our eyes in Russia. In a space of some forty years (1855-97), in Belgium, for example, the number of bureaucrats increased by two and a half times. Even in bureaucratic Austria the increase between 1828 and 1879 was only one of 50 per cent., and in the last thirty-four years the increase has again been about the same. In Russia the mobilization of the bureaucratic forces has proceeded three or four times as quickly."

According to the general census of 1897, there were 435,000 persons employed in the various institutions of the public authorities. Of these 397,000 were men and 38,000 women. Let us note that this number represents a minimum of the actual mass of bureaucrats, for by no means all the categories of bureaucrat are here included. Compare this minimum first with the population: one official to 292 inhabitants. Taking

the male inhabitants between eighteen and eighty-eight years of age, we find one bureaucrat to 89 men.

The composition of the bureaucracy is artificially qualified by the Government. Entry into the bureaucratic army is absolutely forbidden to Jews. Poles and other "foreigners" can only with great difficulty become officials. Exception is made in favour of members of the German nobility of the Baltic provinces, who, being solidly in favour of the autocracy, have provided Russia with numerous officials.

Thus in a large part of Russia the bureaucracy appears as a foreign element, playing the part of conqueror in a vanquished country and provoking the hatred of the population.

The composition of the Russian bureaucracy from the social point of view is highly characteristic. A study of the subject enables us to reply to the question: What is the Russian bureaucracy as a social group? Among the historians, sociologists, and publicists of Russia this subject is still under discussion. Some say the bureaucracy is a group outside all social classes, denuded of social interests, whose members are united only by private and professional interests. Others expound the contrary suggestion, seeking to regard the bureaucracy as a definite class. Here is an analysis of the composition of the Russian bureaucracy which will contribute to the solution of this vexed question:

According to certain statistics, the whole or the higher and part of the middle bureaucracy are recruited from the landowning nobility. All the superior institutions of officialdom—Council of Empire, Senate, Council of Ministers—are filled with scions of the nobility, and all important Government berths, whether internal or representative, such as the post of Governor-General, Governor, Procurator, ambassador, etc., are filled by noble landowners.

If we consult the register of the members of the Council of Empire, we see that the high dignitaries sitting thereon—ex-ministers, generals, admirals, and others—are the holders of the greatest estates in Russia. Twenty-two members of the Council of Empire, "true secret Councillors of State" (the highest

civil title in Russia), possess 176,000 *desiatins*, not including forest lands: that is, each owns on an average 8,000 *desiatins*. We must not forget that the official figures are sensibly below the facts; in reality the territorial wealth of these nobles is twice as great as the Government cares to admit. The eight "secret Councillors of State" own some 115,000 *desiatins*, or some 14,000 *desiatins*, or 38,000 acres, apiece.

The same is true of the senators and other high officials. The mere fact of noble origin and the possession of land constitutes a right to participate in the government of the country. This state of affairs is a remnant of feudalism, the fusion of public power and territorial wealth being characteristic of the feudal system. Other facts also prove the existence of the feudal imprint on the Russian bureaucracy: among the higher dignitaries of the Empire are men of no training whatever, or only the most elementary, who are nevertheless entrusted with the direction of affairs of State. Their title and origin has made them statesmen. Some of these dignitaries have received their education in special establishments, such as the Corps of Pages or the College of Jurisprudence, to which are admitted only the sons of the greatest nobles.

The gravity of the present condition of affairs is increased by the fact that the aristocracy turned bureaucracy, far from forgetting its old feudal customs, has retained them in its administration of the State. The bureaucratic nobility behaves in the administrative domain just as a feudal lord might behave in his stronghold. These officials exact a slavish obedience from their subordinates. In the statutes dealing with civil functionaries is a paragraph, long familiar to every official, by virtue of which any employee may be dismissed by the administration "without explanation of motives." It is easy to understand that under these conditions the Russian functionaries form a far from admirable body.

II

A juridical analysis of the situation of the Russian bureaucracy reveals many peculiarities which prove that the national life is

riddled with feudal prejudices. The typical mark of the feudal system is, as we know, the fusion of the private interests of the landowners with the interests of the State. These interests used to coincide naturally, and every estate was a State in little, with its justice, its army, and its police. In Europe, with the development of the modern centralized State, public and private law were separated. An analogous process set in even in Russia, but the reaction of the last quarter-century has provoked a return to the old traditions. Formerly there were administrative agents who were agents at once of the public authorities and of the great private landowners. And at the beginning of the twentieth century there appeared in Russia a police especially attached to the factories, in the shape of *sergents de ville* and commissaries, who, being leased to factories and workshops, are paid by private individuals but are counted as State officials. By a decree of the Council of Ministers, approved by the Emperor, of the 6th December, 1905, the governors and heads of districts are authorized to satisfy the demands of rural landowners on the subject of creating police officials in the villages and forming detachments of mounted police. These officials and detachments "are obliged to execute all orders of the proprietors with a view to safeguarding their domains." These police are at the service of the State and at the charge of individuals. Many nobles and great rural landowners have these semi-State, semi-private police on their estates. Their creation is the most typical action of the aristocratic restoration. So frank a fusion, and one, which is more characteristic, juridically formulated and sanctioned, of the elements of public power and private rights in a single administrative organ will certainly not be encountered in any modern State.

An analogous feature is revealed in the conduct of the Russian Government towards the public Treasury. The aristocratic landowner, knowing nothing of organizing his estate upon a rational basis, and having squeezed his farmers and peasants like lemons, by a savage exploitation, seeks an advantageous position in some post under the State, as a means of procuring money for the continuation of "his noble existence."

In the Middle Ages, when a *boyar* became a *voevoda*, or governor of some province, it was said of him that he took the post in order to "feed himself," to "eat well." Later the bureaucrats judged a post only from the point of view of the "consumer." The following figures taken from the official data give some idea of the enormous sums spent on this "feeding" process.

According to the official figures for 1903, eighty members of the Council of Empire received each year salaries of which the total amounted to some £160,000. In ten years (1894-1904) the cost of the higher bureaucracy increased by more than 100 per cent. Here are the figures for 1905, indicating the salaries of officials and the number of functionaries benefiting thereby :

Annual Salary.					Number of Officials.	
From £530 to £1,060	1,981
From £1,060 to £2,120	282
From £2,120 to £5,320	40
Over £5,320	10

So the upkeep of these 2,313 high officials costs the people more than £2,000,000 annually.

In other cases the payments made to bureaucrats are incredible. For example, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army received, during the Russo-Japanese war, more than £10,000 annually.

But the lion's share is reserved by the higher officialdom for itself. The small officials receive very poor pay. According to official data, of the 435,000 officials only 91,000 receive more than £106 a year. The other 344,000 receive less than this; and the salaries of certain smaller functionaries (schoolmasters, postal and telegraph employees, etc.) are wretchedly small, many receiving only £1 16s. to £2 a month.

Among the petty officialdom of Russia are cases of extreme poverty, death by inanition, and suicide on account of starvation. Such a position explains the participation of the lesser officials in the general strike (1905) of the proletariat. But it is even more characteristic that those strata of the bureaucracy whose services

are most highly paid are yet unsatisfied with their position, and seek for "private, complementary" gains. Every one knows the vast development attained by extortion in Russia, for it has become a familiar fact, playing a perceptible part in the life of the country. Of recent years the most scandalous instances of this practice have been revealed. Often the proofs were so obvious that the Government was forced, much against its will, to place its highest officials upon the "prisoner's bench." Among others who found their way thither were the Under-Secretary of State, Gurko, the Governor of Nijni-Novgorod, Baron Frederiks, and the Moscow Prefect of Police, Reinbot. Extortion as introduced into the system of government reveals the manner in which the aristocratic bureaucracy regards service under the State. It considers such service merely as a means of personal enrichment. The middle and inferior bureaucracy—the police especially—follows its example. The police literally force the population to ransom themselves from persecution and abuses of power. Every Russian is familiar with the sight of petty police officials visiting the various quarters of the cities before all feast-days and holidays. These functionaries go from house to house, from shop to shop, from cabaret to cabaret, demanding tips from the owners. Higher placed officials do not, of course, take so much trouble; the money extorted by them is sent to their houses. While skilfully developing every possible means of exploitation and enrichment, the Russian bureaucracy seeks at the same time to render the "administrative burden" as light as possible, and to furnish the least possible amount of physical and intellectual labour. The working day of the higher and middle officials lasts only four or five, or at most six hours, and is thus notably shorter than that of their foreign colleagues. But idleness and inaction are not the only qualities of the Russian bureaucrat. More dangerous still is the "administrative ecstasy" of certain officials, by which their administrations can only suffer. Remote from life and the actual needs of the people, these officials are incessantly inventing useless and inapplicable laws and regulations and mutilating the life of the people. Perhaps it could not

be otherwise. The social origin of the Russian bureaucracy must inevitably have such a result. Being of the very blood and bone of the dying nobility, the aristocratic bureaucracy could hardly organize new relations and new forms of the life of the people ; still less, perhaps, could it incarnate in the governmental policy the problems of national progress and economic development, for progress brings with it the loss of that caste whose representatives the Russian bureaucrats are.

CHAPTER III

THE POLICE—THE LAW

- I. Police a concomitant of absolutism—"Secret" police—Azeff and his crimes. II. Russian justice—Its feudal nature—Feudal elements of the reformed justice—Victims of the courts-martial—The Senate.

IN all countries the appearance of police as a special institution has been coincident with the triumph of absolutism. In France this institution was created under Louis XIV, in Prussia under Frederick the Great, and in Russia during the reign of Peter the Great. Before the latter period the functions of police were shared between the feudal *seigneurs* and elected officials. Peter made the police force independent of the population and centralized the functions of police, placing them in the hands of the autocracy and the bureaucracy. Since then the number of policemen has multiplied at a bewildering rate, until it sensibly exceeds the number of officials belonging to other departments of the Government.

The census of 1897 tells us that in that year Russia boasted of 104,500 police, not including the *sotsky* (levied upon each hundred households) and the *diessiatsky* (levied upon each ten households), rural officials whose number amounted to several thousands. Since 1897 this figure has incessantly increased; indeed, competent persons assert that it has doubled in the space of ten years (1897-1907).

This increase in the number of police officials has involved an increase of expenditure. In 1909 the upkeep of the "ordinary" police cost more than £6,000,000 yearly. This amount, which is furnished by the State Treasury, does not include the sums contributed by municipalities and private persons (manufacturers and landowners) towards the upkeep of the "ordinary" police.

Besides the "ordinary" police, who fulfil the same functions as the police of Western Europe, there is another special police force: the political police. To this force belong the *Ossobyi korpuss gendarmov* (Special Corps of Gendarmes). To-day this corps comprises 800 officers and 50,000 men of lower grades. Founded in 1827, after the insurrection of the Decembrists, by the Emperor Nicolas I, it costs the Government more than £800,000 per annum. A legend has it that when Nicolas I appointed the first commander of this corps he gave him a white handkerchief as the emblem of his duties, saying, "Your task is to dry the tears of the unfortunate." But the legend by no means corresponds with the historic truth. The history of the corps of gendarmes is the history of a gloomy reaction, of a political Inquisition. Not for nothing has the "blue coat" (that of the Russian gendarmes) become a synonym for violence and injustice in the eyes of all society. The activities of the Russian gendarmerie are directed not merely against all anti-Governmental organizations, but against every liberal idea. To extirpate the "evil tendencies" of the mind—this is the problem to be faced. Nearly all the notable minds of Russia, from Pushkin to Tolstoy, have come into violent collision with the gendarmes. Much literary and scientific talent has been destroyed by those whose duty it was to "dry the tears of the unfortunate."

Simultaneously with the gendarmerie was organized the Third Section of the private Chancellery of the Tsar, which was afterwards transformed into the Department of Police of the Ministry of the Interior. The "Third Section" had no reason to be jealous of the *korpuss gendarmov*: its fame was equally

sinister. Suppressed for a time, it was revived under Alexander III as the notorious *Okhrana*, in which form it still exists.

The *Okhrana* is a vast organization of secret political police. In the first place the *okhrannoie otdieleniĭ* (detective bureaux) were established only in St. Petersburg and Moscow, but after a time they appeared in all the great cities of Russia. The *Okhrana* does not exist merely to supervise "suspects"; its officials have other duties, and are entrusted with powers of examination and inquiry into political "crimes." The officials of the detective bureaux, who are almost invariably selected from among the officers of the gendarmerie, or the ranks of mere spies and informers, enjoy the power of conducting inquiries and of arresting any one they please. The abuses committed in respect of this power are beyond all belief. During interrogation torture is frequently employed.

In order to gain a stronger hold upon the Government and the Tsar, the *Okhrana* has adopted a system of *provocation*. It instructs its agents to join the secret revolutionary organizations, so that they may take part in their proceedings and then betray their comrades. "These *agents provocateurs* are not content with observing the organizations to which they are attached" by way of obtaining inside information: they also "co-operate with the revolutionists, provoke violent manifestations of revolutionary activity, organize attempts at assassination, and so forth." The *Okhrana* terrorizes the Tsar and the ministers by acts of provocation, and receives subsidies of ever-increasing value for the prosecution of the "struggle against the revolutionists."

We have a classic example of provocation in the case of Azev. This affair will be familiar to all my readers, so that I need not enter into details. I will cite one document only: a declaration made by M. Bourtzev, and communicated some years ago to the Minister of Justice and the Procurator of the Court of Appeal in St. Petersburg.

"It is already more than two years," writes M. Bourtzev, "since I publicly accused the engineer Azev of crimes which

from every point of view were terrible; from that of the most elementary conceptions of justice as well as from that of modern Russian legislation.

"However, no judicial proceedings were able to touch Azev. A free man, he is still a member of our police force.

"Azev, according to the assertion made in the Duma by the President of the Council of Ministers, Stolypin, at the beginning of the year 1909, has belonged to the secret police since the year 1892, and his most fruitful years (as a detective) were those between 1903 and 1908.

"Until the beginning of 1909 Azev was, in the eyes of the revolutionary Socialists, one of the most prominent members of the party. Having been nominally a member of the party for ten years, Azev became a member of the Central Committee, the true head of the 'fighting organization' of the revolutionary Socialists. And in these years, between 1903 and 1908, while Azev was at the head of his party, a whole series of acts of terrorism was committed.

"Azev betrayed his comrades for money and in the pursuit of his career. He organized the execution of Plehve and the Grand-Duke Sergius, firstly in order to secure an important position in the party and to inspire his comrades with a confidence in him that no accusations touching him could destroy, and secondly in order that his collaboration might have a greater value in the eyes of the police.

"With equal indifference, impelled solely by the desire of gain, Azev sent dozens of revolutionists to death, planned the assassination of Plehve and the Grand-Duke Sergius, and even wished to proceed to regicide.

"When I accused Azev, the revolutionary Socialists, anxious to defend him against my accusation, revealed the whole of his activities, and enabled me to establish the following facts:

"In the summer of 1904, having insisted that the 'fighting organization' should undertake the execution of the Minister of the Interior, Plehve, Azev conceived the plan of an attempted assassination and incited Sazonov, Kalaïev, Savinkov and others

to accomplish it. Three weeks before the execution of his scheme, Azev went to St. Petersburg, established himself in the dwelling of the conspirators Savinkov and Sazonov, remained there for ten days without going out, and directed thence the whole of the operations. On the eve of the first attempt on the life of Plehve (8th July), Azev left for Vilna, and sent for Sazonov that he might give him further instructions. On the 15th July Plehve was killed. Azev, having received at Warsaw a telegram despatched by Savinkov, acquainting him with the results of the attempt, immediately left for Vienna (16th July). From Vienna he sent a telegram to the chief of the secret political police, in order to establish an alibi in case of emergency.

"In the autumn Azev was in Switzerland, organizing the murder of the Grand-Duke Sergius, the Grand-Duke Vladimir, and Kleigels. In accordance with his plan he sent to Russia three detachments of Terrorists, and provided them with the dynamite which was used to prepare the bomb that killed the Grand-Duke Sergius.

"On the 23rd April, 1906, Azev was at Moscow, and there he himself placed Terrorists armed with bombs along the route of the Governor-General Dubassov. The latter was wounded, and his adjutant, Prince Konovnitzin, was killed.

"One of the most active members of the 'fighting organization,' the well-known revolutionist Boris Savinkov, who had worked with Azev uninterruptedly, published not long ago the narrative of the murder of the Grand-Duke Sergius, clearly indicating the part played by Azev and himself in this affair.

"In this narrative Savinkov makes the following declaration in respect of Azev's position in the party.

"A member of the party since its foundation, Azev had knowledge of the plan drawn up against the Governor of Kharkov, Prince Obolensky (1902) and took part in the plot which cost the life of Bogdanovitch, Governor of Ufa (1903). In the autumn of the same year he became chief of the

'fighting organization,' and took part in the following Terrorist actions: the assassination of the Minister of the Interior, Plehve; the assassination of the Grand-Duke Sergius; the attempted assassination of the Grand-Duke Vladimir; of the Governor-General of St. Petersburg, Trepov; of the Governor-General of Kiev, Kleyguels; of Admiral Dubassov; of Durnov, Minister of the Interior; of General Minn and Colonel Riman, both officers of the Semenovskiy Regiment, and of Ratchkovsky, chief detective; the assassination of Georg Gapon; the attempted assassination of Tchuknin, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, and of the Prime Minister, Stolypin; and three attempts upon the life of the Tsar. Moreover, he knew of the preparations made in respect of the assassinations of Tatarov, agent of the *Okhrana*; of General Saharov; of Von der Launitz, chief of police; and of General Pavlov, military procurator, and in respect of the attempted assassinations of the Grand-Duke Nicolas, of the Governor-General of Moscow, of Hershelmann, and so forth.

"A member of the Central Committee, he took part in the discussion of every scheme. The plan of the insurrection of Moscow and the mutiny at Kronstadt were also discussed by him."

"However, the list drawn up by Savinkov is far from complete.

"For example, Azev was one of the organizers of the attempted assassination of Kourlov, was accessory to the killing of Sleptzov, the Governor of Tver, etc. He also established laboratories where engines of destruction were manufactured *which did not fail in their object* (assassinations of Plehve, Grand-Duke Sergius, Dubassov, Hershelmann, etc.). Moreover, Azev facilitated the escape of some of the most prominent Terrorists.

"Even in those Terrorist acts in which Azev was unable to share his influence was enormous. For a long time, for years on end, Terrorists were preparing themselves, as workers in dynamite factories, under his direct orders.

"The President of the Council of Ministers, Stolypin, has stated that Azev could not warn him of the plot against Von der Launitz, for being abroad he did not know of it. No! Azev knew of the attempt beforehand. What he did not know was the complete plan of the intended execution. Moreover, the members entrusted with this mission were well known to Azev, and until then had acted only under his direction. Suliatitzky and 'The Admiral' went together to the church, where the latter killed Von der Launitz, 'while the first of these, directed to execute Stolypin, was unable to fulfil his mission, for a mere chance prevented Stolypin from going to the church with Von der Launitz.'

"Thanks to the secret documents of the revolutionary Socialists and the testimony of dozens of persons who had taken part with Azev in Terrorist acts, I was able to probe to the bottom his personality and his activities, and to-day I categorically declare that Azev, having for seven or eight years been a member of the 'fighting organization,' has personally contributed to a whole series of Terrorist attempts and has directed their execution. *His activity was not political but criminal, for his sole object was essentially private and personal.*

"While insisting that Azev shall be immediately brought to justice, I am certain that a number of Russian statesmen, having of late years deliberately concealed his criminal activity, will for their own sakes prevent any legal proceedings against him.

"I have no doubt that the Department of Police was until the year 1905 ignorant of Azev's double activity. As to whether certain members of the superior police knew at that time of Azev's membership in the 'fighting organization,' I cannot at present be certain. In 1905 the activity of Azev as a Terrorist ceased to be a secret to several high officials of the Detective Bureau. But Azev was amnestied by them in the name of services rendered and to come. In 1908 he began to be publicly accused of Terrorist actions. But still he was by no means anxious or disturbed.

"At the beginning of the year 1906 Azev was arrested—

without the knowledge of the revolutionists—by the chief of the Detective Bureau of St. Petersburg, General Gerasimov. In prison a contract was signed. Azev was absolved from participation in the assassination of Plehve and the Grand-Duke Sergius, and in return he undertook to continue to serve the police.

"But even after the signing of this contract Azev organized the attempts against Dubassov, General Hershelmann, Sleptov, etc.

"In 1908, when I unmasked him, Azev was planning regicide. That he did not succeed was no fault of Azev's, for he did *the utmost he could* to ensure success. As for Gerasimov, he did all he could to save Azev.

"In 1909, in the month of February, there was an interpellation in the Duma on the subject of Azev. The President of the Committee of Ministers, Stolypin, represented the activities of Azev under an aspect absolutely contradictory to all the established facts. Azev, said Stolypin, had confined himself to warning the police of intended Terrorist attempts.

"And since February, 1909, Stolypin has done nothing to throw light upon the double activity of Azev. Thanks to this fact, to the aspect of Azev's proceedings presented by M. Stolypin, Azev has escaped justice.

"All that is contained in this declaration I can prove in detail before the Court, and I can also produce witnesses who will support my accusation.

(Signed) "W. BOURTZEY."

The death of Stolypin, killed by an agent of the secret police, shows that the existence of the *Okhrana* sometimes threatens the Government itself.

II

The modern history of Russian justice is closely connected with the general history of the country. Until the abolition

of serfdom, which marked the commencement of the "period of great reforms," there was in Russia no middle-class justice, however irregular. The peasant masses were judged by the landed proprietors, the owners of "serf souls." As for the nobles, they were, practically, not subject to justice, and were very rarely brought to book. As a rule all trials, and especially civil trials, dragged on for years. Not in vain did the people in those days call a judicial procedure *volokita* (from the verb *volotchite*, to drag, to linger).

On the 20th November, 1864, the *Sudebnyia-Ustavy* (judicial statutes) were published. These have been the basis of "European justice" in Russia: a justice of juries, open doors, etc.

The new justice was evoked by new economic necessities; the development of capitalist production and exchange called for the protection of the person and the material property of every Russian, a protection which the old juridical system could no longer extend.

But even in the new juridical system there were anti-democratic reservations. To be elected a juror, a man must be a landowner. The composition of the jury was subject to the control of the bureaucracy. The nobles continued to elect the justices of the peace. Preliminary examinations fell almost exclusively to the charge of the police. The jury was deprived of the right to deal with political offences, a right which was conceded to "chambers of justice," "assisted by the representatives of all the castes of society." The *Volostnoi Sud* (rural tribunal), organized in archaic fashion, continued to judge the material and personal disputes of the peasants.

These imperfections of the new juridical system were rendered still more sensible by the aristocratic restoration which followed. The irremovability of the judges, which was maintained *de jure*, was abolished *de facto*, and the judges became mere officials anxious to content the authorities. At this time a whole series of laws was promulgated relating to offences of the Press. These were declared beyond the competence of the jury. As for political crimes, the examination of prisoners passed from the examining

magistrates into the hands of the gendarmes and the *Okhrana*. Many Press offences, and many political offences, began to be tried outside the courts by the administration. Moreover, a "Special Commission" was established in the Ministry of the Interior, whose mission was to deport to Siberia, without trial, thousands of persons annually. In 1889 a new measure was enacted which confounded the departments of police and administration. This was the creation of the *zemsky natchalnik*. This amounted to the restoration of the old administrative and judicial powers which the feudal *seigneurs* exercised over the country population.

At the beginning of the twentieth century the reaction in the domain of justice became more acute. The courts-martial tried political cases, and the death penalty became a phenomenon of everyday life in Russia. The application of the death penalty has been terribly frequent during the last few years. M. Gruzenberg, the well-known jurist of St. Petersburg, has published the following figures in an article in the juridical review *Pravo* (*The Law*):

"In 1908, during the intensely critical period of the third Duma, the period of pacification proclaimed by the Government, 7,016 civilians were delivered over to the military tribunals by virtue of emergency laws. Of these, 1,340 were condemned to death. In one single year more men were executed than during the preceding thirty-three years of the history of these courts, and one and a half times more than during the so-called revolutionary period (1905-7)."

Do not forget that these figures relate only to capital punishment sanctioned by "justice." A greater number of victims of the reaction perished *without trial*: in two years (1905-6), during the "stifling of the revolutionary movement," 26,000 persons were killed by the army and the police, while 31,000 were wounded. But these figures do not include the victims of the notorious "punitive detachments." These, in the Baltic provinces alone, killed 1,500 to 2,000 of the inhabitants. Add to these 37,000 victims of the *pogroms* (1905-10) and you will

realize what horrible sacrifices the Russian people has offered upon the altar of liberty!

The number of those detained in prison has increased incredibly: in 1897 it was 77,000; in 1909 it was 181,000. These unfortunates consist principally of political "criminals." As for the number of those deported to the north of European Russia or Siberia, it is so great that it cannot be established.

It is not surprising that the expenses involved by the "administration of the prisons" should be extremely burdensome.

I will spare my readers a description of the horrors committed in the depths of the Russian prisons and in Siberia. The prison administration treats those detained on political grounds with the utmost brutality, employing the worst forms of torture and corporal punishment, and the walls of prisons often witness frightful tragedies and wholesale suicides, since suicide is the sole means of protest left to the prisoner.

In conclusion, I will speak a word respecting the highest juridical institution of the Empire—the Senate. The mission of the Russian Senate is to watch over the laws and to safeguard justice. But the Senate is not composed of jurists; for the most part it is filled with retired administrators or even ex-police officials. The members of the Senate, being accustomed to the employment of brute force and illegal expedients, cannot act as the guardians of the law. So the Senate, rather than a supreme court of justice and appeal, capable of correcting the errors of the courts which are subordinated thereto, is really a focus of the abuse of power. As it can both discuss and "elucidate" the laws, the remnants of the judicial legislation of the "period of great reforms" have at length disappeared under the repeated stress of senatorial "elucidations."

CHAPTER IV

LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT—THE ZEMSTVO

- I. Local self-government and its elements. II. Municipalities and zemstvos.

I

Local administration in Russia forms a somewhat confused and complicated system, composed of various institutions founded upon different principles, and very often opposing one another.

On the one hand we see a bureaucratic organization whose highest representatives are the *gubernatory*, or Governors, placed at the head of each *gubernia*, or Government. The administrative power of the Governor is very great. But in districts situated at the extremities and on the frontiers of the Empire (in Siberia, Central Asia, the Caucasus, Poland, and the Baltic provinces—that is, wherever the inhabitants are truly non-Russian) the power of the local administrators is still greater, indeed almost unlimited, on account of the union of the civil and military powers in the hands of the military Governors.

The Governments are divided into *uyezdy*, or cantons, which are administered by police officers, *upravniki*, that is to say, executants who are completely dependent on the Governors.

Besides this bureaucratic organization, there is also in Russia a corporative organization. The nobility, the clergy, the artisans, the *meshchané*, or small urban proprietors—each of these classes

has its own corporative institution. The difference between the historical evolution of Russia and that of Western Europe is plainly revealed by the history of these institutions. While in Western Europe the organization of the urban elements—the merchants and craftsmen—has reached a high degree of development and attained a social and political preponderance over the organizations of the nobility and peasantry, in Russia the urban corporations have remained in an embryonic condition. On the other hand, the corporative institutions of the nobility and peasantry are distinguished by marked and original features.

The relations between the organic parts of the corporative administrations of the nobility and peasantry correspond to the economic and social relations of these two classes, and the communal institutions of the peasants are in reality absolutely dependent upon the *seigneurs*. The reaction of the period of Alexander III and Nicolas II has greatly contributed to this state of things. In 1889 the Government created the institution of the *zemskii natchalnik* (literally, "chiefs of the earth"), which is recruited among the nobles and holds in its hands the entire administrative and judicial powers in the country districts. The *zemskii natchalnik* may, if he wishes, sentence the peasants to be fined or imprisoned by a simple administrative order; and he can dismiss the mayor and the whole rural commune. In the person of the *natchalnik* was restored, to a certain extent, the ancient feudal powers of a *seigneur* over his serfs.

Besides the bureaucratic and corporative organizations there are also in Russia the organs of local self-government—the origins of which go back to the great "reform period." In 1864 the *zemstvo* was created; that is, the self-government of the population dwelling outside the towns. The affairs of the *zemstvo* are administered by the assembly of the canton, or *uyezd*, and the assembly of the Government or province. The first is composed of the representatives of the population of the *uyezd*, but not all the inhabitants enjoy the right of suffrage. Only persons owning a large estate (125 to 800 *desiatins*—337 to 2,160 acres—of land) have the direct and entire electoral right, and persons own-

ing real estate in the shape of houses, factories, etc., to the value of £1,600. As for the small landowners, they form electoral colleges and elect delegates in proportion to the sum of all their properties. The peasants also form a special ward or *curia* with a very limited representation.

The provincial assemblies are composed of delegates elected from among the members of the cantonal assemblies.

The assemblies of the *zemstvo* hold one session annually for the expedition of current affairs, and elect their executive, the *zemskiia upravy*, composed of a president and certain assistants.

Six years after the *zemstvo* was created (in 1870) self-government was instituted also in the cities. This also was based on the property suffrage, which has given the municipal administration into the hands of the rich merchants and proprietors of real estate. The municipal council—known in Russia as the *gorodskaya дума*—elects as its executive the *gorodskaya uprava*.

Into the scope of the *zemstvos* and municipalities enter, by law, all matters relating to local requirements: namely, questions of public education, public health, mutual public fire insurance, public highways, agronomy, etc. The laws of 1864 and 1870 give the Governors and the Minister of the Interior the right to amend the resolutions of the local assemblies only with a view to their conformity with existing legislation. But the reaction of the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth has diminished this comparative independence, as the laws of 1890 and 1892 (relating to the reform of the *zemstvos* and municipalities) and administrative practice also permit the Governors and the Minister to judge the activity of the *zemstvos* and the *gorodskaya duma* from the point of view of their utility. At present the Governor can "disapprove" and annul any decision of the local assembly, so that a great portion of the work of self-government remains unproductive.

The law of 1890 relating to the reform of the *zemstvo* made the latter even less democratic than it was before; the peasants were deprived of the right of directly electing representatives to the *zemstvo* assemblies, and can now only vote for such candidates

as the Governor himself selects. At the same time the number of the peasants' representatives was limited.*

The predominance of the nobility in the zemstvo is revealed in the fact that the assembly cannot even elect its president; it is the "marshal of the nobility" who accomplishes this function *ex officio*. Finally, under Nicolas II yet another restrictive rule was established. The budget of the zemstvos was fixed; the latter bodies were deprived of the possibility of enlarging their activities as they might consider necessary.

There is still an obstacle in the development of the positive labours of the zemstvos: the law obliges them to present for the approbation of the Governor all functionaries and employees whom they appoint in their service—doctors, agricultural experts, schoolmasters, statisticians, etc. Each candidate for such a post is obliged to prove his political "solidity," and the Governor has full liberty to refuse his approval without explanation. This greatly hinders the recruiting of officials for the public services, as many experienced workers appear "suspect" to the bureaucracy and are eliminated from the governmental body. Even presidents and members of the *upravy* cannot exercise their functions without the approbation and authorization of the Government, which often replaces the candidates whom the zemstvos have elected by its own official candidates.

But in spite of all these unfavourable conditions the Russian self-government has succeeded in accomplishing something during its half-century of existence. This is true more especially of the zemstvos, for the urban municipalities directed by ignorant merchants have, with few exceptions, done practically nothing to better the conditions of life. According to the inquiry instituted in 1911 by the Ministry of the Interior, of the 1,078 Russian towns only 545 are provided with a "more or less satisfactory" water supply; as for all the others, they consume bad and impure

* Being in a minority in the assemblies of the zemstvo, the peasants cannot defend their material interests, and the *seigneurs*, who direct the affairs of the zemstvo, burden the peasants' land with taxes far heavier than those on their own.

water. Only 17 per cent. of the towns have a more or less regular system of drainage, and only 3 per cent. have centralized sewers; even St. Petersburg and Baku do not possess the latter. Of these towns 40 per cent. possess other but extremely primitive methods of sanitation, and 60 per cent. have absolutely nothing of the kind. Matters are as bad in respect of lighting, transport, public assistance, etc. Only 18 per cent. of the towns possess telephones and $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. tramways.

It is true that the average mortality is lower in the cities than in the country, the figures being 27.9 and 31.4 per thousand respectively. This difference is not due to the more perfect organization of the public services in the towns, but to the fact that the towns attract more robust elements from the country, leaving in the country the aged and the children, who are less fitted for the struggle for life.

Here are some figures relating to the condition of public health in Russia, cited from an official report and referring to the year 1909.

The average mortality in 1909 was 28.9 per thousand. It was higher in 1909 than in 1908 and 1907. The average birth-rate, 43.8 per thousand, was lower in 1909 than in the twenty preceding years. The natural increase of the population was 14.9 per thousand. The mortality was especially great among young children. The death-rate of children under the age of one year was: in Moscow, 34.6 per cent.; in St. Petersburg, 24.2 per cent.; in Warsaw, 17.5 per cent.; in Odessa, 17.6 per cent.; while in London it is 10.8 per cent.; in Paris, 9.7 per cent.; and in Amsterdam, 8.2 per cent. The medical staff returned the number of sick persons in 1909 as 81,746,000, or 82.4 per cent. of the population. But even this alarming figure is below the truth, as owing to an imperfect system of medical aid many cases of sickness remain absolutely unknown to official statistics; they suffer and die in silence and solitude, like a dog deserted by its master. Of these sick persons 18 per cent. suffered from contagious maladies: malaria accounted for $3\frac{1}{2}$ millions; the various forms of typhoid for 820,000; diphtheria for 462,000; scarlet

fever for 417,000 ; smallpox for 144,000 ; cholera for 24,000, etc. The proportion of sick persons attacked by smallpox amounts to 54 per thousand, or 5·4 per cent. ; while in England and Prussia it is equal to 0·1 per thousand, or 0·01 per cent., and in France to 0·2 per thousand. The victims of typhoid diseases in Russia number 100 per thousand, while in Prussia the figures are 4·9 per thousand, in England 6 per thousand, and in Norway 3·4 per thousand.

These figures would have been still more overwhelming but for the medical organization created by the institution of self-government. If the germ of public medicine and hygiene does exist in Russia, it is solely due to the action of the zemstvos ; the central Government has done nothing in this respect. Unhappily the non-democratic structure of the zemstvos and the political and social conditions of Russian life limit the activity of the public services. According to the just remark of Professor Virchow, the famous German physician, "medicine is in no condition to fight against sickness and death where the whole policy of the Government keeps the people under the yoke of poverty, ignorance, and oppression."

The work of the zemstvos in the sphere of public instruction is by no means negligible. Primary education in Russia is extremely backward in comparison with that of other European countries. According to inquiries referring back to the beginning of the twentieth century, the number of illiterates in each thousand of young men called upon or presenting themselves for military service is in Germany 1 ; in England, 37 ; in France, 52 ; and in Russia, 617 !

According to the census of 1897 the proportion of illiterates in Russia is 79 per cent., or 69 per cent. in the case of males and 87 per cent. in the case of females. The inhabitants of the towns are less illiterate than the peasantry ; among the former the proportion is 55 per cent., and among the latter—82 per cent. !

In 1880 European Russia contained 22,770 primary schools ; in 1911 there were already 80,377. In European and Asiatic Russia taken together there were, in 1911, 100,295 primary schools.

The pupils were estimated at $6\frac{1}{2}$ millions—4 per cent. of the whole population, or 33 per cent. of the children between 8 and 11 years. Specialists assert that to give primary instruction to every Russian child 300,000 primary schools would be required. As for the teaching staff of the primary schools, in 1911 its strength was 154,000—71,000 male and 83,000 female teachers. The total expenditure upon primary instruction in 1910 was £9,553,000, or an average of £21 16s. per school and £1 11s. 3d. per scholar. The greater portion of these expenses is paid by the municipalities and the zemstvos and the rural communes; at the close of the nineteenth century these bodies were already paying two-thirds of the annual cost of primary instruction, while the State met only 14 per cent. of the expenditure, and the churches and convents 2 per cent. The zemstvos and rural communes can apportion 13·6 per cent. of their budget for purposes of primary instruction, and the urban municipalities 8·3 per cent.; but the State pays only 0·4 per cent. of its budget. We must not, however, forget that the budget of the zemstvos is composed principally of payments made by the peasants themselves, so that the latter bear nearly the whole of the cost of primary instruction.

A few months ago the special commission appointed by the third Duma discussed the state of primary education in Russia and arrived at the melancholy deduction that the results of instruction are extremely slight both in quantity and in quality. Few pupils (especially among the girls) remain at school for the whole of the three years which in Russia constitutes the "complete course" of primary education; the majority leave before the examinations. This is due to the fact that the poverty of the peasants compels them to regard their children at a very early age as workers and wage-earners; they take their sons from school so that they may help their fathers in agricultural pursuits or in trades of various kinds, while the daughters look after their younger brothers and sisters or help their mothers in their domestic labours. It is not surprising that among the ex-pupils of the primary schools we find a considerable number of illiterate persons; this "recidivism" of complete ignorance

is unhappily a phenomenon only too familiar in Russia. As for the moral and educative influence of the primary school, it is, according to the commission, insignificant.

This mournful picture will not astonish us if we consider the general conditions of popular life in Russia. A free school can exist only in a free State. The Russian Government will not permit experienced teachers to exercise their profession unless they are "safe" from the point of view of the police. The schoolbooks are for the most part highly unsatisfactory, because the administration requires not that their authors should be good scholars and teachers, but "patriots and believers." Extra-primary classes (night schools, adult classes, etc.) may be instituted only by virtue of the special authorization of the bureaucracy, and the teachers must be previously "approved" by the administration.

The "School Inspection" treats the teachers—especially in the country—as the *seigneurs* used to treat their serfs; even the private and family life of the teachers is under the control of their superiors. Quite recently the Russian journals related the following fact, which will perhaps seem anecdotic, but which is nevertheless true: In the Government of Viatka the superior of a certain teacher was displeased with the latter for wearing his hair "too long"—long hair being in Russia regarded as a sign of "Nihilism." When the teacher came to draw his monthly salary the official declared: "First cut your hair; after that you shall have your money." And here is another curious fact: in Moscow there is a society for the organization of excursions and holidays for the benefit of school-teachers during vacations. In 1909 it wished to arrange a few trips abroad; the administration authorized it to do so, provided the school-teachers avoided Paris as a republican city and "unsafe" from the viewpoint of the Russian police!

In concluding this brief account of a few aspects of the practical work of Russian self-government, I must say a few words respecting another remarkable institution created by the *zemstvos*. I refer to the bureaux of local statistics established by the *zemstvos*,

which undertake the study and the description of the economic life of the people. As a result of the labours of these bureaux we have a great mass of reports and publications relating to the economy of various provinces of Russia. These publications provide an inexhaustible source of information and material for the scientific study of Russian economy, and may be recommended to all foreigners who wish to undertake such researches.

Unhappily, here again the reaction has accomplished its destructive work. The results of statistical inquiries revealed the melancholy situation of the mass of the people, their poverty and ignorance; hence the Government declared them to be "dangerous." So, to combat the "danger" of statistical truths, the Government undertook a veritable crusade against the statistical bureaux; the officials employed in several of the bureaux were arrested and deported and the bureaux were closed. On this account many of the zemstvos have been unable to complete this remarkable task. Moreover, with a few exceptions the zemstvos themselves have learned to regard statistics with a grudging eye. The agrarian movement of the peasantry inspired the nobles who direct the affairs of the zemstvos with such terror that they have said farewell to their ancient liberalism, and to-day the zemstvos are centres of political reaction. Hence the question of democratizing the zemstvos has become more acute than ever. The democratization of the urban municipalities is no less necessary and urgent.

CHAPTER V

THE FINANCES OF THE STATE

I. The Budget of the Russian Empire. II. The Public Debt and budgetary equilibrium.

If we are fully to understand the mechanism of the Russian State we must carefully consider its finances.

"In the financial history of Russia three facts are salient: the extraordinary growth of the State Budget, the enormous accumulation of the public debt, and the incessant increase of indirect taxation. These three things, closely related to one another, are the results of the general political and economic history of Russia."

In these words Professor Bogolepov, a prominent Russian economist, has defined the most characteristic features of the Russian financial system (Professor Bogolepov, *State Finances and Social Interest*, St. Petersburg, 1906).

Of the rapid increase of the Russian Budget, the following figures give us some idea.

At the end of the first twenty-five years of the nineteenth century the total sum of annual budgetary expenses was £15,900,000. By the middle of the nineteenth century this figure had already doubled; by the end of the third quarter it had quadrupled; a little before the Russo-Japanese War it had risen to nearly £212,000,000; in 1903 it was £200,000,000; in 1904, £203,000,000; in 1905, £205,000,000; in 1906,

£220,900,000; in 1907, £233,600,000; in 1908, £246,250,000; and in 1909, £263,000,000.*

These figures deal only with the "ordinary Budget." As for "extraordinary" expenses, they form, despite their name, a permanent and inevitable element of the Russian Budget: in 1909 they amounted to £16,000,000; in 1910 they were less, but added to the ordinary expenses they increased the total to £266,000,000. Two years later the total was £319,000,000.

According to an official report on the Budget of 1909, made by the Minister of Finances, M. Kokovtzev, the £263,000,000 of the Budget was divided among the various branches of the administration as follows:

			£	Per cent.
1. Payment of the Public Debt	42,200,000	= 16.0
2. Army and Navy	57,000,000	= 21.7
3. State industries (alcohol monopoly, railways, etc.)	83,400,000	= 31.7
4. Expenses of administration	41,000,000	= 15.7
5. Salaries of State officials	11,000,000	= 4.2
6. Public education, fine arts	8,300,000	= 3.2
7. Posts, telegraphs, telephones	5,650,000	= 2.1
8. Agrarian measures	4,200,000	= 1.6
9. Commerce and industry	530,000	= 0.2
10. Subsidies for railway companies	4,370,000	= 1.7
11. Public highways, ports, etc.	3,660,000	= 1.4
12. Reserve fund	1,350,000	= 0.5

This table suffices to reveal the backward condition of Russia. In Russia, an agricultural country, where 120 millions of inhabitants (four-fifths of the people) are absolutely illiterate, the State spends on education only 3.2 per cent. of its Budget, and 1.6 per cent. on agriculture.

Even by these insignificant sums the great masses of the people profit very little.

In 1908 the sum assigned for the primary schools was £2,230,000, and in 1909 £3,000,000, or 4d. to 5d. per inhabitant.

From these figures we see that the chief expenditure is in

* From an official report of the Minister of Finances.

connection with unproductive objects. The expenses of administration and the salaries of officials (by which the higher officials are the chief beneficiaries) are even more eloquent; these expenses absorb £52,000,000, or a fifth of the whole Budget.

Moreover, on account of the custom, of many centuries' standing, of confounding the interests of the State and their own private interests, a great deal of money is diverted, and there is a waste of fiscal dues. At the moment of the Russo-Japanese War both superior and subordinate officers entered into negotiations with the army sutlers, and authorized them, in consideration of certain bribes, to supply damaged goods. At the present time such affairs are common, and lead many brilliant officers to the prisoner's bench.

II

The payments made in respect of the Public Debt are a heavy burden on the Russian Budget. Political loans originated in the reign of Catherine II, when, on the occasion of the war with Turkey, certain internal and external loans were contracted. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the State owed some £7,550,000. Between 1800 and 1861 (the year of the abolition of serfdom) the debt increased by £160,000,000; between 1862 and 1876, by another £160,000,000; between 1877 and 1886, by £212,000,000; between 1887 and 1892, by £240,000,000; between 1893 and 1903, by £400,000,000; between 1904 and 1906, by £266,000,000; and in 1909, by £53,000,000.

If to these figures we add those of lesser debts, we shall see that since the end of the eighteenth century the Russian State has borrowed £1,740,000,000. But of this nominal figure only £1,323,000,000 was realized, or 76·6 per cent. of the sum borrowed. The remaining £400,000,000 was employed to meet the expenses of operation—more particularly to fill the pockets of creditors and intermediaries.

Of the £1,740,000,000 borrowed between 1800 and 1906, £828,000,000 was repaid. In 1906 the State still owed

£912,000,000, but a new loan of £56,000,000 increased the Public Debt to £968,000,000. But the debts of the State exceed this figure, for the State railways have contracted individual loans. In 1904 the total of the loans contracted by the railways amounted to £230,700,000. Moreover, the State having guaranteed the loans of the private railway companies, the debts of the latter are transferred to the Treasury, and in 1909 they constituted a sum of £121,500,000. It is therefore hardly possible to say that the indebtedness of the State amounts to £968,000,000. The real debt is much greater, but it is impossible to determine it.*

In 1906, in respect of the Public Debt, Russia occupied the second place among the nations of the world, the first place being occupied by France. But by the amount of her annual payments Russia takes the first place. This latter circumstance makes the situation of Russia peculiarly unfavourable, as she does not possess a great mass of comparatively wealthy people, but by the average revenue of each inhabitant occupies one of the lowest places in Europe.

"The most unfavourable aspect of the public debt of Russia," says Professor Migulin, "is that more than half of this debt was contracted abroad. The Russian people is forced to pay a vast annual tribute to foreign countries, in repayment of a loan which did not even reach the heart of the country, having served to maintain the price of Russian values and to pay the interest of old debts."

This opinion is supported by a French author, who, under the pseudonym of "Lysis," wrote a series of remarkable articles on Russian finances in *La Revue* of 1906 and *La Grande Revue* of 1910. This gentleman states that Russia is for ever raising fresh loans in order to pay the interest on her old debts. He adds that the unproductive character of the Russian loans injures not only the interests of the Russians themselves, but also the saving powers of foreign countries, and especially of France.

* The figures here cited are those of Professor Migulin, author of an important work on the credit of the Russian State.

"What do we lose by the Russian funds?" asks "Lysis," and he replies that "we can readily calculate the loss. It is enough to compare current prices^{*} with the prices of issue. The 4 per cent. stock of 1889, issued at 86·45, now stands at 75. The 4 per cent. stock of 1893 (the 5th), issued at 97·25, stands at 75. The 4 per cent. Consolidated Loan (the 3rd), issued at 97·15, stands at 76. The 4 per cent. stock of 1901, issued at 98·50, stands at 75. The 3½ per cent. stock of 1894, issued at 94·75, stands at 68·50. The 3 per cent. stock of 1890, issued at 92·30, stands at 61·80, etc. On the six Russian stocks that we have cited, the average loss is thus about 24 per cent., or nearly one-fourth; but many French capitalists were not able to buy at the price of issue. After issue the Russian funds were quoted at very high rates. Calculated on these rates, the loss of the public is considerably greater. If I reckon the Russian funds placed in France at £560,000,000, the loss in saved capital is already £120,000,000 to £160,000,000. (See *Contre l'oligarchie financière en France*, by "Lysis," 5th ed., Paris, 1908.)

The losses of the Russian people are still more stupendous, the loans being almost invariably employed to unproductive ends. We will not speak of the Army loans, whose balance-sheet at the time of the Russo-Japanese War was truly lamentable. As for the loans effected for building railways, they have hitherto produced only deficits; the Government, in laying down the rails, never dreamt of economic considerations, but was entirely guided by reasons of strategy, or by motives known to itself alone. For this reason the State railways, far from being a source of profit, are a great expense.²

The foreign public, and above all the French public, is naturally interested in the budgetary equilibrium of Russia, and many foreign authors have studied the question.

Some years ago, in his book on Russian finances, the German

^{*} Written towards the end of 1906.

² Between 1900 and 1905 the State railways occasioned a loss of £17,200,000, or £3,640,000 per annum. In 1906 the loss was £3,320,000; in 1908, £4,255,000.

author, Rudolf Martin, predicted that Russia would presently be bankrupt. "Lysis," already cited, asserts that "Russia will become bankrupt" if her internal system is not radically reformed. Professor Migulin—a man of the most moderate political views—declares that "all discussion of the inextricable situation of Russian finances is without meaning," and he adds: "Credit is certainly exhausted. However, it is not Russia that has exhausted her credit, but her present Government—MM. Kokovtzev and Co.—whose actions will not bear the slightest looking into." Professor Bogolepov does not deny the probable financial bankruptcy of Russia, and regards the situation of the country with the greatest pessimism.

But one thing is certain: that the present Russian Government cannot dispense with loans contracted abroad, for only such loans enable it to supply the void left by annual deficits. In his report on the Budget of 1909 the Minister of Finance himself recognizes that the Government cannot "suppress the absolute need of annual loans."

"The equilibrium of the Budget can only be attained in Russia," he states, "by the increase of taxation and the diminution of expenditure. But as our popular masses are too poor to support a larger measure of taxation, it would be necessary to increase the taxation of the wealthy. And this would be possible only in a very small degree . . . for a radical change of our system of taxation in this direction is impossible." As for the "limitation of expenditure," this "could hardly give any positive results, for nearly all the requirements of national life are already without sufficient means at their disposal."

Thus there is only one thing to be done: to extend the policy of loans so long as there are people left who will provide the money.

A word as to the revenues of the State. Not counting the revenue furnished by loans, we may say that the budget of receipts is constituted principally of indirect taxes. As for direct taxes, they are not regarded with favour by "enlightened

absolutism," which much prefers a concealed attack upon the pockets of its subjects. In Russia the direct taxes, thanks to the poverty of the popular masses and the unwillingness of the upper classes to make the slightest sacrifice for the State, produce only insignificant returns. Despite the "system of execution" adopted in the country—a system which consists of demanding taxes from the *mujiks* by the aid of the knout—the *mujiks* are often absolutely unable to pay, and the village is incessantly falling into arrears. According to the official data:

Between 1871-75 arrears equalled 22% of annual total of direct taxes.

"	1876-80	"	"	22%	"	"	"
"	1881-85	"	"	30%	"	"	"
"	1886-90	"	"	42%	"	"	"
"	1891-95	"	"	45%	"	"	"

The arrears still continue to pile up, and in certain districts constitute 100, 200, 300, 600, 700, and even 900 per cent. of the annual total of direct taxation. The nobles, although strangely less burdened than the peasants, are by no means behind the latter in the matter of arrears; for if the peasants *cannot* pay, the landowners often *will* not pay.

Thus the Government is forced to resort to indirect taxation. It taxes tobacco, matches, cigarette tubes, sugar, etc. In 1904 the indirect taxes yielded £44,520,000, and in 1908 £56,000,000. In addition to these sums the customs duties yielded £23,300,000 in 1904 and £29,700,000 in 1908. Comparing the value of all the imports for 1908 with the total yield of the customs, we shall see that every ruble's worth of merchandise pays an average duty of R.0.31. Consequently the price of all imports is increased by 31 per cent.

But the Government's principal source of revenue is the indirect tax upon *vodka*. Thirty thousand fiscal drink-shops are engaged in the sale of *vodka*. In 1904 nearly 70 million *vedros*, or 189 million gallons, of *vodka* were sold, and in 1910 nearly 80 million *vedros*, or 216 million gallons. Thus in 1904 the consumption was equal to 1.35 gallons per inhabitant, and in

1910, 1·62 gallons. The gross profit yielded by the sale of *vodka* was in 1910 £74,470,000, while the net profit amounted to £58,510,000. Thus nearly one-third of the total revenue of the Russian State is due to the sale of *vodka*, to alcoholism, which is in process of ruining the moral and physical stamina of the Russian masses.¹ Not in vain has the Russian Budget been called the "drunkard's budget." Until this state of affairs is completely remedied it is useless to think of the regeneration of Russian national life.

¹ *Vodka* contains 40 per cent. of alcohol.

CHAPTER VI

FOREIGN POLITICS AND THE ARMY

- I. The internal policy and the foreign policy of the Russian autocracy.
- II. The Franco-Russian alliance and the Anglo-Russian *entente*—Tsarism and the Eastern question—The military weakness of the Russian monarchy as compared with Germany.
- III. The armed forces of the Russian Empire—The social structure of the Russian army and the conditions of the soldier's life—Why Tsarism dare not risk a war.

STATES have two methods of internal expansion. One we may call the feudal method: its character is purely military and territorial. When the feudal sovereigns and *seigneurs* undertook a war they aimed at territorial conquest and profit. They made the inhabitants of the conquered territory their serfs, and overwhelmed them with *corvées* and taxes in kind. In the event of conquering a wealthy city they sacked it.

The external policy of the modern State is of another kind. It is a colonial and imperialist policy. It regards conquered territory and the population thereof as a permanent market for the outlet of products and an object of exploitation, industrial and commercial. The principal aim of the external policy of any modern *bourgeois* State is the economic "valorisation" of territory for the benefit of the great capitalist. This does not mean that the military element is eliminated from current international relations. As the extent of markets and colonies

is limited and appetites are unlimited, competition and conflict between the manufacturers and financiers of different countries are inevitable. This competition contains the seed of armed conflict.

We have seen that modern life in Russia has retained many of the features of feudalism; and we can detect the same characteristics in the foreign policy of Tsardom.

During the last two centuries Russia has known 72 years of peace and 128 years of war. During these 128 years the Russian Government waged 35 wars, of which 33 were waged abroad and 2 at home. Among the 33 foreign wars 22 were devoted to the extension of the frontiers of the State, that is to say, to territorial conquest. All these wars were purely offensive. As a result of these two centuries of warfare the Russian Empire is bounded by 17,000 miles of frontier and is the neighbour of eight States. One thousand miles of frontier divide Russia from Sweden; 738 miles from Germany; 694 from Austria; 466 from Turkey; 1,333 from Persia; 1,258 from Afghanistan; and more than 6,000 miles of frontier divide Russia from China.

According to the official figures, Russia lost nearly 3 millions of men in the wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As for the political balance-sheet of these wars, it is expressed in the extreme complexity of the problems relating to the life of the Russian State. "The extension of the frontiers of Russia in all directions led Russia to occupy territories inhabited by various foreign and hostile nationalities. To-day the frontiers of the inner Russia are surrounded by populations which are only distantly allied to the Russian people; and in this sense the frontiers of Russia were in 1900 less favourable from a military point of view than they were in 1700." Such is the opinion of M. Kuropatkin, ex-Minister of War, as expressed in a report presented to the Tsar in 1900, extracts from which have been published in his *Memoirs of the Russo-Japanese War*.

But although the policy of conquest has involved the State in many difficulties, it has greatly profited the aristocracy and

nobility, as conquered territory has been distributed by the monarchy among the nobles, high officials, and members of the Imperial suite. The Government has also appointed aristocrats to administrative posts in the conquered territories. But I need not deal further here with the share of the nobility in the foreign policy of Russia. In the chapter dealing with the Russo-Japanese War I shall cite some examples of the part which it has played.

Essentially a reactionary class, the nobility pursues, in matters of foreign relations, the same reactionary policy as at home. During the first half of the nineteenth century, Russian Tsarism played the part of an "international policeman" by opposing revolutionary and republican ideas and aspirations in all parts of Europe. Alexander I dreamed of crushing "the hydra head of the French Revolution," while the "Holy Alliance" and the treaty of 1815 were to him the means of realizing this object and of more firmly establishing monarchical principles throughout Europe. Nicolas I sent troops to suppress the Hungarian revolution of 1849; and under Alexander III, when circumstances had compelled Tsarism to conclude a treaty of alliance with "atheistical and republican France," the Russian Government endeavoured to influence the French Government even in the internal affairs of France. In one case the Russian Government even informed the French Government through its ambassador that a certain politician was not, from the Russian point of view, desirable as the chief of the French Cabinet, his opinions being too radical and too advanced.

Considerations of internal politics have always weighed very perceptibly on the external activity of the Russian monarchy. The latter has always regarded the rumour of victory as a means of impressing the imagination of its subjects, and of justifying the enslavement of the people by the exclusive power of the State in international relations. Whenever Russian Tsarism has had reason to fear a revolutionary movement, it has thrown itself into some warlike adventure. For example, the insurrection of the Decembrists (1825) hastened the fourth Russo-

Turkish War (1828-9); the Crimean War was hastened by the signs of the revolutionary movement of the preceding years; and the same was true of the Oriental campaign (1877-8) and the Russo-Japanese War. But after this last campaign and the revolution of 1905 the process became useless and the autocracy abandoned it.

II

Let us now briefly review the present situation of Russia in the "concert of the Powers."

And first a few words as to the Franco-Russian alliance. What was the origin of this strange union between a despotic and barbarous Power and a republican democracy? Those who explain this union by referring it exclusively to the "Germanophobia" of the French are mistaken. There is another explanation, more natural and more correct. The commencement of the Franco-Russian friendship coincides with the downfall of French imperialism in Tonkin.

Almost immediately after the war of 1870-1 the great capitalists of France sought to repay themselves for the crisis and the ruin caused by the war by undertaking a great colonial and imperial policy, of which the most widely known manifestation was the Tonkinese adventure. The unhappy termination of this latter led to the fall of Ferry's ministry and forced the French capitalists to seek less exotic markets. Hence the new orientation of French capital and its outflow into Russia. Shares in Russian foundries and mines, Russian loans quoted on the Bourse of Paris—such were the bases of the Franco-Russian alliance.

Thus is explained the curious fact that the Russian monarchy and republican France have conceived a mutual affection. The Russian monarchy needs the aid of the French Bourse, and the latter is anxious that a "strong authority" should exist in Russia, in order to assure it of the payment of interest, the creation of sinking funds, etc. The financial support of France has always

been of extreme value to the Russian monarchy. For example, in 1906, when the Tsar's Government was at its last gasp and its energies were exhausted, the loan concluded in the Paris market saved it and supplied it with means to continue its work of reaction. It may be asserted without any exaggeration that the cost of two successive *coups d'état*—the dissolution of the first Duma in 1906 and that of the second Duma in 1907—was paid by the Bourse of Paris.

In saying that the Franco-Russian alliance is based on the financial relations between the two countries, I do not mean that military and diplomatic considerations played no part in the matter. I recognize also that the political rivalry between France and Germany has played its part in the alliance. But I consider such elements as of secondary importance compared with the financial and economic situation.

As for the understanding between England and Russia, which is certainly one of the most remarkable phenomena of contemporary international politics, it is to be explained by causes of a different order. Russia and England have no common economic interests. One may even assert that the interests of British imperialism are opposed to those of Russian imperialism wherever the two come into contact, more particularly in Asia. The Russian penetration of Asia Minor and the march of Russia toward the Persian Gulf threatened British influence in Asia, and even the British territorial possessions. In 1885 the relations between England and Russia were so strained that at one moment war seemed inevitable. But during the closing years of the nineteenth century and the opening years of the twentieth a change was perceptible in the relations of the two Powers. Two facts were responsible for this change. In the first place, the awakening of the populations of Asia threatened the supremacy of Europe in Asia. Ten years ago General Kuropatkin stated, in this connection: "The twentieth century must bring with it a serious conflict between the Christian and the non-Christian peoples in Asia. It is necessary for the salvation of humanity that we Russians should in this struggle be at one

with Christian England in opposing the non-Christian tribes of Asia." If we disregard his religious terminology, General Kuropatkin's remarks need no comment. The same idea is expressed by him in another passage of his report :

"The interests of Russia and those of England are identical in Asia ; we, as well as the English, have to reckon with the aspirations of conquered peoples to throw off the yoke of the conqueror. It would therefore be far more natural for our troops to lend their aid to England in her struggle against local populations than to march upon India in an attempt to raise these populations against England." "Profoundly convinced that the occupation of India by Russia in the twentieth century would bring us misfortune and an excessive burden, at the same time I think it is natural and desirable that our relations with England should become so friendly that in case of popular risings against England in India we should be on the side of the English."

This proposal of Anglo-Russian co-operation against the oppressed populations of Asia is to-day realized. The Persian revolution hastened its advent, and the Anglo-Russian treaty concerning the division of spheres of influence in Persia is an important sign of the times.

The awakening of Asia is in reality highly inconvenient from the standpoint of the Russian autocracy. To be surrounded by constitutional States—a reformed Persia, a reformed China, a reformed Turkey—is by no means agreeable to Tsarism. Formerly it might have posed as the representative of European "civilization" before the peoples of Asia, but to-day these peoples are everywhere initiating themselves into modern ideas and more advanced forms of human life ; so that the monarchy of the Tsar must bid good-bye to all its hopes of Russian domination over the tribes of Asia. Union with England in Asia is the last refuge of its dying hopes.

There is yet another factor which has inclined England toward an Anglo-Russian friendship. This is German competition. The appearance of German trade and industry upon the international market is to the prejudice of British interests.

Statistics prove that the increase of German exports during the last twenty-five years has been followed by a *relative* decrease of English exports. The German advance Eastwards, the "Germanization" of the network of the railways of Asia Minor, the colossal project of the Bagdad railway—such matters could not leave England calm and indifferent. Commercial, industrial and financial competition was soon transformed into naval and military rivalry, and this rivalry appears to be the axis of European world-politics.

When we meet a more dangerous enemy we evade the weaker adversary or even unite with him against the former. Such is the meaning of the Anglo-Russian *entente*. It is German competition that has made it possible.

The present situation is greatly to the advantage of the Russian autocracy. The latter can exploit the rivalry of England and Germany to its own profit, and understands perfectly how to do so. It seeks to recover its ancient prestige, shattered by the war with Japan. One might say that the part at present played by the Russian monarchy in respect of international combinations is in no way proportionate to its real strength; it is rather equivalent to the importance of a small weight in the presence of two heavy weights which are nearly in equilibrium. The international force of Tsarism to-day resides exclusively in the uncertainty of European equilibrium.

Russian Tsarism has entered into certain engagements in respect of France and England. Can it fulfil them? A French author, well informed as to Russian affairs and extremely moderate in his assertions, replies to this question in the negative. In speaking of the Russian loans taken up in Paris, "Lysis" remarks:

"If it is impossible to justify the Russian loans upon financial grounds properly so called, an attempt is made to defend them by withdrawal behind a barricade of sentiment infinitely more difficult to demolish than the false reputation of Russian paper. An appeal is made to patriotic sentiment. Russia, it is said, is the defender of France, her rampart against Germany. We must lend our millions indefinitely to Russia so that she may preserve

us from the Prussian invasion. We have to choose between two evils; we would rather be ruined than invaded and conquered. The Russian loans are perhaps bad business from a financial point of view, but they are good from a patriotic point of view. Actually we pay £40,000,000 a year to Russia to avoid war. . . .

"But a policy involving these reserves is indefensible, not only on account of its immorality, but because it will have its to-morrow. On the other hand the following point of view insists upon presenting itself: in ordinary social life, when we assure against a great risk by paying a high premium, we like to be certain that if an accident should take place payment will really be made. Here the annual premium is some £40,000,000, and the risk that of an eventual declaration of war from Germany. If such a declaration were presented, would Russia keep her engagements? In the first place it is not at all certain that she would wish to. Popular opinion goes for nothing in Russia; everything depends upon the Tsar, who, together with his Court, is Germanophile and cordially detests the French Republic. The French are antipathetic to him for two reasons: they are democrats and usurers, or at least that is how he sees them. But let us suppose that the Tsar would side with the French out of respect for his given word. What is his army worth? Very little, according to the experts; it is deficient in organization, material, and leaders, and incapable of coping with an enemy scientifically equipped. The Manchurian war enabled us to perceive what the bureaucracy has made of the Russian army. Moreover, it is not long since we saw Russia, conscious of her military impotence, dishonourably recoiling before Austria.

"However, one fact comes before all: Russia has no money. She has not enough money for peace, so how should she have enough for war? From this results the following situation: Firstly, for Russia to help France, France would have first of all to advance her the expenses of her campaign at the very moment when she would have to make a very considerable financial effort on her own account. Secondly, as Russia would not be able to pay interest on the war-loan, France would have to do so in her

place ; she would have to support two national debts, the Russian and her own ; she would have to pay interest on £1,600,000,000. Thirdly, what at such a moment would be the value of the 640,000,000 of Russian shares held in France ? They would be unrealizable, so much buried capital ; it would be just as though they did not exist ; for English, German, Italian, Spanish, Austrian and other securities are negotiated in all the money-markets, but Russian bonds have no market save in France. The Russian shares held in France, finding no buyers and being no longer maintained by the banks, would fall to ridiculous prices, French stock would suffer in the crisis, and the credit of France would be destroyed. Is this too black a picture ? By no means. Matters could not happen otherwise : if there were war between France and Germany these consequences would naturally ensue.

"To conclude : France is paying a formidable premium of £40,000,000 for insurance against the eventual danger of a German invasion, and the fact remains that were the Franco-Russian alliance ever to render France the service for which she is paying, she would have to find such a stupendous sum of money that she would be financially drained dry before hostilities had even commenced." (Abridged from *La Grande Revue*, 1910, No. 7, pp. 473-6.)

To these considerations I may add a moral argument. The Russian Government, which has on several occasions deceived its own people, which has broken all its constitutional promises and violated every civic guarantee, is hardly likely to prove faithful to international alliances and keep to its engagements with its friends and allies. This is not merely a personal opinion. Some years ago the English Press was of the same opinion : the *Economist* for July, 1906, asserted that it was impossible to believe in the honesty of the Russian autocracy, and that its perfidiousness should be regarded with a wary eye.

The interviews which took place at Racconigi and at Potsdam were very characteristic from this point of view. The ally of France, Nicolas II repaired to Racconigi in order to conclude a secret treaty with Italy. There is reason to believe that by the

terms of this treaty Russia left Italy perfectly free to occupy Tripoli and to extend Italian influence in those portions of North Africa which are in the immediate vicinity of the French possessions. At Potsdam, Nicolas II gave Germany a free hand in the matter of the Bagdad railway, and opened the door for the Germans to march upon the Persian Gulf.

Then the Russian Government began to spread its nets in the Balkans, attracted thither by financial and economic interests. Russia has only one resource which might enable her to pay her foreign debt (nearly £32,000,000 annually) ; namely, the forced exportation of wheat, on which her commercial balance depends. The principal outlet for this product is the Black Sea and the Dardanelles. The idea of the possession of Constantinople was once more haunting the heads of the chief personages of the Russian Government. Profiting by the instability and lack of equilibrium in the relations of the European Powers, the autocracy attempted to settle the "Eastern question" in its own favour by pushing the Balkan States against Turkey on the one hand and Austria on the other.

"Since the great dream of M. Witte, or the economic conquest of China, has piteously miscarried in the blood-soaked mire of Manchuria, Russia has re-diverted her ambitions to Europe, and the focus of her policy is removed from the Yellow Sea to the Black Sea. With the aid of French, Belgian, English, and German capital great foundries and looms have been established in the rich coal and iron districts of the Donetz. Odessa and Nicolayev find themselves cramped by the Black Sea and covet the Mediterranean markets. Like Servia, Bulgaria, and Austria, Russia, confined to the *cul-de-sac* of the Black Sea, has dreams of a free ocean outlet.

"This she can obtain in three ways : Firstly, a railway running down from the Caucasus towards the Gulf of Alexandria, which would clash with the plans of Germany, the owner of the Konia-Bagdad line : and secondly, the waterway of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles ; but England will always oppose the descent of the Russian fleet into the *Ægean* Sea, and the

route through Suez to India. Thirdly, it remains for Russia to resume, in a modern spirit, the policy of San Stefano, and in the name of orthodox Pan-Slavism to unite the Serbs, Bulgars, and Montenegrins by means of a railway and a customs union which would open the markets of the Balkans to the factories of Poland and the Donetz.

"This is why Russian diplomacy so strenuously supports the Danube-Adriatic railway. It was Russia, so to speak, that invented this project. M. Izvolski, in 1907, first opposed Count Aerenthal's project of the Sanjak railway; M. Tcharykov, who in May of last year realized the secret union of the four Balkan allies, inducing the Christian States to forget their old racial and religious feuds, succeeded in uniting them and obtaining their approval of a policy of railway expansion. The matter leaked out and Nicolas II had to recall his representative; but the secret union survived. It was Russia who, in the first days of the war, by forcing the Turks to relinquish the blockade of Varna and Burgas, facilitated the revictualling of the Bulgar army and their triumphant march upon Constantinople.

"In short, the present war is the work of Russia; and the Danube-Adriatic railway is a Russian project. If it succeeds a continuous barrier of Slav peoples will bar the way to the Mediterranean, the path of Austro-German expansion, from the Black Sea to the Adriatic.

"But here again the Romanovs oppose the Hapsburgs. The Austro-Serb conflict becomes an Austro-Russian conflict. Two Great Powers are at grips, and the Balkan conflict becomes a European conflict." *

The French author we have just cited believes that the Austro-Russian quarrel may develop into a European war. We are not of the same opinion, and we will cite the remarks of General Kuropatkin, who in his report for the year 1900 has described the attitude of Russia towards Austria and Germany in a tone which is far from encouraging. "We must cherish no illusions as to the possibility of an easy victory over the

* Francis Delaisi, *De la Guerre du Balkans à la Guerre européenne*.

Austrian army," he says, and he demonstrates the superiority of Austria from a military point of view. The Austrians have eight railways to transport their troops to the Russian frontier, while Russia has only four lines at her disposal. The situation of Germany is still more greatly superior: Germany has seventeen lines of railway running in the direction of the Russian frontier, while Russia has only five lines leading towards Germany. "The difference is too enormous and leaves our neighbours a superiority which cannot be overcome by the numbers of our troops nor their courage."^{*}

Austria and Germany can despatch 760 military trains *per diem*! Germany, says General Kuropatkin, has in general better technical resources at her disposal than Russia. "Comparing the Russian and German forces, the invasion of Russia by German troops is more probable than the invasion of Germany by Russian troops."

"Our western frontier, in the event of a European war, would be in such danger as has never been known in all the history of Russia."

General Kuropatkin arrived at the conclusion cited twelve years ago (in 1900). But during the last twelve years the German and Austrian forces have been continually increasing, while the Russian forces were enfeebled by the unhappy war with Japan. The situation on the western frontier of Russia is worse to-day than in 1900. The Russian Government eventually decided, some years ago, to disarm the frontier completely, and to withdraw the point of concentration of its troops to a position some hundreds of miles within the country. This action evoked a protest from the French, who considered it a violation of engagements on the part of Russia.

III

Although economic and financial interests are at the bottom of the foreign policies of the present time, the army and the

^{*} See *Memoirs of General Kuropatkin*, vol. i., p. 49, Russian edition.

fleet are the supreme argument. But the army and the navy are themselves to-day a vast and complicated technical enterprise. It is by no means astonishing that the semi-feudal Russian monarchy, finding itself in permanent conflict with the trend of economic and social development, should be unable to organize its military forces as the industrial and *bourgeois* States organize theirs.

General Kuropatkin relates in his *Memoirs* that when he entered the War Office in 1898 he found the Russian army and navy in a state of chaos.

"The Ministry of War was without any programme of action, and there was no systematic connection between that Ministry and the Ministries of Finances, of the Interior, and of Foreign Affairs. Neither was there any community of action between the Ministry of War and that of the Navy."

"After the victorious wars of the nineteenth century our army did not progress" in the matter of technical training and armaments, but rather moved backward.

"The general staff was especially weak. . . . The promotion of officers depended on favouritism. Soldiers were cruelly treated. Their food was bad. Waste and thefts and embezzlement of all sorts were common phenomena in the army. The command of regiments was entrusted to aristocrats who had squandered their personal fortunes and were seeking means of re-establishing their affairs by military service. The Imperial Guard enjoyed oppressive privileges. . . . As a result the Russian army had not improved from a moral point of view, and from a material point of view it was inferior to other European armies."

So much for the army. Now for the navy. "The backward state of our navy in comparison with the other navies of Europe was still more marked."

This verdict from the pen of an official personage is not out of date to-day, although it refers to the Russian navy of the end of the nineteenth century. The Russo-Japanese War, of which we shall speak in a succeeding chapter, revealed the fact

that all the defects and vices of the internal organization of the military forces of Russia were still to the front in 1904. And so long as the present Government remains in power no reorganization of the army or navy is possible. Why? Because the present structure of the Russian army reflects the general conditions of the social and economic life of Russia.

Compulsory military service was established in Russia in 1871. Nominally service is universal, but in practice only the poorer classes feel its full weight. Rich people can easily escape service by the payment of bribes.

The command of the army is entrusted to the sons of nobles or bureaucrats, while the sons of the small middle-class folk, artisans, peasants, etc., cannot, with very rare exceptions, attain officer's rank. The officers form a caste in Russia. The high commands are filled by aristocrats. The higher military colleges, and even the cadets' schools—the secondary military colleges—admit for the most part only the sons of nobles or officers. Thus the officers as a class are a purely anti-democratic body, and democracy regards them as enemies of the people. The Russian officer is always striving to manifest his disdain for civilians, and readily uses his sword against peaceful citizens. Any day you may read in the Russian Press accounts of collisions between officers and civilians, or of the murder of civilians by drunken officers, or by officers who would claim that they were legitimately defending their "honour."

The relations between the officers and their men are revolting. Sons of nobles and wealthy folk on becoming officers retain all their original insolence toward the peasant or artisan turned soldier; the officers strike their soldiers and treat them like beasts of burden.

The material conditions of the soldier's life are shocking. Here are a few examples, drawn from official documents and from articles by a military surgeon published in the Russian Press.

The clothing of the Russian soldier is thin and inconvenient.

It is handed from one soldier to another until it becomes worn and filthy. "The soldier's clothes retain and propagate the germs of disease: of syphilis and other specific maladies, trachoma, typhus, etc." Such is the confession of an army surgeon. The footgear is no better: the soldiers are obliged to sell the boots served out to them and to buy more comfortable boots at their own expense. The sites of the barracks are unhealthy. Even in the military division of St. Petersburg, where the Tsar retains his most faithful troops—his guards—"the barracks are for the most part injurious to the health" (cited from the official report of the medical inspector of the army). The food of the soldiers is a source of profit to the officers and non-commissioned officers. They do not give the soldiers their legal rations, but retain for themselves a considerable proportion of the bread, meat, and other provisions. "The food is often of bad quality and decayed, and its consumption often causes sickness among the troops."^{*}

Scurvy is regarded by doctors as the most undeniable sign of deficient nourishment, of famine. Now, during the years 1897–1907, the number of soldiers attacked by scurvy increased by 50 per cent. The increase of sick in the army was 22 per cent. in the case of typhus, 315 per cent. in the case of hernia, 39 per cent. in the case of affections of the respiratory organs, 13 per cent. in the case of syphilis, 29 per cent. in the case of gonorrhoea, and 32 per cent. in the case of diseases of the circulatory organs. Thus, instead of improving, the sanitary condition of the Russian army is always deteriorating. Special inquiries have demonstrated that the mortality from typhus in St. Petersburg is 7 per thousand sick persons among the civil population and 16 per thousand in the army.

To this we must add that suicides are very common in the Russian army.

^{*} In 1906, according to official documents, in the Tsaritsynsky regiment (at Krasnoie Selo, near St. Petersburg) 161 soldiers fell ill in three days; in the Finlandsky regiment, 536 in two days; and in the 5th Strelkovoy, 233 in four days. In all these cases the spread of sickness was due to bad food.

Here again is a fact characteristic of the situation of the Russian soldier and the relations between officers and men : the number of *denshtchiki* or orderlies performing domestic duties in officers' quarters or houses is 53,000. Fifty-three thousand unpaid slaves exploited by Russian officers !

If the reader will consider all these facts, he will not be surprised to learn that the Russian soldiery are extremely discontented with their situation and that the revolutionary spirit is not unknown in the army. The Government knows this and fears a military revolt. This fear will not allow the Russian autocracy to risk a war in order to stifle the revolutionary movement by the report of victories, as it has done before now. Tsarism had considerable experience of this kind during and after the Russo-Japanese War. It saw revolutionary manifestations in the army, and more especially in the navy : it has seen cruisers flying the red flag and fortresses in the hands of insurgents, and does not wish to repeat the experience. This is why it avoids, and will avoid so long as it is possible to do so, any armed conflict with a European Power. That the Russian Government, during the crisis provoked by the annexation of Herzegovina and Bosnia in 1909, yielded to the threats of Germany and Austria, was due to the fact that it is already none too sure of the fidelity of the army and navy. We have the right to assert that the revolutionary movement of the popular masses, the working classes, the peasants, the army, and the navy is the best and principal guarantee of a pacific attitude on the part of the Russian monarchy.

BOOK IV

THE POLITICAL CONFLICT

CHAPTER I

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND THE REVOLUTIONARY CRISIS

- I. Can we regard the Russo-Japanese War as the cause of the Russian revolution?—What is meant by a “revolution”? II. Relations between Japan and Russia—The inevitable nature of the conflict between them. III. What does the defeat of Russia show?—The influence of the war upon the revolutionary crisis.

WE very often hear the opinion that the cause of the Russian revolution was no other than the disastrous war with Japan. Is this opinion justified? Yes and no: according to the aspect of the question envisaged. If by the *cause* of the revolution we mean the mere fact of the shock which uncovered the forces of the revolution, we may say that the revolutionary movement was assuredly the result of the war. But if we study the question more deeply we shall see that the Russo-Japanese War merely determined the moment of the revolutionary outbreak, and, if you like, its rhythm, or the rapidity of its development. As for the manner in which the motive forces of the revolution were compounded and the forms assumed by the encounter of these different forces, they were determined by the most important and fundamental phenomena of Russian history. Moreover, we may even affirm that the Russo-Japanese War and its disastrous results were prepared by the previous development of the Russian Empire, and were merely the inevitable consequences of certain

peculiarities of this development. War and revolution both were a result : but they were not a cause, not an antecedent. So, although we cannot regard the war as the cause of the revolution, although the scientific explanation of the origin of the revolutionary crisis is not to be found exclusively in the victory of the Japanese armies, it would be still more unscientific to explain the crisis as an affair organized by the revolutionists—Socialists, Terrorists, and other restless folk. To imagine that the revolutionists caused the revolution is to take the appearances of facts for causes ; to judge matters like a policeman. Neither risings nor bloodshed nor bombs are the essence of a revolution : they are merely outward accessories, the grim setting of a profound historic drama.

Such external phenomena are often inevitably historic ; the progressive embitterment of the class conflict leads almost always to the immediate and physical encounter of the hostile forces, and the transformation of the arm of criticism into the criticism of arms. However, this external manifestation is not absolutely indispensable to revolution, and history relates acts of the most revolutionary nature which had no revolutionary appearance : as the declaration of the delegates of the Third Estate in Paris that they constituted a National Assembly (June 17, 1789). Here was no violent manifestation : but, on the other hand, actions whose aspect is revolutionary, far from overturning the political and social life of the country, will sometimes even consolidate the established system. This is true of all the "palace revolutions" which we shall encounter in the history of almost any State, and in that of Russia particularly. In order to illustrate this idea, let us mention that palace conspiracy which at the end of the seventeenth century placed Catherine II on a throne spattered with the blood of the murdered Peter III. The autocracy, after this upheaval, was more firmly established than ever.

So the essential fact resides neither in the speeches nor the deeds of revolutionists, nor in rivers of blood, nor in the explosion of bombs. We must therefore seek elsewhere than in the

external signs of the political conflict for the answer to the question : What is to be understood by a "revolution" ?

To understand and define the significance of a revolution, let us take yet another example. In 1860, after the Crimean War, a whole series of important changes took place in the social and political life of the country. Slavery was abolished, new tribunals were created, with a local self-government (the *zemstvo*), etc. But no one called these changes a revolution. The years in which they were accomplished are known in Russian literature as "the period of great reforms." The year 1905, on the other hand, is known as "the year of the Revolution." Nevertheless, apart from the creation of a somewhat impotent Duma, it brought with it no real or important change in the political system of Russia.

And in what does the distinction between these two historical moments consist ? Why is one spoken of as a time of reformation and the other as a time of revolution ?

Because the changes that followed the Crimean War were due to the monarchy and the bureaucratic nobility, while in 1905 the initiative was assumed by the people. We do not by that mean that the reforms effected by the Government were effected voluntarily. They were demanded both by the external political situation and by the internal agitation of the masses. But after all the application of the reforms of 1860 was due to the old social elements, to the nobles who formed the support of the monarchy, while in 1905 the transformation of the Russian Government was demanded by a new element, by the working classes allied with the revolutionary middle classes and the peasantry.

If we seek a similar instance in the history of the French Revolution, dissimilar as it was to the Russian movement, we shall not be disappointed. The commencement of the Revolution of 1789 was marked by the day when the deputies of the Third Estate, declaring themselves a National Assembly, seized the reins of power in order to transform the political system of France. A few years earlier the French Government had attempted to introduce reforms similar to those which were realized by the Third

Estate. Such was the aim of Turgot. Yet this activity did not bear the name of revolution; because Turgot's day and the year 1789 were differentiated by a conquest of political power, by a new class, and by the transference of power from the nobles to the *bourgeoisie*.

The difference between a "revolution" and a "reform" resides in the transference of public authority from one class to another class that has as yet enjoyed no authority.

If the reader is in agreement with our point of view he will seek for the causes of revolutions neither in the ardent propaganda of the revolutionists nor in their heroism and abnegation, nor in the bad qualities of monarchs and their advisers, but in the deep and silent operation of certain forces, which lead new social classes upon the stage of history.

II

The Russo-Japanese War was the natural and logical result of Russia's offensive tactics in the Far East.

The hostility between Russia and Japan dates back to the eighteenth century. In 1790 Russian vessels first appeared in Japanese waters. In 1798 the Russians attempted to seize the Kurile Isles, but were defeated by the Japanese. Even so, the appearance of the Russians aroused a keen anxiety in the minds of Japanese patriots, and one of the latter, a celebrated writer, Sh. Hayashi, appealed to the people to defend their country against the "great Empire of the North." In 1804 the Russian Government sent a diplomatic mission to Japan in charge of Riazanov, which ended its "diplomatic" negotiation by attacking several Japanese villages. Two years later the northern portion of the island of Saghalien had fallen into the hands of Russia. Continuous contact was established between the Japanese and the Russians, and as a result thereof the Russian admiral Golovin was three years a prisoner in Japan. In the end these relations were interrupted while Japan underwent a great crisis in her domestic life; her ancient natural economy died a sudden death,

the feudal system fell to pieces, the trade and industry of the country increased, and public instruction was developed. Japanese scholars profited by the times to call the younger generation to the schools, in order to consolidate the forces of the country and to save it from foreign invasion. But the foreign ships returned. A proof of the justice of the advice given by Japanese patriots, they stimulated the internal development of the country. In 1862 and 1867 there were fresh negotiations in respect of Saghalien, but this was the last time Russia had to deal with "Old Japan." In 1868 the revolution broke out in Japan, leading to the final ruin of feudalism and the reformation of the institutions of the State. The most prominent leaders of this movement were Marquis Ito, Marshal Oyama, and General Kuroki, under whose leadership Russia was one day to be defeated.

The revolution and the reforms realized by Japan in various departments of life required of the country a considerable internal effort and prevented it, as may easily be understood, from following an aggressive foreign policy during the first two years after the revolution. For this reason Japan at first adopted a policy of concessions, and by the treaty of 1874 ceded to Russia the entire island of Saghalien, full of enormous natural wealth, in exchange for the poor and sparsely peopled Kuriles. This arrangement aroused the keenest discontent among the Japanese people, and a cold hatred of "the wild eagle of the North" (the name given to Russia by the Japanese poets of the time) invaded the hearts of the citizens of the Land of the Rising Sun.

The cession of Saghalien did not check the Russian Empire in its march toward the Far East. After the disastrous war in the Crimea Russia wished to take her revenge, at least in Asia. She occupied with her troops the left bank of the River Amur, to which, two years later, was added the region of Ussuri. The eastern limits of the Russian Empire drew still nearer to the Pacific Ocean. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century the policy of invasion was continually at work in Asia, for the domination of Saghalien had merely whetted the stupendous appetite of the Russian Government. During these twenty-five

years the Russian bureaucracy was busy solely with plans of campaign with a view to the conquest of the Far East. Its less obvious aim was to turn the attention of the people from the defects of the internal organization of Russia by reports of external victories. The coincidence between the extremely reactionary policies of the reigns of Alexander III and Nicolas II and the insane pranks of the armies in the Far East was not accidental. In 1885 the Government of Alexander III made an attempt to seize Port Lazarev. As in 1861, England intervened, and once more the Russian autocracy was forced to draw back. But this recoil was only momentary. Russia quickly commenced to prepare herself for other conquests. In 1891 she built the Trans-Siberian railway, and her squadrons effected a reconnaissance near the Japanese coasts. The irritation of the Japanese reached its maximum and was manifested by the attempt on the life of the heir of the Russian throne, the Nicolas II of to-day, who was then travelling in Japan. The author of the attempt justified his act in the following words, which were published in a native journal: "The Russian prince was studying Japan from a strategical point of view, simply in order to be able to invade it with his armies later. Then I resolved to prevent the war and save the country." (See the work by M. Volontaire on *The Russo-Japanese War*, St. Petersburg, 1904.)

Three years later Japan tested the strength of her army and her fleet, both of which had been reorganized, in a war with China. Japan was victorious. The treaty of April 27, 1895, stipulated that China should cede to Japan the peninsula of Liao-Tung, with Port Arthur and Talienvan (Dalny), and pay a large indemnity. Russia, in agreement with France and England, protested against the occupation of Liao-Tung. Japan had to renounce her conquest, which fell to—Russia! During the negotiations between the Great Powers and little Japan, Russia sought to provoke a war with the latter, enfeebled as she was by her war with China. The matter went so far that the commander of the Russian squadron, Admiral Tyrtov, on several occasions proposed to his French colleague to fall

unexpectedly upon the Japanese fleet, *without waiting for the close of negotiations*; thus seeking to involve France in the treacherous policy of the Russian autocracy. The Conservative Press supported this policy, and eagerly exclaimed that the "wings of the Russian Eagle should cover the whole East." The progressive and independent Press being muzzled by the censorship, there was no one in Russia to protest against the gross jingoism and the foolish adventurousness of the Imperial bureaucracy. The latter even considered it advantageous that Russia should assist China to pay the war indemnity to Japan. The Russian money paid for the building of Japanese warships, for the construction of that fleet which struck such terrible blows at Russia's influence in Asia. As a historian of the Russo-Japanese War has remarked, "the autocracy precipitated its own fall."

Naturally Russia did not assist China for nothing. Towards 1896 she began to invade Manchuria, and by the treaty of May 15, 1897, China gave her "for twenty-five years" Port Arthur and Talienvan, which had only just been resumed from Japan. Then, through the medium of a "private" shareholding company, the Russian Government commenced the construction of the Manchurian railway. The creation of the Russo-Chinese Bank, also "private," followed. In order to protect these private undertakings the Russian troops penetrated farther and farther into foreign territory. The danger to Japan became obvious. The last act of the policy of Russian Tsarism in the Far East was to procure the famous concession of the banks of the Yalu, with a view to the exploitation of the forest wealth of the country. This action, the work of the *camarilla* of courtiers who thought of nothing but their personal interests, rendered the beating of the wings of the Northern Eagle more wild and insolent than ever.

As for Japan, with the help of Russian gold she had in twelve years built a powerful fleet (of 67 large and 100 small vessels), had increased her army, and had obtained the diplomatic support of Great Britain and of the United States. Suddenly she passed from the defensive to the offensive, and demanded that Russia

should evacuate Manchuria, which, according to the declaration of the Russian Government itself, was only "momentarily" occupied.

The Russian autocracy repeatedly promised to withdraw its troops, but failed to do so. A date was fixed, the 8th of October, 1903. Once more the Tsar broke his promise. On the 8th of February, 1904, the Japanese attacked the Russian squadron. One of the greatest wars in the history of the world was about to begin.

The question arises which party was in the right in this long quarrel, which was settled amid the horrors of fire and bloodshed. I do not ask which was juridically justified, for juridical principles, once they appear inimical to the material interests of a State, are often reversed or rejected. On the contrary, I am considering only the positive interests of the two combatants. Of the two Great Powers, whose interests were the more real and whose needs the greater?

If we compare Japan with Russia, we find that on Japanese territory, one-sixtieth only the size of Russia, dwell 45 millions of inhabitants. In Korea the economic influence of Japan is predominant. In 1900 the total value of the foreign trade of Korea was £1,600,000, and of this over £1,000,000 was due to Japan. It is easy to prove that in Manchuria and other parts of China the influence and the colonizing policy of Japan have an economic basis, which Russia's rôle is exclusively military. The military tone of Russian "culture" in the Far East is perceptible even in those portions which have been Russian for more than fifty years. Ten years before the outbreak of the war the expenditure upon the army, the fleet, and the administration in the region of the *Primorskaya Oblast* amounted to 90 per cent. of the total expenditure. Thus, for each inhabitant of this country the expenses were estimated as 34 rubles for the army, 11 rubles for the fleet, and 76 kopeks for public instruction. In the region of the Amur the cost of the army amounted to 10 roubles per inhabitant, while the sum spent on public education amounted to 82 kopeks. Before the

war these expenses were increasing with bewildering speed. New forts were built, and the number of soldiers increased. But nothing was attempted towards the economic conquest of the country or the development of rural economy or industry, and according to the admissions of numerous Russian specialists, "even the Chinese and the Koreans were better colonists in the region of the Amur than were the Russians."

Still less productive and still more essentially military was the policy of the Russian Government in Manchuria and the Liao-Tung. In January, 1903, that is, a year before the war, the Russian population of Port Arthur was only 17,709, of whom 14,573 were military and 3,136 civil inhabitants! And these "civil" inhabitants included 1,171 functionaries and aristocratic adventurers, but only 73 traders! The population of Harbin, before the war, consisted entirely of soldiers and servants of the State railways. The "oasis of Russian culture" in Asia could not boast of a single school, nor of a commercial undertaking, nor of a factory, but it did contain a barracks and a *maison publique*. According to Russian investigators, the Chinese made far better masters of Manchuria than did the Russian bureaucrats.

"We shall encounter astonishing phenomena in the Chinese colonization of Manchuria: the Chinese immigrants, far from representing the clenched fist or the policeman, while leaving the military and administrative functions to the natives of the country, make themselves the true masters of their conquest; subjugating it entirely and irrevocably by their culture, for the higher culture always in the end dominates the lower, without artificial means, without repressive tactics" (V. P. Golovatchev, *Russia in the Far East*, St. Petersburg, 1904.)

Inferior to the Chinese in the domain of agriculture, the Russian "colonists" are also their inferiors in the matter of commercial competition. Before the Russians penetrated the Liao-Tung (1894), the sum total of trade between China and Russia was equivalent to £4,570,000, of which £4,100,000 was due to the exportation of goods from China to Russia, and only £470,000 to the export of Russian goods to China; that is,

Russia imports nine times as much as she exports. In the matter of trade with China, Russia stands below many other States.

In 1896 the number of foreign vessels visiting the Chinese ports was as follows :

	Number of Vessels.	Tonnage.
Great Britain	10,711	21,817,082
Germany	2,090	7,251,292
Norway and Sw	1,126	870,173
Japan ...	546	565,992
France ...	427	434,415
Denmark	333	171,826
United States	143	165,578
Russia ...	66	113,656

While Japan is in the fourth rank, Russia occupies the eighth and last place in this list. The feeble development of trade relations between Russia and China is still farther betrayed by the insignificant quantity of Russian trade-marks in China. In 1894 there were 350 English trade-marks in China, 85 German, 50 Japanese, 31 American, and 12 Russian. At the beginning of 1904, in that "paradise of traders," Shanghai, there was scarcely a Russian merchant. All the articles of export which Russia might have furnished were sent thither by Japan : fish, fishing-gear, coal, and wood. Trepan was supplied by Korea. As for the trade in cotton-thread, Japan was the successful rival even of England, while Russia lingered far behind. According to the testimony of a local Russian journal, "the influence of Russian trade in the Far East is almost entirely stifled by the greatly superior organization of the Europeans. Three-quarters of the exports consist of foreign goods, and the local trade is gradually falling into the hands of our neighbours, the Japanese and Chinese." Thus, if even in her own possessions Russia has been unable to develop her trade, it is not surprising that in matters

of commerce she should be entirely powerless in China and Manchuria. This commercial importance is recognized even by those who inspired the advance toward the Far East. Thus a well-known Russian financier, Professor Migulin, stated in a book published two years before the war that industrial competition between Russia and Japan was impossible. The *Novy Kray*, a semi-official journal published in Port Arthur, stated in 1903: "Our manufacturing trade has no solid ground beneath it. It is checked by two important factors, the competition of Japan and the inertia of our merchants. It is extremely difficult to contend against Japan, which has occupied all the markets here, and is so near to China and Manchuria. The distance of our factories from the place of outlet greatly increases the price of our products, so that those of the Japanese are sold much more cheaply. Moreover, we cannot organize a credit trade as the Japanese have done, as to do so we should need to have enormous depôts in Manchuria, which would still further increase factitious prices."

It is true that it costs far less to transport merchandise from Japan into China than from Russia. The cost of transport from Odessa to Vladivostok is from 35 kopeks to 2½ rubles per pood (36 lb. to 40 lb. Russian), while from any Japanese port the freight is only 8 kopeks. Even from the German ports the freight is only one-fourth of the freight from Odessa.

As for transport by rail, it is extremely costly. The Siberian railroad, with its continuation into Manchuria, consists only of a single track. A competent author states positively that "the Manchurian railroad can never pay; as a commercial undertaking it must be counted a useless failure, and the pacific conquest of Manchuria, with the object of creating a new market for Russian industry, has for the present become impossible." For if this railroad is of profit to any one it is to Japan and the United States, who, having cheap and convenient means of communication with the ports of Manchuria, make use of this railway as of a pump "to pour their products into Manchuria and Siberia." As for Russia, it is evident that she has not as yet a sufficient

economic basis to enable her to pursue an offensive policy in Asia, and even before the war certain patriotic journals of the Right had begun to advise the Russian Government to close as quickly as possible the enormous hole which has been dug in Asia, in which, were matters to go wrong, tens and hundreds of millions of Russian rubles would be lost as in a bottomless pit.

"We have made a stupendous mistake in installing ourselves in this Oriental abyss, and we should make every effort to extricate ourselves therefrom," stated an influential Conservative journal (the *Kievlianin*) in the early days of 1904. But it was too late; the atmosphere was heavy with menaces and the *dénouement* was approaching.

III

I shall not relate in detail the facts of the Russo-Japanese War; they will be familiar to my readers. I will not reopen still smarting wounds, nor disturb the weary and shattered bones of the peasants and artisans, Japanese and Russian, who sleep amid the hills and valleys of Manchuria or in the depths of the Pacific Ocean. I will confine myself to noting the more important dates of the war.

On the 8th February, 1904, a Japanese torpedo squadron entered Port Arthur, attacked the Russian squadron, and disabled the three best vessels—the *Tsarevitch*, the *Retvizan*, and the *Pallada*.

On the 12th April the Russian squadron steamed out of Port Arthur. The ironclad *Petropaulovsk* was blown up as the result of a Japanese mine exploding. With her perished the commander of the fleet, Admiral Makaroff. The cruiser *Pobeda* was damaged.

On the 18th April a battle near the Yalu River. After seven hours of attack, General Kuroki routed the Russian army, which left behind it 30 guns and 600 prisoners.

On the 28th May, a battle near Kin-chu. The Russians beat a retreat, losing 72 guns.

At the beginning of June a Russian army of 35,000 men arrived under the command of Stakelberg to relieve Port Arthur. It was attacked by the Japanese at Vafangu. Fifteen minutes of Japanese fire disabled all the Russian guns and forced the Russian troops to fly.

After Vafangu came a whole series of Russian defeats—Motien-Ling, Tatchikao, Yu-chun-ling, Kung-Tsu-ling, etc.

On the 10th August the Port Arthur squadron, according to orders from St. Petersburg, attempted to fight its way to Vladivostok. It lost nine of its vessels, and the remnant had perforce to return to Port Arthur.

On the 14th August the Vladivostok squadron came upon the scene. Its best cruiser, the *Rurik*, perished. Two other vessels, the *Gromvoboi* and the *Rossiya*, retired much damaged.

On the 16th August the Japanese were approaching Liao-yang, where the Russian troops were concentrated. After losing 13,000 men the Russian army, under the command of Kuropatkin, retired, leaving behind it quantities of provisions and ammunition.

Kuropatkin reassembled his troops, strengthened his army, and declared in a manifesto to his soldiers that "the moment had come to bend the Japanese to our will; the strength of our army is great enough to permit us to take the offensive."

The offensive was assumed. Kuropatkin lost 50,000 men and 43 cannon.

In January Port Arthur was reduced; 546 cannon, 4 ironclads, 2 cruisers, 34 torpedo-boats and destroyers, 35,000 rifles, 82,000 shells, and 2,000,000 cartridges fell into the hands of Japan. The entire garrison was taken prisoner.

On the 24th January, 1905, General Gripenberg attacked a greatly inferior force of Japanese near Sandepu. He was defeated and lost 13,000 men.

On the 14th February Marshal Oyama fell unexpectedly upon the Russians near Mukden, the chief stronghold and centre of the Russian forces in Manchuria, and delivered battle against Kuropatkin. The Russian army, despite the desperate resistance of

the soldiers, who fought for fifteen days, was forced to retire, only to be attacked and defeated anew at Teling, six days later. Thenceforth the continental campaign was irrecoverably lost.

Three months later perished the last hopes of a naval victory. On the 14th May the united squadrons of Rojdestvensky and Nebogatov were entirely destroyed in the stupendous battle of Tsushima.

Thanks to the intervention of Roosevelt, negotiations were commenced with a view to peace, and by the treaty of Portsmouth, ratified the 14th October, Russia ceded to Japan the Liao-tung peninsula, with Port Arthur and Dalny and 74½ miles of the Chinese railway, renouncing all pretension to Manchuria and the shores of the Pacific Ocean.

A Conservative journal, the *Novñie Vremya*, spoke of the treaty thus: "A terrible blow has been struck at our position in Asia—a blow which reduces our political rôle in the Far East almost to a negative quantity" (V. M. Pavlovitch, *The Foreign Policy and the Russo-Japanese War*).

The Russo-Japanese War was a decisive landmark not only in the external policy of Russia, but also in her inner life, for the result of the war was singularly to embitter the revolutionary conflict between the tendencies of the economic and social development of the country and its political system, and to awaken the somnolent forces of the revolution.

The shock was tremendous. The immediate losses were stupendous: 400,000 men killed and wounded and £530,000,000 of the people's money lost: such are the monstrous figures of the blood-stained balance-sheet of this war. Moreover, beside the immediate cost in men and money the war struck a blow at the already feeble economic situation of Russia. The mobilization of the troops led to an ebbing of the working forces of the rural economy, and in some departments of Siberia the wheat harvest could not be gathered for lack of labour. The disorganization of the foreign trade of Russia, the suppression of foreign credit, the check to the construction of railways, all aggravated the crisis in the iron trade and in other domains of capitali-

enterprise, provoking terrible strikes in the cities and industrial centres. The number of bankruptcies attained an incredible figure during the war. The price of Russian paper fell to one of the lowest figures known, and in the home markets the price of the ruble fell. Many bank-notes were put into circulation, but the circulation of gold diminished. The necessity of loans had to be faced.

A loan contracted in Russia itself (1904) had already, by withdrawing some £16,000,000 from internal circulation, increased the depression of the Russian market, and the shadow of the economic crisis covered the whole country, weighing most heavily upon the poorest strata of the people. Morally tortured by the shameful defeat of the Russian armies and broken by poverty, the popular masses were quickly aroused to the need of disentangling the causes of the terrible national misery and of seeking the authors of the disaster.

The awakening of the people, it is true, was not immediate. At first there was a general faith in an easy victory over the Japanese, for the bureaucracy, hiding the terrible truth, had blinded the people with patriotic lies. The first Russian defeat was treated by patriotic officialdom as a "flea-bite," and the Conservative journals boasted that Japan would disappear did each Russian but throw his cap into the air. Governmental proclamations and pamphlets breathing the lowest jingoism were distributed, after this defeat, among the peasants and workers. Humorous sketches illustrated these pamphlets. The most popular of these "works of art" represented a huge Cossack, with a ferocious expression, either swallowing tiny Japanese by the dozen or lashing them with his *nagaïka*. Tsarism thought at first to utilize the war in order to stifle the revolutionary movement. According to the declaration of a high official (Prince Urussoff, ex-Governor of Bessarabia, *vide Memoirs of a Governor*), "the members of the Government expressed a hope, after the first battle, that the war would evoke a wave of patriotism, and that it would thus arrest the anti-Governmental propaganda, and render it easier for the local authorities to preserve

order and public tranquillity." But events shattered these ill-founded hopes, and lent a grim irony to the image of the Cossack flogging the Japanese—an image full of unconscious humour, symbolic of the non-existent victories of despotic Tsardom over constitutional Japan. Nevertheless, unwilling to admit the inevitable, the Russian Government continued its former policy. After the capture of Kin-chu a Council of War assembled at Tsarskoïe Selo, under the presidency of the Tsar himself, which gave Kuropatkin the insane orders to deliver Port Arthur and to revive the faith of the people in the autocracy by "the thunders of victory." The defeat of Stakelberg near Vafangu was the only result of this order, which was decided upon at an enormous distance from the seat of the war by persons knowing nothing of Russia's situation in Manchuria. This order was based essentially upon the calculations of internal politics.

A historian of the Russo-Japanese War (M. Volontaire) compares the action of the Russian Government with a similar action on the part of the French Government during the Second Empire. "There is an astonishing analogy between the motives for the order given by Nicolas II, to the effect that Russia was to take the offensive, although such tactics were simple suicide from a military point of view, and the motives of the order given by Napoleon III during the war of 1870 after Bazaine had been beaten back toward Metz, as Strousel was beaten back from Kin-chu toward Port Arthur. Napoleon, perceiving the numerical superiority of the German army, wished to retire upon Paris to join other forces, as Stakelberg retired toward Liao-yung. But the Emperor and the minister Palikao, who had succeeded Ollivier, persuaded Napoleon III that to retire might be to cause an outbreak of revolution. The French army went forward, and the result was the catastrophe of Sedan."

Similar considerations of internal policy forced the Tsar and the Russian Government to send the Baltic fleet towards an inevitable peril, and, in the words of the same historian, "Rojdestvensky's squadron went to fight not the Japanese, but the partisans

or popular representation, who were beginning to speak of the necessity of a constitution." But the plan for restoring the people's love for the autocracy by means of foreign victories miscarried. Defeat rapidly following on defeat forced the Government to make some few concessions in order to calm the malcontents. On August 24, 1904, it suppressed corporal punishment for peasants and soldiers, which until then existed as a *legal institution*, and released the peasantry from paying their arrears to the public Treasury, the total sum of which was £13,510,000. The utter poverty of the peasantry had made such payment impossible. An Imperial *ukase* added to the localities reserved for Jews. Although the chains binding the Russian people were not destroyed, they were at least made lighter. The 26th August of the same year marked the reopening of the Finnish Diet, which some time before had been dissolved illegally and by force. In the beginning of September Plehve, killed by the Terrorists in July, was replaced at the Ministry of the Interior by the "Liberal" Prince Sviatopolk Mirsky, and the Government assured society of its "confidence." On March 1st was published an Imperial *ukase* summoning the representatives of the people to take part in the legislation of the country. It was intended that the people should be given only a deliberative voice in affairs. But, after all, these concessions were merely so many bones thrown to a dog, to divert his attention for the moment, and the Government quickly resolved to terminate its conflict with Japan, in order to have its hands free to "make war" upon the people. January, a month before the convocation of the nation's elected representatives was issued, saw the horrible fusillade of the workmen of St. Petersburg, who had peacefully mustered, with their wives and children, beneath the windows of the Winter Palace, to pray the Tsar to grant them his aid and protection. Arrests, deportations, and repression by means of the censorship followed.

On August 19th the Russian Government reiterated its promise to convoke the delegates of the people, but at the same time it mobilized the forces of reaction and prepared to restore

the ancient yoke. . . . Too late! The Russian masses were already awakened; the war had opened their eyes to the miserable condition of the country.

What is proved by the Russo-Japanese War? In the first place it revealed the indubitable fact that to conquer in a modern campaign it is not enough to possess mechanical forces; an efficient social and economic organization is also necessary. The Russian country-side, at the lowest level of economic ineptitude and hopeless ignorance, could not furnish the army with a healthy social element, and the passive heroism of the Russian soldier could not resist the active energy of the Japanese fighting-man. The difference between the social systems of Russia and Japan was reflected by the difference to be observed in their officers. The Japanese leaders, sons of the Revolution of 1868, were by their knowledge, their energy, and their sense of duty far superior to the Russian generals, who came from an idle aristocratic environment, and were used to breathe the heavy atmosphere of despotism.

Japan merely confirmed the lesson taught by France in 1789, when, having won their liberty, the people, fighting for their real interests, produced marvellous leaders and conquered despite a thousand obstacles. Japan was fighting for something close at hand and comprehensible. As for the Russian peasants, they were going to be killed without knowing why, without understanding what "high interests" were forcing the Government to send them far away to Manchuria.

The war compromised the military power of the autocracy. It also compromised its diplomatic abilities, for the Russian diplomatists could foresee nothing, could avert nothing. On the contrary, by their blunders they had forever covered the Russian bureaucracy with dishonour; both before and during the war its complete incapacity to organize anything whatever was only too clearly revealed. Its bankruptcy was indisputable. The ancient mirage faded like smoke, and Russian society began, with incredible celerity, to discard the old values. The mind of the people was awake and a new ideal arose.

But although the war exercised a beneficent action in awakening the conscience of the people, on the other hand it complicated the problem of enfranchising the masses. War, according to the German sociologist Kautsky, hinders revolution if it coincides with it in time, or if revolution breaks out under the influence of war. "War brings with it such terrible devastation, makes such stupendous demands, that the revolution finds itself overburdened with problems that are unfamiliar, and which for the moment absorb all its strength and all its time." Moreover, a revolution ensuing from a war is a proof of the weakness of the revolutionary class, and sometimes a cause of further weakness. This weakness is, then, merely a result of the moral and intellectual degradation which almost always follows upon war. So, on the one hand, the problems of the revolutionary government are complicated; on the other hand, its forces are enfeebled. For this reason a revolution provoked by a war is either destroyed or it expends its vital energy too soon. See what an extreme difference exists between the middle-class revolution in France, which was the result of a popular insurrection, and the revolution in Germany, which was, so to say, imported by a series of wars."

The justice of these words is confirmed by the experiment attempted by Russia. The Russo-Japanese War gave an impulse to the Russian revolution, but it hampered its activities by a shower of difficulties, placing a double load upon the wearied shoulders of the people. Historians will in time establish the tie between the defects and failures of the revolution and the military tempest from which the movement of liberation was evolved.

CHAPTER II

THE ELEMENTS OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY—THEIR RÔLE IN THE REVOLUTION AND THEIR POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

I. Political ideology a reflection of class interests. II. Position of the various social classes during the revolution and their general political grouping—The moderate *bourgeoisie*—The rural democracy (the "Labourites"). III. Socialists—The two chief currents of Russian Socialism. IV. The general strike of 1905—The insurrection.

I

We have already stated that the war contributed to awaken the mind of Russian society. But it would be an error to regard the war as responsible for the forms and the tendencies of the ideas at this time prevalent, these ideas having been shaped by the previous course of social and economic evolution.

Political ideology—that is, the mass of ideas, catchwords, programmes, opinions, and proclamations by which the thought of the society is expressed—is in itself an organizing and creative form of the collective experience, like morality, religion, science, art, and other departments of human ideology. However, political ideology differs from these, being more closely bound up with the economic and social life of the people and more immediately reflecting the grouping of classes and their actual interests.

We see in modern society three principal divisions of classes. The economic basis of these divisions is simply their different

methods of exploiting property. The first of these classes is that of the landed proprietors, who live by rent derived from land. The second class, that of the capitalists, have a more specific source of profit, namely, industrial capital. The third class is that of the proletariat, which lives by its wages.

To these three classes correspond, in the domain of political theory and practice, three types of ideology : feudal Conservatism, *bourgeois* Liberalism, and proletarian Socialism.

The reader will understand that this classification of class ideology is merely theoretical. In real life this abstract division is often violated ; in the United States, for example, feudal Conservatism does not exist, and in Russia, besides these three types, we observe yet a fourth, that of the small peasant *bourgeoisie*, quasi-communist, an inevitable product of the backward condition of the economics of the Russian village. Moreover, we observe in every society mixtures of various ideological types, or momentary and transitory types. These few reservations apart, the above classification is a valuable and reliable sociological deduction.

Political ideology not only reflects the separation of the social classes and centralizes their political experience, but it is also in itself an influential weapon to be used in the modification of society. Politics is full of subjectivity ; it also contains an element of propagandism, and often a touch of demagogy. However, this subjectivity once more reflects class interest and class conflict, and in conceptions which at first sight appear completely Utopian, and in all plans and programmes, we find the most valuable material for the characterization of the period and its social relations.

II

From the preceding chapters the reader will have learned the character of the economic and social development of Russia at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. The reader knows that the new forms of economic activity have led the Russian people into a revolutionary conflict

with the old forms of its political life. We may even without exaggeration assert that nearly all classes of society were interested in the termination of this conflict by the downfall of the old system. But an insignificant number of nobles, bureaucrats, and knights of industry, whose existence is closely bound up with the existence of the autocracy, had from the beginning regarded the awaking of the people with hostility. Consequently a general popular rising occurred at the very beginning of the revolution, which was recruited even by the purely *bourgeois* element, this having adopted the revolutionary method of the Socialist proletariat. *The History of the Council of Labour Delegates of the City of St. Petersburg* has thus described the rallying of the Liberal *bourgeoisie* to the proletarian side of the conflict :

"The means of combat peculiar to the proletariat—the strike—became a *national* weapon against absolutism. Officials, engineers, jurists, bank clerks, professors, all turned strikers, all marched in company behind the proletariat, borrowing from the latter not only its method of conflict, but also its form of organization."

Moreover, the "Liberal Constitutional Democrat" party publicly identified itself, at the first of its congresses (October, 1905), with the general labour strike which was then disorganizing the whole of Russia. However, the revolution did not long retain the character of a *general* popular rising, on account of the intestine conflicts which broke out between the different classes opposing the old order of government, and the forces of the opposition were presently divided into several hostile camps.

The reader will doubtless realize how these camps were formed. Russia, entering upon the task of abolishing absolutism, had capitalist relations more highly organized than those of France in 1789 or Germany in 1848. The growth of wholesale industry had provoked a hopeless discrepancy between the economic interests of the middle classes and the working classes. The pressure exercised by the bureaucratic system prevented any free expression of this discrepancy. Then came the revolution. The pressure from above diminished ; the struggle

between capital and labour came to a violent head. Although the labour movement of 1905 had a strongly marked political character, economic motives played an important part therein. According to the statistical data published by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry relating to the strikes of 1905, we see that the strikes of an economic nature involved a greater number of workers than did the political strikes. If, however, we consider not the number of workers participating in a strike, but the number of strikes merely, we shall find that political motives came first.^{*} As these data show, in 1905 an enormous number of workers were fighting not only to conquer the political independence of the whole people, but also to effect an immediate amelioration of the economic situation, involving higher wages, shorter hours of work, and better sanitary and legal conditions of work. The introduction of the economic element into the struggle naturally embittered the relations between the middle classes and the proletariat. But what more especially embittered these relations was the demand for the eight-hour day, which was presented by the Council of Labour Delegates at the end of 1905; a demand which the workers vainly attempted to realize by "revolutionary means." This demand not only met with the opposition of the Government and the employers, who retaliated by a vast lock-out, but evoked a protest from the middle-class Press, and even from the Liberal camp. The middle-class Press accused the Council of Labour Delegates and the socialist organizations which supported them of wishing to ruin the nation's industries, of marching towards "the anarchy of production." The Labour press, on the other hand, accused the Liberal *bourgeoisie* of treason against liberty, and the struggle between the Liberals and the Socialists assumed a violent character.

This economic discord was augmented by political differences. The Socialists were unwilling to make any concessions to

^{*} See the official publication of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry: *Statistics of the Labour Strikes in Factories and Workshops in 1905*.

Tsarism, and wished, in their own words, "to pursue the revolution to the end," meaning the absolute destruction of monarchical despotism. But these republican tendencies met with no support from the Liberal middle classes. One section of the latter feared that the proletariat would profit by them to realize their economic demands, while another declared itself incredulous of the possibility of applying a republican Constitution to Russia, and that it would allow no useless sacrifices. In opposition to the republican propaganda of the Socialists, the Liberals adopted the watchword of "Constitutional Monarchy."

Different aims resulted in the use of different means. The Socialists openly confessed themselves advocates of revolutionary tactics, and declared that the reorganization of Russia was only possible at the price of an armed struggle against the Government, the fall of the latter, and the convocation of a Constituent Assembly. The middle-class Liberals replied by proposing "peaceful" reforms, an agreement between the people and the monarchy, and the partition of power between its former possessors and the representatives of the people.

"We abide by the revolution," said the Socialists. "And we," said the Liberals, "by law and order."

Many reproaches and accusations were exchanged between the two parties, above all when the revolutionary impulse commenced to die out and repression to triumph. The Liberals accused the Socialists of having provoked repression by their "lack of moderation." The Socialists demonstrated that the Liberals, by "betraying" the cause of the people, were responsible for the revolutionary defeat. But, ignoring these mutual accusations, we may perceive that from the historical point of view the rupture between the workers and the *bourgeoisie* was inevitable, and that each step that labour took to the left must necessarily have led the *bourgeoisie* to move another step to the right. It has always been so in Europe during the course of previous revolutions. Such is the instinctive logic of the war of classes in modern society, with all due deference to the

apostles of "the social peace" and "the harmony of economic interests."

Quite as inevitable was the rupture between Liberalism and the peasant democracy. The peasants had originated a radical democracy which was supported and stiffened by neither the lower nor the middle *bourgeoisie* of the Russian cities. In the years 1905-6 the peasantry formed organizations which in respect of the numbers of their members were of great importance. At the head of these were "The Union of the Peasants of All Russia" and the "Labour Group." The programmes of these two organizations were very similar. However, while the "Union" concentrated its forces on the organization of the masses outside Parliament, by the "direct action" of expropriating the lands of the nobles and transferring them to the peasantry, the "Group" aimed at the parliamentary representation of the rural democracy, and after the election of the first Duma it raised the standard, so to speak, of the "Union," this latter having been broken by the Governmental repression which followed the outbreak of the revolution.

The political ideology of this rural democracy reflects the conditions of the social and economic life of the Russian peasants. An instinctive protest, and the hatred of the nobility and bureaucracy, fostered by poverty, hunger, and humiliation, are combined, in this ideology, with an unconscious policy and an inorganic ideal: an ideal as narrow and primitive as the primitive economy of the peasant, isolated in his little holding, unable to rise to an understanding of all the complications of economic phenomena and social relations. The present democracy, in all countries, commonly marches behind the other elements of society, being itself unable to give definite shape to its political demands. In the Russian revolution it marched behind the "intellectual Populists." These Populists were not distinguished by the lucidity nor the logical quality of their political ideals, for which reason they hesitated, in leading the peasant movement, before this question: By what means, by what tactics, should the claims of the peasants be realized? At times they inclined to a

semi-anarchist policy, involving the adoption of the agrarian Terror (burning of country seats, expropriations of lands belonging to the *seigneurs*, individual murders, etc.) ; at times, on the contrary, they concentrated their attention upon a purely parliamentary activity in the Duma ; and there again the deputies elected by the peasants hesitated between the Liberalism of the "Cadets" and the revolutionary opposition of Social Democracy, and could decide upon nothing.

The basis of all the programmes of the rural democratic parties in Russia is "the declaration of the right of all citizens to the soil, a declaration which should be realized by the suppression of private property in land and the creation of a national stock of land." All those who wished to work the land were to receive, from this stock, holdings not surpassing the dimensions of the *norm of labour* : that is, an amount of land which the holder could cultivate merely by the labour of himself and his family, without the help of *paid labour*. These holdings would be given for use, but not as property.

It is not difficult to prove that the removal of land from the general system of exchange and capitalist competition, the proposal of an "agrarian equality," and the suppression of salaried labour in the rural districts exclusively, is the merest Utopia. The Russian village, despite its backward condition, is already involved in the vicissitudes of the capitalist market and economic competition, in which the strongest and best adapted win. Moreover, even if it were possible to introduce such an agrarian equality, and to divide the soil into such allotments, this would not establish a true economic equality, for there would still be differences of capital, differences of technical methods, differences of energy and initiative. With different degrees of capital and different instruments of production there might result, even with equal allotments, very different quantities of products. Consequently the competition between more and less productive economic units would continue as in the past, and the Utopian character of the proposed agrarian equality would be promptly revealed.

But the agrarian programme of the rural "intellectual Populists" is by no means a simple Utopia. It is a maleficent and reactionary Utopia from the standpoint of economic progress. If this programme could be realized it would bring the development of agricultural production to a standstill; it would render the organization of large undertakings employing machinery and salaried labour almost impossible, and would establish not an equality of wealth, but an equality of poverty.

That the peasant masses of Russia none the less eagerly supported the Utopian and reactionary programme of these "intellectuals" was due partly to the limited mentality of the small rural landowner, to whom it seems that if the soil were shared *equally*, the whole social problem would be solved. Here, of course, we have the play of historic prejudices, originating in the life of the commune during the period of natural economy, when the land belonged to the whole *mir* (to all the members of the commune). On the other hand we may regard this programme as a piece of unconscious ideological hypocrisy, such as one often encounters in the history of the political and social ideologies of the different classes. When one class expresses its needs it does not express them as its own ideal only, but as every one's ideal. Thus, for example, in struggling for the "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity" of all, the French *bourgeoisie* of the Revolution clothed their class protest against absolutism and aristocratic privilege in forms of universal ideology. In the same way the ideologues of the Russian peasants of to-day give a universal character to their struggle against the landed proprietors, and hold forth prospects of universal equality, when in reality the question is merely one of the transference of landed property from one class to another.

Numbers of Liberals did not at the outset protest against the principle of this idea, but when the question of its practical realization arose the opinions of the Liberals and the rural democracy diverged. The peasant masses, as we may well believe, desired to receive the land *gratis*, without any obligation to pay for it. The Liberals, on the other hand, demanded

"ransom," it being to their interest that a pecuniary compensation should be offered to them in place of the land ceded to the peasantry, and foreseeing what frantic opposition the proposal or rural democracies would encounter from the autocracy. They sought to create an "understanding" between the revolution and the reaction, by establishing an agreement between landowners and peasants by means of a system of "redemption." As the peasant movement developed, the tendency of the peasants to excite an agrarian revolution "from below" became emphasized, while the Liberals became more resolved to accomplish reforms "from above." There was a clash between the revolutionary ideas of the peasants and the Liberal ideas of "order" and "firm authority." At the beginning of 1906, during the session of the first Duma, there was a definite break between the peasants and the middle-class Liberals. The peasants joined the ranks of the Socialist proletariat and the Liberals formed a distinct and separate camp.

III

The reader is already acquainted with the programme of the Labour party, and will therefore readily comprehend the ideology of Russian Socialism, one branch of which, the Revolutionary Socialist party, presents many points of contact with the Labour party. The programme of the Revolutionary Socialists asserts: "In the domain of changing agrarian relations the Revolutionary Socialist party attempts to base itself upon the interests of Socialism, and in the domain of the conflict with middle-class principles of property upon the communist and 'Labourite' conception of property, on the forms and traditions of the life of the Russian peasantry, and on the opinion, very general among the latter, that the soil belongs to no one, and that the right to enjoy it is acquired by labour. This conception of the problems of the rural revolution impels the Revolutionary Socialist party to fight for the socialization of the soil, for the exclusion of the land from commercial free-trade, and for the transformation

of the land from private property, as it is now, into the property of the whole people." Among the Revolutionary Socialists, as among the Labour party, we find the same Utopian faith in the realization of agrarian Socialism and in the liberation of the land from the laws of capitalistic revolution. The antithesis, expressed by the Revolutionary Socialist programme, between the *bourgeois* principles of capitalist society and the communistic traditions of the Russian peasants reveals the reactionary character of this socialist Utopia. The economic "traditions and forms" of the Russian rural commune are merely a survival of the past, constituting not a higher but a lower stage in comparison with the forms of capitalist economy, and it is strange to regard them as the basis of the realization of an ideal future.

This last objection is always raised against the Revolutionary Socialists by the other section of Russian Socialism, the Social Democratic party. Russian Social Democracy, based upon Marxism, supposes that Russia can only reach socialism through capitalism, that is, by the path followed by every other country in Europe. The belief that Russia can avoid capitalism, thanks to her agricultural development, and without it realize a social revolution, is extremely ingenuous. The socialization of the means and implements of production in the domain of rural economy would be possible only if the conditions were as favourable for the socialization of all the other departments of the popular economy; if production were highly concentrated, the differentiation of the classes strongly marked, and labour liberated from capital. As for any attempt to establish a partial socialism in the rural districts, without awaiting the complete disappearance of the capitalist system from all other spheres of the economic life of the country, it would inevitably lead to nothing: the partial destruction of the contradictions dividing the various classes and the establishment of social equality in a corner, so to speak, of a capitalist society, is impossible. Such an attempt would at most prolong the use of antiquated methods in agriculture at the cost of industrial development. Regarding such "agrarian socialism" as a harmful and reactionary Utopia,

Russian Social Democracy conducts an active propaganda against the plans of the Revolutionary Socialists.

The better to explain the differences which obtain between the Revolutionary Socialists and the Social Democrats, I will cite a passage from the programme of the Revolutionary Socialists :

"For the realization of its task the Revolutionary Socialist party aspires to utilize also all the positive aspects of economic development, which have assumed various capitalistic forms, as well as the independent creative capacities of the labouring masses, proletarianized or otherwise."

This thesis is eagerly attacked by the Social Democratic party, which claims that from the socialistic point of view the union of proletarian and non-proletarian elements is profoundly erroneous. Indeed, although in the modern *bourgeois* struggle for the democratic system the interests of salaried workers, that is, the interests of the proletariat in the proper sense of the word, coincide with those of the non-proletarian strata or the lesser *bourgeoisie* and the peasantry, and although the fall of absolutism is indispensable to both, it is only by reason of a temporary coincidence of interests. As soon as the democratic revolution is over the proletariat will enter upon its "final struggle" to effect the social revolution, while the non-proletarian elements, contented with a democratic constitution, will become supporters or the *bourgeoisie*. Moreover, the Social Democrats regard as unjust and unscientific the opposition of the Revolutionary Socialists to "independent creation" and "economic development"; an opposition connected with the old dualistic theory, according to which human ideas and "creative force" are "independent" of economic development. (This dualist theory, *mutatis mutandis*, is to be found in the latest philosophic inventions of M. Bergson, in his "vital impulse" and "creative forces.") The Social Democrats, on the other hand, affirm that the creative capacities of men are determined by the material evolution of the external environment and by social conditions, and that the manifestation of the creative capacities of man can only be possible and productive when such manifestation corresponds with the

general evolution of technical methods and economic life. These various points of view are connected with the various conceptions of the rôle of personality in history. While the Revolutionary Socialists attribute an enormous significance to the individual, the Social Democrats consider the individual as a drop lost amid the ocean. The individualist idealism of the Revolutionary Socialists is totally opposed to the determinist materialism of the Social Democrats.

The conflict which divides the two Socialist parties began long ago, and there was a time when it divided the whole intellectual youth of Russia into two hostile camps. Even to-day, far from being abstract, it is an actual collision between two methods or practical activity, between two political tactics. The Revolutionary Socialists attribute a great significance to individuality in history, to individual acts. Hence their leaning toward Terrorism. The Social Democrats, on the contrary, are the enemies of Terrorism, preferring the organization of the masses. As for the *practical* demands of the programmes of the two parties, they present many points in common : both have for their watchword "The Democratic Republic" or "The Sovereignty of the People"; both demand universal suffrage for both sexes, the replacement of the permanent army by the general arming of the people, the institution of elected tribunals, the suppression of indirect taxation, the introduction of a progressive tax on income, and an eight-hour day. But their respective conceptions of the agrarian question are entirely different.

The influence of the Revolutionary Socialists is felt more especially among the peasants, and in many groups of the lesser *bourgeoisie* ; that is, among the "intellectuals," schoolmasters, small officials, etc. The Social Democrats have most influence upon the salaried workers of the industrial centres. Moreover, the two parties conduct an active propaganda among the soldiery. Down to 1905 the two parties existed illegally, printing their propagandist literature either abroad or in clandestine printing-presses. In 1905, when the revolution broke the close-drawn ranks of the police system, they legalized themselves, without

demanding any authorization from the Government. Besides many journals openly published in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and other cities, the two parties issued many books and pamphlets. According to the calculations of a competent bibliographer, between 1905 and 1907 no less than twenty-six million copies of books or pamphlets of Social Democratic tendencies were issued, and twenty-four millions of Revolutionary Socialist tendencies. As for the predominance of one or the other party, we may judge by consulting the results of the elections. The second Duma contained 35 Revolutionary Socialist deputies and 65 Social Democratic deputies; moreover, the Labour wards elected only Social Democrats as their representatives. But it is outside the Duma that the influence of the two parties is more especially felt. The years 1905 and 1906 proved the force of this double influence.

IV

People often speak of the general strike of 1905, but the expression is incorrect, for in 1905 there were several general strikes in Russia. The first tentative insurrection and general strike was connected with the fusillade of January, 1905. This massacre of a peaceable crowd was nevertheless an advance on what befell of old. Under Catherine II the workers sent to the Imperial Court three delegates, instructed to implore the Imperial protection against the abuses of the employers. These delegates "received each one hundred blows with the knout, had their nostrils burned with red-hot irons, and were deported for life to Siberia." In January, 1905, St. Petersburg saw its first barricade and on the following days the first wave of strikes swept across St. Petersburg and the great industrial centres of the province.

The Government attempted, immediately after these attempts at insurrection, a reconciliation with the workers. To this effect the Governor-General of St. Petersburg, Trepov, assembled a delegation of "safe" working men and led them before the Tsar after giving them the following advice :

"Russian men must salute in Russian fashion, by bending in two, not by a sign of the head. You will salute, then you will listen to what the Emperor will say to you. Let none of you take it into his head to take part in the conversation, for talkers will be sent to Siberia."

Naturally this attempt miscarried; it could not stay the river of blood which, since the massacre of January, divided the monarchy from the workers. (On the 9th of January five hundred workers were killed and three thousand wounded, and among the dead and wounded were many women and children.) Then the Government resorted to another means of "reconciliation." It instructed a Commission, presided over by a censor and composed of delegates of the workers, to make an inquiry into the condition of the workers of St. Petersburg. The delegates of the workers exacted inviolability and liberty to discuss with their electors the question touched upon by the Commission. These conditions were not granted. Then the delegates refused to sit upon the Commission. Thereupon they were imprisoned, and this imprisonment provoked numerous strikes of protest in St. Petersburg and in the provinces.

Then the labour movement appeared to quiet down somewhat, and the agitation left the city but spread through the country. The spring of 1905 saw 14 per cent. of the cantons of Central Russia a prey to agrarian disturbances. Many farms belonging to rich proprietors were attacked by peasants eager to seize wheat for food and wood for fuel. Some properties were burned by the more embittered, but general slaughter and terrible corporal punishment finally stifled the peasant movement.

The month of June brought more strikes, which involved the district of Ivanovo-Voznessensk with its tens of thousands of workers and brought the inhabitants of Lodz and Warsaw into the streets, there to build barricades.

In June also appeared on the revolutionary stage a new and extremely important element. The sailors of the ironclad *Potemkin* raised the standard of revolt. But not being supported by the rest of their comrades. and abandoned by the workers,

they were forced to fly to Roumania. This lack of support is explained by the suddenness of the *Potemkin* mutiny, which stupefied all Russia "like a flash of lightning from a blue sky." When the *Potemkin* approached Odessa with the intention of entering into communication with the labour organizations of that city, the police, in order to crush the incipient rising, had recourse to the "Black Band." These latter proceeded to organize *pogroms* and to pillage the port in order to compromise the revolutionary movement in the eyes of the population.¹

Then once more a calm ensued. But, invisible yet fruitful, the propaganda continued its work amidst the proletariat and the army. The workers, unable to organize themselves openly, met secretly away from the towns, in the woods, despite the pursuit of spies and Cossacks.

The "autumn season" opened with an attempt on the part of the Government to divert the popular attention from the revolutionary movement by turning it upon the national discord. In Baku, where the revolutionary element consisted of Armenians, the police excited the gloomy and ignorant Tartar population against the latter, and horrible butcheries filled the streets of Baku with blood. But this "diversion" did not succeed, and the revolutionary movement continued to increase. In September the compositors of Moscow struck, and their action was a prelude to the general strike of October, which for the first time brought the inhabitants of Moscow into contact with the armed forces of the Government and resulted in the creation of a "Council of Delegates of the Printers of Moscow," on the model of which the famous "Council of Labour Delegates of St. Petersburg" was afterwards constituted. The printers' strike was followed by the strike of ironworkers and of the workers in other Muscovite industries. "The strike epidemic assumed an intermittent character. Strikes, like will-o'-the-wisps, flared up rapidly and as soon flickered out."

¹ The *Potemkin*, deserted by its crew, was returned by the Roumanian Government. A few months later its new crew followed the example of their predecessors and in their turn entered the struggle against the monarchy.

On the 5/18th* October the strike of the industrial workers of Moscow was officially terminated, and on the 7/20th October the railway strike began, the result of the sessions of the Congress of Railway Employees convoked by the Government to draft a new statute relating to pensions funds, and to appease the railway workers, who had "gone on strike" after "Bloody Sunday." This Congress, although composed of superior employees, engineers, etc., had not escaped the influence of the revolutionary atmosphere, and from the discussion of pensions funds it passed to questions of political liberty and excited the population without calling upon it to strike. On the 7/20th October the railway workers did strike, and on the same day the Moscow-Kazan railway ceased to run. On the 8th October the employees of the Moscow-Archangel, Moscow-Kursk, and Moscow-Nijni-Novgorod lines ceased work; on the 9th the Moscow-Kiev-Voroneje line, and on the 10th the Kharkov-Nicolaev, Kharkov-Kursk, and Kharkov-Sebastopol lines also ceased, while on the 12th the lines leading to St. Petersburg struck, with the exception of the Finland railway, which ran for four days longer; on the 14th the strike invaded Poland and the Baltic provinces and stopped the traffic on the railways of the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Russian Siberia.

Ten days after its commencement the railway strike had invaded all the Russian lines with their 25,000 miles of rails and their 750,000 employees.

The interruption of means of transport by rail led to a general strike in the cities of Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslavl, Kursk, Samara, Revel, Lodz, etc. The employees of the municipalities, zemstvos, banks, and law courts joined the strikers, who were already supported by the school-teachers of both sexes. The students also went out on strike and opened the doors of their lecture-room to the "revolutionary people," to the organizers of political meetings and the apostles of liberty. There were bloody encounters between the strikers and the armed forces of the Government.

* Old and new style.

The Prime Minister, Count Witte, then attempted influence the strikers in a very curious manner. "Remember he said to a delegation from the Congress of Railway Employes "that in such circumstances the Government may fall, not without dragging you down with it; you are the best for of the people, and thus you will have laboured for the profit that very *bourgeoisie* against which you are to-day struggling. But this attempt at demagoguery, which thought to utilize the hatred of the proletariat for the *bourgeoisie*, completely failed, the workers understanding that the struggle which had commenced could only lead to a *bourgeois* system of government. When on the 14th October the delegation of the Council of Labor Delegates of St. Petersburg met the Municipal Council, composed of representatives of the great landlords, the delegates of the workers declared to the members of the Council: "We know perfectly well that you will never fight for our watchword. It is not for that that we are here. The revolution that is now shaking Russia is a *bourgeois* revolution, created in the interests of the *bourgeoisie*. It is in your own interests that this revolution should be accomplished and completed as quickly as possible. And if you are at all clairvoyant, if you really understand the interests of your class, you will assist the people with all your might in their struggle against absolutism." Thus the Russian worker was far from believing, in 1905, in the near triumph of Socialism, and he was perfectly conscientious in fighting for the *bourgeois* revolution, in which he saw an inevitable phase of the social development of the country.

On the 17/30th October the Government had to yield. A manifesto was issued, which marked the first capitulation of the autocracy, after which the general strike was terminated. But this moral victory of the revolution was not a real victory: the real power, even after this surrender, still resided in the hands of the autocracy and bureaucracy. On the morrow of the publication of this manifesto the Department of the Police, directed by the aristocratic *camarilla*, organized pogroms of the Jews and "intellectuals," in the course of which

3,000 persons were killed and 10,000 wounded, while 101 towns were delivered into the hands of the "Black Bands" and the "police terror" (from the 18th to the 24th October), a policy intended to destroy some portion of the revolutionary element, to intimidate the rest, and to demonstrate that so-called "liberty" could only lead the country to anarchy, and that the "simple" people desired no liberty and hated revolution.

Nevertheless the revolutionary movement continued to spread. In many cities "Committees of Public Safety" sprang up, charged with the defence of the population against the *pogroms*; militia were created also, composed of workers and students, and often subventioned by the municipalities. Part of the army once again went over to the revolutionaries; on the 8/21st November, at Kronstadt, there was a mutiny among the artillerymen and the sailors, which miscarried by reason of their indecision. A host of these unfortunates were arrested and threatened with the death penalty. Then the "St. Petersburg Council of Labour Delegates," anxious to snatch its "soldier brothers" from the jaws of death, announced a new general strike, while demanding amnesty for the Kronstadt mutineers and the suspension of the state of siege declared a few days earlier in Poland.

This strike was less general than that of October. The workers in the factories and workshops joined in, but the transport workers responded but coldly to the appeal of the "Council of Labour Delegates," while the *bourgeois* elements did not respond at all. However, the strike produced the effect desired. Count Witte hastened to address the workers of St. Petersburg as follows: "Little brothers, workers! Return to your work; have pity on your wives and children. . . . Give us time to do for you all that is possible. Listen to the advice of a man who bears you nothing but good-will. . . ."

In reply to Count Witte, the Council drew up the following resolution:

"Count Witte has told us to have pity on our wives and children. The Council of Labour Delegates recommends all

working men to estimate how far the number of widows and orphans has increased in the ranks of the proletariat since Count Witte came into power. . . . Count Witte states that he is full of good-will towards us. . . . The Council declares that the working class has no need of the good-will or favour of the Tsar, and demands the direct and universal suffrage. . . . Moreover, the Council is profoundly astonished by the familiarity of the Imperial favourite, which permits him to address the St. Petersburg workers as 'little brothers.' The proletariat is united by no tie of kinship to Count Witte."

The strike lasted five days, and as a result the Kronstadt mutineers were tried by the ordinary military courts, and not by the courts-martial, and the state of siege in Poland was raised.

At the same time agrarian disturbances, more tumultuous than ever, invaded 37 per cent. of the cantons of Central Russia. (In the spring these disturbances were felt in only 14 per cent. of the cantons.) During these disturbances 2,000 manors were burned, and the losses thus occasioned in 19 governments amounted, according to the official figures, to £3,085,000. The Government resorted to its customary measures to isolate this movement: it diminished the sums which the peasants had to pay periodically for the lands granted them in 1861, promised to facilitate fresh acquisitions of land by means of loans advanced by the Treasury, and at the same time to each of the more disturbed districts the Tsar sent a general of the Imperial suite, instructed to calm the peasants by means of shooting them down *en masse*. "Arrest as few as possible, and above all shoot. . . ." "Leave persuasion alone, use gunpowder." Such were the instructions given by the authorities to those who were to pacify the peasants.

"Around us blood is flowing, all is in flames. As for us, we hack, we slash, we fire." Thus wrote one of the officers sent to suppress the agrarian troubles, describing the method of suppression. (See *The Peasants and the Revolution in Russia*, Moscow, 1907.)

Four days after the political strike at St. Petersburg had terminated, on the 24th November, the warships *Potemkin*, *Otchakov*, and *Dniester*, forming part of the Black Sea squadron, raised the standard of revolt at Sebastopol. A naval officer, Lieutenant Schmidt, commanded the mutinied fleet. But once again isolated, the insurrection was quickly suppressed by the Government, after claiming numerous victims among the insurgents. A week later there were fresh military disturbances—the revolt of the battalion of engineers at Kiev—which ended with the imprisonment and execution of the rebels. Then, on the 28th November, came the strike of the Post and Telegraph employees.

The Government was quickly on the offensive. On the 8th December the President of the "St. Petersburg Council of Labour Delegates" was imprisoned. In response to this action the Council drafted the following resolution: "The Council of Labour Delegates elects a new president and continues to prepare itself for armed insurrection." The watchword "strike" gives way to the watchword "insurrection."

The history of the insurrection was very like that of the strike.

The rising was especially obstinate in the Baltic provinces. Commencing in the middle of December, it led to the seizure of vast estates by the Lithuanian peasants and workers, who drove away the Government officials and themselves formed their administrative organs. The insurrection of the Georgians in the Caucasus was of a similar character.

And just when the Government had commenced to stifle the insurrection of the Baltic provinces, on the 22nd December the insurrection of Moscow broke out. The *Boievyya drujiny* (insurrectionary groups) of the Socialist parties and of certain trade organizations (the guild or syndicate of printers, the railway workers' union), as well as the *drujiny* of students, were for some days the masters of Moscow. The soldiers of the garrison, with the exception of the Cossacks, were by no means "safe," and the Government could only suppress the revolution by

bringing from St. Petersburg a regiment of the Imperial Guard, and by employing artillery, the insurgents being armed only with a few hundreds of Browning and Mauser pistols and a few score rifles.

The insurrection of Moscow nevertheless lasted a week, thanks in the first place to the topographical conditions of the city and to the system of partisan warfare adopted by the insurgents, who raised barricades, not in order to defend them, but so that they might, while sheltered behind them, fatigue the regular army by unexpected attacks; and in the second place to the good-will which the population bore the insurgents.

The Baltic provinces, the Caucasus, and Moscow were the chief centres of the insurrection, but rebellion revealed itself in many other places: in Kharkov, in the district of Donetz, and along the Siberian railway. In these regions a state of siege was declared, and repressive expeditions were despatched thither, and armoured wagons filled with soldiers. The insurrection was stifled in a sea of blood.

The chief cause of the failure of the insurrection resided in the fact that the greater part of the army remained faithful to the Government. The forces which joined the revolution were more especially the artillery, the engineers, and the sailors of the navy; that is to say, the more intelligent bodies in which the artisan element prevailed. As for the infantry, consisting chiefly of peasants, it gave no assistance to the revolutionary movement; and with the technical methods of modern warfare rebellion cannot succeed without the help of a great part of the army. Moreover, one of the causes of failure was the lack of centralization in the revolutionary movement, the isolation of the various foci of insurrection while the actions of the Government were centralized. Again, we must note the defensive character of the insurrection. Very often, after seizing this or that strategic point, the insurgents contented themselves with "waiting," instead of seeking to enlarge the base of their operations and taking the offensive, and thus they facilitated the task of the regular army, which, after having surrounded them, rapidly

disposed or them. This lack of active will-power and practical sense of which the insurgents gave proof was one of the consequences of age-long life beneath the political yoke. I have already cited the public resolution of the "Council of Labour Delegates," which declared that the latter body was preparing for "armed insurrection." This resolution sufficed to demonstrate the unpractical nature of the leaders of the insurrection. The insurrection, before all, should have been unexpected by the Government. The events which, quite recently, overwhelmed Turkey and Portugal will testify to the justice of this assertion. As for declaring a month in advance that the insurrection was preparing, this was to invite failure.

In January, 1906, the insurrection was completely stifled. In vain did the Labour party seek to rouse the people by advising them to boycott the elections to the Duma, which was to open in 1906. The boycotting failed, and Russia swiftly entered upon a fresh period of political conflict. Hiding behind a screen of Parliamentaryism, the reaction became supreme.

CHAPTER III

AFTER THE REVOLUTION

- I. The three Dumas. II. The activity of the Government—Agrarian reform (destruction of the rural commune). III. Russian society after the revolution—Fatigue and despair—Epidemic of suicides—Signs of a renaissance.

I

WE shall find the embryo of national representation in the history of ancient Russia. In the "great cities" of Novgorod and Pskov, in the twelfth century, there were already *Vietches*, or assemblies of citizens participating in the government of each of the republics. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Muscovite Tsar convoked, at times, the *Zemsky Sobor*, a council formed of the representatives of the various States. But from the eighteenth century down to 1905 the Empire permitted no national representation, unless we count an attempt of Catherine II's. In 1767 Catherine instituted a "commission instructed to elaborate a project for a new code." This commission, created, as its name indicates, for a special end, played a more important part—that of a commission of inquiry. But its conclusions as to the general situation in Russia, being far too unflattering to the Government, caused Catherine II to suppress it.

In the nineteenth century certain sections of society attempted, on several occasions, to realize the ideal of national representation: the Decembrists by means of an armed insurrection (1825); certain zemstvos by presenting a petition to Nicolas II, at the time

of his accession ; and the Terrorists by throwing bombs. But all these attempts failed, and only in 1905 did a revolutionary movement of the people itself force the monarchy to give way. The manifestation of the workers of St. Petersburg in January, 1905, and the threat of innumerable political strikes, impelled the Tsar to express, in the "rescript" of 18th February (3rd March), his intention to invite "the worthiest persons, and those enjoying the confidence of the people," to contribute to "the preliminary elaboration and the discussion of projected legislation." A commission was instructed to supervise the details of this decision. It confined itself to the project of the institution of a "State Duma," and on the 6/19th August this proposal was approved by the Tsar and became law. According to this first law the Duma was to be merely consultative, and would represent only the wealthier classes of society. In response to this law was organized a new political strike, which dragged from the monarchy the "manifesto of October 17th." This manifesto accorded the Duma legislative powers and enlarged the electorate. Then, on the 20th February (5th March), 1906, was published a new law which recognized the electoral right, active and passive, of every man aged at least twenty-five years who could give proof of a fixed domicile and the required property qualification. In the country districts those peasants who were fathers of families became electors, also rural landowners, nobles, merchants, and members of the clergy : in the urban districts the proprietors of real and movable estate, the State officials, members of the public services, and men who had occupied a lodging for at least a year. As to industrial workers, only those having worked continuously for six months in an enterprise employing at least fifty hands received the elector's ticket.

The "national representation" instituted in Russia by the manifesto of 17th October was not direct. It was representation by two degrees for certain classes of electors, and by three degrees for others. The Government hoped no doubt to obtain the support of the peasants and landed proprietors, for it was to them that they confided the majority of the "electoral colleges."

According to the law of 1906, of the 6,164 members of these colleges there were 2,654 peasants (43 per cent.), 1,965 land-owners (31 per cent.), 1,368 "citizens" (22 per cent.), and 177 working men (4 per cent.). But the hopes of the monarchists were disappointed; the majority of the peasant "wards" elected deputies to the "Left," who promptly formed the "Labour group" of which we have already spoken, and which numbered no less than 100 members. As for the rest of the Duma, it was constituted by 40 "moderates" and "Rights," 180 "Cadets," 32 Polish Nationalists, 14 Social Democrats, etc. The first Duma was not rich in Socialists, for the Social-Democratic party and the Revolutionary Socialist party, with a few rare exceptions, boycotted the first elections. The "Cadets" were predominant, and they endeavoured, by means of the greatest restraint, to cross the Government in nothing. However, the conflict between the Duma and the Government was inevitable: the existence of embittered questions, which could not possibly be eliminated—as the question of an amnesty for political prisoners, the existence of courts-martial, of the death penalty, of *pogroms*, etc., and the question of ministerial responsibility to the Duma—rendered agreement impossible. The appearance of these questions on the "order of the day" provoked a violent disturbance, not only in the Duma, but also beyond its walls. The attitude of bravado adopted by the Government only increased the agitation. The following episodes will give some idea of the conduct of the Government towards the first Duma; on the 12/25th May an interpellation in respect of the death sentence upon eight young working men of Riga was approved by the Duma. The same day these eight prisoners were shot. Four days later the Government informed the Duma that its interpellation had been referred, "as pertained thereto," to the Ministry of War. In reply to a law voted by the Duma suppressing the capital sentence, the Government proceeded to multiply the executions of political prisoners. Finally the members of the Duma, indignant, began to hiss the representatives of the Government and to call them assassins and butchers.

The impotence of the Duma was obvious. Then some of its members expressed the idea of approaching the people by means of local committees elected by the inhabitants of this and that district, which might serve as a laboratory for the preliminary elaboration of public opinion and as a support to the Duma itself. But the "Cadets," who constituted the majority in the Duma, protested against these methods as "unparliamentary" and "too revolutionary" for their liking; and the first Duma decided to keep within the limits of the Constitution and the parliamentary system.

But in reality neither Constitution nor parliamentary system existed, for *four days* before the opening of the Duma the Government hastily promulgated new "organic laws" which reduced the activity of the Duma almost to a negative quantity. "The Tsar possesses supreme and autocratic power, and no new law can enter into force without his approval"—such was the essential meaning of these hastily executed laws. Moreover, the Government reserved the right of promulgating laws "in exceptional instances" during the vacations of the Duma, and greatly limited the power of the latter body. The Duma, in short, was forbidden to discuss the institution of military courts or to raise the question of revising the "organic laws." The prerogative of modifying the laws was reserved by the Tsar. By March, 1906, six weeks before the opening of the Duma, the Government produced "budgetary regulations," which resulted in the Budget being "iron-clad" and proof against any attempts on the part of the Duma to amend it. According to the opinion of the French jurist, M. Pierre Chasles, the budgetary rights of the Duma are practically null, all such rights being eliminated by "exceptions," for the Russian autocracy withdrew with one hand what it had given with the other. M. Chasles adds that there is no Parliament in the world whose financial rights are limited as are those of the Duma. (See Pierre Chasles, *Le Parlement Russe*, Paris, 1910.)

Possessing no real power, the first Duma was doomed to fall as soon as the Government thought fit to oppose it openly.

And, indeed, seventy-two days after the opening of the Duma it was dissolved by the Tsar, at the moment when it was about to present to the Government a project of agrarian reform and to address the people for the first time on the subject of the agrarian troubles which were disturbing certain provinces. A party of deputies, headed by all the leaders, resolved to protest against this dissolution, and repaired to Viborg, in Finland, whence they addressed a manifesto to the people. This manifesto counselled the people not to pay a penny of their taxes and not to supply the army with a single soldier until the day on which the Government should convoke a new Duma. The deputies who signed the "Proclamation of Viborg" were sentenced to three months' imprisonment and deprived of the electoral right; but no one thought fit to refuse the payment of taxes or to boycott the army. The Duma was too little in touch with the people for its proclamation to produce the desired effect. The "Cadets" who initiated the journey to Viborg declared during their trial that their proclamation was intended solely to divert the people from the revolutionary conflict by indicating a method of passive opposition. As to the Left side of the Duma, constituted by the Labour men and Social Democrats, not content with urging the people to passive opposition, it issued two further proclamations—one addressed to the peasants and workers, the other to the army and the navy—both recommending an armed struggle against the Government. A few strikes responded to these proclamations and then a few military insurrections: Poltava (28th of July), the fortress of Siraborg (30th of July and 1st of August) and Kronstadt (1st and 2nd of August); badly organized, these strikes and insurrections ended in the complete defeat of the revolutionists and the victory of the Government.

Six months after the dissolution of the first Duma the second was convoked. The Government resolved once more to assemble a so-called Parliament, fearing internal discontent and more especially the public opinion of Europe. Moreover, the dissolution of the Duma had provoked a heavy slump of

Russian securities on the exchanges of Europe. The electoral law was left in the same condition as before ; but thanks to the "commentaries and elucidations" of the Senate, the number of the electors was still further diminished. Moreover, a number of decrees limited the liberties of the electoral assemblies. Here is the tenor of one of these decrees : "The commissary of police who is present at these meetings may dissolve them if he observes incitement to hatred or remarks the presence of unqualified persons or *considers that the meeting is wandering from the 'order of the day'*" (*sic*!). These decrees were followed by the accompanying circular, addressed to the Governors by the Minister of the Interior : "The deportation of possible candidates of the parties of the Left constitutes a measure which is contemplated by the Government not only in the interests of public authority and security, but because the Minister desired to see in the new Duma men who correspond to the veritable (?) aspirations of the population."

Despite all these measures the Government received a check at the new election, and the second Duma was more revolutionary than the first. The Left of the second Parliament consisted of two hundred members (sixty-five Social Democrats, thirty-five Revolutionary Socialists, and a hundred Labourites), while the Right obtained only sixty seats and the Liberal Centre (Cadets) lost more than 40 per cent. of its strength in the previous Duma. Thus the second Duma expressed even more violently than the first the revolutionary conflict between the forces of reaction and the forces of the people. In vain did the Cadets essay to "spare" the Duma, by carefully avoiding any conflict with the Government or by sometimes uniting themselves with the Right in order to prevent the Left, directed by the Social Democrats, from passing revolutionary resolutions. The Government was not long willing to support the pitiless criticism of its actions which proceeded from the orators of the Left, and in June, 1907, 103 days after its opening, the Second Duma also was dissolved. This dissolution was preceded by a demand on the part of the Government that the deputies of

the Social Democratic party should be handed over to it, on the pretext that they had been involved in the organization of a military plot directed against the monarchy. In reality the only crime of the deputies of the Social Democratic group consisted in their having received the *nakazes* (*cahiers*) in which the people had expressed its necessities and claims and the soldiers the causes of their discontent. As it proved later, the staging of this imaginary "plot" was effected by a method habitual with the Government—provocation. A repentant agent of the *Okhrana* (the detective police), Brodsky, had recently revealed all the machinations employed by the *Okhrana* to establish overwhelming proofs of guilt of the Social Democratic deputies. However, with the exception of a few deputies who had time to escape abroad, they were brought to trial, and thirty-seven representatives of the Russian proletariat were condemned to hard labour and banished to Siberia.

Having dispersed the second Duma, the Tsar in a manifesto stated that it was of the utmost importance to reform the electoral law, "for he recognized that the composition of the Duma was not satisfactory. . . . Only that power which conceded the first electoral law, the historic power of the Tsar, possesses the right to abrogate that law and to replace it by a new law, and as it was God who bestowed upon us our power as autocrat, it is before His altar that we shall answer for the destinies of the Russian State."

The transformation of the electoral law accomplished according to the "indications of God" by the Tsar of All the Russias consisted in reducing the members of the Duma to 442; they had formerly been 524. This diminution was effected at the expense of Russian subjects of "foreign" race. Poland has to-day 14 deputies instead of 37, the Caucasus 10 instead of 29, Asiatic Russia 15 instead of 46, while Turkestan no longer has one. The system of "wards," of which the germ existed in the previous law, now obtained its full development, the great landowners being isolated in one particular ward, the first, to which was promised the majority both in the electoral colleges

and the Duma. Now, of the 5,252 members of the electoral colleges, the great landowners constitute more than one-half. They returned to their colleges 2,647 of their own representatives (56.6 per cent.). The peasants returned 1,160 (22 per cent.), the townsfolk 1,333 (25.3 per cent.), and the workers 112 (2.1 per cent.). In other words, the Government has transformed the Duma into the organ of the landowners and great capitalists. The third Duma, whose first session opened on November 14, 1907, was composed largely of Octobrists and members of the Right. The Cadets numbered 30 deputies, the Labour group about 20, the Social Democrats 16, and the Revolutionary Socialists none—they had boycotted the elections.

The third Duma was regarded as "satisfactory" by the Government. Treading faithfully in the path of reaction, it still exists. In the rare cases when the opinion of this Duma has been opposed to that of the Government, either the Council of Empire or the Tsar himself has vetoed its decisions. One day, when the Government wished to pass a law affecting the self-government of the Western region, whose character was distinctly chauvinistic, the Duma and the Council of Empire opposed it. The Government then resorted to a very simple and original measure, which is doubtless unknown to European parliamentary life: it dissolved the Duma and the Council of Empire *for three days*, promulgated the desired law during that interval in the name of the Tsar, and then ordered the reopening of the two Chambers, which had to face an accomplished fact. The Duma and the Council of Empire submitted with perfect docility to this test of their "loyalty."

As for the popular masses, they appear to be ignorant of the existence of the third Duma. Although the peasants, working men, and townsfolk followed the doings of the first and second Dumas with interest, they are completely indifferent to the actions of the third. For the people the third Duma, far from being a popular institution, is a purely Governmental organ, one of its countless bureaucratic devices. This conception can only be shared by the Russian deputy of to-day.

II

"First pacification, then reforms!" Thus did Stolypin, after the revolution, express the intentions of the Government.

Of the manner in which the "pacification" was effected we shall not say much. A social conflict is always more violent than an international conflict, and the victors in an intestine struggle always treat the vanquished far more brutally than the victors in an external war. The Russian reaction could be no exception to this rule, for the intellectual level of its leaders is of the lowest, and these leaders, thanks to the historical conditions of their education and their fear of losing their property and perhaps their lives in the revolutionary tempest, are always ready to inflict pitiless punishment. After the victory of the Government these leaders proposed to *root out* the revolution by exterminating all those who had taken part in the events of the revolution and all those who were suspect of having done so. So, despite the existence of numerous Draconian penalties in the Russian code, the reaction demanded the adoption of exceptional and illegal measures. The Russian courts-martial enjoyed the right to finish any trial whatever within twenty-four hours. Nevertheless, the reaction executed political prisoners *en masse*, without any judicial proceedings. Interpellations in the Duma established the fact that the Governor-General of Warsaw ordered more than one illegal capital execution *by administrative process*, and it was also officially proved in the Duma that torture was employed as a means of preliminary inquiry in political trials. It is a fact that there existed in Riga, in the years 1906-7, and even later, a "museum of tortures," in which the police, with the approval of the magistrates, tortured political prisoners, in order to wring admissions from them and to extract the names of their comrades. The tortures were directed by a special "commission," composed of officials to whom the Governor—according to the declaration of the commission—had granted

the right to kill political prisoners without trial and without inquest.

Here are some facts, cited from an interpellation made in April, 1907, upon this subject, and approved by an enormous majority of the second Duma :

"On the night of January 13, 1906, a young prisoner of eighteen years, from whom no admission could be obtained, had the thorax and the flanks bruised and ground under the feet of a sub-commissary of police. The same night another 'detained' was so violently struck on the calves that the flesh of his legs hung in strips, showing the naked bone.

"On March 14, 1906, three revolutionaries were arrested, and for eight days they were subjected to the most refined tortures. . . . Their nails and hair were torn out, they were struck upon the genital organs, their bones were broken. . . .

"On the 18th August a youth of sixteen was arrested, a secondary school boy, being accused of lending a comrade a copy of the 'Proclamation of Viborg.' He was struck on the arms, the back, the head, and the genital organs, so that at last his whole body was merely one horrible wound.

"Another young prisoner of twenty-two, arrested the 30th of November, 1906, was transformed, in a detective police bureau, into a hairless and mutilated old man."

The report of the session of the Duma of the 10th of April, 1907 (see the shorthand report of the second session of the second Duma, St. Petersburg, 1907, published by the State Printing Press, pp. 1880-97), mentions many other facts similar to these, and states how the police "used to extinguish cigarettes on the bodies they had already tortured, kicked the prisoners, tore out their eyes, filled painful wounds with salt, scorched the feet of prisoners at the fire," and how, to destroy all trace of torture, they then used to kill their victims, naturally without trial.

Similar deeds were committed in other parts of the Baltic provinces and in Poland. In reply to the interpellation of the Duma the Government, being unable to deny the evidence, contented itself with attempting to excuse its agents by declaring

that they had been excited against the revolutionists by numerous Terrorist attempts.

I will stop here in the enumeration of facts characteristic of the cruelty of the Governmental system of repression, for I prefer to spare my readers' nerves. Yet it is my great wish to make Europeans understand what *can* happen in Russia. But while Russians are almost accustomed to certain phenomena, because these are known to them all and recur in their country from time to time, Europeans find it difficult even to realize the existence of such phenomena.

Without reckoning a few unimportant, practical measures, the reforms granted between 1903 and 1910 fall into two categories; one of these appearing as the direct result of the revolutionary movement and the other as the fruit of Governmental initiative.

To the first of these categories belong those measures affecting the extension of civic rights, Press rights, rights of association, the right to strike, etc. Until 1905 there was in Russia a preventive censorship, which subjected to its decisions all journals, books, and reviews. Its proceedings against "liberal" ideas often assumed a purely academic form. Everybody knows how a censor, instructed to revise a cookery-book, discovered therein a "revolutionary" phrase, which he suppressed. This phrase advised the cook to cook certain meats by means of "free heat." Another censor, in Odessa, recently reading a criticism of *Hamlet, Prince of Denmark*, blacked out the second portion of the title of the piece, explaining that one could not speak of Danish princes without an authorization from the Ministry of the Imperial Court, as the Empress-mother, Maria Fedorovna, was allied to the royal house of Denmark. But although such fantastic feats were sometimes comic, the majority were truly tragic; they hampered the development of the Press and of science by forbidding them even to touch upon a host of theories and problems.

In 1905 the censorship, although not officially suppressed, ceased for a moment to exist. The political organizations having

commenced to publish books and journals "by the wish of the people" without getting them revised by the censors, the private publishers were not long in following suit, and the Government, in the face of the accomplished fact, suppressed the *preliminary* censorship, while reserving the right to fine publishers, imprison editors without trial, and suppress journals. After 1905 the Government began to profit so largely by the latter right that to-day freedom of the Press is practically unknown in Russia. Just as before the revolution, the democratic parties are forced to get their pamphlets printed abroad or in secret printing-offices.

Only in 1905 did Russia enjoy the right of assembly. At the beginning of 1906 the Government promulgated a "provisional decree" ordering all organizers of public meetings to warn the local police at least *three days* in advance of the place, date, and object of the intended meeting. This same decree authorized the local administrations to prohibit all such meetings as it seemed good to them to prohibit. Now the right of public assembly only exists as a formula, for the local administrations, anxious to avoid all disturbances, prohibit practically all meetings.

As for the right of association and the right to strike, these also date from the year 1905. In that year a Government circular ordered the agents of the Government no longer to apply the laws directed against workmen "on strike." But administrative practice soon returned to the old ways: imprisonment and deportation of strikers. Associations or unions may still be constituted, but they may be dissolved at any moment by a simple administrative order. Moreover, nearly all the professional, philanthropic, and civilizing organizations which were the hope of the active portion of society have one by one been forced to disappear.

Another conquest of the revolutionary movement, "academic autonomy," suffered the same fate as the unions. Before 1905 the assemblies of the Russian university professors were absolutely dependent upon the pedagogic bureaucracy; in other words, the Minister of Public Instruction and the "curators of the educational districts." This dependence was felt even in the region of

pure science. Thus, the Minister appointed and dismissed the professors, without taking their professional merits into consideration. As I have already stated, during the first half of the nineteenth century the professors of anatomy were forced not merely to teach their students the structure of the human body, but also to "direct the spirits of the hearers towards the All-Clement Deity, creator of the human body in all its marvellous complexity."

In a provincial university the chair of philosophy was occupied by a commissary of police (*sic*), who was instructed to render the science of philosophy more "safe." As for being a materialist or a disciple of the Darwinian theory, that was regarded as a terrible crime. The result was that many talented teachers were eventually either dismissed on account of their "atheism" and "lack of safety," or had to take refuge in foreign universities, where their work was better appreciated than in Russia.

In 1905 the Russian universities obtained autonomy and the right to select the occupants of their professional chairs by means of competition. But the universities did not long enjoy their autonomy, for in 1908 they were already invaded by the waves of reaction. The high-schools were ransacked; dozens of professors of various faculties at odds with the Government were dismissed. To fill the empty chairs the Russian Government appoints persons who are not selected by the faculties, despite the opposition of the latter.

The aggressive policy adopted by the Government in respect of the professors of the high-schools is not particularly reasonable even from the Governmental point of view. The Russian professors, like the majority of "men of science," belong to the category of "peaceable citizens," and their political opinions, with very rare exceptions, are excessively moderate. Thus, at the moment of the revolution they were employing all their efforts to restrain the students from taking part in revolutionary movements. For this very reason there were many quarrels between professors and students. And even these professors seemed, to the Russian reaction, "insupportable."

Passing to the reforms due to the initiative of the Government, I will say nothing of national legislation, for I shall refer to that in another chapter. I will speak here of the new agrarian reform. This reform, known as the "law of the 9th November, 1906," is of the greatest importance, for it is by itself indicative of the complete downfall of the old Governmental policy in respect of the rural commune and the revision of all previous legislation.

In speaking of rural economy I have already stated that the Government attempted artificially to retain the *obshchina* (rural commune). All the eminent servants of the Russian autocracy (such as the celebrated Plehve, killed by Terrorists, and the no less celebrated Pobiedonostzev) were persuaded that the existence of the rural commune and its social and economic isolation were the best foundations of the monarchy. In January, 1904, the Government once more expressed its wish to contribute to the preservation of the commune. And suddenly, two years later, the contrary principle was proclaimed. In March, 1906, the Government declared in a *ukase* that it was "the present system of property and exploitation of the soil that had led the peasants to poverty and the ruin of the rural economy." On the 9/22nd November of the same year was promulgated a law authorizing any member of a commune to require of the latter the transformation into private property of the land cultivated by him, and to resort to the aid of the Governmental administration in case of refusal on the part of the commune. Thus, in opposition to the old system of keeping the property of the commune undivided and indivisible, the "law of the 9th November" introduced the system of sharing the soil among private owners.

The *principle* of this agrarian reform is indisputable. The rural commune was a most antiquated institution, which had more than once hampered the economic evolution of the village, and private property was far more appropriate to a capitalistic system, as it stimulates personal initiative and free competition. Count Witte, father of this reform, understood better than any other Minister the *problems* of the *bourgeois* development of Russia. But principles and hard reality are different things. In re-

forming the communal system the Government, regarding the reform as a panacea capable of calming the agrarian troubles, was pursuing a political rather than an economic aim. In the years 1905 and 1906 the agrarian disturbances invaded enormous areas, and the peasants, whole *mir*s at a time, had attacked the homes of the rich landowners. After this effervescence the Government and the nobles persuaded themselves that the *mir*, by giving the peasants a certain solidarity in their attacks on the great landowners, was the principal cause of the agrarian troubles. It was to shatter this solidarity of the *mir* that the law of the 9th of November was promulgated.

To put this law into execution special commissions were formed in each *uyezd* (canton) and in each *guberniya* (Government). These commissions were composed of representatives of the Government, of the nobles, and of the peasants. But as the representatives of the peasants were present only in the most insignificant proportions, the task of realizing the new reform was really incumbent on the nobility and the bureaucracy. The ancient distrust which the peasants felt for the bureaucrats caused the former to embody their suspicions in "agrarian commissions," entrusted with the protection of the rights of the members "put out" of the communes. There were bloody encounters between the peasants and the administrative authorities. Moreover, in the interior of the commune itself a quarrel broke out between the advocates and the opponents of the policy of sharing the land. This struggle led to murders, to premeditated cases of arson. The opponents of the reform asserted that the secret aim of the Government, in granting this reform, was to sow discord within the commune, and thus to divert the peasants from their attacks upon the great landowners. The reform reckoned confidently upon the peasant's aspiration towards property, an aspiration which had long existed in the mind of the Russian *mujik*, disguised by an archaic pseudo-communism. But in arousing these individualist aspirations the agrarian reform too often resulted in the conflict of these desires with the interests of the great majority of the members of the commune. It has often happened that the

peasant who by chance enjoys the use of an important allotment of land belonging to the commune is anxious to depart from the commune. His departure still further diminishes the possessions of the commune, still further increasing the general poverty caused by the deficiency of land. Sometimes also some peasant who has long ago broken all ties with the commune, living in the city but nominally still a member of the commune, returns to the village and demands his allotment, and immediately on receiving it hastens to sell it. For that matter, the majority of the peasants "emerge" from the commune in order to sell their property. Thus the agrarian reform, instead of forming a "class of solid landowners," serves still further to hasten the proletarianization of the village. Many peasants who have "emerged" from the commune and are anxious to continue to cultivate the land *cannot* lead an independent existence for want of money, live-stock, and implements; the next thing is that they also promptly swell the ranks of the proletariat.

According to the official data, here are the results of the agrarian reform during the first four years of its operation: in 1907, 240,143 acres were converted into private properties; in 1908, 1,178,609 acres; in 1909, 3,300,598 acres; in 1910, 3,940,350; and in all, during these four years, 8,659,700 acres. These 8,659,700 acres were divided among 319,148 *dvors* or families. If we take into consideration that the total number of peasant *dvors* in Russia amounts to twelve millions, we shall see that hitherto the results of the reform are somewhat insignificant. If we compare the number of *dvors* which have "emerged" from the commune with the amounts of land allotted to each, we shall see that the new reform profits more particularly the more wealthy *dvors*, that is to say, those which possess at least 27 acres.

While it authorized "emergence" from the commune, the Government also realized another measure, the "distribution" of the peasants, the object of which was to break up the large villages into hamlets, into isolated *khutors* (a *khutor* is a *métairie*). The organization of these *khutors* was facilitated both by the allotments which had emerged from the communes and by the

land acquired by the peasants with the help of the Peasant Bank. The creation of these *khutors* is regarded by the Government as one of the most important of questions. However, the results hitherto obtained by this measure are negligible both in quality and in quantity. Instead of becoming "solid economics" the *khutors* are promptly sold by their possessors to the large buyers of land. Inquiries made by agronomists in various provinces of Russia—in Pskov, Samara, Kiev, Tula, etc.—prove that the individual peasant property can to-day look for no further development in Russia, for the political and juridical conditions of the life of the peasants as well as their extreme poverty render such development impossible. Moreover, it is obvious that in order to work an independent property the small Russian holder must own at least 27 acres. Thus the agrarian question is no more solved to-day than it was before the 9th of November, 1906, and the Government is mistaken in believing that the agrarian reform can prevent the expropriation of the lands of the nobles to the profit of those whose needs are the most important problem of the Russian revolution—the *mujiks*.

The situation has been still further complicated by the fact that the proletarianization of the rural population, accelerated by the agrarian reform, is daily increasing the number of the unemployed, Russian industry being far too poorly developed to employ so many hands. Finally, to all these circumstances was added the horrible dearth of 1911, which spread famine through more than twenty provinces. By the end of the year the number of starving persons had risen to twenty-five millions! And, after the promulgation of the law of 19th November, scurvy and typhoid, the inseparable companions of famine, continued to empty the Russian villages as effectually as ever, if not more so.

III

The pictures which pass before our eyes, when we think what was the life of Russian society after the revolution, are tragic in

the extreme, and would supply material for many psychologists, sociologists, and novelists.

Revolutionary disturbances, while awakening the consciousness of a people, always exhaust its physical and moral sources as greatly as does an external conflict, and it was after an external war that Russia was subjected to violent internal perturbation. Thus the Russian people was obliged to make a double effort, which was inevitably followed by an immense fatigue. It was this fatigue which finally became despair before the certainty that the painful struggle had terminated in no practical or satisfactory result. The Russian people is a young people, without great historical experience, liable to exaggerate its own strength and to undervalue that of the monarchy. Victory seemed so easy, liberty so near! And when, in place of victory, it met defeat, and in place of liberty the triumph of a bloody repression, its disillusion was terrible.

From the beginning of the repression the revolutionary cause was abandoned by a vast number of those who had quite recently sworn eternal fidelity thereto. And many of those who thus abandoned it were not contented with a passive contemplation. Some were prompt to condemn and attack the liberative movement. There were even those who did not recoil before treason. And then commenced a period which in all truth saw "brother turned against brother," when the breath of treachery poisoned the atmosphere of the revolutionary organizations, and provocation acquired so extraordinary a power that a mutual distrust eventually seized upon all their members. The dismemberment of the organizations followed.

The dismemberment of the revolutionary organizations and the decay of discipline led many revolutionists, who could not reconcile themselves with the defeat of the movement of liberation, to enter into the struggle on their own account, to declare an irregular war upon the monarchy, in the shape of an individual terrorism or of "expropriations." The "expropriators" were numerous, and their exploits took place in banks, post-offices, and fiscal wine-shops. Strange legends were

circulated relating to the "expropriators," especially one Stepan Lbov, who for some months succeeded in terrorizing the police of the Urals, and was at last hanged. Unfortunately the political element in the composition of the groups of "expropriators" was largely reinforced by criminals, offenders against the common law, sometimes even police *procurators*, and many "expropriations" were effected by genuine bandits, who, under the style of "revolutionaries," attacked fiscal and private institutions indifferently. In some districts the "expropriations" became veritable epidemics. But we must admit that this development was largely aggravated by the economic crisis, which threw into the streets a multitude of the unemployed, starving and embittered.

While in the lower depths of society the dismemberment of the revolutionary organizations was followed merely by an epidemic of expropriation and a few unimportant acts of terrorism, in the intellectual class a spiritual crisis was evoked, and the "intellectuals," in the words of the poet, began to burn what they had adored, and to adore what they had burned. The cult of the welfare of the people gave way to the cult of private welfare, and the ardour inspired of old by the social struggle died down, to give way to the pursuit of pleasure. *Carpe diem* became the law of life. In literature and poetry these changes were manifested by a sudden interest in the "sexual problem." Many writers, some of them highly talented, commenced to make physical love the object of a special cult, and a wave of pornography swept across Russian literature. In the midst of the bloody Governmental repression this resembled a banquet in time of pestilence, or a dance executed upon the scaffold.

Psychologists and alienists often speak of the tie between the sexual element and the mystic element. This observation may very appropriately be applied to the spiritual crisis suffered by the Russian intellectuals after the revolution. While surrendering themselves to a bacchanal of sexual emotions, one section of Russian society plunged into mysticism. Therein some sought new sensations; others, a simplification and repose of the soul.

Others, again, wished to associate religious aspirations and social ideals by giving both a religious basis. Two religious movements appeared after the revolution, the first being known as "The Search for God," the second as "The Construction of God." The "Seekers" declared that the divine principle was contained in the existing order, and that it was only needful to "discover" it: the "Constructors," some or whom were Socialists, declared that the divine principle could be incarnated in life only after the destruction of present conditions of life and the organization of a new order. The adepts of these two new cults sought, in a resurrection of archaic forms of ideology, a means of galvanizing the chilly corpse of their ideas and feelings.

The war, the revolution, and the reaction, in addition to the moral crisis among the intellectuals, provoked a crisis in the popular health. Already enfeebled by the yoke of the autocracy, by hunger, and by previous alcoholism, the physical and psychical health of the people could not resist these three terrible shocks. At the beginning of the year 1910, at the Congress of Russian Physicians, a report was read relating to the numerous cases of neurasthenia observable among the masses. This report, founded upon precise facts and figures, demonstrated the falsity of the common opinion that neurasthenia was practically confined to the upper classes. In Russia, stated the report, there is an extreme development of neurasthenia among the workers and the peasants. Having compared the data for Russia with those for other countries, the author of the report concluded that Russia, by the number of its workers and peasants attacked by neurasthenia, occupies, if not the first place, at least one of the first places in Europe. "The propagation of this neurasthenia is explained by the political yoke, by famine, and by a superfluity of population. . . . At present it is indispensable to let the people breathe a little, at least for a time."

As a proof of the disorganization of popular life we have suicide, which assumes the character of an epidemic. At the Congress above mentioned it was demonstrated that between 1905 and 1909 there were in Russia more than 45,000 suicides,

and that the years when the reaction was at its apogee, the years 1908 and 1909, were the most fatal. In St. Petersburg, in 1904, 427 suicides were reported; in 1905, 354; in 1906, 532; in 1907, 716; in 1908, 1,408; in 1909, 1,438. "These figures," writes a publicist, "tell us that during the tumultuous years of 1905 and 1906 the inhabitants of St. Petersburg were living three or four times better than during the years that followed, for the idea of suicide came to them three or four times less often than it did later." A melancholy profusion of suicides was also observed in Odessa and in Moscow. In Odessa there were 256 suicides in 1905 and 642 in 1908; in Moscow, 174 in 1906 and 614 in 1908.

Suicides caused by hunger and poverty were the most numerous. However, there were great numbers of suicides which were due to moral motives. Here is an extract from a letter written before death by a young student of twenty years in Odessa:

"To live as I would, now, is impossible, and live as it is possible I cannot. . . . I cannot witness atrocities and suffering, cannot hear the complaints and the sobs of the oppressed, and at the same time feel my impotence to solace, however little, this horror that is life. And I am going out of life, for there is nothing to live for."

Such human documents abound. It is strange, but it is especially the very young who kill themselves in Russia. Of one thousand suicides in Moscow during the years 1908 and 1909 there were—

45 of persons aged from 8 to 14 years				
381	"	"	15	" 20 "
179	"	"	21	" 25 "
134	"	"	26	" 30 "
117	"	"	31	" 40 "
73	"	"	41	" 50 "

and 71 were of persons aged more than 50 years.

Suicide has become the "malady of youth" in Russia. At one time a special Commission was instructed by the Ministry of Public Instruction to inquire into the causes of suicide among

the pupils of the public schools, and a number of societies were formed with a view to preventing these suicides of children.

A little boy of eight years, a little girl of ten, killed themselves because "it was difficult to live," because "there was nothing to live for." . . . The Angel of Death seems to hover above Russia and to cut down with his mortal breath the freshest of our flowers. . . .

"The true reaction is over. And, distant as yet, already foams the crest of that wave which will sweep us away anew. The aspect of Russia is melancholy, her business affairs are insignificant or unfavourable, but something already begins to quiver, to come to life. It is a joyful call towards a fresh and a sore revolutionary labour."

So, in October, 1911, the actual situation of Russia was described by Maxim Gorky. It was the truth. The year 1909 was the culmination of the social and psychical reaction, and to-day we may observe the proofs of a fresh rebirth. It could not be otherwise. If the phenomena of 1908 and 1909 had continued it would have meant that the Russian people was in a state of decadence, ready to expire. And the Russian people, or rather the peoples of Russia, possess too great a reserve of strength to die thus. Moral and intellectual decomposition cannot contaminate all the sources of the psychical life of the people, and the material blows of the reaction, while they wounded and tortured it atrociously, could not batter the mind of the people into insensibility. Suddenly, after a slight abatement of the economic crisis (in 1910) the proletariat—which, thanks to historic conditions, is in Russia the advance-guard of those who fight for liberty—was once more astir. Then the old economic and political organizations reappeared, and there was a sudden *volte-face* of the intellectual middle classes; the wave of sexuality and mysticism swept on and away, leaving the mind to turn to economic, social, and political questions. Then, as often happens, a chance shock helped to reveal the instability of the situation and the imminent need of radical reforms.

This shock was the death of Tolstoy. The death of him who had always preached "non-resistance to evil" produced a profound impression upon Russian society, and was the pretext for manifestations directed against the death penalty and an autocratic system sustained only by the gallows. Then, despite the police, over and over again numerous meetings were organized of St. Petersburg students and artisans and others. At these meetings all was as before the reaction; the same faith in victory was there, the same aspirations toward liberty.

The revolution, if it gave Russia practically nothing in the way of a tangible conquest, did at least cause an intellectual upheaval. In 1905 the poor stricken illiterate people ceased to regard itself as a herd of cattle. The millions of books and pamphlets scattered throughout Russia during the revolution were not without fruit. They drew the Russian people, at least in thought, a little closer to the great family of enlightened European peoples. And in one day this thought was transformed into reality.

"One can do anything with bayonets except sit down on them," said Talleyrand. And as the Russian despotism is no longer supported by anything better than bayonets, we may say that the liberation of Russia is not, as one of our proverbs has it, "behind the mountains."

* This volume was already completed when the news came to hand of the shooting down of the workers in the gold-mines of Lena (Siberia), of the numerous strikes of protest provoked by this massacre, of the mutiny of the engineer battalions at Tashkend, and the disturbance among the sailors of the Black Sea and Baltic fleets. All this demonstrates the instability of the present regime in Russia and the approach of a new revolutionary storm.

BOOK V

**THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND THE
RELIGIOUS QUESTION**

CHAPTER I

THE NATIONAL CONFLICT AND THE UNITY OF THE STATE

I. Poland and Russia. II. The Finnish question. III. The nationalist policy and the unity of the State.

I

IN the chapter dealing with the "Races" of Russia I remarked more than once that the idea of "race" or "nation," far from possessing any absolute or metaphysical meaning, is the imprint of a conventional and historical character. The same may be said of the national question. The history of the national problem, or problems, in Russia confirms this statement in a striking manner.

Let us, for instance, take the Polish question, which not so long ago disturbed all Europe by its international significance, and is to-day reviving under a new aspect.

Let us take the facts. When, at the end of the eighteenth century, after the tragedy of the partition of ancient Poland, the Russian Empire appropriated a great part of the latter, Poland was a feudal oligarchy with an almost natural economy. In the thirteenth century, it is true, the production of artisans had seemed likely to serve as the basis of an industrial development, but in the seventeenth century no trace of this attempt was left, and all Poland was given over to agriculture. The attempts on the part of the Polish magnates, at the end of the seventeenth

century, to introduce the arts of manufacture into Poland were a complete fiasco; the anarchical feudalism of ancient Poland was far too unfavourable to capitalist industry, which requires a centralized system of government.

Industry did not exist in Poland, and the rural economy was decadent. In the fifteenth century there was a great demand for Polish wheat on the markets of Europe, and this provoked an extensive economy in the *latifundia*, followed by the exhaustion of the soil and an extreme exploitation of the serfs. External complications—war and the "Continental system" of Napoleon—led to a fall of the exports of Polish wheat and a diminution of the returns of the rural economy. The suppression of serfdom (1807) finally ruined the economic power of the Polish *szlachta* (the nobility), and decreased their political importance. The Russian Government profited by this process to oppose new social elements to the moribund *szlachta*. By a series of *ukases* published between 1815 and 1830 it contributed to the industrial development of Poland. As the result of the development of capitalism a new social class, the *bourgeoisie*, rapidly filled the place of the old nobility, and there was a corresponding change of political ideology.

At the beginning of the twentieth century Russia was consuming two-thirds of all the produce of Poland.

In pouring its merchandise into the Russian markets Poland, or rather the Polish *bourgeoisie*, had to abandon the old dreams of political independence. The appearance on the Russian market of Polish fabrics, of Polish coal and iron, was a veritable *Finis Poloniae*, for it served as the unshakeable foundation material of political unity with Russia. Even in 1831, during a Polish insurrection, Nicolas I remarked: "Having won their independence, the Poles would be in a difficult position. What can they do without seaports? Where can they get rid of the products of their industry once Russian markets are closed to them?"

The profound revolution to which the political ideology of Polish "society" was subjected under the stress of the econo-

mic development which fused Poland and Russia into one was brilliantly demonstrated by the welcome proffered to Nicolas II in 1896, at the time of his visit to Warsaw. The industrial and intellectual *bourgeoisie* of Warsaw organized demonstrations in honour of the Tsar. The children of those who died in 1863 fighting for the independence of their country promised fidelity to the Russian monarchy.

How the Polish *bourgeoisie* regards the national problem we may discover by considering the position of the Polish *kolo* (circle) in the Duma. In 1907 forty-six Polish deputies presented to the Duma a project of autonomy for Poland. In this project was the phrase: "The kingdom of Poland constitutes an inseparable part of the Russian Empire." (See *Project of Autonomy for the Kingdom of Poland*, Article II, St. Petersburg, 1907, State Press.)

While they regard the existence of a Polish Diet as indispensable, the Polish deputies claim for this Diet only limited legislative powers, and are ready to declare as beyond its competence all questions relating to foreign politics, State loans, State defence, customs tariffs, post and telegraphs, etc. Far from being revolutionary, in their project of autonomy they lay great stress on the prerogatives of the Imperial power.

It is a characteristic fact that this project was signed as readily by representatives of the nobility as by those of the *bourgeoisie*. The Polish nobles, who have themselves become *bourgeois*, seem to have forgotten their dreams of independence.

But here is a still more interesting fact: the class-conscious Polish proletariat, the most revolutionary element of modern Polish society, is equally opposed to Polish independence. However, in opposition to the *bourgeoisie*, it strives not for a constitutional monarchy, but for a republic, and in this struggle it stands with the proletariat of the other nations of Russia. (Polish Social Democracy, like Lettish Social Democracy and Jewish Social Democracy, forms part of the Social Democratic party of Russia.) Theorists of the Polish Social-Democratic party, such as Rosa Luxembourg, for example, demonstrate that independence is not

to be desired for Poland, as it would be injurious to the interests of the Polish proletariat. In general the Polish Social-Democrats evoke the idea of class at the expense of the national idea. Only one relatively insignificant group of Polish Socialists, the Utopian Socialists, resembling by their Terrorist programme and theory the Russian Revolutionary Socialist party, aspire to the nationalist ideal of an independent Poland.

II

There is another example illustrating the historic evolution of the nationalist conflict. It is that of Finland, and we must consider the inner reasons which led the Russian monarchy to change its policy in respect of the Finnish question.

The annexation of Finland to Russia in 1808 was the result of an understanding between the Russian Government and a portion of the Finnish nobility. Russia, in order to render her northern frontier more secure, ejected the Swedes from Finland. Upon this the Finnish nobles replied by demanding a Russian protectorate. Russia established the protectorate, but left Finland an almost complete political independence, with a Parliament. Under Alexander II, Finland even had her own army and could mint money. More than once Alexander I and Alexander II swore fidelity to the Finnish Constitution.

From an economic point of view, during the first part of the nineteenth century Finland was a market for Russian corn, for the poverty of the soil of Finland makes it impossible for that country to provide sufficient grain for her population. Thanks to geographical proximity and convenience of communication, the producers of Russian wheat had no competition to fear in the Finnish market. The fact of this outlet for Russian wheat explains to a certain degree the "liberal" conduct of the Russian Government of this period in respect of the Finnish Constitution.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century the relations

between Finland and Russia changed. During this period Russia, from the agricultural country which she was, began to transform herself into an industrial country and to seek markets for her products. Naturally her glance quickly fell on Finland. But Finland also was developing a national industry and was exporting every year more than £1,400,000 worth of manufactured articles, and it was impossible for Russian products to resist foreign competition on the Finnish market, for, possessing fiscal independence, Finland would hear nothing of protectionism. Moreover, thanks to the absence of custom-houses between Russia and Finland, products imported from Europe finally appeared on the Russian markets.

Being technically extremely backward, Russian capitalism, incapable of competing with Finnish and foreign products in a free-trade market, promptly demanded special measures of defence from the Russian Government.

In 1885 a rigorous customs frontier was established between Russia and Finland, and the merchants of Finland were burdened with customs duties. But all these measures led to nothing; after a momentary fall the Finnish exports reappeared triumphantly in the Russian markets (in 1896 Finland exported to Russia more than £1,120,000 of merchandise), while Russian capital experienced nothing but loss in Finland (between 1876 and 1896 the Russian exports to Finland fell from £3,000,000 to £2,200,000 annually), a loss which was highly profitable to Germany and England.

The Russian capitalists and the Russian Government then decided to conquer the markets of Finland by force. To achieve this object it was resolved to transform independent Finland, united federally to Russia, into a province of Russia. The Tsar, after swearing fidelity to the Constitution of Finland, suppressed the Finnish army and authorized a number of measures tending toward the Russification of the country.

After a hundred years of peace between the two countries, suddenly arose the "Finnish question," which to-day occupies the attention of all the civilized world.

III

A comparison of the respective situations of Poland and Finland enables us to grasp the material and economic basis of the national and historical connections of the national question. In Poland we observe a preponderance of centripetal forces connecting Polish production with the Russian markets. In Finland the centrifugal forces balance the centripetal and sometimes overcome them. While in Poland the ruling classes and the proletariat have abandoned the ideal of independence, in Finland that ideal animates all classes of society. As for the other regions of the Empire, we may assert that wherever capitalism has already penetrated it is creating similar solid foundations for the elaboration of the political unity of the State. The Letts of the Baltic provinces and the Georgians of the Caucasus—two nations playing an important part in the political life of the Empire—are equally anti-separatist.

The great centres of industry and commerce are organs of denationalization, great cauldrons which transform a mixture of varied tribes and races into a uniform mass, comprising the *bourgeoisie* on the one hand and the proletariat on the other. But although the internal composition of the capitalist culture of to-day is cosmopolitan, that does not alter the fact that it is obliged, in its own development, to make use of certain national forces, of which the most important is the national tongue. The school, the library, the bookseller's, the Press, the theatre, public meetings—all these indispensable elements of modern life must develop in a national environment, under conditions of historical succession. In this way the national question could not be abolished by capitalism. Capitalism has merely changed the problem of political independence into the problem of autonomous national culture. But the question of autonomous culture, although imbued with *local* characteristics, but based upon universal *capitalism*, is far from opposing the unity of the Russian State, and even guarantees the latter more securely than any mechanical and artificial denationalization which depends upon police measures.

The Russian Government in this case also would not listen to the demands of reason. Instead of seeking to render all the various peoples inhabiting Russia collaborators in one free task, it so feared "separatism" that it thought only of stifling all national aspirations. When in 1864 and 1870 it promulgated the laws relating to the zemstvos and municipalities, the Poles, Livonians, White Russians, a large proportion of the Ukrainians, the Georgians, the Armenians, and the whole population of Siberia and Central Asia, were deprived of the right of local self-government. In this manner to this day the local life of the "foreign" provinces is subjected to the exclusive rule of the bureaucracy. With the object of "Russification" the Government attempted to establish Russian landowners in Poland, in the Caucasus, and in other extremities of the Empire. By this attempt the bureaucrats and the nobles profited considerably, as they received for nothing, or next to nothing, large tracts of land taken from the local populations. But they introduced into these regions no rational system of economy, contenting themselves with employing the land thus acquired as the basis of speculation. In this way enormous quantities of real estate fell into the hands of adventurers. As for "non-Russian" subjects, they were in many districts forbidden to buy land.

Always with a view to the "Russification" of the Empire, the Government took energetic measures in the domain of public education. The Ukrainians, the White Russians, the Livonians, the Poles, etc., were deprived of the right of teaching their children their own mother-tongue. In all schools of the Empire teaching in the Russian language is compulsory, that is, in the most literary form of the Great Russian dialect. The study of this literary language presents great difficulties even to the peasants of Great Russia, so greatly does it differ from the current language of the people. The publication of schoolbooks in the mother-tongue is strictly prohibited. The Press, the theatre, and other manifestations of national culture are constantly the objects of Governmental prosecutions. In Poland not even the signs of shops may be written in Polish.

But the Jews are the worst sufferers from Governmental repression. In the eighteenth century and early in the nineteenth the Russian Government regarded the Jews as the most useful element of the nation, and invited Jewish merchants and artisans to migrate into Russia. The economic culture of South-western and Western Russia is largely due to the Russian Jews. Then the Governmental policy in respect of the Jews gradually began to change and to assume a reactionary character, until the Jewish question finally became a hideous bleeding wound. As in the time of the Inquisition the Ghetto still exists in Russia, the "boundaries of demarcation" which mark the quarters in which the Jews may inhabit. Considerable obstacles confront the Jew desirous of obtaining education, for there is a limit to the number of Jewish pupils which may be accepted either by a secondary school or a faculty. In the Universities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, for instance, students of the "Judaic religion" may not constitute more than 3 per cent. of the total number of students. A host of other no less burdensome regulations cripple the Russian Jew.

In spite of everything, the Jews have given Russia much. Among the most talented representatives of Russian poetry, music, art, and politics it is by no means rare to encounter Jewish names.

Like the Jewish race, all the other "nations" of Russia give proof, despite Governmental repression, of a great reserve of vital forces. The national literatures—Polish, Ukrainian, Armenian, Lettish—so little known to the European reader, have attained a high degree of development, and are so many pearls of price amid the wealth of the world's human genius.

To-day the national problem is becoming more and more acute. The revolutionary outbreaks of 1905 and 1906 contributed to awaken the sentiment of nationality among the various peoples of the Empire, and the policy of the Government merely stimulates this sentiment.

To the ideal of a democratic revolution sustained by the revolutionary elements of the various nations the Government opposes

that of a conservative nationalism incarnated in such pompous formulæ as "Great Russia," the "Russia of Russias," etc. In reality this conservative nationalism diminishes Great Russia, by limiting it to a small group of nobles of Great Russian origin. The "Russia of Russias" is a foolish watchword, for those whom the Government regards as Russians—the original inhabitants of Great Russia—constitute only one-third of the whole population of the Empire. Moreover, of this third even the Government neglects the great proportion composed of peasants and workers, to consider only the interests of the nobles and the bureaucracy, and sometimes those of capital. Erected upon so narrow a basis, the Governmental nationalism of to-day merely clashes with the vital elements of society, and is of a fundamentally negative character. Thus our modern nationalists have recently expounded a proposal with a view to "nationalizing the wheat-trade," that is to say of centralizing it, or concentrating it, by legislative means, in the hands of purely Russian merchants. Naturally, this project has merely disturbed the wheat-market—not only in Russia but abroad, the foreign houses being in touch with our exporters—and could not be realized. However, the experimenters in nationalism continued their dreams, and many other projects of a similar kind are already realized, or are on the point of being so. Thus, for example, not long ago a law was promulgated relating to the introduction of the *zemstvo* in the Governments of South-western Russia—Governments whose population is composed of Ukrainians, Great Russians, Poles, Czechs, and Jews. This law, not content with artificially protecting the interests of "Russians" to the detriment of those of "non-Russians," also introduced into the local self-governments the system of national "wards," or *curiæ*, thus augmenting the differences dividing the divers nations instead of seeking to lessen them. Still more strange were the projected laws which the Government presented to the third Duma, which related to Poland and Finland. These projects reveal the Government's desire totally to deprive Finland of her Constitution, to "separate" from Finland, with a view to its "Russification," a portion of

the province of Viborg in order to add it to the Government of St. Petersburg; the Government also wished to perform a similar surgical operation upon Poland, by removing from it one canton, that of Khelm, in the Government of Lublin.

What would you say, reader, were the French Government, considering the interests of "true Frenchmen" as "insufficiently defended" in Brittany, to request the chamber of deputies to remove two cantons from Brittany in order to unite them to the department of the Seine? Yet such a proposal would be quite as reasonable as those which delight the minds of our "nationalists." But while in France such a project would merely rouse anxious doubts as to the mental condition of its authors, in Russia it is seriously discussed and supported by a great majority of the nationalists of the third Duma.

CHAPTER II

THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION

I. The Religious Problem in Russia. II. Schism. III. The Sects.

I

IN Russia the national problem is complicated by the religious question. The division of the population corresponds to a certain point with the national divisions: the Jews profess the Judaic faith, the Poles and the Lithuanians are Catholics, the Armenians belong to the Græco-Armenian Church, the Letts are Protestant, while the Great Russians, Ukrainians, and a large portion of the White Russians are Orthodox. But while the majority of those belonging to the Orthodox faith are members of the "dominant" Church, that is, of the official Church, the minority are adherents of the "Old Orthodox" religion, or one of the "schisms." Besides these there are various other sects.

The official data of the religious divisions of Russia are very far from the reality. Before the year 1905, when the revolution wrung from the Government the first laws relating to religious tolerance, there was no religious liberty known in Russia. Any departure from the Orthodox Church was regarded as a grave offence, and many persons were forced to hide their true religious opinions and to pass for good Orthodox Christians. In reality, by the end of the nineteenth century a large proportion of the intellectuals and industrial workers were either atheists or indifferent, and many of those who belonged

formally to the Orthodox Church practised other religions. The Orthodox Church has always given proof of a great missionary zeal; but the intellectual level of its priests being of the lowest, it was able to "convert" infidels only by means of external measures based upon brute force. At the moment when Christianity was introduced into Russia a certain refrain became popular among the Russian Slavs: "They baptized with steel and fire." As the Russian State grew greater and greater, the zeal of the Orthodox Church was able to assert itself upon fresh subjects: the Tartars of the Volga and the Crimea, the Finns of the Volga, the mountaineers of the Caucasus, the Buriats, Yakuts, and other peoples of Siberia. Among all these peoples the Orthodox Church has succeeded in "making" numerous "Christians." But very often the "Christianity" of these "recent converts" is merely fictitious: thus, the Yakuts of Siberia are all "Orthodox," yet they are all still addicted to pagan Shamanism, while many other "converted" peoples have never ceased to observe the rites of paganism, Buddhism, Mohammedanism, etc.

Still less fruitful has been the missionary activity of the Orthodox Church in the West of Russia, where it comes into conflict with Catholicism. The principal field of conflict between the two Churches is the regions inhabited by the Lithuanians, the White Russians, and the Little Russians. So long as Catholic Poland was an independent kingdom the Orthodox Church was utterly powerless there, for even in the sixteenth century the Orthodox population of Western Russia, including the clergy, was wholly subject to the intellectual influence of Catholicism. In this manner arose the *uniatus*, a religion half-way between the Orthodox and the Catholic (from *uniya* = union), a religion which recognizes both the rites and dogmas of the Orthodox faith and the authority of the Pope.

These hybrid religions caused a desperate struggle between the two Churches. As soon as the political conditions allowed, the Orthodox Church began to convert by brute force the

uniats, and even the Catholics, setting about this "delicate" spiritual operation in the most material manner. The police forbade the peasants to enter the Catholic churches and "reduced" them to entering the Orthodox churches. For any Catholic propaganda the punishment was pitiless banishment from the West of Russia. Catholic or *uniat* parents saw their children *rescued* (*sic*) from them, so that the Government might bring them up in the principles of the Orthodox religion.

Despite all these measures, when in April, 1905, the Government promulgated a decree establishing religious toleration in Russia, all the fictitious Orthodox Christians returned to their old religions. Very interesting in this connection is the confession contained in a report by the chief procurator of the Holy Synod, dated 1910 :

"Since religious tolerance has existed in Russia the Orthodox Church has lost many disciples. . . . According to the information of the central management of the Holy Synod, the majority of those who abandon the Orthodox Church promptly embrace either the Catholic faith, or the Mohammedan, or the Protestant religion." Between the 17th of April, 1905, and December, 1907, in 9 dioceses of the South-west, 170,936 persons left the Orthodox Church for the Catholic ; in 14 dioceses of the Volga, the Urals, and Siberia, 36,299 persons embraced Mohammedanism, and in 4 dioceses of the Baltic provinces and Olonetz, 10,964 persons adopted the Protestant faith. Thus, in two and a half years 218,209 persons abandoned the Orthodox faith. For lack of parishioners, numerous parishes had to be suppressed. This is how the chief procurator of the Holy Synod explains these numerous defections :

"The principal and usual reason for this apostasy of the masses consists in the fact that even *before* the 17th of April, 1905, the majority of those masses belonged to the Orthodox Church only nominally, continuing to put their faith in some other religion, often in that of their fathers."

II

The *raskol*—that is to say, the schism—and other sects which have issued from Orthodoxy itself, are still more important rivals of the Orthodox Church.

The *raskol* appeared in Russia in the second half of the seventeenth century, when, under the initiative of the patriarch Nikon, the task was commenced of correcting the religious books, which were much corrupted by almost illiterate copyists. A great proportion of the population saw in this correction of the "old" books an abjuration of the true faith and an unpardonable "innovation." The conflict raised by the disciples of the "old" books and the "new" was complicated by other disagreements over matters of ritual: the official Church demanded that the sign of the cross should be made with three fingers, and the *raskolniki* or schismatics wished to make it with two; the official clergy led processions round the church "against the sun" and the *raskolniki* "according to the sun"; the Russian Church wrote the word *Iisus* (Jesus) with two *i*'s and the "Old Believers" with a single *i*, etc. These questions, insignificant in themselves, were enormously important to the believers of the time: Russian Orthodoxy being in reality a transformation of the old paganism, in which the external element played a preponderant part, so that a change of rites, formulæ, and words must have seemed a violation of the magic power of religion and "the work of Antichrist."

But the *raskol* was not a purely religious phenomenon. Its scholastic envelope merely served to mask a profound social and political conflict. The second half of the seventeenth century was a period which saw Russia enter into close contact with Europe, while the administration of the State was reformed, military and financial changes were effected, and the way was prepared for the reforms of Peter the Great. Having need of money for external warfare and internal administration, the Government of this period greatly increased the taxes, transformed

the financial system, and effected a fiscal census of the population. Loaded with taxes, the people promptly regarded the authors of the new measures with distrust, saw in the census the sign manual of Antichrist, and regarded such foreigners as appeared at the Court of Moscow as the servants and precursors of Antichrist. The religious ideology of the *raskol*—the defence of the old belief—could not fail to please the conservative strata of society, the merchants and the peasants, the most heavily taxed of all. The struggle of these latter for the "Old Belief" was the reflection of their political discontent, a struggle against a Government that protected the "new" orthodoxy.

With short intervals of toleration, the conflict between the schismatics and the Government lasted for two centuries.

But all these measures, based upon brute force, brought the Orthodox Church neither glory or profit. To-day, despite all the repression it has endured, the *raskol* is endowed with remarkable vitality, while the official Russian Church is merely a dead and bureaucratic and moribund institution.

The internal organization of the *raskol* has undergone a process of evolution, like other Christian organisms. The democratic strata gradually lost their influence over the life of the organism, and the management of all the affairs of the commune of the *raskolniki* finally fell into the hands of rich merchant families. At present it is the old commercial houses of Moscow and Nijni-Novgorod that form the vital centre of the *raskol*.

From the beginning of the *raskol* more or less extreme and more or less moderate tendencies were observable. For many of the *raskolniki* the end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth were the periods when the "death of the world" was expected. They made themselves biers and lay upon them, singing religious chants. Exalted disciples, seeing that the end of the world delayed, resolved voluntarily to escape from the "reign of Antichrist." There was an epidemic or suicides by fire. By scores, by hundreds, the *raskolniki* shut themselves in wooden coffins and burned themselves. "Fire

cleanseth all sins. Useless to labour, to fast ; by fire one enters straight into Paradise." "How joyful it would be if all the city were to burn ! Children and old men all would escape the imprint of the Antichrist." Thus reasoned the apostles of death by fire, and the figures show that their arguments were not always confined to the domain of pure theory : for between the origin of the *raskol* in 1567 and the end of the seventeenth century no less than 20,000 persons burned themselves.

To the sect of the "Burners" we may compare the sect of the *Beguny*, or "Runners," known also as the *Stranniki*, or "Travellers." The disciples of this sect also departed from the reign of the Antichrist, escaping not into the fire but into the "desert"—that is, the marshes and forests of Northern and North-eastern Russia. The "Runners," like the "Burners," absolutely denied the State and the Church, and escaped from them as far as possible. The ideology of the "Runners" was the ideology of a class which had suffered greatly from economic poverty and the political yoke, but could not bring itself to face an active struggle. For the "Runners" voluntary escape to a distance was the sole issue. The sect of "Burners" has been extinct since the beginning of the eighteenth century. As for the "Runners," their sect still boasts of disciples, though these are not numerous. But now that economic and social conditions are other than they were when the sect originated, all that is left of the primitive meaning of the sect is purely symbolic. The "Runners" run no longer, being contented with dying outside their own houses. At the approach of death a "Runner" of our days must repair to a neighbour's house, to die there.

But all Russian sects do not aim at such pessimistic and negative ideals. For many the waiting for the end of the world became inseparable from the hope of a second coming of Christ, and this Messianism became embodied in three important sects, the *Chlystovstvo*, the *Dukhoborstvo*, and the *Iskoptanistvo*.

The *Chlystovstvo*, or the *Khristovstvo* (from the word *Kristos*, Christ), originated at a very early date, and was, perhaps, even

contemporary with the *raskol*. Legend relates that its founder, Danila Philippovitch, having meditated upon the discord between the Old Believers and the official Church, which arose from the question of the "holy books," arrived at the conclusion that neither the old books nor the new were necessary to the salvation of the soul. "One book only is necessary and that is the golden book, the book of life, the book of the dove. . . . This book is the Holy Spirit." And Danila threw all the books into the waves of the Volga. Then "God Himself descended from the clouds in a chariot of fire and entered into the flesh of Danila Philippovitch."

As you see, the *Chlystovstvo*, having denied the point of view upon which the "old" and "new" orthodoxy were based, finally arrived at a gross anthropomorphical mysticism. The hierarchy of the *Chlystovstvo* is composed of Jesus Christ, incarnated in a member of the sect, the Holy Virgin, and the Apostles, all equally living persons. Before special assemblies called *radeniés* the Holy Spirit descends upon the *Chlystovtzy*. While waiting for its descent, the sectaries, clothed in long white gowns, taper in hand, sing and dance while falling into a profound ecstasy, which is manifested by semi-hysterical accesses, during which he who feels himself touched by the Holy Spirit prophesies. This religious ecstasy is followed by a sexual ecstasy, and many *radeniés* terminate in a general orgy.

The introduction of the sexual element into the life of the *Khristovstvo* resulted in the fact that one group, discontented with this introduction, left the *Khristovstvo* in order to form the sect of the *Skoptzy* (from the verb *oskoptat*, meaning to deprive of the sexual capacities). Regarding the sexual life as the greatest of sins, they strive against it by a radical means: castration. But the *Skoptzy* are not real ascetics, for, while renouncing sexual appetite, far from "forsaking the world," they are extremely active in the economic sphere of material life. *Skoptetz* is often synonymous with an eminent man of business, an able merchant, sometimes a usurer. Under Alexander I several *Skoptzy* even formed part of the Imperial suite.

contemporary with the *raskol*. Legend relates that its founder, Danila Philippovitch, having meditated upon the discord between the Old Believers and the official Church, which arose from the question of the "holy books," arrived at the conclusion that neither the old books nor the new were necessary to the salvation of the soul. "One book only is necessary and that is the golden book, the book of life, the book of the dove. . . . This book is the Holy Spirit." And Danila threw all the books into the waves of the Volga. Then "God Himself descended from the clouds in a chariot of fire and entered into the flesh of Danila Philippovitch."

As you see, the *Chlystovstvo*, having denied the point of view upon which the "old" and "new" orthodoxy were based, finally arrived at a gross anthropomorphical mysticism. The hierarchy of the *Chlystovstvo* is composed of Jesus Christ, incarnated in a member of the sect, the Holy Virgin, and the Apostles, all equally living persons. Before special assemblies called *radeniés* the Holy Spirit descends upon the *Chlystovtzy*. While waiting for its descent, the sectaries, clothed in long white gowns, taper in hand, sing and dance while falling into a profound ecstasy, which is manifested by semi-hysterical accesses, during which he who feels himself touched by the Holy Spirit prophesies. This religious ecstasy is followed by a sexual ecstasy, and many *radeniés* terminate in a general orgy.

The introduction of the sexual element into the life of the *Khristovstvo* resulted in the fact that one group, discontented with this introduction, left the *Khristovstvo* in order to form the sect of the *Skoptzy* (from the verb *oskoptat*, meaning to deprive of the sexual capacities). Regarding the sexual life as the greatest of sins, they strive against it by a radical means: castration. But the *Skoptzy* are not real ascetics, for, while renouncing sexual appetite, far from "forsaking the world," they are extremely active in the economic sphere of material life. *Skoptz* is often synonymous with an eminent man of business, an able merchant, sometimes a usurer. Under Alexander I several *Skoptzy* even formed part of the Imperial suite.

The *Dukhoborstvo* (*Dukhobor* means "striving spirit") and the *Molokanstvo* originated at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century.

"There is no need to go to Jerusalem, for each may wash his sins away in his own house"—such is the doctrine of the *Dukhobors* a doctrine protesting against the official conception of religion, against its excessive externalization, and partly due to the sermons of those "Spiritual Christians" who penetrated Russia. But as the Russian peasants are incapable of adopting a purely spiritual religion, this doctrine is enshrined in a fetichism comparable to that of the *Chlystovstvo*. One of the members of the *Dukhobor* commune of the Government of Tobolsk is declared the "Son of God" and is surrounded by a dozen "archangels." As for the ritual side of the sect, it consists of a somewhat complicated symbolism.

The *Dukhoborstvo* is far from being as widespread as the *Molokanstvo* (from the word *Moloko* = milk : because its disciples drink milk during their fasts). The *Molokanstvo* left the *Dukhoborstvo* and is distinguished from the latter by the fact that it recognizes the Holy Scriptures as well as direct religious intuition, while the *Dukhobors* place the Scriptures far below intuition. This toleration of the traditions of the official Church is reflected in the *Molokan* dogmas. While the *Dukhobors* interpret the Holy Trinity in a purely allegorical manner, the *Molokans* leave it its official meaning. The *Molokanstvo* is a kind of compromise between Orthodoxy and "Spiritual Christianity"; but it is also impregnated with fetichism. The first action of its founder was to surround himself with seventy apostles and in their company to make a triumphant entry into the city of Tambov. But there, instead of sitting on the celestial throne, at the right hand of "God the Father," the poor founder fell into the city jail.

The Government treats the sectaries with the utmost rigour, not only with an eye to the interests of the Church, but also with a view to political interests. The *Christovstvo*, *Dukhoborstvo* and *Molokanstvo* have furnished a social and political element

ch must be taken into consideration, and the Messianism of the three great sects is, after all, the translation into religious language of the social aspirations of the peasantry. Under Nicholas I, a little before the emancipation of the peasants, when their position was extremely grievous, the sectaries denied the authority of the Tsar, refusing military service and the payment of taxes, while waiting for the Saviour, who would lead all the "good" to the "land of milk and honey." And as, according to legend, this country was in the neighbourhood of Mount Ararat, a number of sectaries passed over the Caucasus, between 1830 and 1840, to be nearer the Promised Land! In 1833 a "Molokan" declared that he was the Prophet Elias, and even fixed the day of his assumption. But no miracle occurred, and the prophet fell into the hands of the Government. Just before the abolition of serfdom, a peasant of the sect of the *Khlysty* gave an extremely brutal manifestation of Messianism: he burned his house and set out for the mountains with his wife and two quite young children. Once there, he offered his children as "a sacrifice to God," cutting their throats with his own hands while his wife read the prayers. Deported to Siberia, he raised a cross in the woods, near a little chapel, and crucified himself.

"This story," says an author who has studied the religious movement in Russia—N. Nikolsky—"constitutes the epilogue of the Messianism of the *Christovostvo*, the *Molokanstvo*, and the *Dukhoborstvo*. The Messiah expected by these sects has not come. In his place, ignorant and obscure, in the Siberian desert appears a Messiah bearing upon him all the sins of the world; a Messiah symbolizing the peasants disenchanted by their vain efforts to create a better world upon earth in the shape of *Dukhobor* or *Molokan* communes."

The fall of serfdom and the invasion of village life by capitalism contributed to give the ideology of the peasants a more rationalistic character and to evoke a new sect: *Chitundism* or Stundism.

The word *Chitundism*, or *chtunda*, comes from the German *Stunde*, which in the eighteenth century was employed in Germany to denote the evangelical circles of that country.

German colonists introduced into Russia both the term and the evangelical meetings themselves, and these latter rapidly extended, having undergone changes which rendered them more in conformity with the mentality of the Russian peasants.

By its religious doctrine Stundism is akin to the *Molokanstvo*. Stundism, like the *Molokanstvo*, recognizes a double source of faith: direct religious intuition and the Holy Scripture explained in an allegorical and rationalistic manner. As for external worship, it is denied by the Stundists. Stundists recognize baptism, but, like the German Baptists, they receive it only when they have reached the "age of reason."

The social doctrine of the Stundists is a Utopian communism. God, it states, created all men equal and allowed them to enjoy in common the earth, the harvest, the waters, etc. But men began to buy and sell the gifts of God, to exchange their labour and their conscience for money. Then, as the Egyptian Pharaohs enslaved the Jews, the wicked enslaved the unhappy people. To stop the "Egyptian sufferings" of the latter (epidemics, famines, wars, etc.), the will of God must be established upon earth. And God wills that the earth and its fruits, the waters, and every useful article should belong in common to all, that each should cultivate the scrap of earth needful for his support, that commercial exchange and the use of money should be suppressed and the exchange of products against products established, and that the existing Government should give way to free communes of workers.

The "agrarian communism" of the Stundists is the same as that of the Utopian programmes of the peasants' political parties.

The influence of the Stundists is very perceptible, above all in South Russia, but it is also noticeable in Central Russia. Since the manifesto of April 17th Stundism is beginning to gain the upper hand of Orthodoxy among the peasantry.

Before terminating this sketch of the religious sects of Russia I should like to say a few words as to these curious phenomena: during the last few years there have arisen in St. Petersburg and in Moscow, among the outcast element of the population and the

lesser *bourgeoisie*, highly interesting religious organizations directed by *Bratzy* (little brothers). These *Bratzy* preach upon different moral themes relating to daily life and "console" those who, wounded by the struggle for life, apply to them.

The upper strata of society are subject to the influence of other free preachers, the *Startzy* (the "aged"), who, mostly young and hearty, achieve an enormous success among the aristocracy, especially among the women. And we must add that the sexual element contributes not a little to their success. One of them, Grigori Raspontin, has even succeeded in slipping into Court, and to-day his influence is felt even over the destinies of the Russian Empire.

Thus, while the *Bratzy* console the spirit the *Startzy* console the flesh.

BOOK VI

RUSSIAN LITERATURE AND POETRY

CHAPTER I

GENERAL CHARACTER OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE

I. The peculiarities of Russian literature. II. Russian lyrical poetry and its social tendencies.

A FAVOURITE Russian poet has said :

"The writer—if he is a wave
Of that ocean which men call Russia
Can but awake to rebellion
When the ocean itself rebels.
The writer—if he is a nerve
Of that great body which is the people
Can but feel the wound
When Liberty is stricken."

These verses never fail to occur to me when I ask myself, In what does Russian literature differ from other European literatures? What is its national peculiarity? For these verses answer the question as justly and completely as one could wish. They tell me that Russian literature is far more *social* than the other literatures of Europe.

This general characteristic of Russian prose and poetry is a perfectly natural and inevitable phenomenon. As absolutism forbids political activity to thousands of citizens, the intellectual members of the progressive stratum of society have only one resource—literature—if they would share, at least to a certain

degree, in the social activity of the country. For the majority of Russian writers literary work replaces political work, the latter being almost impossible, and the conflict of the various literary currents acquires in Russia the character of a political struggle, a character unknown to Western literature.

Thanks to this, literature in Russia occupies a very special position: Russian society, unused to seeing in literature only a source of distraction, as is the case with European readers, looks to it for social programmes, for the solutions of the "accursed problems of life." A beacon shining amid the darkness of the social night—such is literature to Russian society.

II

Even in *lyric* poetry that which especially enchants the Russian reader is neither harmonious form nor beauty of phrase or line, nor the sublime manifestations of the intimate feelings of the poet, but rather the *social* sense of the work, the humanistic ideas, the civic sympathies of the author. A Russian poet is almost always a *social poet*, and I do not think there is any other country in which poetry has to such a degree been a weapon of social and political warfare. During the whole of the nineteenth century social and political motives prevailed in Russian poetry. There is Pushkin, uncrowned Tsar of Russian poetry, who writes an "Ode to Liberty." It is naive, perhaps, but full of ardour, this ode which interpellates the Tsars, counselling them "to bow the head before the Law and to appoint Liberty the guard of their throne." Another great poet, Lermontov, after the tragic duel in which Pushkin fell, wrote verses full of fire dedicated to the "noble blood" of the dead poet and cursing "the greedy crew that surrounds the thrones of the butchers of liberty and genius." Another contemporary, Ryleev, evokes in his "Thoughts" the combatants who have died for liberty. "My destiny is equally to detest tyrants and slaves," says Ryleev in one of his poems. Ogariov, friend of Herzen, salutes the onset of the revolutionary

storm in 1848, a tempest which "drew man from his repose" and "raised the Right above cupidity, bright as pure reason." Then, in the course of the year 1849, a lament escapes the lips of the poet, wounded by the sight of the revolution crushed and despotism triumphant. "In Europe there is not a single spot where we might end our lives in a bright and peaceful manner," writes Ogariov in 1849. But ten years go by, and despair with them. Then Ogariov once again addresses Herzen :

"When I was a tender, docile child,
When I was a rebellious and passionate youth,
When old age was my neighbour,
Always, in short, one word echoed in my ear:
In my ear sounded one word, ever the same—
Liberty ! Liberty !"

and the poet begs his friend "not to let him grow cold upon his death-bed without whispering to him that last and holy word : liberty, liberty !"

The Russian poets of the first half of the nineteenth century had only a very vague conception of liberty. It remained for the lyrical poetry of the years 1860-80 to render this conception less indefinite.

Those years saw the rise of a whole *Pléiade* of "civic poets," who played an important part in the social movement of the time. One of its members, Plechtchiev, described this part in the following lines :

"Forward, friend, without fear or doubt :
The exploit valorous awaits us.
The bright dawn of expiation
Already is announced in the heavens.
Clasp hands firmly, friends,
And with a bold step, forward !
Under the standard of Knowledge
May our union swell and swell. . . ."

To this day this poem is very popular among Russian youth, and is often recited at concerts.

Another poet of the same period, Minaev, the author of numerous satirical poems ridiculing traditional beliefs and principles, was a pioneer in expressing the ideals of the emancipation of the people and of woman.

In general the lyrical poets of this period are inspired less by the misfortunes of the *people*, the people of all countries, than by *individual* sufferings. Let us consider the poetess Barykov. Her feminine lyre sings neither of love nor of moonlit nights, but of the poor people drowning its misery in alcohol, perishing in poverty and ignorance, succumbing to sickness. Barykov speaks ironically of the "priests of æsthetics" who consider the "national suffering" as "prose unworthy of pure art." She threatens with "the judgment of the country" those poets who "sing for the delight of the mind," and transform their talent, "marvellous gift of nature," into a "plaything for man."

"The poet is the buckler, the sword of the country. . . . He is the source of ideas. . . . He is the voice, the tongue of the poor mute people. . . . He is the first ray of the dawn of the bright days."

This poetess ridiculed the conception of women as "bird-headed creatures," seeking "with their males" an "earthworm's love" on "the lukewarm dunghill of conjugal happiness."

Personal happiness is to the poets of this period a very negligible quantity compared with the struggle "for the happiness of all."

"Leave father and mother"—so one of these poets advises youth—"build no nest, be alone. . . . Once and for all extinguish the human passions in thy soul! Be obdurate to the seductions of love, of wealth, of glory. Be holy. . . . In thy breast keep thy heart intact and pure, then give it *wholly* to thy unhappy brothers: where thou *rest* it, thither must thou go. . . . Suffer more than *al* poor and naked, And thou wilt be great and the troubled by thy reproach!"

Here we have no Christian ~~asceticism~~, but a revolutionary asceticism; the gift of self for the sake of *strife*. Many poems of this period are really revolutionary proclamations, and were

regarded as such by the reader. These verses by Dobrolubov, literary critic and poet, will give some idea of the mental condition of these lyrical poets :

"Dear friend, I die.
Why? Because I have been honest.
But I believe my native land
Will not forget me.
Dear friend, I die,
But my soul is calm.
I bless thee and hope
Thou wilt follow the same path. . . ."

Short, lucid, and simple! This tranquil simplicity perfectly expresses the psychology of the intellectual youth of Russia during this period; a psychology very remote from the refined complexity of the modern *bourgeois* mentality.

The "civic poetry" of Russia attained its highest development with Nekrasov (1821-77). The works of Nekrasov belong to the category of those works which cannot please all tastes alike. Even over his tomb the discussions that were raised in his lifetime are still continued : discussions on the subject of his poetic talent. Some deny Nekrasov even the name of poet, calling his verses "chopped-up prose"; others regard him as the greatest of the Russian poets. These discussions are explained in part by the fact that the imagery of his poetry is extremely realistic; but those who wish to become acquainted, not with the "poetized" Russia of literature, but the real Russia of the age of serfdom and the first fifteen years after its abolition, must go to Nekrasov. He will depict for you the damp, chilly city of St. Petersburg, with its innumerable bureaucrats and "men of business," its poverty and prostitution, its *littérateurs* and its newsvendors. Then from St. Petersburg he will take you into the open country, where men labour for a crust of bread, and without sentimentality, without idealization, he will lay open before you the mind of the Russian peasant.

We must admit that his versification is sometimes at fault, but its slight defects, purely external, are far from veiling the

profound thought of the poet and the beauty of his images. To Nekrasov also we owe the simplification of the language of Russian poetry. Thanks to this fact his books are accessible to all readers. Some of his poems, set to music, have become popular songs in many parts of Russia.

The influence of Nekrasov was enormous even during his lifetime. Thousands and thousands of mourners followed his coffin, and the burial of a poet became a vast demonstration. Many generations of readers, including our own, have found in Nekrasov's works a school of humanism; a primary school, but marked by absolute sincerity. Moreover, Nekrasov foresaw that his verses would find their way to the reader's heart: "He is no Russian," he wrote in one of his poems, "who can regard without love this poor pallid Muse, bleeding from the knout." "Pallid Muse, bleeding from the knout!" It is no idle phrase: it describes the characteristics of Russian poetry and literature at the culminating point of their development.

The society of those days regarded its poets and writers as "teachers of life," as prophets and leaders. But the latter paid dearly for the title. Pushkin, after a period of banishment, was under police supervision to the end of his life. Lermontov, an officer, was degraded and also deported. Ryliov was hanged for having taken part in the "revolt of the Decembrists." Ogariov was forced to emigrate. The well-known literary critic—Pissarev—passed four years in prison. Another critic, and the author of an extremely popular novel (*What's to be Done?*), Tchernychevsky (see his biography in *Portraits d'hier*, by Mme Vera Starkov, Paris, 1910), was deported to Siberia. To the convict prisons of Siberia also were deported Dostoyevsky and a celebrated poet of a later period than that of Nekrasov, namely Yakubovitch. Till his latest moments Tolstoy was spied upon by the secret police. Gorky is obliged to live abroad, that he may not be deported or sent to the mines.

These are the best-known victims immolated on the altar of Russian literature. But how many more have there been?

More—apart from the authors themselves, how many readers have been disturbed and persecuted, how many books confiscated? This is why the Russian Muse is so weary, so enfeebled; why she is a "Muse of vengeance and sadness"; why the great Russian writers die so young. Tuberculosis and insanity are "writers' maladies" in Russia. Mournfully true are these lines of Nekrasov:

"Brother writers! over your destiny
Hovers who knows what fatalities!"

And again:

"The Russian genius has always crowned
Those who do not live long,
Those of whom the people say:
'Of a happy man the enemies die,
Of an unfortunate man dies the last friend.'"

After Nekrasov the development of Russian poetry was twofold. One branch of this development was the continuation of the old civic poetry, and, faithful to its trust, it sought inspiration in social life. Jemtechujnikov and Yakubovitch were the most eminent writers of this school. (The latter, by the way, made an excellent translation of the works of Baudelaire.) The other branch was concerned only with "pure art," "art for art's sake," and gave birth to some beautiful examples of pure lyric poetry. Of this school were Tutchev, Fete, Maïkov, Alexis Tolstoy, etc.

Such works of "pure art" are isolated phenomena, and merely emphasize the social tone of the bulk of Russian poetry, and in vain did certain supporters of the pure lyric attempt to transform the weapon of attack that Russian verse had become into a means of evading the vulgar reality, of attaining the "seventh heaven of absolute art"; but to these attempts the adversaries of art *an und für sich*, as the Germans say, replied as follows:

"Changeable, incredulous, fashion tells us:

'The sufferings of the people are a very old story,

A story that poetry should forget forever!

Youth, do not believe it! It is a subject that can never grow old.'"

And youth has ranged itself on the side of the "civic poets." Nevertheless, lyrical poetry is still a living art.

The development of capitalism and the *bourgeois* economic system inevitably results in the transformation of literature primarily into a source of enjoyment. This tendency was observable in Russia during the last ten years of the nineteenth century and the opening years of the twentieth.

Several periods might be established in the development of this tendency; at the outset the representatives of this literary movement did not break with the old traditions; they sang the "conflict," the "sufferings of our brethren," and expressed humanitarian ideas, borrowing their forms from the "civic" school. However, the talented poet Nadson (died of tuberculosis in 1887) already revealed an individualistic and lyrical note, and with a few other poets of the same period he transformed the "conflict" into the internal conflict which rages in the soul of each of us. His successors—Apukhtin, Golenichtchev-Kutusov, Minsky—advanced a step further, proclaiming that the sentiments and aspirations of the individual are of greater significance than the feelings and "aspirations" of the "crowd," and began to regard the latter with an offensive pity, sometimes even with distrust and malevolence. The last five years of the nineteenth century saw the rise of a new group of poets, known by the general appellation of "Decadents," of whom the majority are "neo-romantics." One of these—Balmont, the translator of Shelley—deserted Russian realism for exoticism; another, Brussov, writes of the ancient world of classic life; a third, A. Blok, lives in the mystic atmosphere of aspiration toward "the unknown."

This rupture with actual life and the people has injured the poets themselves, as they have deprived themselves of an inexhaustible source of inspiration, and must henceforth laboriously search for subjects. In 1905, when the revolution burst forth, many Decadents could not resist their "solitude," and eagerly threw themselves upon the material provided by the incidents of the revolution. Some of them even wrote verses in which they

swore fidelity to the people and declared themselves the champions of the proletariat and of Socialism. But this curious phenomenon was of short duration. The reaction came, and the Decadents again steeped themselves in mysticism or frank sexuality. The Decadents could not fail to feel their false position. Blok, one of the most talented of them, recently published an open letter, in which he avowed that the public is far from regarding the Decadents as it regarded, and does still regard, the representatives of "civic poetry." When the aged Plechtchiev stretched forth his trembling hand, counselling men to "go forward without fear or doubt towards the valorous exploit," all his hearers heard him with respect. In the representatives of "pure art" the same audience see only so many comedians or clowns. This complaint, cited from Blok's letter, is not without foundation: the majority of Russian readers continue to regard "social" poetry as a noble manifestation of the poetic genius.

CHAPTER II

THE EVOLUTION OF LITERATURE IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES

- I. The Russian novel. II. The literature of the *Raznolchitsy—Narodnichestvo*. III. The literature of the "grey days"—Tchekhov. IV. Modernists and Decadents. V. Two opposite poles—Tolstoy and Gorky.

I

THE specific character of Russian literature—its closeness to real life and its social character—both facilitates and hampers the study of its evolution. It facilitates it because the dates and phases of literary evolution coincide with those of social and political evolution; it hampers it because, Russian literature being merely the *direct* reflection of the life of Russia, it is necessary to understand the peculiarities of that life before one can grasp the evolution of Russian letters.

This closeness to life has provoked one very curious phenomenon: the heredity of literary types. In real life the generations are connected by ties of psychic parentage and inherit one from another. In the same way the works of Russian literature, studied in chronological order, enable us to establish a genealogy of types. This genealogy is divided into literary families, whose members present common characteristics, and each of these families is inseparable from a given social stratum.

From this point of view the literary evolution of the first half of the nineteenth century is particularly interesting. At this

period the nobility, freed by the system of serfdom from all labour and material care, might have devoted itself to the acquisition of a wide and generous culture. It did nothing of the kind. Only a small group of nobles devoted themselves to the study of foreign literature, the perfection of intellectual culture, and the creation of modern Russian literature. This intellectual movement developed under the influence of the French Revolution and of foreign philosophy.

The position of this "enlightened *élite*" was sufficiently tragic. Their spirits soared high; their ideas were astonishingly radical for the period; but physically they were compelled to live in an atmosphere saturated with the ignorance of the people and the arbitrary brutality of the Government. This contradiction between the ideal and the real, between *what ought to be* and *what is*, could but provoke an embittered melancholy in the mind of the "intellectual." This melancholy was the more gloomy in that even the hopes of a better future were feeble; the masses were sunk in so profound a slumber, were so remote from the environment of the thinkers, that the latter could not even dream of any practical application of their ideas. Moreover, the Government rigorously repressed any attempt of the kind. The sentiment of solitude, scepticism, and despair invaded the mind of the cultured thinker. Many of these intimate dramas ended disastrously; society finally "ate up" all the good impulses, the radical aspirations or the Russian "Voltaireans," who, as they grew older, changed into hypocritical bigots and conservators. There is one typical instance of such a transformation. At first a passionate admirer of Voltaire, then alarmed by his "revolutionary" ideas, Catherine II finally persecuted the Russian *Voltaireanetz* and sent a bust of Voltaire, which adorned her worktable, to the lumber-room. If an "intellectual" resented and opposed the process of "assimilation," he took refuge in a moral and spiritual solitude, veiled in a gloomy cloud of scepticism and despair.

This impossibility of realizing the dreamed-of ideal, of giving oneself to some practical task, led the *élite* of the time to develop

themselves on *one side only*, at the cost of stultifying the will. This mixture of culture and deficient will-power is characteristic of the Russian "intellectual." The type of "intellectual" without a will fills the literature of the first half of the nineteenth century. As the novel occupied the place of honour in this literature, the heroes of the most remarkable novels of this period are merely so many variants of the same type.

This type appears first in Pushkin's *Eugene Onegin*. The hero of this romance in verse—Onegin—while at some points resembling the heroes of Byron, is before all an essentially national figure. "The universal sadness," the scepticism and irony of the heroes of Byron are steeped, at the touch of Pushkin, with a flood of local colour. Onegin is certainly by far the superior of those who surround him, but the consciousness of his intellectual superiority, which is due to the education he has received and the conditions of his life, leads him to despise other men. He becomes so accustomed to pay no attention to those about him that he fails to perceive the profound feeling with which he has inspired a young girl, and does not understand the soul, so full of life, that surrenders to him. Yet this soul is the manifestation of the feminine ideal which was thenceforth to haunt the Russian novel. This superiority over others is in Onegin's case quickly transformed into malediction. Not only do men fail to understand him, but he ceases to understand them. His education and the habit of worldly life prevent him from breaking with a society which is totally alien to him, and he continues to waste his existence. The melancholy of the Russian meadows and the cold of foggy St. Petersburg—the background of the romance—still further emphasize the *leit-motif* of despair which sounds in the pages of *Eugene Onegin*.

In the *Heroes of our Times*, by Lermontov, we find another Onegin in the person of Petchorin, but he is more profound and more of a thinker than his precursor. Like Onegin, Petchorin makes no use of his brilliant aptitudes; like Onegin, he wastes the energies of his soul in amorous adventures, duels, etc. The same type meets us again in the *Demon* of Lermontov,

a fallen angel, descended upon earth to bring desolation and misery.

The social and psychological roots or the "negative" and "destructive" types of Pushkin and Lermontov are easily discovered if we compare the Oniegin of Russian fiction with the intellectual type depicted by Griboiedov in his immortal comedy *Intelligence brings Misfortune*. The hero of this comedy (contemporary with the works of Pushkin) is a veritable enthusiast compared with the "cold" Oniegin and the "gloomy" Petchorin.

Equally discontented with his environment, he does not confine himself to adopting an abstract scepticism like Oniegin, but dreams of arousing his country. However, his generous ideas, his fiery speeches simply beat against the stupid passivity of society, and he is presently convinced that he is a useless, a superfluous person. His enthusiasm lapses into despair and the comedy ends in tragedy.

The transformation of comedy into tragedy is one of the most frequent phenomena in Russian literature. From this point of view the evolution of Gogol is particularly interesting. Gogol (1809-52) began by humorous tales of the popular customs of the Ukraine, tales sparkling with genuine youthful gaiety. Then he wrote *The Inspector*, a comedy drawn from the life of the provincial bureaucracy, at the end of which he asks the public, shaking with laughter, the unexpected question: "What are you laughing at? You are laughing at yourselves!" And suddenly tragedy pierces the gusts of laughter; the various episodes which seemed so delightful considered separately become mournful and disastrous. Then appeared a poem in prose, *Dead Souls*, describing the laughable sides of Russian life: and this time the reader hears "a laugh behind the sobs."

This "comedy" of Russian life ends in complaint and horror. Attacked by neurosis, the laugh died forever on his lips: presently they gave utterance only to groans and words of horror stammered in the face of death.

Another example: Tchekhov, a writer who died but a few

years ago, gained his first reputation by light humor in which all was gay and inoffensive. Years passed and dramatic notes were at first rare, but present more and more frequent in his humorous tales. The little jester's bells were drowned by the hammer of nails into the immense coffin in which the living—Russia.

But let us return to the Russian novel. It was of Gontcharov and Turgenev and Tolstoy that the highest development. As I shall have to speak of Tolstoy, I will set his work aside for the moment. Gontcharov and Turgenev, their principal work of mind, variants of the same old theme: the intellectual Russia is useless and incapable of practical activity.

Gontcharov's novel *Oblomov* (published in 1859) is an economic and social surroundings in which the "not active" type of "intellectual" is formed. The noble who has lived from childhood in the atmosphere of "natural economy"; he is not a producer, but a consumer. The serfs do everything for him, and according to his admission "he had never even drawn his own sword." Oblomov frequents the University; he has a pretentious understanding of art.

"The delight of high ideals was within his reach. In the deep silence of his soul, he wept bitterly over the fate of humanity, experiencing a vague suffering, a straining of the soul towards some unknown distance. Sometimes a thought would shine into his mind, would sweep his brain as a wave of the sea, and then, growing into a passion, would fire all his blood. Then his muscles quivered, his heart would swell, and his intentions were transformed into action. Now, now, his aspirations were about to be realized, place to action . . . and then! . . ."

But instead of action there comes only a mournful "To what end?" And Oblomov, wearied by a spiritless life, stretches himself upon his bed, where he passes almost

day. Even love, the heroic love of Olga, which strives to save Oblomov from being engulfed, is powerless in the face of habit and social conditions. Even while loving Olga, Oblomov renounces his love as being too "unquiet" for him, and threatening to break through his profound somnolence.

Sometimes Oblomov is powerless not only to transform his ideas into action, but even to translate them into words. . . . Rudin, Turgenev's hero, on the contrary, has the faculty of enveloping his ideas in a form that fires the hearts of his hearers, but after this transformation of energy, he stops short. Rudin's words remain pretty phrases; they are unable to translate themselves into vital and practical action.

Rudin is far more profound and interesting than the heroes of Pushkin and Lermontov. He does not drape himself, as do these latter, in the worn mantle of a somewhat superficial Byronism; he does not suffer from that almost Oriental indolence which destroys Oblomov, and far from despising the populace, he loves it warmly. But sincere though they are, Rudin does not go farther than his phrases. Rudin's energy is subjected by Turgenev to many tests. One of these tests consists in his meeting with a young girl, Natalie, who, filled with enthusiasm by his speeches, determines to follow him in his pursuit of the ideal. But Rudin does not accept Natalie as his companion; he himself feels incapable of undertaking this pursuit, full of difficulties as it is. After all, behind Rudin's fine phrases there is nothing but a lack of will and a powerlessness to devote himself to practical activity. As with all the heroes of the Russian novel of this period, his moral courage is inferior to his intellectual force.

Gontcharov and Turgenev attempted to find the hero whose soul shall be a balanced harmony of intelligence and will; but the Russian society of their day did not enable them to conceive such a type. It is a curious fact that both these writers found it necessary to import a positive type from abroad. To the idle Oblomov Gontcharov opposed Stolz, a semi-German, a dry personage, the prototype of the "business man" rather than the

"social man." As for Tourgenév, the hero of his novel *On the Eve* is a Bulgar patriot, who, unlike Rudin, can not only speak but act, and who does not fear to allow the woman he loved to follow him. The expression "to follow him" is hardly exact, for the heroine of the Russian novel, far from following her man, marches at his side or even precedes him. She suffers from no lack of will, and with her the thought and the word are always ready for transformation into action. She seeks in the man not external attractions but spiritual beauty, elevation of ideas. For her, the man is neither a male nor an adorer, but a friend at whose side she strives for the ideal.

II

The commencement of the second half of the nineteenth century marked a change in the aspect of Russian literature. While the literature of the previous fifty years had been almost exclusively aristocratic, and the ideology of its authors similar to that of the *élite* of the nobility, the second half of the century saw the rise of the *raznotchintzy* (men of various ranks), and of a literature which was the work of the middle and lower classes of society, and a living protest against the aristocracy and serfdom.

With its advent into life and letters, the "Nihilism" of the *raznotchintzy* attacked with hatred the "aesthetics" of the old aristocratic Liberalism, and laughed at the latter's love of fine phrases never followed by practical action. Under the influence of the *raznotchintzy* even the external aspect of Russian literature was modified, for new literary methods were employed and a new style was formed. But the *raznotchintzy* writers remained faithful to the flag of realism—in whose shadow the Russian novel had achieved so powerful a growth—and continued to employ the "inductive method of creation," which had endowed Russian literature with an extraordinary vitality and an attractive simplicity. The realism of the new writers presently became

naturalism, but a naturalism very remote from the "sexual naturalism" of Western Europe and of France. The naturalism of the backstairs and boudoir has never had its disciples in Russian letters, and it is only the "Modernists" and "Decadents" of the present day who are beginning to treat of sexual themes. The naturalism of the *raznatchintzy* was merely a pitilessly truthful but chaste and pure description of life, of the sufferings of the people. The novelists of the old school had sympathized with the people, but their works reflected only a calm compassion. The new men wrote with "the sap of their nerves, the blood of their hearts." Their style was restless, impetuous, unpolished; their works gave the impression that their authors found it materially and morally impossible to polish every chapter, every phrase, as Gontcharov, for example, had done. Gontcharov devoted to each of his novels ten to twenty years of assiduous labour. The material conditions of the majority of the new writers were lamentable. Moreover, they deliberately avoided giving their work an "æsthetic" aspect, and hastened to throw it, like an accusation, in the face of society. For this reason their work seems a chaos if we compare it with the novels of Tourgenyev and Gontcharov, with their sure and graceful architecture. But this chaos has its dreadful beauty.

The most remarkable representatives of the literature of the period of "Nihilism" were Pomialovsky and Reshetnikov.

Pomialovsky (1835-63) acquired fame by his *Tales of the Bursa*, in which we find a rigorously exact picture of the education received by the children in the ecclesiastical schools or *Bursy*. Drunkenness in masters and pupils, mutual hatred, corporal punishment pushed to the degree of torture—such was the moral and pedagogical hell described by Pomialovsky.

He was also the author of two long novels, *Molotov* and *The Happiness of a Middle-class Man*, whose hero is the same, and which read like two parts of one work. In these books the question of private happiness and public welfare is considered from the point of view of the *raznatchintzy*. Molotov, the hero of the two novels, is an "intellectual" who has issued from the

great masses, as is his friend Tcherevanin. Molotov and Tcherevanin both suffer from social inequalities, but, like Rudin, Molotov is incapable of struggling against evil, doubts himself, and is tormented by pessimism. In the end he halts on the threshold of "*bourgeois* happiness," while understanding that the "domestic idyll" is not a solution of the social and philosophic problem of the aims of life, but a flight before this problem. Tcherevanin is even more severely bitten by the serpents of doubt and scepticism. He elaborates a "philosophy of the graveyard," which declares that men are too evil to deserve to be loved, and his gloomy pessimism ends in the negation of all ideals. The logical conclusion of his philosophy is solitude.

In the works of Reshetnikov (1841-71) the naturalistic literature of the period of "Nihilism" attained its most ardent expression. The novel *Podlipnaya* (the inhabitants of the village of Podlipnaia), a novel which brought fame to Reshetnikov, was the first purely realistic description of the life of our peasants. In this work we see the *mujik*, not through the prism of compassion or with the pity of the "enlightened *seigneur*," but as he is, and we see him amid a desolate territory, inhabited by a half-pagan tribe, the Permiaks. The better educated of the inhabitants of Podlipnaia can hardly count up to five, and the majority of them have not enough to eat. When they do manage to eat, their nourishment consists of a mixture of potato flour and the bark of trees reduced to a powder. The horizon of the inhabitants of Podlipnaia is confined to the boundaries of their village, and only the question of the stomach is accessible to their minds.

Thanks to his artistic penetration, Reshetnikov was not contented to paint the gloomy life of the Russian peasants: he also understood their minds.

His works formed a kind of transition between the period of "Nihilism" and that of the *narodnitchestvo*. This latter period lasted from 1870 to 1880.

The expression *narodnitchestvo* is derived from the word *narod*, people. Populism would be the best translation of the term.

The *narodnitchestvo* was at once a literary phenomenon and a vast philosophic, sociological, and political movement. It represented an impulse which led the "intellectuals" toward the people, or rather toward the peasants, for the industrial proletariat of those days was very small. The "intellectuals" hoped to find in the people an aid to the realization of projected reforms, the source of that hope and activity whose absence made their own lives so wretched and despairing. The *narodniki*, that is, the disciples of the new populism, entertained a romantic hope of finding in the rural commune the embryo of the reign of justice and equality.

The ideologists of the new school were not *raznatchintzy* "Nihilists," for these latter were far from desiring to idealize the popular life. The nucleus of the *narodnitchestvo* consisted of a group of "repentant *seigneurs*," an ironical nickname which fairly well defined the tone and the psychological origin of the new writers. When, after the abolition of serfdom, the "intellectuals" succeeded in becoming acquainted with the life of the Russian peasants, they were horrified. Many of them then grasped the fact that they were living on the labour of the people, that they were its "debtors," and they resolved to "repay the debt."

Moreover, the *narodniki* hoped to find in the life of the people the moral "foundations" necessary to heal their lack of will and their scepticism, and the "superfluous" man hoped to change himself by contact with the great masses, as Antæus was restored by contact with the earth.

The literature of the *narodnitchestvo* was coloured by this tendency. It did not break with the realist tradition, but the semi-ethnographical naturalism of Pomialovsky and Reshetnikov could not satisfy them, for they were not content to describe facts, but sought to discover the truth concealed in the depths of peasant life. Impelled by this tendency, numerous *narodniki* writers idealized the *muzik*, and presented him as a somewhat superficial type. Such was the case with Zlatovratsky, who—according to the remark of a Russian critic—transformed the

"drab little *monnik* into an epic hero, expressing himself like a poet." Zasodimsky, another well-known writer, painted the Russian peasants as "village Titans."

The literature of the *narodniki* was crossed by yet another current, which was manifested in the profoundly vital works of the writer Uspensky (1842-1902). This does not mean that Uspensky was a stranger to subjective art. Reading his novels, drawn from the life of the peasants and the *petits bourgeois*, one always knows on which side the sympathies of the writer are to be found. However, Uspensky never distorted the truth for the sake of his sympathies, however hard this reality may have been to his *narodnik's* heart. It was with anguish that he related his scrupulous observations, and with anguish he discovered how remote was the reality from the assertions of the *narodniki*. He does not paint the rural commune as a paradise of social equality: he shows it as the theatre of an economic struggle, the merciless warfare of the strong upon the weak. The psychical and moral "bases" of the peasant appear in Uspensky's novels not idealized, but as they are. Cupidity and rapacity are so strongly implanted in the peasant's nature, says Uspensky, that the "communism" of the *mir* is merely a pleasing mask, behind which lurk exploitation, competition, injustice and violence. A gloomy pessimism tinges all his works. Uspensky could not endure the contrast between his ideal and the reality, and finally contracted a mental malady. Having passed long years in an asylum, Uspensky died in 1902.

III

The pessimism which claimed the most talented and sincere of the *narodniki*, Uspensky, seized upon a host of others.

After the year 1880 almost the whole of Russian literature was tinged with a gloomy pessimism, and the period of "analysis" set in, a period which marked the death of recent enthusiasms and ardent feeling. This change in the general state of mind was due in part to the political reaction and the cruel Governmental

repression, and in part to the disillusion of the intellectuals, who had not found in the people what they had hoped. The intellectual *élite* and the people had not been able to draw very near to one another. A writer of the period, young Osipovitch-Novodvorský (died of tuberculosis in 1882) waxed ironical over this "march toward the people" on the part of the intellectuals, of whom he said: "Neither jays nor peacocks, they are as far from the ruling classes as from the mass of the people."

To this uncertain position of the "intellectuals," who seem as though suspended in a void, corresponds a psychical and moral degeneration. Social questions, questions of the concrete life of the people, disappear no one knows whither, to give place to psychological problems, analyses of sensations and ideas, and literature assumes a psychological character, a development which the "psychological novel" of Dostoyevsky had foretold.

I have not yet had occasion to speak of Dostoyevsky, for it is difficult to refer this remarkable writer to his place in current literature. Dostoyevsky began in his famous *Memories of the Dead-house*, a realistic description of the convict prison and its manners, but this novel did not place him in the camp of the realists, whose leaders were Ponomalovsky and Reshetnikov. On the contrary, he was violently opposed to "Nihilistic" tendencies and wrote a novel entitled *The Evil Spirits*, which was directed against "Nihilism" and the revolutionary movement. Having condemned the "pride" of the intellectuals, Dostoyevsky contrasted with this pride the "simplicity" of the popular mind and lauded the "moral bases" of the Russian people. But the mystical affection which he felt for the people had nothing in common with the populism of Uspensky. The populism of Dostoyevsky was of the "Right," akin to Slavism and the official patriotism; that of Uspensky was of the "Left." As for the literary side of Dostoyevsky's work, it may be called realistic, but it is the realism of psychology, almost of psychiatry. Dostoyevsky's power of reading the soul was extraordinary. Better than any one he knew the ins and outs of the mind of the Russian "intellectual," that mind so eager to "scourge

itself," to turn upon itself—a mind without will. (His *Underground Memoirs* are a valuable document from this point of view.) Neither Christianity nor Satanism could save the heroes of Dostoyevsky from their fall, from internal discord, and in vain did his heroes call Christ and the Devil to their aid.

Between 1880 and 1890 the tragedy which was proceeding in the mind of the Russian "intellectual" was depicted by many authors, prominent among whom was Garshin, who died in 1888. Garshin could not give us the full measure of his talent; a mental malady led him while yet young to suicide. His *Red Flower*, which symbolizes "all the evil of the world," recalls some of the symbols of Dostoyevsky, although Garshin's point of view was very different from the latter's. Another of Garshin's novels, *The Painters*, raises the problem of the artistic vocation and altruistic duty, a question which had already tormented the "repentant *seigneurs*" of the populist period.

The revolutionary fire of the years 1860-80 died down, and in literature the chronicling of "grey, ordinary days" replaced the interpretation of tumultuous impulses. As the poet of the "grey days" appeared Tchekhov. We have already mentioned this writer in a preceding chapter, in which we noted how readily the comedy of the great Russian writers turns to tragedy.

Tchekhov (1860-1904), a writer of most original talent, resembles other Russian authors neither in form nor in style. He created and perfected the sketch and the short story—forms comparable to those of the French writers.

Tchekhov habitually seized upon one fact, one personage, one moment in the life of a man, and therein reflected, as in a microcosm, the essence of the life, the soul of the person selected. From the outset of his literary career Tchekhov concentrated his attention on the comic sides of life, and his laughter rang like the joyful song of a young bird. Then he devoted himself to depicting the sorrows of life, attaining in this province the same perfection as before. The trivial facts of the lives of common folk were described by him, and for these descriptions he employed the method of artistic induction so dear to the old Russian realism,

and at the same time, like the best of the impressionists, he created with a few simple touches the desired mental attitude.

All Russian society—peasants, lower middle-class folk, merchants, nobles, popes, bureaucrats, and others—passes through Tchekhov's work; all are clothed in their appropriate manners, sometimes laughable, but assuredly profoundly sad. But Tchekhov has devoted himself more especially to the portrayal of the life of the "intellectuals"; to the portrayal, rather, of their dying agonies; the "intellectuals" of Tchekhov do not live: they die slowly. The "intellectual" of Tchekhov is by no means a Rudin, thirsty—at least according to himself—for conflict. Neither is he a *raznochinets-nihilist*, believing in the power of positive knowledge and "the thinking personality." Still less is he comparable to the *narodnik*, who thirsts to drink the "living water" from the well of "popular truth." The "intellectual" of Tchekhov possesses only one thing: the past. For him the present and the future are only an interminable sequence of "grey days," a waste of vulgar existence, the shadow of the tomb. . . .

What's to be done? asks the heroine of one of Tchekhov's dramas. "We shall live . . . We shall live a long, long procession of nights and days. . . . And then, obediently, we shall surrender ourselves to death. . . . And we shall rest in the tomb."

A tranquil despair—this is the peculiar tone of Tchekhov's intellectuals.

IV

"The flowers are faded, the fires are dead,
Night is impenetrable, black as the tomb."

In these words a Russian poet has characterized the mental condition of Tchekhov's period, the atmosphere of the "grey days." In vain did many writers attempt to revive the better traditions of Russian letters. In vain the brilliant novelist, Korolenko, continued the work of Turgenev, giving to Russian

society his beautiful studies of popular life, studies illumined by the rays of a genuine humanism. In vain did Leo Tolstoy—that mighty lion of Russian literature—preach his indefatigable sermons. Russian society seemed to have forgotten the gods it had adored but a little while before. . . . *The flowers are faded, the fires are dead.* . . . Yes, but paper flowers have sprouted in the place of the living blossom; in place of the true fire we have fireworks. To-day the foreground of Russian literature is occupied by a host of writers who regard literature as a noisy trade, an advertisement. At every moment we have “new currents,” each claiming to be “the very latest thing.” We have “mystic writers,” “anarchist-mystics,” “symbolists,” “impressionists,” and plenty more. The public and the critics do not make much effort to distinguish between all these titles and are content to lump them together under the style of “Modernists” or “Decadents.”

Although in verse the “Modernists” have contributed to perfect the technique of poetry, on the other hand they threaten to destroy the noble simplicity of Russian prose by introducing, out of a love of “originality,” artificial and affected terms and phrases. As for the ideas of the “Modernists,” they are negative. With much sound and fury, they claim to have endowed Russia with a “new word”; but a study of their works shows that this “new word” is merely a clumsy falsification of the most ordinary *bourgeois* individualisms borrowed from Europe. Thus the “Modernists” are like the cook who, having stolen from her mistress a cast-off old-fashioned hat, ingenuously imagined that she was wearing the very latest creation. Modernist literature has introduced only one novelty to the Russian reader: with efforts worthy of a better cause, the “Modernists” have concentrated their attention upon sexual subjects. Here again our “Modernists” are imitating models, especially French models. But in place of the light and joyous Gallic touch they often give us merely a gross and naked pornography.

It is very regrettable that “Modernism,” which has many insignificant disciples, should have influenced so great a talent as

that of Leonid Andreyev, the novelist and dramatist. Andreyev made his literary *début* at the beginning of the present century with short stories in which the methods of Russian realism were mingled with impressionist and symbolist elements, and which revealed the influence of Edgar Allen Poe. He then broke with realism, and instead of resorting to the inductive method, so typical of Russian realism, or the purely deductive method, Andreyev chooses no matter what abstract philosophical or moral thesis and incarnates it in the semi-abstract characters of his books. It was thus that he wrote two of his longer novels—*Thoughts* and *The Life of Vassili Phivinsky*. The hero of *Thoughts* incarnates the question of the relative value of reason and insanity, and the absence of a precise boundary between these two states of mind. *The Life of Vassili Phivinsky* is a transcription of the Biblical narrative of Job, in which the part of Job is sustained by a poor country priest, Vassili Phiveisky. A host of misfortunes fall upon Vassili, who is assured that God has sent them to "mark him" with "His ring," and thereby to make him a prophet and miracle-worker. But the expected miracle is not performed, and Vassili curses God.

Andreyev also raises the question of miracles in his drama *Savva*. The hero of *Savva* is an atheist, an anarchist, who detests culture and dreams of destroying it in order to see "man left naked on the earth." Particularly, Savva hates religion. Anxious to uproot religious prejudice, he tries to break a miraculous ikon which is kept in a country monastery. The attempt fails, owing to the treachery of a young monk, Savva's confidant, and the crowd, with greater fervour than ever, continues to believe in the "miraculous power" of the holy ikon. As for Savva, he is killed by those whom he sought to deliver from their prejudices.

The victory of "the shadows" over "the light," of natural forces over conscious forces, of "fury" over "reason," of death over life, has become the favourite theme of Andreyev's work. In his tale *The Shadow* a revolutionary encounters a prostitute, the incarnation of human degradation, and arrives at the conclu-

sion that it is impossible to struggle with evil. Having denied evil previously, he finally recognizes it and approves of it: "You who see! Let us put out our eyes, for it is shameful for us to look at those who are born blind. If, thanks to our tiny lanterns, we cannot light all the darkness, then out with the flame and let us all crawl in the dark. If Paradise is not for all, I will none of it! . . . Let us drink in order that all fires may go out!"

In *My Notes* Andreyev gives us a defence of prisons and proves the insignificance of liberty. In *Judas* we have the apologia of treason. Judas delivered Christ only to glorify Him, and his treachery appears as the sublimest proof of love. In his drama *Anathema* he demonstrates the uselessness of goodness and of good actions, which according to the author are invariably transformed into evil. Finally, in the *Life of Man* Andreyev represents the tragedy of life in general and the absolute inevitability of unhappiness.

The pessimism of Andreyev cannot be compared to the pessimism of a Tchekhov, which looks sadly upon Russian life, but not on life in general. In reality, all Andreyev's work is merely the apology of death, an apology in which the Russian intellectual, from his militant rationalism and his social ideas of the mid-century, has passed on to a negation of all ideals, to the symbolical glorification of darkness and the prison.

But while the Decadents belonging to the intellectual Russian *bourgeoisie* have sunk into pessimism, certain young voices have arisen among the people—voices full of hope and vigour. Maxim Gorky was the first and the best of these heralds of the new forces of the people.

To understand and judge Maxim Gorky, we should compare him with Leo Tolstoy. This comparison will enable us to note the individual peculiarities of the two great writers and the path which Russian literary genius has followed during the last fifty years.

Maxim Gorky and Leo Tolstoy are the two poles of contemporary Russian literature. They belong to two different, entirely different worlds. Leo Tolstoy was a Count, a member of one of the oldest aristocratic families of Russia, a rich landowner who passed half his life isolated upon his family estate. Gorky, the son of a house-painter, had to struggle for life during his whole youth, wandering across the steppes and along the roads of Russia.

The development of Tolstoy's literary talent commenced during the first half of the nineteenth century, that is to say, when the economic and social conditions of Russia were very different to what they are to-day. The *bourgeoisie* and the industrial proletariat of our days did not as yet exist. Landowners and peasants, military and civil bureaucrats, made up the whole of society. The education received in this precapitalist environment left its mark upon Tolstoy. The country, the life of the rural landowners and the peasants, were to the end of his days the principal if not the only theme of Tolstoy's work. The new social classes, especially the proletariat, remained always unknown to him, always incomprehensible. He despised them, recognizing no labour as "real" and useful, except labour performed upon the soil, and regarding the life of cities as negative and destructive.

Having concentrated all his attention on the country and the life of rural landowners and peasants, Tolstoy passed through several stages in the comprehension and representation of that life. The first of these phases was marked by the immortal romance *War and Peace*. This work contains the whole precapitalist period of Russian life, the nobles living still under conditions of natural economy, without anxiety, untroubled by doubts, accepting life as it came, profoundly persuaded that this life was as it *should be*. The "millions of torments" which so cruelly wounded the minds of the heroes of other Russian novels of the mid-century had scarcely touched the heroes of *War and Peace*. Only two of them seem already infected by the spirit of inquietude; only two seem to muse upon the problem of the

meaning of life. The heroes of *War and Peace* are contented to live.

Anna Karenin marks the second phase in the literary evolution of Tolstoy, and in this novel the Russian nobility are seen under another aspect. The abolition of serfdom has resulted in the disappearance of the natural economy and the advent of the reign of enterprise, and the nobles have been forced to awaken from their slumber to choose between two alternatives: either they must waste their lives or from being consumers turn producers. Levin chooses the latter issue. In him are to be found certain autobiographical features. However, the road he follows does not satisfy the critical mind of Tolstoy; for Tolstoy the system of *bourgeois* economy was merely a manifestation of the "false culture" of cities, and he continued to seek a solution to the problem of life outside the capitalist world, deep in the country. Unable to find this solution among the nobles, he applies to the *mujiks*. And he declares "the truth of the *mujiks*" to be "the sole truth of God and humanity."

The germ of this "truth of the *mujiks*" is to be found in *Anna Karenin* in the peasant Karatayev. He is distinguished by his perfect submission to fate, to the "supreme will"—a submission explained by the long centuries of subjection.

To the "vanity" of the intellectual *élite* Tolstoy opposes the "simplicity" of the life of those who till the soil, and in his works this submission takes shape in the well-known idea "not to resist evil by violence." This idea, joined to that of "simplification," constitutes the *leit-motif* of the literary work of Tolstoy.

The material and intellectual level of the great mass of the Russian people being of the very lowest, Tolstoy could not go to them with his principle of "simplification." It was the upper stratum of society, the class of which he formed a part, that he called upon to "simplify" themselves.

The invitation to "simplify" and "repent" seems to relate Tolstoy to the *narodnitchestvo*, whose representatives called themselves "repentant *seigneurs*," and of whom we have already spoken. But while the *narodniki* of the Left summoned men

to collective battle and revolution, Tolstoy did not believe in revolution, judging it to be as dangerous as autocracy, and *in principle* did not distinguish between Governmental violence and revolutionary violence. In this negation of organized conflict expressed by Tolstoy we find the essential features of the peasant's character: social amorphousness, the tendency toward isolation, and the incapacity of organizing themselves. By this negation of organized conflict Tolstoy also emphasized the necessity of the individual struggle against evil, of a struggle which was nothing more than a passive resistance to evil. This individual struggle would consist in not participating in evil, in not accepting administrative duties, in refusing to sit as a magistrate, in refusing military service, etc. It was by these means that Tolstoy hoped to destroy the modern State and to lead men toward a free life upon free soil. This preaching of personal abnegation was in reality but little dangerous to the Government; such non-organized individual activity was too insignificant to harm the powerful and complicated system of the modern State. But little dangerous, and Utopian also, was the last ideal of Tolstoy, for the return to the life of a "free labourer" and artisan, accompanied by the renunciation of modern technical methods, of industry, and of science, is impossible to humanity; one cannot reverse the wheels of history. But another side of Tolstoy's literary work excited the resentment of the Russian reaction. It was his criticism of the State and of modern society, his criticism of all prejudices in general, and religious prejudices in particular. Thanks to the piercing insight of his mind and the delicate hearing of his heart, Tolstoy was able to penetrate beneath the depths of modern social relations, relieve the sufferings of those who were dear to him, and depict them with extraordinary power. In the darkest hours of a despotic reaction, only the fearless, indignant voice of the grand old man echoed across the land. All Tolstoy's talent was devoted to the denunciation and criticism of evil. Tolstoy considered art and literature only as means of struggling against evil and to propagate humanitarian ideas. Tolstoy's work entitled *What is Art?* has exercised a

considerable influence upon foreign art criticism. One of the most interesting representatives of the French art criticism of our days, M. Elie Faure, has remarked in this connection: "In telling us of the man, art teaches us of ourselves. The strange thing is that it should need to do so. Tolstoy's book means nothing else. It has come in an unhappy hour, when, strongly equipped for our inquiry, but confused before the horizons which it opens, and perceiving that our efforts are dissipated, we seek to confront the results acquired, to unite ourselves to others in a common faith and march forward. . . . Tolstoy has said what needed to be said at the moment of his utterance" (Elie Faure, *History of Art*, Paris, 1909).

Gorky and Tolstoy have one point of contact: both regard the function of literature in the same manner, feeling the same contempt for "pure art." One other feature they have in common: their complete negation of the existing social and political system. Apart from this, Gorky's talent seems to have come from a different planet to that of Tolstoy.

Unlike Tolstoy, who knew and loved only the country, Gorky is a true son of the city. Far from regarding the peasant's mind as a "well of wisdom and goodness," Gorky declares that it is mean and narrow, and is indignant at the greed of the little rural landowner and his narrowness of mind. To this greed and narrowness Gorky prefers the generosity, the audacity of the *lumpen-proletariat*, the vagabonds and thieves, the heroes of his first tales. Submission to fate is unknown to these latter, whose souls are thirsty for startling feats of violence in which they can give proof of pride and audacity: "Must we reduce the whole earth to powder? Or had we better gather the comrades and kill all the Jews . . . to the very last man? How good it would be, as a rule, to accomplish an act which would set you above other men, and, from your height, to permit yourself to spit upon them . . . and say to them, 'Ah, reptiles! why do you live? You are nothing but a heap of liars and hypocrites, nothing more!'"

Such are the dreams of Grishka Orlov, one of the heroes of the

novel, *The Orlov Couple*; dreams like those of other heroes of Gorky's. But this anarchistical Nietzschean protest so soon revealed its emptiness that Gorky was prompt to abandon it. The appearance of *The Lower Depths* marks another step in the development of Gorky's talent. The *bossiaki* (so in Russian are called the vagabonds and representatives of the *lumpen-proletariat*), heroes of this work, no longer drape themselves in the picturesque mantle of a superhuman pride, but are unhappy creatures worthy of pity.

After this impulse toward anarchistic individualism Gorky turned toward the collectivism of the Socialists and *lumpen-proletariat*, and his sympathies passed to the organized proletariat. *Humble Folk* is the result of this transformation. In this work, for the first time Gorky depicts a "conscientious workman." In the person of the mechanician Nil, this "conscientious workman" thinks and feels in a manner quite foreign to the writer's previous heroes. Nil does not dream of destroying the world. He has only one desire: "To mingle in the whirlwind of life and to help to rebuild it." In *The Enemies*, and particularly in his novel *The Mother*, Gorky devotes his talents to depicting the life and the struggles of the industrial proletariat. Naturally it was difficult for Gorky immediately to renounce his anarchistic point of view. This point of view we shall occasionally recover in those works of Gorky's which are the most animated by the idea of proletarian collectivism. In his novel *The Mother*, the hero of the proletarian movement is not the mob itself but an individual, so that this novel is not purely realistic in character. This is easily comprehensible. It is only recently that the Russian working class has appeared in the social and political arena, and its ideology has not yet had time to crystallize. Every class at the dawn of its development realizes its problems and its future only in a vague and romantic fashion. It is this romanticism which has set its imprint upon Gorky's work. But although Gorky has not yet attained perfect power and simplicity in the representation of the life and impulses of the proletariat, he is nevertheless the first and only great Russian writer to paint the

proletariat. In Gorky's works we see for the first time the noble, the merchant, the *raznotchinets* and the *muji* make way for the working man. This fact marks the commencement of a new era in the social and literary development of Russia. What this new era will bring, this only the future will show.

CONCLUSION

AND now, our review of the material and intellectual life of Russia being terminated, let us try to obtain therefrom a final deduction.

What is the feature that most strikes the observer of Russian life? It is undoubtedly its extreme complexity, for Russian life is a curious compound of violently contrasted elements, of mutually contradictory principles.

Contradictions abound in all spheres of Russian life. In the economic domain we see modern capitalism developing itself with American celerity, beside mediæval villages whose economy is still almost natural. In the social domain the proletariat, conscious and organized, eager to procure the triumph of the ideal of universal happiness, and trained in the ideas of a theoretical socialism, lives side by side with feudal *seigneurs* who do not recognize even the most elementary demands of justice. In the political domain the most sincere and ardent aspirations towards liberty contend against the worst possible methods of repression. And in the literary and artistic domain, while many Russians are known far beyond the frontiers of their country for the noble simplicity and profundity of their thought, one hundred million inhabitants of Russian soil are absolutely illiterate. The youth of the intellectual and working classes are materialistic atheists, but the most barbarous prejudices, the most primitive of fetichisms, constitute the mentality of the Russian peasantry. On the one hand is an arrogant aristocracy incessantly feasting in stone-built capitals; on the other are millions of human beings sheltered

under roofs of straw and nourished by a stony bread composed of the pounded bark of a tree.

“And poor
And abundant
And mighty
And impotent
Art thou, O our mother, Russia!”

writes a Russian poet, saddened by the contrasts of Russian life.

These contrasts demonstrate not only the backward state of the country and its isolation from the great nations of Europe, but also its material and spiritual dependence upon these nations. The contrasts of Russia are formed by the clash of modern, European, and, if you will, universal ideas, and the remains of the Middle Ages, the heritage of that period when Russia still lived her own life, and was not yet drawn into that mill of the world which crushes between its mighty stones the grain of old humanity to make the bread of the Future. And however mournful the present situation of Russia, however hard to-day the fate of her people, we may affirm that the new life will triumph, and may say with Napoleon: “There are two systems, the past and the future. The present is only a painful transition. Which will triumph? Is it not the future?”

INDEX

- Abduction of peasant girls, 85
 Absolutism, *see* Autocracy
 Administration in the eighteenth century, 63-4
 Administrations, budget of the, 206
Agents provocateurs, 187
 Agrarian problems, 138-54; reforms of 1906, 285-7
 Alcoholism, *see* Vodka
 Alexander I, 59, 60, 67, 215
 Alexander II, 138
 Alexander III, 215, 236
 Alexander Nevsky, 47
 Alexei Romanov, 58
 Ancestor worship, 73-4
 Animism, 71-6
 "Aristo-serf" culture, 86
 Army, expansion of, 60; rejections on account of physical deficiency, 149; loans, 209; bad conditions in, 224-8; Kuropatkin on, 225; compulsory service, 226; officers of, 226; insanitary conditions in, 226-7; *see* Russo-Japanese War
 Aryan invasion, 19
 Asia, awakening of, 218
 Asiatic immigration, 14
 Austria, military power of, 235
 Austro-Russian conflict, 223
 Autocracy, origin and resources of, 173-228
 Avowal, feudal right of, 45, 50
 Azev, Terrorist and police-spy, 187-92
 Bagdad Railway, 219
 Balkans, Russian policy in the, 222
 Baltic Sea, 15
 Baltic, shores of, conquered, 59
Barshchina, the, 61-2
 "Black Bands," the, 264-7
 Black Sea, 15; mutiny in squadron, 269
 "Bloody Sunday," 92
 Boris Godunov, 56-7, 60
Burtzen, quoted, 167
Boyars, the, 39, 45, 50, 55; diminished powers of, 56; 64
Boyars' Duma, 45, 50
Boyarshtchina, division of land, 43
Brazky, "consolers," 317
 Budget, eighteenth century, 63, 176; rapid increase in, 205-12
 Bureaucracy (178-84), composition of, 179-80; cost of, 182; poverty of lower grades, 182-3; corruption of, 183
 Byzantine ideology, 51, 77-8
 Byzantium, 51
 Cabinet, the, 175
Camarilla, the, 175-6

- Capital, action of, 99; foreign, 103-6; development and forms of Russian, 114-37; organization of, 122-3
- Capitalists, revenue of, 113
- Catherine II, 59, 64-5, 87, 91, 277, 331
- Caucasus, conquest of, 60
- Census, the first, 107; of workers, 109-11, 123-6
- Central power, organization of, 173-7
- Chasles, M.*, quoted, 275
- China, war with Japan, 236-7; trade with, 239-40
- Chinese as colonists, 239
- Cholera riots, 89
- Christianity, early, 77
- Church, feudalism of the, 45; wealth of, 81-2
- Cities, growth of, 134; migration into, 156; shocking condition of, 199-200
- Clergy, ignorance of, 80; hereditary nature of, 81
- Climate of Russia, 15
- Coal, 105
- Commerce, *see* Capital, Industry, Trade, etc.
- Commercial journals, 122, 136
- Communal organization of society, 37
- Commune, the village, 150-4
- Communistic spirit among peasants, 150-2
- Concert of Powers, the, 216-18
- Constantinople, 61; siege of, in 1204, 41, 48
- "Cook's children, circular concerning the," 166
- Council of Empire, 182
- Courts-martial, 194
- Crimea, conquest of the, 59, 233
- Crimean War, 68, 139, 216
- Customs, 24
- Dan*, Tartar tribute, 50
- Daniel Alexandrovitch, 47
- Danube-Adriatic Railway, 223
- Death penalty, frequency of, 194
- Decadents, 328-9, 344
- "Decembrist," revolt of the, 67-8, 215
- "Descent among the people," 91
- Dimitri, the real and the false, 57, 91
- "Disavowal," feudal right of, 41, 50, 61
- Divinities, natural, 72-3
- Dostoyevsky*, novelist, 324, 340-1
- Dukhobors, the, 314
- Duma, the, 175, 194, 272, 9
- Dronamid*, the, 56, 7, 63
- Dronamido*, the, 61, 63, 5
- Dwellings, peasant, deplorable condition of, 148
- Eagle, the two-headed, 51
- Economic organization of Russia, 97-104
- Education, 106-7; primary, 201
- Electoral law, the, 278
- Empire, foundation of the, 58
- Employers, union of, 121
- Exports, *see* Trade
- Family, the, 155-61
- Family group, the, 36-7
- Famine, 288
- Fanatical sects, 312-13
- Fetichism, 75, 163
- Feudal hierarchy, 43-6
- Feudalism, destroyed, 65
- vivals of, 92
- Finances of State, 205-12

- Financial crisis after war, 245
 Fines in factories, 128
 Finland, absorption of, 60; prob-
 lem of, 300-1
 Finnish settlers, 21, 26-7
 Folk-tales and lore, 71-7
 Foreign politics, 213-24
 Forests, 16
 Franco-Russian alliance, 216-21
 French finance, harmful results of,
 168-9
 French Revolution, 232-3
 Functionaries, provided by
 dyroviansstro, 63
 Funds, Russian, loss on, 209
 Gapon, Father, *agent provocateur*,
 92
 Gorkin, novelist, 342
 Germany, military superiority of,
 224
 Glacial action, 15
 Gogol, novelist, 333
 Golden Charter, 91
 Golden Horde, 47; downfall of, 51
 Goncharov, novelist, 335, 337
 Governments, the provincial, 196;
 assemblies of, 197
 Governors, provincial, 196
 Greek colonization, 20
 Guerasimov, attempts to
 Arzev, 192
 Health, public, 20-21; of army,
 226-7
 Herodotus, 13
 Imperial family, land owned by,
 144-5, 173-4
 Imports, *see* Trade
 Income, average, of workers, 112
 Industrial centres, 130-4
 Industries, village, or *kustar*, 130-2
 Industry, development of, 66-7,
 101-3, 105, 106; abatement
 of, 116-17; higher organiza-
 tion of, 117-18
 Insurrection of peasants, 87-9
 Intellectual classes, 162-70
 Ivan Kalita, 67
 Ivan the Terrible, 50, 55-6
 Ivan III refuses to recognize the
 Khan, 51
 Japan, revolution in, 235; her fleet
 built with Russian money, 237;
 ultimatum of, to Russia, 238;
 war breaks out, 238; *see* Russo-
 Japanese War
 Jews, massacre of, 266, 304
 Judges, mere officials, 143
 "Judicial statutes," 193
 Judicial system, 192-5
 Juries, 193
 Kautsky, quoted, 249
 Khan, the Tartar, 25, 47; grants
 titles to Russian Grand Dukes,
 50
 "Kiev, period of," 24, 40, 41
 Kluckhersch, quoted, 15, 30, 31
 Korea, trade of, 238
 Kourbsky, Prince, 50
 Kronstadt, mutiny at, 267
 Kuropatkin, quoted, 217-18, 223-5
 Kustar industries, 130-2
 Labour, hours of, 128
 "Labour Delegates, Council of,"
 264, 267
 Labour party, 253-5
 Land, tenure of, 42-3; by serfs at
 time of liberation, 139-40;
 how divided among State,
 landlords, and peasants, 144-5

- 150-2; after the reform of 1906, 287
- Landowners, revenue of, 112
- Laufer, Dr.*, quoted, 128-9
- Le Bon*, quoted, 81-2
- Legislative power, the, 176-7
- Lermontov*, poet, 332-3
- Liberal party, 252-63
- Literature, fruit of serfdom, 86-7, 321-9; evolution of, 330-52
- Local self-government, 196, 209
- Lositsky*, quoted, 123
- "*Lysis*," quoted, 208-9, 219, 225
- Manchuria, 222; see Russo-Japanese War
- Manchurian Railway, 237
- Marriage, 39
- Materialism, 333
- Merchants as manufacturers, 66
- Metallurgical industries, 102, 105; combination of, 119-20
- Metropolitan, the, 49
- Middle Ages, in Russia, 42
- Migulin, Professor*, quoted, 208, 241
- Mine-owners, combination of, 118-19
- Ministers, dependent on Tsar, 175
- Mirsky, Prince, 247
- Modernism, 344
- Mongol invasion, 20
- Montesquieu*, quoted, 34-5
- Mortality, in villages, 146-7
- Moscow, rise of, 48-9; triumph of, 50; "the third Rome," 51; insurrection of, 269-70
- Moscow, High Princes of, 25, 47, 50
- Moscow, principality of, 47; becomes a Grand Duchy, 50
- "Moscow, period of," 24, 42
- Nadson*, poet, 328
- Nationalist problem, the, 297-306
- Navy, in the Russo-Japanese War, 242-3
- Nekrasov*, poet, 325-6
- Neurasthenia, prevalence of, 149, 291
- Nicolas I, 60, 63; peasant revolts under, 87
- Nicolas II, attempt on life of, 236; 273
- Nihilism, 162-70; in literature, 336-7
- Nihilist, the, defined, 162-3
- Nijni-Novgorod, 48
- Nobles as judges and police, 63; compulsory service of, abolished, 64; scramble for posts, 64-5; failure of, to erect a new economic system, 142-3
- Novgorod, 46, 48
- Ogarov*, poet, 322, 326
- Otkranta*, the, secret police, 187
- Oprichnina*, the, 55-6
- Orthodox Church, 79; loses disciples, 309
- Palaeologus, Sophia, marries Ivan III, 51
- Pan-Slavism, 227
- Patriarch of Moscow, the, 58
- Paul I, killed by Imperial Guard, 65
- Pavlov-Silvansky*, quoted, 43
- Peasants, under feudal system, 46; under serfdom, 61; in the eighteenth century, 62; revolts of, 87-8; wealthy peasants, 143; diet of, 148-9; degeneration among, 149; indifference of, to the Duma, 274

- People, the Russian, 105-13
 "Period of troubles," 57
 Persian Gulf, Russia on the, 217
 Petchenegs, 25
 Peter the Great, 58; reforms of, 58-9; 78
 Peter III, killed by Imperial Guard, 65, 91
 Peter, Saint, of Tver, 49
 Pisogov, 166
Pissarev, critic, 326
Plinskichev, poet, 323
 Plevro, assassination of, 188, 247
 Poetry, *see* Literature
 Pogodov, quoted, 115, 123, 124, 153
 Pogroms, 264, 274
 rosety, quoted, 37, 42
 and, partition of, 50, 247
 ice, "yellow" and "black," village police, 181; partition and extortion by, census of, 185; cost of, political police, 186; *and* *prosecutors*, 187-92

 Political parties, 250-62, 27
 Polovetzcs, 24
Ponomarevsky, novelist, 117
 Popes, the Orthodox, vena *Russ*
 Population, density of, 60-1, active and dependent standard of life, 111
 Port Arthur, 216-7; population, reduction of, 213
Potemkin, mutiny on the, 263-4
 Press, muzzling of the, 282
 Prices, inflated by tariffs, 112, 211
Priskin, 64
 Prime Minister, the, 175
 Professional census, 110-11

 Proletarianization of the people, 123
 Prostitution, 86, 157-8
 Pskov, 46
 Psychology affected by serfdom, 82
 Public Debt, the, 207-8
 Public health, 146-7; injured by army, 227
 Pugatchev, pretender, 87, 91
Pushkin, poet, 39, 322, 332

 Races of Russia, 18-33; list of, 31-3; 297-306
Raskol, the, 310-11
 Reaction, number of victims of the, 104-5
Reiketsinok, novelist, 338
 Religions of Russia, 33; primitive, 71-6; 307-17
 Revolution, the Russian: "stifling" the, 104-5; 231-4, 262-3, 276, 289-94
 Revolutionary Socialist party, 258-9
 Riga, prisoners shot in, 274; *fortures* employed, 281
 Rivers of Russia, 13
Rozlov, quoted, 51-4
 Romanov, Mikhail Fedorovich,

 Rural courts, 193
 Rural economy, *h* of the State, of the, 106;

 Rurik, 51
 Russia, area of, 13; geography of, 13-17; coastline of, 14; geology of, 14; expansion of, 59, 60
 Russo-Japanese War, cost of, 207-10, 216, 228 (231-49);

- causes of, 234; incident 242-8
Ryleev, poet, 322
- Saghalien, cession of, 235
 St. Petersburg, founded, 59
 "St. Petersburg, period of," 5
 Sand, plague of, 16
 Sarmatians, the, 19
 School-teachers, conditions 202-3
 Scythians, the, 19
 Senate, the, 195
 Serfdom, instituted, 61-2; al-
 tion and results of, 138-41
 Serfs, conditions of the, 6,
 right to sell conceded,
 in industries, 66-7; tortu-
 83-5; land owned by
 liberation, 139-40, huge
- Sergius, Grand Duke, assassi-
 nated, 188-9
 Shoulsky, Prince, elected Tsar, 51
 Siberia, conquest of, 59; serfs sent
 to by masters, 65; recon-
 ciles to, 195
 Siberian Railway, 241
 Slavs, the, 22-4, 28-9, primitive
 society of, 36-7, primitive
 religion, 71-6
 Smolensk, 48
 Social Democracy, 259-62
 Socialism, 168-9
 Society, structure of, 251
 Soul, theory of the, 73-6
 Spring, legend of, 74
 State, the, evolution of, 34-68
 basis of, 70; military activity
 of, 70; institutions of, 175
 Strikes: the general strike, 261
 strikes of 1905, 263-9
- Sugar, 106, 123
 Syndicalism, 135-6
 Syndicates, 117-19
 Synod, the Holy, 58, 79
- Tallien van, 236-7
 Tariffs, prices inflated by, 122, 221
 Tartar Khan, the, sovereign of
 Russia, 47
 Tartars, invasion of, 24-5; tribute
 paid to, 50; yoke of, thrown
 off, 50
 Taxation, 111; arrears of, 211;
 indirect, 211
Tchekhov, novelist, etc., 133-4
Tchernyshevsky, poet, 326
Tchinniski, the, 89
 Temperature, 15
 "Third Section," the (police), 186
Tolstoy, novelist, 147, 50
 Torture of serfs, 84-6, of political
 prisoners, 252-3
 Totemism, 75
Tughan-Baranovsky, quoted, 116
 Trade, development of, 66; ex-
 ports and imports, 97-9, ex-
 cess of exports, 100, with
 Finland, 301
 Trade journals, suppressed, 121
 Trades, census of, 110-11
 Trades unions, 115-6, dissolved
 by police, 137
 Trans-Siberian Railway, 236
 Treasury, the, 181
 Trepov, General, 262
 Trusts, 117-18
 Tsar, the Russian, 65, popular
 conception of, 90, 93, wealth
 of, 173; Azev plans to kill,
 192, see Duma
 Tsar, the Tartar, 47
Turgenev, novelist, 124, 163-4, 133-4

- Iver**, Archbishop of, 49; city of, 49
Ukraine, 59
Ulozheni, legal code, 58
Unity, Russian, 47
Universities, 166-7, 283-4
Urban culture, lack of, 129-30
Uspensky, novelist, 346
Variags, the (Varingians), 21
Vassili Dimitrovitch, 51
Viborg, Proclamation of, 276, 281
Villages, condition of, 115, 146-7; life in, 157
Voronezh, qu 21
Vladimir, capital, 42, 47
Vladimir Monomakh, 40
Vostok, Government in no-poly, 121; ravages of, 149 profits on, 211-12
Vorovsky, the, 64
Volga, basin of the, 13; conquest of, 59
Volontaire, quoted, 236, 246
Voltaire, 333
Vollainanets, 331
Wage-earners, census of, 123-6
Wages, 125-8
Wars, losses by, 214
Warsaw, 59
Witte, Count, 222, 266-8, 285
Women, position of, 126, 155-61
Workers, census of, 124; female and child, 125-6
Yakubovitch, poet, 326
Yalu River, battle of, 242
Yaroslav the Wise, 40
Yermak conquers Siberia, 59
Zemskii nachalniki, 197
Zemskii sobory, 57-8
Zemstvo, the (1906-304), budget of, fixed, 199; in South-west Russia, 305
Zubatov, chief of secret police, 135

PRINTED AT THE PRESS, BIRMINGHAM